DMA access to encrypted memory cannot be performed when SEV is active.
In order for DMA to properly work when SEV is active, the SWIOTLB bounce
buffers must be used.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>C
Tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-12-brijesh.singh@amd.com

In order for memory pages to be properly mapped when SEV is active, it's
necessary to use the PAGE_KERNEL protection attribute as the base
protection.  This ensures that memory mapping of, e.g. ACPI tables,
receives the proper mapping attributes.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-11-brijesh.singh@amd.com

In preperation for a new function that will need additional resource
information during the resource walk, update the resource walk callback to
pass the resource structure.  Since the current callback start and end
arguments are pulled from the resource structure, the callback functions
can obtain them from the resource structure directly.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-10-brijesh.singh@amd.com

The walk_iomem_res_desc(), walk_system_ram_res() and walk_system_ram_range()
functions each have much of the same code.

Create a new function that consolidates the common code from these
functions in one place to reduce the amount of duplicated code.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-9-brijesh.singh@amd.com

EFI data is encrypted when the kernel is run under SEV. Update the
page table references to be sure the EFI memory areas are accessed
encrypted.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-8-brijesh.singh@amd.com

The current code checks only for sme_active() when determining whether
to perform the encryption attribute change.  Include sev_active() in this
check so that memory attribute changes can occur under SME and SEV.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-7-brijesh.singh@amd.com

When Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is active, boot data (such as
EFI related data, setup data) is encrypted and needs to be accessed as
such when mapped. Update the architecture override in early_memremap to
keep the encryption attribute when mapping this data.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-6-brijesh.singh@amd.com

When SEV is active the trampoline area will need to be in encrypted
memory so only mark the area decrypted if SME is active.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-5-brijesh.singh@amd.com

When SEV is active the initrd/initramfs will already have already been
placed in memory encrypted so do not try to encrypt it.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-4-brijesh.singh@amd.com

Provide support for Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV). This initial
support defines a flag that is used by the kernel to determine if it is
running with SEV active.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-3-brijesh.singh@amd.com

Update the AMD memory encryption document describing the Secure Encrypted
Virtualization (SEV) feature.
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-2-brijesh.singh@amd.com

We use alternatives_text_reserved() to check if the address is in
the fixed pieces of alternative reserved, but the problem is that
we don't hold the smp_alt mutex when call this function. So the list
traversal may encounter a deleted list_head if another path is doing
alternatives_smp_module_del().

One solution is that we can hold smp_alt mutex before call this
function, but the difficult point is that the callers of this
functions, arch_prepare_kprobe() and arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe(),
are called inside the text_mutex. So we must hold smp_alt mutex
before we go into these arch dependent code. But we can't now,
the smp_alt mutex is the arch dependent part, only x86 has it.
Maybe we can export another arch dependent callback to solve this.

But there is a simpler way to handle this problem. We can reuse the
text_mutex to protect smp_alt_modules instead of using another mutex.
And all the arch dependent checks of kprobes are inside the text_mutex,
so it's safe now.
Signed-off-by: NZhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@suse.de
Fixes: 2cfa1978 "ftrace/alternatives: Introducing *_text_reserved functions"
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509585501-79466-1-git-send-email-zhouchengming1@huawei.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Some of the files generated by the build process were not listed.
Signed-off-by: NChangbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509939179-7556-5-git-send-email-changbin.du@intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

It avoids the following warning triggered by newer versions of mkisofs:

    -input-charset not specified, using utf-8 (detected in locale settings)
Signed-off-by: NChangbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509939179-7556-4-git-send-email-changbin.du@intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Recently I failed to build isoimage target, because the path of isolinux.bin
changed to /usr/xxx/ISOLINUX/isolinux.bin, as well as ldlinux.c32 which
changed to /usr/xxx/syslinux/modules/bios/ldlinux.c32.

This patch improves the file search logic:
  - Show a error message instead of silent fail.
  - Add above new paths.
Signed-off-by: NChangbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509939179-7556-3-git-send-email-changbin.du@intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The build messages for fdimage/isoimage generation are pretty unstructured,
just the raw shell command blocks are printed.

Emit shortened messages similar to existing kbuild messages, and move
the Makefile commands into a separate shell script - which is much
easier to handle.

This patch factors out the commands used for fdimage/isoimage generation
from arch/x86/boot/Makefile to a new script arch/x86/boot/genimage.sh.
Then it adds the new kbuild command 'genimage' which invokes the new script.
All fdimages/isoimage files are now generated by a call to 'genimage' with
different parameters.

