If we're sharing the ring across forks, then one process exiting means
that we cancel ALL work and prevent future work. This is overly
restrictive. As long as we cancel the work associated with the files
from the current task, it's safe to let others persist. Normal fd close
on exit will still wait (and cancel) pending work.

Fixes: fcb323cc ("io_uring: io_uring: add support for async work inheriting files")
Reported-by: NAndres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

This ends up being too restrictive for tasks that willingly fork and
share the ring between forks. Andres reports that this breaks his
postgresql work. Since we're close to 5.5 release, revert this change
for now.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 44d28279 ("io_uring: only allow submit from owning task")
Reported-by: NAndres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

The afs filesystem needs to prohibit certain characters from cell names,
such as '/', as these are used to form filenames in procfs, leading to
the following warning being generated:

	WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3489 at fs/proc/generic.c:178

Fix afs_alloc_cell() to disallow nonprintable characters, '/', '@' and
names that begin with a dot.

Remove the check for "@cell" as that is then redundant.

This can be tested by running:

	echo add foo/.bar 1.2.3.4 >/proc/fs/afs/cells

Note that we will also need to deal with:

 - Names ending in ".invalid" shouldn't be passed to the DNS.

 - Names that contain non-valid domainname chars shouldn't be passed to
   the DNS.

 - DNS replies that say "your-dns-needs-immediate-attention.<gTLD>" and
   replies containing A records that say 127.0.53.53 should be
   considered invalid.
   [https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/name-collision-mitigation-01aug14-en.pdf]

but these need to be dealt with by the kafs-client DNS program rather
than the kernel.

Reported-by: syzbot+b904ba7c947a37b4b291@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

may_create_in_sticky() call is done when we already have dropped the
reference to dir.

Fixes: 30aba665 (namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files)
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

The fstests btrfs/011 triggered a warning at the end of device replace,

  [ 1891.998975] BTRFS warning (device vdd): failed setting block group ro: -28
  [ 1892.038338] BTRFS error (device vdd): btrfs_scrub_dev(/dev/vdd, 1, /dev/vdb) failed -28
  [ 1892.059993] ------------[ cut here ]------------
  [ 1892.063032] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2244 at fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c:506 btrfs_dev_replace_start.cold+0xf9/0x140 [btrfs]
  [ 1892.074346] CPU: 2 PID: 2244 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.5.0-rc7-default+ #942
  [ 1892.079956] RIP: 0010:btrfs_dev_replace_start.cold+0xf9/0x140 [btrfs]

  [ 1892.096576] RSP: 0018:ffffbb58c7b3fd10 EFLAGS: 00010286
  [ 1892.098311] RAX: 00000000ffffffe4 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 8888888888888889
  [ 1892.100342] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff9e889645f5d8 RDI: ffffffff92821080
  [ 1892.102291] RBP: ffff9e889645c000 R08: 000001b8878fe1f6 R09: 0000000000000000
  [ 1892.104239] R10: ffffbb58c7b3fd08 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9e88a0017000
  [ 1892.106434] R13: ffff9e889645f608 R14: ffff9e88794e1000 R15: ffff9e88a07b5200
  [ 1892.108642] FS:  00007fcaed3f18c0(0000) GS:ffff9e88bda00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [ 1892.111558] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [ 1892.113492] CR2: 00007f52509ff420 CR3: 00000000603dd002 CR4: 0000000000160ee0

  [ 1892.115814] Call Trace:
  [ 1892.116896]  btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl+0x35/0x60 [btrfs]
  [ 1892.118962]  btrfs_ioctl+0x1d62/0x2550 [btrfs]

caused by the previous patch ("btrfs: scrub: Require mandatory block
group RO for dev-replace"). Hitting ENOSPC is possible and could happen
when the block group is set read-only, preventing NOCOW writes to the
area that's being accessed by dev-replace.

This has happend with scratch devices of size 12G but not with 5G and
20G, so this is depends on timing and other activity on the filesystem.
The whole replace operation is restartable, the space state should be
examined by the user in any case.

The error code is propagated back to the ioctl caller so the kernel
warning is causing false alerts.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

[BUG]
For dev-replace test cases with fsstress, like btrfs/06[45] btrfs/071,
looped runs can lead to random failure, where scrub finds csum error.

The possibility is not high, around 1/20 to 1/100, but it's causing data
corruption.

The bug is observable after commit b12de528 ("btrfs: scrub: Don't
check free space before marking a block group RO")

[CAUSE]
Dev-replace has two source of writes:

- Write duplication
  All writes to source device will also be duplicated to target device.

