It would be nice to keep things working even with this built as a
module, it took me some time to realize my IPv6 tunnel was broken
because of the missing sit module. This module alias fixes things
until distributions have added an appropriate alias to modprobe.conf.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

If inet6_init() fails later than ndisc_init() call, or IPv6 module is
unloaded, ndisc_netdev_notifier call remains in the list and will follows in
oops later.
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

We have seen a couple of __alloc_pages() failures due to
fragmentation, there is plenty of free memory but no large order pages
available.  I think the problem is in sock_alloc_send_pskb(), the
gfp_mask includes __GFP_REPEAT but its never used/passed to the page
allocator.  Shouldnt the gfp_mask be passed to alloc_skb() ?
Signed-off-by: NLarry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

open-coded variant there works only for little-endian
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

htons() is not needed (and no, it's not misspelled ntohs() -
userland expects net-endian here).
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Calculation of IPX checksum got buggered about 2.4.0.  The old variant
mangled the packet; that got fixed, but calculation itself got buggered.
Restored the correct logics, fixed a subtle breakage we used to have even
back then: if the sum is 0 mod 0xffff, we want to return 0, not 0xffff.
The latter has special meaning for IPX (cheksum disabled).  Observation
(and obvious fix) nicked from history of FreeBSD ipx_cksum.c...
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c: In function 'ebt_dev_check':
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:89: warning: initialization discards qualifiers from pointer target type

So make the char* a const char * and the warning is gone.
Signed-off-by: NMeelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In theory these are opaque 32bit values.  However, we end up
allocating them sequentially in host-endian and stick unchanged
on the wire.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The setting of the default congestion control was buried in
the sysctl code so it would not be done properly if SYSCTL was
not enabled.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The correct order is: NULL check before dereference

Spotted by the Coverity checker.
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

I don't want my code to downgraded to GPLv3 because of
cut-n-pasted the comments. These files which I hold copyright
on were started before it was clear what GPLv3 was going to be.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>

There's a bug in the seqfile show operation for flowlabel objects, where 
each hash chain is traversed cumulatively for each element.  The following 
function is called for each element of each chain:

static void ip6fl_fl_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, struct ip6_flowlabel *fl)
{
        while(fl) {
                seq_printf...
		
		fl = fl->next;
	}
}

Thus, objects can appear mutliple times when reading 
/proc/net/ip6_flowlabel, as the above is called for each element in the 
chain.

The solution is to remove the while() loop from the above, and traverse 
each chain exactly once, per the patch below.  This also removes the 
ip6fl_fl_seq_show() function, which does nothing else.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Currently, when an application requests a lease for a flowlabel via the 
IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR socket option, no error is returned if an invalid type 
of destination address is supplied as part of the request, leading to a 
silent failure.  This patch ensures that EINVAL is returned to the 
application in this case.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Every time SCTP creates a temporary association, the stack hashes it,
puts it on a list of endpoint associations and increments the backlog.
However, the lifetime of a temporary association is the processing time
of a current packet and it's destroyed after that. In fact, we don't
really want anyone else finding this association. There is no reason to
do this extra work.
Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NSridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Make SCTP 1-1 style and peeled-off associations behave like TCP when
setting IP id. In both cases, we set the inet_sk(sk)->daddr and initialize
inet_sk(sk)->id to a random value.
Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NSridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch makes two changes to protect applications from either removing or
tampering with the CIPSOv4 IP option on a socket.  The first is the requirement
that applications have the CAP_NET_RAW capability to set an IPOPT_CIPSO option
on a socket; this prevents untrusted applications from setting their own
CIPSOv4 security attributes on the packets they send.  The second change is to
SELinux and it prevents applications from setting any IPv4 options when there
is an IPOPT_CIPSO option already present on the socket; this prevents
applications from removing CIPSOv4 security attributes from the packets they
send.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch fixes bug in iptables modules refcounting on compat error way.

As we are getting modules in check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(), in case of
later error, we should put them all in translate_compat_table(), not  in the
compat_copy_entry_from_user() or compat_copy_match_from_user(), as it is now.
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>
Acked-by: NVasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: NKirill Korotaev <dev@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add missing unlock in get_next_corpse() in nf_conntrack. It was missed
during the removal of listhelp.h . Also remove an unneeded use of
nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack() in the same function.

Should be applied before 2.6.19 is released.
Signed-off-by: NMartin Josefsson <gandalf@wlug.westbo.se>
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch adds forgotten compat_flush_offset() call to error way of
translate_compat_table().  May lead to table corruption on the next
compat_do_replace().
Signed-off-by: NVasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: NDmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>
Acked-by: NKirill Korotaev <dev@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

There is a number of issues in parsing user-provided table in
translate_table(). Malicious user with CAP_NET_ADMIN may crash system by
passing special-crafted table to the *_tables.

The first issue is that mark_source_chains() function is called before entry
content checks. In case of standard target, mark_source_chains() function
uses t->verdict field in order to determine new position. But the check, that
this field leads no further, than the table end, is in check_entry(), which
is called later, than mark_source_chains().

The second issue, that there is no check that target_offset points inside
entry. If so, *_ITERATE_MATCH macro will follow further, than the entry
ends. As a result, we'll have oops or memory disclosure.

And the third issue, that there is no check that the target is completely
inside entry. Results are the same, as in previous issue.
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>
Acked-by: NKirill Korotaev <dev@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

There's a bug in the seqfile handling for /proc/net/ip6_flowlabel, where,
after finding a flowlabel, the code will loop forever not finding any
further flowlabels, first traversing the rest of the hash bucket then just
looping.

This patch fixes the problem by breaking after the hash bucket has been
traversed.

