In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com

Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com

Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com

Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com

Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>
Cc: linux-wpan@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com

Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com

Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In preparation for removal of VLAs due to skcipher requests on the stack
via SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage, this introduces the infrastructure
for the "sync skcipher" tfm, which is for handling the on-stack cases of
skcipher, which are always non-ASYNC and have a known limited request
size.

The crypto API additions:

	struct crypto_sync_skcipher (wrapper for struct crypto_skcipher)
	crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher()
	crypto_free_sync_skcipher()
	crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey()
	crypto_sync_skcipher_get_flags()
	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags()
	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags()
	crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize()
	crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize()
	crypto_sync_skcipher_reqtfm()
	skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm()
	SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() (with tfm type check)
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The encryption mode of pkcs1pad never uses out_sg and out_buf, so
there's no need to allocate the buffer, which presently is not even
being freed.

CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NDan Aloni <dan@kernelim.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add support for aes counter(ctr) block cipher mode of operation for
Exynos Hardware. In contrast to ecb and cbc modes, aes-ctr allows
encyption/decryption for request sizes not being a multiple of 16(bytes).

Hardware requires block sizes being a multiple of 16(bytes). In order to
achieve this, copy request source and destination memory, and align it's size
to 16. That way hardware processes additional bytes, that are omitted
when copying the result back to its original destination.

Tested on Odroid-U3 with Exynos 4412 CPU, kernel 4.19-rc2 with crypto
run-time self test testmgr.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Manszewski <c.manszewski@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: NKrzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NKamil Konieczny <k.konieczny@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Modifications in s5p-sss.c:
- remove unnecessary 'goto' statements (making code shorter),
- change uint_8 and uint_32 to u8 and u32 types (for consistency in the
driver and making code shorter),
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Manszewski <c.manszewski@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: NKrzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NKamil Konieczny <k.konieczny@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Fix misalignment of continued argument list.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Manszewski <c.manszewski@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: NKrzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NKamil Konieczny <k.konieczny@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Remove a race condition introduced by error path in functions:
s5p_aes_interrupt and s5p_aes_crypt_start. Setting the busy field of
struct s5p_aes_dev to false made it possible for s5p_tasklet_cb to
change the req field, before s5p_aes_complete was called.

Change the first parameter of s5p_aes_complete to struct
ablkcipher_request. Before spin_unlock, make a copy of the currently
handled request, to ensure s5p_aes_complete function call with the
correct request.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Manszewski <c.manszewski@samsung.com>
Acked-by: NKamil Konieczny <k.konieczny@partner.samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: NKrzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The table id (second) argument to MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE is often
referenced otherwise. This is not the case for CPU features. This
leads to a warning when building the kernel with Clang:
  arch/arm/crypto/crc32-ce-glue.c:239:33: warning: variable
    'crc32_cpu_feature' is not needed and will not be emitted
    [-Wunneeded-internal-declaration]
  static const struct cpu_feature crc32_cpu_feature[] = {
                                  ^

Avoid warnings by using __maybe_unused, similar to commit 1f318a8b
("modules: mark __inittest/__exittest as __maybe_unused").

Fixes: 2a9faf8b ("crypto: arm/crc32 - enable module autoloading based on CPU feature bits")
Signed-off-by: NStefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The table id (second) argument to MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE is often
referenced otherwise. This is not the case for CPU features. This
leads to warnings when building the kernel with Clang:
  arch/arm/crypto/aes-ce-glue.c:450:1: warning: variable
    'cpu_feature_match_AES' is not needed and will not be emitted
    [-Wunneeded-internal-declaration]
  module_cpu_feature_match(AES, aes_init);
  ^

Avoid warnings by using __maybe_unused, similar to commit 1f318a8b
("modules: mark __inittest/__exittest as __maybe_unused").

Fixes: 67bad2fd ("cpu: add generic support for CPU feature based module autoloading")
Signed-off-by: NStefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

During PSP initialization, there is an attempt to update the SEV firmware
by looking in /lib/firmware/amd/. Currently, sev.fw is the expected name
of the firmware blob.

This patch will allow for firmware filenames based on the family and
model of the processor.

Model specific firmware files are given highest priority. Followed by
firmware for a subset of models. Lastly, failing the previous two options,
fallback to looking for sev.fw.
Signed-off-by: NJanakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: NGary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Under certain configuration SEV functions can be defined as no-op.
In such a case error can be uninitialized.

Initialize the variable to 0.

Cc: Dan Carpenter <Dan.Carpenter@oracle.com>
Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <Dan.Carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJanakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Acked-by: NGary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This patch simplifies the LRW template to recompute the LRW tweaks from
scratch in the second pass and thus also removes the need to allocate a
dynamic buffer using kmalloc().