  Content:	Not yet persisted data/meta

- Scrub copy
  Dev-replace reused scrub code to iterate through existing extents, and
  copy the verified data to target device.

  Content:	Previously persisted data and metadata

The difference in contents makes the following race possible:
	Regular Writer		|	Dev-replace
-----------------------------------------------------------------
  ^                             |
  | Preallocate one data extent |
  | at bytenr X, len 1M		|
  v				|
  ^ Commit transaction		|
  | Now extent [X, X+1M) is in  |
  v commit root			|
 ================== Dev replace starts =========================
  				| ^
				| | Scrub extent [X, X+1M)
				| | Read [X, X+1M)
				| | (The content are mostly garbage
				| |  since it's preallocated)
  ^				| v
  | Write back happens for	|
  | extent [X, X+512K)		|
  | New data writes to both	|
  | source and target dev.	|
  v				|
				| ^
				| | Scrub writes back extent [X, X+1M)
				| | to target device.
				| | This will over write the new data in
				| | [X, X+512K)
				| v

This race can only happen for nocow writes. Thus metadata and data cow
writes are safe, as COW will never overwrite extents of previous
transaction (in commit root).

This behavior can be confirmed by disabling all fallocate related calls
in fsstress (*), then all related tests can pass a 2000 run loop.

*: FSSTRESS_AVOID="-f fallocate=0 -f allocsp=0 -f zero=0 -f insert=0 \
		   -f collapse=0 -f punch=0 -f resvsp=0"
   I didn't expect resvsp ioctl will fallback to fallocate in VFS...

[FIX]
Make dev-replace to require mandatory block group RO, and wait for current
nocow writes before calling scrub_chunk().

This patch will mostly revert commit 76a8efa1 ("btrfs: Continue replace
when set_block_ro failed") for dev-replace path.

The side effect is, dev-replace can be more strict on avaialble space, but
definitely worth to avoid data corruption.
Reported-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Fixes: 76a8efa1 ("btrfs: Continue replace when set_block_ro failed")
Fixes: b12de528 ("btrfs: scrub: Don't check free space before marking a block group RO")
Reviewed-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

In commit 9f79b78e ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to
unsafe_put_user()") I changed filldir to not do individual __put_user()
accesses, but instead use unsafe_put_user() surrounded by the proper
user_access_begin/end() pair.

That make them enormously faster on modern x86, where the STAC/CLAC
games make individual user accesses fairly heavy-weight.

However, the user_access_begin() range was not really the exact right
one, since filldir() has the unfortunate problem that it needs to not
only fill out the new directory entry, it also needs to fix up the
previous one to contain the proper file offset.

It's unfortunate, but the "d_off" field in "struct dirent" is _not_ the
file offset of the directory entry itself - it's the offset of the next
one.  So we end up backfilling the offset in the previous entry as we
walk along.

But since x86 didn't really care about the exact range, and used to be
the only architecture that did anything fancy in user_access_begin() to
begin with, the filldir[64]() changes did something lazy, and even
commented on it:

	/*
	 * Note! This range-checks 'previous' (which may be NULL).
	 * The real range was checked in getdents
	 */
	if (!user_access_begin(dirent, sizeof(*dirent)))
		goto efault;

and it all worked fine.

But now 32-bit ppc is starting to also implement user_access_begin(),
and the fact that we faked the range to only be the (possibly not even
valid) previous directory entry becomes a problem, because ppc32 will
actually be using the range that is passed in for more than just "check
that it's user space".

This is a complete rewrite of Christophe's original patch.

By saving off the record length of the previous entry instead of a
pointer to it in the filldir data structures, we can simplify the range
check and the writing of the previous entry d_off field.  No need for
any conditionals in the user accesses themselves, although we retain the
conditional EINTR checking for the "was this the first directory entry"
signal handling latency logic.

Fixes: 9f79b78e ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/a02d3426f93f7eb04960a4d9140902d278cab0bb.1579697910.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/408c90c4068b00ea8f1c41cca45b84ec23d4946b.1579783936.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr/Reported-and-tested-by: NChristophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Commit 8a23eb80 ("Make filldir[64]() verify the directory entry
filename is valid") added some minimal validity checks on the directory
entries passed to filldir[64]().  But they really were pretty minimal.

This fleshes out at least the name length check: we used to disallow
zero-length names, but really, negative lengths or oevr-long names
aren't ok either.  Both could happen if there is some filesystem
corruption going on.