Now 'make isoimage' becomes:

	...
	Kernel: arch/x86/boot/bzImage is ready  (#30)
	  GENIMAGE arch/x86/boot/image.iso
	Size of boot image is 4 sectors -> No emulation
	 15.37% done, estimate finish Sun Nov  5 23:36:57 2017
	 30.68% done, estimate finish Sun Nov  5 23:36:57 2017
	 46.04% done, estimate finish Sun Nov  5 23:36:57 2017
	 61.35% done, estimate finish Sun Nov  5 23:36:57 2017
	 76.69% done, estimate finish Sun Nov  5 23:36:57 2017
	 92.00% done, estimate finish Sun Nov  5 23:36:57 2017
	Total translation table size: 2048
	Total rockridge attributes bytes: 659
	Total directory bytes: 0
	Path table size(bytes): 10
	Max brk space used 0
	32608 extents written (63 MB)
	Kernel: arch/x86/boot/image.iso is ready

Before:

	Kernel: arch/x86/boot/bzImage is ready  (#63)
	rm -rf arch/x86/boot/isoimage
	mkdir arch/x86/boot/isoimage
	for i in lib lib64 share end ; do \
		if [ -f /usr/$i/syslinux/isolinux.bin ] ; then \
			cp /usr/$i/syslinux/isolinux.bin arch/x86/boot/isoimage ; \
			if [ -f /usr/$i/syslinux/ldlinux.c32 ]; then \
				cp /usr/$i/syslinux/ldlinux.c32 arch/x86/boot/isoimage ; \
			fi ; \
			break ; \
		fi ; \
		if [ $i = end ] ; then exit 1 ; fi ; \
	done
	...
Suggested-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NChangbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509939179-7556-2-git-send-email-changbin.du@intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

We weren't testing the .limit and .limit_in_pages fields very well.
Add more tests.

This addition seems to trigger the "bits 16:19 are undefined" issue
that was fixed in an earlier patch.  I think that, at least on my
CPU, the high nibble of the limit ends in LAR bits 16:19.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5601c15ea9b3113d288953fd2838b18bedf6bc67.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Now that the main test infrastructure supports the GDT, run tests
that will pass the kernel's GDT permission tests against the GDT.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/686a1eda63414da38fcecc2412db8dba1ae40581.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Much of the test design could apply to set_thread_area() (i.e. GDT),
not just modify_ldt().  Add set_thread_area() to the
install_valid_mode() helper.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/02c23f8fba5547007f741dc24c3926e5284ede02.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Bits 19:16 of LAR's result are undefined, and some upcoming
improvements to the test case seem to trigger this.  Mask off those
bits to avoid spurious failures.

commit 5b781c7e ("x86/tls: Forcibly set the accessed bit in TLS
segments") adds a valid case in which LAR's output doesn't quite
agree with set_thread_area()'s input.  This isn't triggered in the
test as is, but it will be if we start calling set_thread_area()
with the accessed bit clear.  Work around this discrepency.

I've added a Fixes tag so that -stable can pick this up if neccesary.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 5b781c7e ("x86/tls: Forcibly set the accessed bit in TLS segments")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b82f3f89c034b53580970ac865139fd8863f44e2.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

On new enough glibc, the pkey syscalls numbers are available.  Check
first before defining them to avoid warnings like:

protection_keys.c:198:0: warning: "SYS_pkey_alloc" redefined
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1fbef53a9e6befb7165ff855fc1a7d4788a191d6.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Kept this commit separate from the re-tabulation changes, to make
the changes easier to review:

 - add better explanation for entries with no explanation
 - fix/enhance the text of some of the entries
 - fix the vertical alignment of some of the feature number definitions
 - fix inconsistent capitalization
 - ... and lots of other small details

i.e. make it all more of a coherent unit, instead of a patchwork of years of additions.

Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171031121723.28524-4-mingo@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Over the years asm/cpufeatures.h has become somewhat of a mess: the original
tabulation style was too narrow, while x86 feature names also kept growing
in length, creating frequent field width overflows.

Re-tabulate it to make it wider and easier to read/modify. Also harmonize
the tabulation of the other defines in this file to match it.

Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171031121723.28524-3-mingo@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Conflicts:
	arch/x86/entry/syscalls/Makefile
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Conflicts:
	arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Pull workqueue fix from Tejun Heo:
 "Another fix for a really old bug.

  It only affects drain_workqueue() which isn't used often and even then
  triggers only during a pretty small race window, so it isn't too
  surprising that it stayed hidden for so long.

  The fix is straight-forward and low-risk. Kudos to Li Bin for
  reporting and fixing the bug"

* 'for-4.14-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/wq:
  workqueue: Fix NULL pointer dereference

Currently we are leaking addresses from the kernel to user space. This
script is an attempt to find some of those leakages. Script parses
`dmesg` output and /proc and /sys files for hex strings that look like
kernel addresses.

Only works for 64 bit kernels, the reason being that kernel addresses on
64 bit kernels have 'ffff' as the leading bit pattern making greping
possible. On 32 kernels we don't have this luxury.

Scripts is _slightly_ smarter than a straight grep, we check for false
positives (all 0's or all 1's, and vsyscall start/finish addresses).