As discussed at [1], the use of kmalloc causes deadlocks with dm-crypt.

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS (x86_64)
Performed using: https://gitlab.com/omos/linux-crypto-bench
Crypto driver used: lrw(ecb-aes-aesni)

The results show that the new code has about the same performance as the
old code. For 512-byte message it seems to be even slightly faster, but
that might be just noise.

Before:
       ALGORITHM KEY (b)        DATA (B)   TIME ENC (ns)   TIME DEC (ns)
        lrw(aes)     256              64             200             203
        lrw(aes)     320              64             202             204
        lrw(aes)     384              64             204             205
        lrw(aes)     256             512             415             415
        lrw(aes)     320             512             432             440
        lrw(aes)     384             512             449             451
        lrw(aes)     256            4096            1838            1995
        lrw(aes)     320            4096            2123            1980
        lrw(aes)     384            4096            2100            2119
        lrw(aes)     256           16384            7183            6954
        lrw(aes)     320           16384            7844            7631
        lrw(aes)     384           16384            8256            8126
        lrw(aes)     256           32768           14772           14484
        lrw(aes)     320           32768           15281           15431
        lrw(aes)     384           32768           16469           16293

After:
       ALGORITHM KEY (b)        DATA (B)   TIME ENC (ns)   TIME DEC (ns)
        lrw(aes)     256              64             197             196
        lrw(aes)     320              64             200             197
        lrw(aes)     384              64             203             199
        lrw(aes)     256             512             385             380
        lrw(aes)     320             512             401             395
        lrw(aes)     384             512             415             415
        lrw(aes)     256            4096            1869            1846
        lrw(aes)     320            4096            2080            1981
        lrw(aes)     384            4096            2160            2109
        lrw(aes)     256           16384            7077            7127
        lrw(aes)     320           16384            7807            7766
        lrw(aes)     384           16384            8108            8357
        lrw(aes)     256           32768           14111           14454
        lrw(aes)     320           32768           15268           15082
        lrw(aes)     384           32768           16581           16250

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/8/23/1315Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This patch rewrites the tweak computation to a slightly simpler method
that performs less bswaps. Based on performance measurements the new
code seems to provide slightly better performance than the old one.

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS (x86_64)
Performed using: https://gitlab.com/omos/linux-crypto-bench
Crypto driver used: lrw(ecb-aes-aesni)

Before:
       ALGORITHM KEY (b)        DATA (B)   TIME ENC (ns)   TIME DEC (ns)
        lrw(aes)     256              64             204             286
        lrw(aes)     320              64             227             203
        lrw(aes)     384              64             208             204
        lrw(aes)     256             512             441             439
        lrw(aes)     320             512             456             455
        lrw(aes)     384             512             469             483
        lrw(aes)     256            4096            2136            2190
        lrw(aes)     320            4096            2161            2213
        lrw(aes)     384            4096            2295            2369
        lrw(aes)     256           16384            7692            7868
        lrw(aes)     320           16384            8230            8691
        lrw(aes)     384           16384            8971            8813
        lrw(aes)     256           32768           15336           15560
        lrw(aes)     320           32768           16410           16346
        lrw(aes)     384           32768           18023           17465

After:
       ALGORITHM KEY (b)        DATA (B)   TIME ENC (ns)   TIME DEC (ns)
        lrw(aes)     256              64             200             203
        lrw(aes)     320              64             202             204
        lrw(aes)     384              64             204             205
        lrw(aes)     256             512             415             415
        lrw(aes)     320             512             432             440
        lrw(aes)     384             512             449             451
        lrw(aes)     256            4096            1838            1995
        lrw(aes)     320            4096            2123            1980
        lrw(aes)     384            4096            2100            2119
        lrw(aes)     256           16384            7183            6954
        lrw(aes)     320           16384            7844            7631
        lrw(aes)     384           16384            8256            8126
        lrw(aes)     256           32768           14772           14484
        lrw(aes)     320           32768           15281           15431
        lrw(aes)     384           32768           16469           16293
Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This patch adds a test vector for lrw(aes) that triggers wrap-around of
the counter, which is a tricky corner case.
Suggested-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

When the LRW block counter overflows, the current implementation returns
128 as the index to the precomputed multiplication table, which has 128
entries. This patch fixes it to return the correct value (127).