Now, most filesystems tend to use just an "unsigned char" or similar for
the length of a directory entry name, so even with a corrupt filesystem
you should never see anything odd like that.  But since we then use the
name length to create the directory entry record length, let's make sure
it actually is half-way sensible.

Note how POSIX states that the size of a path component is limited by
NAME_MAX, but we actually use PATH_MAX for the check here.  That's
because while NAME_MAX is generally the correct maximum name length
(it's 255, for the same old "name length is usually just a byte on
disk"), there's nothing in the VFS layer that really cares.

So the real limitation at a VFS layer is the total pathname length you
can pass as a filename: PATH_MAX.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Currently, we just assume that it will stick around by virtue of the
submitter's reference, but later patches will allow the syscall to
return early and we can't rely on that reference at that point.

While I'm not aware of any reports of it, Xiubo pointed out that this
may fix a use-after-free.  If the wait for a reply times out or is
canceled via signal, and then the reply comes in after the syscall
returns, the client can end up trying to access r_parent without a
reference.

Take an extra reference to the inode when setting r_parent and release
it when releasing the request.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: N"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

fds field of struct io_uring_files_update is problematic with regards
to compat user space, as pointer size is different in 32-bit, 32-on-64-bit,
and 64-bit user space.  In order to avoid custom handling of compat in
the syscall implementation, make fds __u64 and use u64_to_user_ptr in
order to retrieve it.  Also, align the field naturally and check that
no garbage is passed there.

Fixes: c3a31e60 ("io_uring: add support for IORING_REGISTER_FILES_UPDATE")
Signed-off-by: NEugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

The fstest btrfs/154 reports

  [ 8675.381709] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28)
  [ 8675.383302] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 31900 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:2038 btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x1e0/0x1f0 [btrfs]
  [ 8675.390925] CPU: 1 PID: 31900 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-default+ #935
  [ 8675.392780] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba527-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
  [ 8675.395452] RIP: 0010:btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x1e0/0x1f0 [btrfs]
  [ 8675.402672] RSP: 0018:ffffb2090888fb00 EFLAGS: 00010286
  [ 8675.404413] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff92026dfa91c8 RCX: 0000000000000001
  [ 8675.406609] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8e100899 RDI: ffffffff8e100971
  [ 8675.408775] RBP: ffff920247c61660 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  [ 8675.410978] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000ffffffe4
  [ 8675.412647] R13: ffff92026db74000 R14: ffff920247c616b8 R15: ffff92026dfbc000
  [ 8675.413994] FS:  00007fd5e57248c0(0000) GS:ffff92027d800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [ 8675.416146] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [ 8675.417833] CR2: 0000564aa51682d8 CR3: 000000006dcbc004 CR4: 0000000000160ee0
  [ 8675.419801] Call Trace:
  [ 8675.420742]  btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x355/0x480 [btrfs]
  [ 8675.422600]  btrfs_commit_transaction+0xc8/0xaf0 [btrfs]
  [ 8675.424335]  reset_balance_state+0x14a/0x190 [btrfs]
  [ 8675.425824]  btrfs_balance.cold+0xe7/0x154 [btrfs]
  [ 8675.427313]  ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x235/0x2c0
  [ 8675.428663]  btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x298/0x350 [btrfs]
  [ 8675.430285]  btrfs_ioctl+0x466/0x2550 [btrfs]
  [ 8675.431788]  ? mem_cgroup_charge_statistics+0x51/0xf0
  [ 8675.433487]  ? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0x56/0x400
  [ 8675.435122]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xc0
  [ 8675.436618]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30
  [ 8675.438093]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x499/0x740
  [ 8675.439619]  ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x56e/0x770
  [ 8675.441034]  do_vfs_ioctl+0x56e/0x770
  [ 8675.442411]  ksys_ioctl+0x3a/0x70
  [ 8675.443718]  ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
  [ 8675.445333]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
  [ 8675.446705]  do_syscall_64+0x50/0x210
  [ 8675.448059]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
  [ 8675.479187] BTRFS: error (device vdb) in btrfs_create_pending_block_groups:2038: errno=-28 No space left

We now use btrfs_can_overcommit() to see if we can flip a block group
read only.  Before this would fail because we weren't taking into
account the usable un-allocated space for allocating chunks.  With my
patches we were allowed to do the balance, which is technically correct.

The test is trying to start balance on degraded mount.  So now we're
trying to allocate a chunk and cannot because we want to allocate a
RAID1 chunk, but there's only 1 device that's available for usage.  This
results in an ENOSPC.