[ I think there is a lot of room for improvement here, but it's already
  useful, so I'm merging it as-is. The whole "hash %p format" series is
  expected to go into 4.15, but will not fix %x users, and will not
  incentivize people to look at what they are leaking.     - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: NTobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
 "This fixes an unaligned panic in x86/sha-mb and a bug in ccm that
  triggers with certain underlying implementations"

* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
  crypto: ccm - preserve the IV buffer
  crypto: x86/sha1-mb - fix panic due to unaligned access
  crypto: x86/sha256-mb - fix panic due to unaligned access

... so that the difference is obvious.

No functionality change.
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171103102028.20284-1-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Concentrate x86 MM and asm related changes into a single super-topic,
in preparation for larger changes.
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Two fixes:

   - A PCID related revert that fixes power management and performance
     regressions.

   - The module loader robustization and sanity check commit is rather
     fresh, but it looked like a good idea to apply because of the
     hidden data corruption problem such invalid modules could cause"

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/module: Detect and skip invalid relocations
  Revert "x86/mm: Stop calling leave_mm() in idle code"

Pull RAS fix from Ingo Molnar:
 "Fix an RCU warning that triggers when /dev/mcelog is used"

* 'ras-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/mcelog: Get rid of RCU remnants

Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Various fixes:

   - synchronize kernel and tooling headers

   - cgroup support fix

   - two tooling fixes"

* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  tools/headers: Synchronize kernel ABI headers
  perf/cgroup: Fix perf cgroup hierarchy support
  perf tools: Unwind properly location after REJECT
  perf symbols: Fix memory corruption because of zero length symbols

Pull irq fix from Ingo Molnar:
 "An irqchip driver init fix"

* 'irq-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  irqchip/irq-mvebu-gicp: Add missing spin_lock init

Pull core fixes from Ingo Molnar:

 - workaround for gcc asm handling

 - futex race fixes

 - objtool build warning fix

 - two watchdog fixes: a crash fix (revert) and a bug fix for
   /proc/sys/kernel/watchdog_thresh handling.

* 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  objtool: Prevent GCC from merging annotate_unreachable(), take 2
  objtool: Resync objtool's instruction decoder source code copy with the kernel's latest version
  watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Use atomics to track in-use cpu counter
  watchdog/harclockup/perf: Revert a33d4484 ("watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Simplify deferred event destroy")
  futex: Fix more put_pi_state() vs. exit_pi_state_list() races

Merge tag 'enforcement-4.14-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core

Pull enforcement statement update from Greg KH:
 "Documentation: enforcement-statement: name updates

  Here are 12 patches for the kernel-enforcement-statement.rst file that
  add new names, fix the ordering of them, remove a duplicate, and
  remove some company markings that wished to be removed.

  All of these have passed the 0-day testing, even-though it is just a
  documentation file update :)"

* tag 'enforcement-4.14-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
  Documentation: Add Frank Rowand to list of enforcement statement endorsers
  doc: add Willy Tarreau to the list of enforcement statement endorsers
  Documentation: Add Tim Bird to list of enforcement statement endorsers
  Documentation: Add my name to kernel enforcement statement
  Documentation: kernel-enforcement-statement.rst: proper sort names
  Documentation: Add Arm Ltd to kernel-enforcement-statement.rst
  Documentation: kernel-enforcement-statement.rst: Remove Red Hat markings
  Documentation: Add myself to the enforcement statement list
  Documentation: Sign kernel enforcement statement
  Add ack for Trond Myklebust to the enforcement statement
  Documentation: update kernel enforcement support list
  Documentation: add my name to supporters

There have been some cases where external tooling (e.g., kpatch-build)
creates a corrupt relocation which targets the wrong address.  This is a
silent failure which can corrupt memory in unexpected places.

On x86, the bytes of data being overwritten by relocations are always
initialized to zero beforehand.  Use that knowledge to add sanity checks
to detect such cases before they corrupt memory.
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: jeyu@kernel.org
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/37450d6c6225e54db107fba447ce9e56e5f758e9.1509713553.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
[ Restructured the messages, as it's unclear whether the relocation or the target is corrupted. ]
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Pull ARM fixes from Russell King:

 - omit EFI memory map sorting, which was recently introduced, but
   caused problems with the decompressor due to additional sections
   being emitted.

 - avoid unaligned load fault-generating instructions in the
   decompressor by switching to a private unaligned implementation.

 - add a symbol into the decompressor to further debug non-boot
   situations (ld's documentation is extremely poor for how "." works,
   ld doesn't seem to follow its own documentation!)

 - parse endian information to sparse

* 'fixes' of git://git.armlinux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm:
  ARM: add debug ".edata_real" symbol
  ARM: 8716/1: pass endianness info to sparse
  efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map
  ARM: 8715/1: add a private asm/unaligned.h