Fixes: 64470f1b ("[CRYPTO] lrw: Liskov Rivest Wagner, a tweakable narrow block cipher mode")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.20+
Reported-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

ghash is a keyed hash algorithm, thus setkey needs to be called.
Otherwise the following error occurs:
$ modprobe tcrypt mode=318 sec=1
testing speed of async ghash-generic (ghash-generic)
tcrypt: test  0 (   16 byte blocks,   16 bytes per update,   1 updates):
tcrypt: hashing failed ret=-126

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.6+
Fixes: 0660511c ("crypto: tcrypt - Use ahash")
Tested-by: NFranck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NHoria Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Enable CAAM (Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module) driver
for QorIQ Data Path Acceleration Architecture (DPAA) v2.
It handles DPSECI (Data Path SEC Interface) DPAA2 objects that sit
on the Management Complex (MC) fsl-mc bus.
Signed-off-by: NHoria Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add support for unkeyed and keyed (hmac) md5, sha algorithms.
Signed-off-by: NHoria Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

caam/qi2 driver will support ahash algorithms,
thus move ahash descriptors generation in a shared location.
Signed-off-by: NHoria Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add support to submit the following skcipher algorithms
via the DPSECI backend:
cbc({aes,des,des3_ede})
ctr(aes), rfc3686(ctr(aes))
xts(aes)
Signed-off-by: NHoria Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add CAAM driver that works using the DPSECI backend, i.e. manages
DPSECI DPAA2 objects sitting on the Management Complex (MC) fsl-mc bus.

Data transfers (crypto requests) are sent/received to/from CAAM crypto
engine via Queue Interface (v2), this being similar to existing caam/qi.
OTOH, configuration/setup (obtaining virtual queue IDs, authorization
etc.) is done by sending commands to the MC f/w.

Note that the CAAM accelerator included in DPAA2 platforms still has
Job Rings. However, the driver being added does not handle access
via this backend. Kconfig & Makefile are updated such that DPAA2-CAAM
(a.k.a. "caam/qi2") driver does not depend on caam/jr or caam/qi
backends - which rely on platform bus support (ctrl.c).

Support for the following aead and authenc algorithms is also added
in this patch:
-aead:
gcm(aes)
rfc4106(gcm(aes))
rfc4543(gcm(aes))
-authenc:
authenc(hmac({md5,sha*}),cbc({aes,des,des3_ede}))
echainiv(authenc(hmac({md5,sha*}),cbc({aes,des,des3_ede})))
authenc(hmac({md5,sha*}),rfc3686(ctr(aes))
seqiv(authenc(hmac({md5,sha*}),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))
Signed-off-by: NHoria Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add support to translate error codes returned by QI v2, i.e.
Queue Interface present on DataPath Acceleration Architecture
v2 (DPAA2).
Signed-off-by: NHoria Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add the low-level API that allows to manage DPSECI DPAA2 objects
that sit on the Management Complex (MC) fsl-mc bus.

The API is compatible with MC firmware 10.2.0+.
Signed-off-by: NHoria Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Fix the following sparse endianness warnings:

drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h:95:1: sparse: incorrect type in return expression (different base types) @@    expected unsigned int @@    got restricted __le32unsigned int @@
drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h:95:1:    expected unsigned int
drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h:95:1:    got restricted __le32 [usertype] <noident>
drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h:95:1: sparse: incorrect type in return expression (different base types) @@    expected unsigned int @@    got restricted __be32unsigned int @@
drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h:95:1:    expected unsigned int
drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h:95:1:    got restricted __be32 [usertype] <noident>

drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h:92:1: sparse: cast to restricted __le32
drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h:92:1: sparse: cast to restricted __be32

Fixes: 261ea058 ("crypto: caam - handle core endianness != caam endianness")
Reported-by: Nkbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NHoria Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add support for Congestion State Change Notifications (CSCN), which
allow DPIO users to be notified when a congestion group changes its
state (due to hitting the entrance / exit threshold).
Acked-by: NLi Yang <leoyang.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NHoria Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add support for dpaa2_fd_list format, i.e. dpaa2_fl_entry structure
and accessors.

Frame list entries (FLEs) are similar, but not identical to FDs:
+ "F" (final) bit
- FMT[b'01] is reserved
- DD, SC, DROPP bits (covered by "FD compatibility" field in FLE case)
- FLC[5:0] not used for stashing
Signed-off-by: NHoria Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Acked-by: NLi Yang <leoyang.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This commit adds back functions removed in
commit a211c817 ("staging: fsl-mc/dpio: remove couple of unused functions")
since dpseci object will make use of them.
Acked-by: NLi Yang <leoyang.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NHoria Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Signed-off-by: NHoria Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Acked-by: NLaurentiu Tudor <laurentiu.tudor@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In commit 9f480fae ("crypto: chacha20 - Fix keystream alignment for
chacha20_block()"), I had missed that chacha20_block() can be called
directly on the buffer passed to get_random_bytes(), which can have any
alignment.  So, while my commit didn't break anything, it didn't fully
solve the alignment problems.

Revert my solution and just update chacha20_block() to use
put_unaligned_le32(), so the output buffer need not be aligned.
This is simpler, and on many CPUs it's the same speed.