But we shouldn't even be making it this far, we don't have enough
devices to restripe.  The problem is we're using btrfs_num_devices(),
that also includes missing devices. That's not actually what we want, we
need to use rw_devices.

The chunk_mutex is not needed here, rw_devices changes only in device
add, remove or replace, all are excluded by EXCL_OP mechanism.

Fixes: e4d8ec0f ("Btrfs: implement online profile changing")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add stacktrace, update changelog, drop chunk_mutex ]
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

If scrub returns an error we are not copying back the scrub arguments
structure to user space. This prevents user space to know how much
progress scrub has done if an error happened - this includes -ECANCELED
which is returned when users ask for scrub to stop. A particular use
case, which is used in btrfs-progs, is to resume scrub after it is
canceled, in that case it relies on checking the progress from the scrub
arguments structure and then use that progress in a call to resume
scrub.

So fix this by always copying the scrub arguments structure to user
space, overwriting the value returned to user space with -EFAULT only if
copying the structure failed to let user space know that either that
copying did not happen, and therefore the structure is stale, or it
happened partially and the structure is probably not valid and corrupt
due to the partial copy.
Reported-by: NGraham Cobb <g.btrfs@cobb.uk.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/d0a97688-78be-08de-ca7d-bcb4c7fb397e@cobb.uk.net/
Fixes: 06fe39ab ("Btrfs: do not overwrite scrub error with fault error in scrub ioctl")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1+
Reviewed-by: NJohannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Tested-by: NGraham Cobb <g.btrfs@cobb.uk.net>
Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

If the credentials or the mm doesn't match, don't allow the task to
submit anything on behalf of this ring. The task that owns the ring can
pass the file descriptor to another task, but we don't want to allow
that task to submit an SQE that then assumes the ring mm and creds if
it needs to go async.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: NStefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Commit 60e4cf67 (reiserfs: fix extended attributes on the root
directory) introduced a regression open_xa_root started returning
-EOPNOTSUPP but it was not handled properly in reiserfs_for_each_xattr.

When the reiserfs module is built without CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_XATTR,
deleting an inode would result in a warning and chowning an inode
would also result in a warning and then fail to complete.

With CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_XATTR enabled, the xattr root would always be
present for read-write operations.

This commit handles -EOPNOSUPP in the same way -ENODATA is handled.

Fixes: 60e4cf67 ("reiserfs: fix extended attributes on the root directory")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org	# Commit 60e4cf67 was picked up by stable
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200115180059.6935-1-jeffm@suse.comReported-by: NMichael Brunnbauer <brunni@netestate.de>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

Buffered read in fuse normally goes via:

 -> generic_file_buffered_read()
   -> fuse_readpages()
     -> fuse_send_readpages()
       ->fuse_simple_request() [called since v5.4]

In the case of a read request, fuse_simple_request() will return a
non-negative bytecount on success or a negative error value.  A positive
bytecount was taken to be an error and the PG_error flag set on the page.
This resulted in generic_file_buffered_read() falling back to ->readpage(),
which would repeat the read request and succeed.  Because of the repeated
read succeeding the bug was not detected with regression tests or other use
cases.

The FTP module in GVFS however fails the second read due to the
non-seekable nature of FTP downloads.

Fix by checking and ignoring positive return value from
fuse_simple_request().
Reported-by: NOndrej Holy <oholy@redhat.com>
Link: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/issues/441
Fixes: 134831e3 ("fuse: convert readpages to simple api")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

A previous commit moved the locking for the async sqthread, but didn't
take into account that the io-wq workers still need it. We can't use
req->in_async for this anymore as both the sqthread and io-wq workers
set it, gate the need for locking on io_wq_current_is_worker() instead.

Fixes: 8a4955ff ("io_uring: sqthread should grab ctx->uring_lock for submissions")
Reported-by: NBijan Mottahedeh <bijan.mottahedeh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

req->result is cleared when io_issue_sqe() calls io_read/write_pre()
routines.  Those routines however are not called when the sqe
argument is NULL, which is the case when io_issue_sqe() is called from
io_wq_submit_work().  io_issue_sqe() may then examine a stale result if
a polled request had previously failed with -EAGAIN:

        if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL) {
                if (req->result == -EAGAIN)
                        return -EAGAIN;

                io_iopoll_req_issued(req);
        }

and in turn cause a subsequently completed request to be re-issued in
io_wq_submit_work().
Signed-off-by: NBijan Mottahedeh <bijan.mottahedeh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

we need to reload ->d_flags after the call of ->d_manage() - the thing
might've been called with dentry still negative and have the damn thing
turned positive while we'd waited.