Note that this bug can cause lockups and oopses, and is trivially invoked
by an unpriveleged user.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NHeiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

I was looking at a RHEL5 bug report involving Xen and SCTP
(https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=212550).
It turns out that SCTP wasn't written to handle skb fragments at
all.  The absence of any calls to skb_may_pull is testament to
that.

It just so happens that Xen creates fragmented packets more often
than other scenarios (header & data split when going from domU to
dom0).  That's what caused this bug to show up.

Until someone has the time sits down and audits the entire net/sctp
directory, here is a conservative and safe solution that simply
linearises all packets on input.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Fix printk format warnings:
build2.out:net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c:355: warning: long long unsigned int format, u64 arg (arg 3)
build2.out:net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c:360: warning: long long unsigned int format, u64 arg (arg 3)
build2.out:net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c:482: warning: long long unsigned int format, u64 arg (arg 5)
build2.out:net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c:639: warning: long long unsigned int format, u64 arg (arg 3)
build2.out:net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c:639: warning: long long unsigned int format, u64 arg (arg 4)
build2.out:net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c:674: warning: long long unsigned int format, u64 arg (arg 3)
build2.out:net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c:720: warning: long long unsigned int format, u64 arg (arg 3)
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

skb_segment fails to segment linear packets correctly because it
tries to write all linear parts of the original skb into each
segment.  This will always panic as each segment only contains
enough space for one MSS.

This was not detected earlier because linear packets should be
rare for GSO.  In fact it still remains to be seen what exactly
created the linear packets that triggered this bug.  Basically
the only time this should happen is if someone enables GSO
emulation on an interface that does not support SG.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Use memcpy() to move xfrm_address_t objects in and out
of netlink messages.  The vast majority of xfrm_user was
doing this properly, except for copy_from_user_state()
and copy_to_user_state().
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

atrtr_find() can return NULL, so do not blindly dereference
rt->dev before we check for rt being NULL.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

- printk should remain dprintk

- fix coding-style.

Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

A recent patch fixed a problem which would occur when the refcount on an
auth_domain reached zero.  This problem has not been reported in practice
despite existing in two major kernel releases because the refcount can
never reach zero.

This patch fixes the problems that stop the refcount reaching zero.

1/ We were adding to the refcount when inserting in the hash table,
   but only removing from the hashtable when the refcount reached zero.
   Obviously it never would.  So don't count the implied reference of
   being in the hash table.

2/ There are two paths on which a socket can be destroyed.  One called
   svcauth_unix_info_release().  The other didn't.  So when the other was
   taken, we can lose a reference to an ip_map which in-turn holds a
   reference to an auth_domain

   So unify the exit paths into svc_sock_put.  This highlights the fact
   that svc_delete_socket has slightly odd semantics - it does not drop
   a reference but probably should.  Fixing this need a bit more
   thought and testing.
Signed-off-by: NNeil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Correct message typo/spello.
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When using H-TCP with a single flow on a 500Mbit connection (or less
actually), alpha can exceed 65000, so alpha needs to be a u32.
Signed-off-by: NGavin McCullagh <gavin.mccullagh@nuim.ie>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Leith <doug.leith@nuim.ie>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Doug Leith observed a discrepancy between the version of CUBIC described
in the papers and the version in 2.6.18. A math error related to scaling
causes Cubic to grow too slowly.

Patch is from "Sangtae Ha" <sha2@ncsu.edu>. I validated that
it does fix the problems.

See the following to show behavior over 500ms 100 Mbit link.

Sender (2.6.19-rc3) ---  Bridge (2.6.18-rt7) ------- Receiver (2.6.19-rc3)
                    1G      [netem]           100M

	http://developer.osdl.org/shemminger/tcp/2.6.19-rc3/cubic-orig.png
	http://developer.osdl.org/shemminger/tcp/2.6.19-rc3/cubic-fix.pngSigned-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

CRYPTO_MANAGER is selected automatically by CONFIG_ECB and CONFIG_CBC.

config CRYPTO_ECB
        tristate "ECB support"
        select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
        select CRYPTO_MANAGER


I've added CONFIG_ECB to the ones you mentioned and CONFIG_CBC to
gssapi.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Updates the references to spec documents throughout the code, taking into
account that

* the DCCP, CCID 2, and CCID 3 drafts all became RFCs in March this year

* RFC 1063 was obsoleted by RFC 1191

* draft-ietf-tcpimpl-pmtud-0x.txt was published as an Informational
  RFC, RFC 2923 on 2000-09-22.

All references verified.
Signed-off-by: NGerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

As reported by Mark Dowd <Mark_Dowd@McAfee.com>, ip6_tables is susceptible
to a fragmentation attack causing false negatives on extension header matches.

When extension headers occur in the non-first fragment after the fragment
header (possibly with an incorrect nexthdr value in the fragment header)
a rule looking for this extension header will never match.

Drop fragments that are at offset 0 and don't contain the final protocol
header regardless of the ruleset, since this should not happen normally.
Since all extension headers are before the protocol header this makes sure
an extension header is either not present or in the first fragment, where
we can properly parse it.

With help from Yasuyuki KOZAKAI <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp>.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

As reported by Mark Dowd <Mark_Dowd@McAfee.com>, ip6_tables is susceptible
to a fragmentation attack causing false negatives on protocol matches.

When the protocol header doesn't follow the fragment header immediately,
the fragment header contains the protocol number of the next extension
header. When the extension header and the protocol header are sent in
a second fragment a rule like "ip6tables .. -p udp -j DROP" will never
match.

Drop fragments that are at offset 0 and don't contain the final protocol
header regardless of the ruleset, since this should not happen normally.

With help from Yasuyuki KOZAKAI <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp>.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>