But, I kept the 'tmp' buffers in extract_crng_user() and
_get_random_bytes() 4-byte aligned, since that alignment is actually
needed for _crng_backtrack_protect() too.
Reported-by: NStephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Since commit acb9b159 ("crypto: gf128mul - define gf128mul_x_* in
gf128mul.h"), the gf128mul_x_*() functions are very fast and therefore
caching the computed XTS tweaks has only negligible advantage over
computing them twice.

In fact, since the current caching implementation limits the size of
the calls to the child ecb(...) algorithm to PAGE_SIZE (usually 4096 B),
it is often actually slower than the simple recomputing implementation.

This patch simplifies the XTS template to recompute the XTS tweaks from
scratch in the second pass and thus also removes the need to allocate a
dynamic buffer using kmalloc().

As discussed at [1], the use of kmalloc causes deadlocks with dm-crypt.

PERFORMANCE RESULTS
I measured time to encrypt/decrypt a memory buffer of varying sizes with
xts(ecb-aes-aesni) using a tool I wrote ([2]) and the results suggest
that after this patch the performance is either better or comparable for
both small and large buffers. Note that there is a lot of noise in the
measurements, but the overall difference is easy to see.

Old code:
       ALGORITHM KEY (b)        DATA (B)   TIME ENC (ns)   TIME DEC (ns)
        xts(aes)     256              64             331             328
        xts(aes)     384              64             332             333
        xts(aes)     512              64             338             348
        xts(aes)     256             512             889             920
        xts(aes)     384             512            1019             993
        xts(aes)     512             512            1032             990
        xts(aes)     256            4096            2152            2292
        xts(aes)     384            4096            2453            2597
        xts(aes)     512            4096            3041            2641
        xts(aes)     256           16384            9443            8027
        xts(aes)     384           16384            8536            8925
        xts(aes)     512           16384            9232            9417
        xts(aes)     256           32768           16383           14897
        xts(aes)     384           32768           17527           16102
        xts(aes)     512           32768           18483           17322

New code:
       ALGORITHM KEY (b)        DATA (B)   TIME ENC (ns)   TIME DEC (ns)
        xts(aes)     256              64             328             324
        xts(aes)     384              64             324             319
        xts(aes)     512              64             320             322
        xts(aes)     256             512             476             473
        xts(aes)     384             512             509             492
        xts(aes)     512             512             531             514
        xts(aes)     256            4096            2132            1829
        xts(aes)     384            4096            2357            2055
        xts(aes)     512            4096            2178            2027
        xts(aes)     256           16384            6920            6983
        xts(aes)     384           16384            8597            7505
        xts(aes)     512           16384            7841            8164
        xts(aes)     256           32768           13468           12307
        xts(aes)     384           32768           14808           13402
        xts(aes)     512           32768           15753           14636

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/8/23/1315
[2] https://gitlab.com/omos/linux-crypto-benchSigned-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The Crypto Extension instantiation of the aes-modes.S collection of
skciphers uses only 15 NEON registers for the round key array, whereas
the pure NEON flavor uses 16 NEON registers for the AES S-box.

This means we have a spare register available that we can use to hold
the XTS mask vector, removing the need to reload it at every iteration
of the inner loop.

Since the pure NEON version does not permit this optimization, tweak
the macros so we can factor out this functionality. Also, replace the
literal load with a short sequence to compose the mask vector.

On Cortex-A53, this results in a ~4% speedup.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Currently, we rely on the generic CTS chaining mode wrapper to
instantiate the cts(cbc(aes)) skcipher. Due to the high performance
of the ARMv8 Crypto Extensions AES instructions (~1 cycles per byte),
any overhead in the chaining mode layers is amplified, and so it pays
off considerably to fold the CTS handling into the SIMD routines.

On Cortex-A53, this results in a ~50% speedup for smaller input sizes.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The reasoning of commit f10dc56c ("crypto: arm64 - revert NEON yield
for fast AEAD implementations") applies equally to skciphers: the walk
API already guarantees that the input size of each call into the NEON
code is bounded to the size of a page, and so there is no need for an
additional TIF_NEED_RESCHED flag check inside the inner loop. So revert
the skcipher changes to aes-modes.S (but retain the mac ones)

This partially reverts commit 0c8f838a.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

For some reason, the asmlinkage prototypes of the NEON routines take
u8[] arguments for the round key arrays, while the actual round keys
are arrays of u32, and so passing them into those routines requires
u8* casts at each occurrence. Fix that.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

use dma_pool_zalloc() instead of dma_pool_alloc with __GFP_ZERO flag.
crypto dma pool renamed to "nitrox-context".
Signed-off-by: NSrikanth Jampala <Jampala.Srikanth@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>