Fixes: d41efb52 "fs/namei.c: pull positivity check into follow_managed()"
Reported-by: NIan Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Tested-by: NIan Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... and get rid of a bunch of bugs in it.  Background:
the reason for path_mountpoint() is that umount() really doesn't
want attempts to revalidate the root of what it's trying to umount.
The thing we want to avoid actually happen from complete_walk();
solution was to do something parallel to normal path_lookupat()
and it both went overboard and got the boilerplate subtly
(and not so subtly) wrong.

A better solution is to do pretty much what the normal path_lookupat()
does, but instead of complete_walk() do unlazy_walk().  All it takes
to avoid that ->d_weak_revalidate() call...  mountpoint_last() goes
away, along with everything it got wrong, and so does the magic around
LOOKUP_NO_REVAL.

Another source of bugs is that when we traverse mounts at the final
location (and we need to do that - umount . expects to get whatever's
overmounting ., if any, out of the lookup) we really ought to take
care of ->d_manage() - as it is, manual umount of autofs automount
in progress can lead to unpleasant surprises for the daemon.  Easily
solved by using handle_lookup_down() instead of follow_mount().
Tested-by: NIan Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

If we pass back dependent work in case of links, we need to always
ensure that we call the link setup and work prep handler. If not, we
might be missing some setup for the next work item.
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

If we require mm and user context, mark the request for cancellation
if we fail to acquire the desired mm.
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Fix afs_lookup() to not clobber the version set on a new dentry by
afs_do_lookup() - especially as it's using the wrong version of the
version (we need to use the one given to us by whatever op the dir
contents correspond to rather than what's in the afs_vnode).

Fixes: 9dd0b82e ("afs: Fix missing dentry data version updating")
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

afs_lookup() has a tracepoint to indicate the outcome of
d_splice_alias(), passing it the inode to retrieve the fid from.
However, the function gave up its ref on that inode when it called
d_splice_alias(), which may have failed and dropped the inode.

Fix this by caching the fid.

Fixes: 80548b03 ("afs: Add more tracepoints")
Reported-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

We don't need it, and if we have it, then the retry handler will attempt
to copy the non-existent iovec with the inline iovec, with a segment
count that doesn't make sense.

Fixes: f67676d1 ("io_uring: ensure async punted read/write requests copy iovec")
Reported-by: NJonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

[BUG]
There are several different KASAN reports for balance + snapshot
workloads.  Involved call paths include:

   should_ignore_root+0x54/0xb0 [btrfs]
   build_backref_tree+0x11af/0x2280 [btrfs]
   relocate_tree_blocks+0x391/0xb80 [btrfs]
   relocate_block_group+0x3e5/0xa00 [btrfs]
   btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x240/0x4d0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x53/0xf0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_balance+0xc91/0x1840 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x416/0x4e0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl+0x8af/0x3e60 [btrfs]
   do_vfs_ioctl+0x831/0xb10

   create_reloc_root+0x9f/0x460 [btrfs]
   btrfs_reloc_post_snapshot+0xff/0x6c0 [btrfs]
   create_pending_snapshot+0xa9b/0x15f0 [btrfs]
   create_pending_snapshots+0x111/0x140 [btrfs]
   btrfs_commit_transaction+0x7a6/0x1360 [btrfs]
   btrfs_mksubvol+0x915/0x960 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x1d5/0x1e0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x1d3/0x270 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl+0x241b/0x3e60 [btrfs]
   do_vfs_ioctl+0x831/0xb10

   btrfs_reloc_pre_snapshot+0x85/0xc0 [btrfs]
   create_pending_snapshot+0x209/0x15f0 [btrfs]
   create_pending_snapshots+0x111/0x140 [btrfs]
   btrfs_commit_transaction+0x7a6/0x1360 [btrfs]
   btrfs_mksubvol+0x915/0x960 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x1d5/0x1e0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x1d3/0x270 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl+0x241b/0x3e60 [btrfs]
   do_vfs_ioctl+0x831/0xb10

[CAUSE]
All these call sites are only relying on root->reloc_root, which can
undergo btrfs_drop_snapshot(), and since we don't have real refcount
based protection to reloc roots, we can reach already dropped reloc
root, triggering KASAN.

[FIX]
To avoid such access to unstable root->reloc_root, we should check
BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE bit first.

This patch introduces wrappers that provide the correct way to check the
bit with memory barriers protection.

Most callers don't distinguish merged reloc tree and no reloc tree.  The
only exception is should_ignore_root(), as merged reloc tree can be
ignored, while no reloc tree shouldn't.

[CRITICAL SECTION ANALYSIS]
Although test_bit()/set_bit()/clear_bit() doesn't imply a barrier, the
DEAD_RELOC_TREE bit has extra help from transaction as a higher level
barrier, the lifespan of root::reloc_root and DEAD_RELOC_TREE bit are:

	NULL: reloc_root is NULL	PTR: reloc_root is not NULL
	0: DEAD_RELOC_ROOT bit not set	DEAD: DEAD_RELOC_ROOT bit set

	(NULL, 0)    Initial state		 __
	  |					 /\ Section A
        btrfs_init_reloc_root()			 \/
	  |				 	 __
	(PTR, 0)     reloc_root initialized      /\
          |					 |
	btrfs_update_reloc_root()		 |  Section B
          |					 |
	(PTR, DEAD)  reloc_root has been merged  \/
          |					 __
	=== btrfs_commit_transaction() ====================
	  |					 /\
	clean_dirty_subvols()			 |
	  |					 |  Section C
	(NULL, DEAD) reloc_root cleanup starts   \/
          |					 __
	btrfs_drop_snapshot()			 /\
	  |					 |  Section D
	(NULL, 0)    Back to initial state	 \/

Every have_reloc_root() or test_bit(DEAD_RELOC_ROOT) caller holds
transaction handle, so none of such caller can cross transaction boundary.

In Section A, every caller just found no DEAD bit, and grab reloc_root.

In the cross section A-B, caller may get no DEAD bit, but since reloc_root
is still completely valid thus accessing reloc_root is completely safe.

No test_bit() caller can cross the boundary of Section B and Section C.

In Section C, every caller found the DEAD bit, so no one will access
reloc_root.

In the cross section C-D, either caller gets the DEAD bit set, avoiding
access reloc_root no matter if it's safe or not.  Or caller get the DEAD
bit cleared, then access reloc_root, which is already NULL, nothing will
be wrong.

The memory write barriers are between the reloc_root updates and bit
set/clear, the pairing read side is before test_bit.
Reported-by: NZygo Blaxell <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org>
Fixes: d2311e69 ("btrfs: relocation: Delay reloc tree deletion after merge_reloc_roots")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ barriers ]
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Commit 85a8ce62 ("block: add bio_truncate to fix guard_bio_eod")
adds bio_truncate() for handling bio EOD. However, bio_truncate()
doesn't use the passed 'op' parameter from guard_bio_eod's callers.

So bio_trunacate() may retrieve wrong 'op', and zering pages may
not be done for READ bio.

Fixes this issue by moving guard_bio_eod() after bio_set_op_attrs()
in submit_bh_wbc() so that bio_truncate() can always retrieve correct
op info.

Meantime remove the 'op' parameter from guard_bio_eod() because it isn't
used any more.

Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 85a8ce62 ("block: add bio_truncate to fix guard_bio_eod")
Signed-off-by: NMing Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>

Fold in kerneldoc and bio_op() change.
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

In my attempt to fix a memory leak, I introduced a double-free in the
pstore error path. Instead of trying to manage the allocation lifetime
between persistent_ram_new() and its callers, adjust the logic so
persistent_ram_new() always takes a kstrdup() copy, and leaves the
caller's allocation lifetime up to the caller. Therefore callers are
_always_ responsible for freeing their label. Before, it only needed
freeing when the prz itself failed to allocate, and not in any of the
other prz failure cases, which callers would have no visibility into,
which is the root design problem that lead to both the leak and now
double-free bugs.
Reported-by: NCengiz Can <cengiz@kernel.wtf>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/d4ec59002ede4aaf9928c7f7526da87c@kernel.wtf
Fixes: 8df955a3 ("pstore/ram: Fix error-path memory leak in persistent_ram_new() callers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

When running xfstests on the current btrfs I get the following splat from
kmemleak:

unreferenced object 0xffff88821b2404e0 (size 32):
  comm "kworker/u4:7", pid 26663, jiffies 4295283698 (age 8.776s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 ff fd 26 82 88 ff ff  ...........&....
    10 ff fd 26 82 88 ff ff 20 ff fd 26 82 88 ff ff  ...&.... ..&....
  backtrace:
    [<00000000f94fd43f>] ulist_alloc+0x25/0x60 [btrfs]
    [<00000000fd023d99>] btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0x41/0x100 [btrfs]
    [<000000008f17bd32>] btrfs_find_all_roots+0x52/0x70 [btrfs]
    [<00000000b7660afb>] btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0x343/0x680 [btrfs]
    [<0000000058e66778>] btrfs_work_helper+0xac/0x1e0 [btrfs]
    [<00000000f0188930>] process_one_work+0x1cf/0x350
    [<00000000af5f2f8e>] worker_thread+0x28/0x3c0
    [<00000000b55a1add>] kthread+0x109/0x120
    [<00000000f88cbd17>] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

This corresponds to:

  (gdb) l *(btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0x41)
  0x8d7e1 is in btrfs_find_all_roots_safe (fs/btrfs/backref.c:1413).
  1408
  1409            tmp = ulist_alloc(GFP_NOFS);
  1410            if (!tmp)
  1411                    return -ENOMEM;
  1412            *roots = ulist_alloc(GFP_NOFS);
  1413            if (!*roots) {
  1414                    ulist_free(tmp);
  1415                    return -ENOMEM;
  1416            }
  1417

Following the lifetime of the allocated 'roots' ulist, it gets freed
again in btrfs_qgroup_account_extent().

But this does not happen if the function is called with the
'BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED' flag cleared, then btrfs_qgroup_account_extent()
does a short leave and directly returns.

Instead of directly returning we should jump to the 'out_free' in order to
free all resources as expected.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
[ add comment ]
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

btrfs_del_root_ref() will simply WARN_ON() if the ref doesn't match in
any way, and then continue to delete the reference.  This shouldn't
happen, we have these values because there's more to the reference than
the original root and the sub root.  If any of these checks fail, return
-ENOENT.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

If we have the following sequence of events

  btrfs sub create A
  btrfs sub create A/B
  btrfs sub snap A C
  mkdir C/foo
  mv A/B C/foo
  rm -rf *

We will end up with a transaction abort.

The reason for this is because we create a root ref for B pointing to A.
When we create a snapshot of C we still have B in our tree, but because
the root ref points to A and not C we will make it appear to be empty.

The problem happens when we move B into C.  This removes the root ref
for B pointing to A and adds a ref of B pointing to C.  When we rmdir C
we'll see that we have a ref to our root and remove the root ref,
despite not actually matching our reference name.

Now btrfs_del_root_ref() allowing this to work is a bug as well, however
we know that this inode does not actually point to a root ref in the
first place, so we shouldn't be calling btrfs_del_root_ref() in the
first place and instead simply look up our dir index for this item and
do the rest of the removal.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

btrfs_unlink_subvol takes the name of the dentry and the root objectid
based on what kind of inode this is, either a real subvolume link or a
empty one that we inherited as a snapshot.  We need to fix how we unlink
in the case for BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID in the future, so rework
btrfs_unlink_subvol to just take the dentry and handle getting the right
objectid given the type of inode this is.  There is no functional change
here, simply pushing the work into btrfs_unlink_subvol() proper.
Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

We currently punt any short read on a regular file to async context,
but this fails if the short read is due to running into EOF. This is
especially problematic since we only do the single prep for commands
now, as we don't reset kiocb->ki_pos. This can result in a 4k read on
a 1k file returning zero, as we detect the short read and then retry
from async context. At the time of retry, the position is now 1k, and
we end up reading nothing, and hence return 0.

Instead of trying to patch around the fact that short reads can be
legitimate and won't succeed in case of retry, remove the logic to punt
a short read to async context. Simply return it.
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

'chrdev_open()' calls 'cdev_get()' to obtain a reference to the
'struct cdev *' stashed in the 'i_cdev' field of the target inode
structure. If the pointer is NULL, then it is initialised lazily by
looking up the kobject in the 'cdev_map' and so the whole procedure is
protected by the 'cdev_lock' spinlock to serialise initialisation of
the shared pointer.

Unfortunately, it is possible for the initialising thread to fail *after*
installing the new pointer, for example if the subsequent '->open()' call
on the file fails. In this case, 'cdev_put()' is called, the reference
count on the kobject is dropped and, if nobody else has taken a reference,
the release function is called which finally clears 'inode->i_cdev' from
'cdev_purge()' before potentially freeing the object. The problem here
is that a racing thread can happily take the 'cdev_lock' and see the
non-NULL pointer in the inode, which can result in a refcount increment
from zero and a warning:

  |  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  |  refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
  |  WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 6385 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x6d/0xf0
  |  Modules linked in:
  |  CPU: 2 PID: 6385 Comm: repro Not tainted 5.5.0-rc2+ #22
  |  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
  |  RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x6d/0xf0
  |  Code: 05 55 9a 15 01 01 e8 9d aa c8 ff 0f 0b c3 80 3d 45 9a 15 01 00 75 ce 48 c7 c7 00 9c 62 b3 c6 08
  |  RSP: 0018:ffffb524c1b9bc70 EFLAGS: 00010282
  |  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e9da1f71390 RCX: 0000000000000000
  |  RDX: ffff9e9dbbd27618 RSI: ffff9e9dbbd18798 RDI: ffff9e9dbbd18798
  |  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000095f R09: 0000000000000039
  |  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffb524c1b9bb20 R12: ffff9e9da1e8c700
  |  R13: ffffffffb25ee8b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9e9da1e8c700
  |  FS:  00007f3b87d26700(0000) GS:ffff9e9dbbd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  |  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  |  CR2: 00007fc16909c000 CR3: 000000012df9c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
  |  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  |  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  |  Call Trace:
  |   kobject_get+0x5c/0x60
  |   cdev_get+0x2b/0x60
  |   chrdev_open+0x55/0x220
  |   ? cdev_put.part.3+0x20/0x20
  |   do_dentry_open+0x13a/0x390
  |   path_openat+0x2c8/0x1470
  |   do_filp_open+0x93/0x100
  |   ? selinux_file_ioctl+0x17f/0x220
  |   do_sys_open+0x186/0x220
  |   do_syscall_64+0x48/0x150
  |   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  |  RIP: 0033:0x7f3b87efcd0e
  |  Code: 89 54 24 08 e8 a3 f4 ff ff 8b 74 24 0c 48 8b 3c 24 41 89 c0 44 8b 54 24 08 b8 01 01 00 00 89 f4
  |  RSP: 002b:00007f3b87d259f0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
  |  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3b87efcd0e
  |  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f3b87d25a80 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
  |  RBP: 00007f3b87d25e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  |  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007ffe188f504e
  |  R13: 00007ffe188f504f R14: 00007f3b87d26700 R15: 0000000000000000
  |  ---[ end trace 24f53ca58db8180a ]---

Since 'cdev_get()' can already fail to obtain a reference, simply move
it over to use 'kobject_get_unless_zero()' instead of 'kobject_get()',
which will cause the racing thread to return -ENXIO if the initialising
thread fails unexpectedly.

Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reported-by: syzbot+82defefbbd8527e1c2cb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191219120203.32691-1-will@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Because ocfs2_get_dlm_debug() function is called once less here, ocfs2
file system will trigger the system crash, usually after ocfs2 file
system is unmounted.

This system crash is caused by a generic memory corruption, these crash
backtraces are not always the same, for exapmle,

    ocfs2: Unmounting device (253,16) on (node 172167785)
    general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
    CPU: 3 PID: 14107 Comm: fence_legacy Kdump:
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
    RIP: 0010:__kmalloc+0xa5/0x2a0
    Code: 00 00 4d 8b 07 65 4d 8b
    RSP: 0018:ffffaa1fc094bbe8 EFLAGS: 00010286
    RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: d310a8800d7a3faf RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000dc0 RDI: ffff96e68fc036c0
    RBP: d310a8800d7a3faf R08: ffff96e6ffdb10a0 R09: 00000000752e7079
    R10: 000000000001c513 R11: 0000000004091041 R12: 0000000000000dc0
    R13: 0000000000000039 R14: ffff96e68fc036c0 R15: ffff96e68fc036c0
    FS:  00007f699dfba540(0000) GS:ffff96e6ffd80000(0000) knlGS:00000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 000055f3a9d9b768 CR3: 000000002cd1c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    Call Trace:
     ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x35/0x100 [ext4]
     htree_dirblock_to_tree+0xea/0x290 [ext4]
     ext4_htree_fill_tree+0x1c1/0x2d0 [ext4]
     ext4_readdir+0x67c/0x9d0 [ext4]
     iterate_dir+0x8d/0x1a0
     __x64_sys_getdents+0xab/0x130
     do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1f0
     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
    RIP: 0033:0x7f699d33a9fb

This regression problem was introduced by commit e581595e ("ocfs: no
need to check return value of debugfs_create functions").

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191225061501.13587-1-ghe@suse.com
Fixes: e581595e ("ocfs: no need to check return value of debugfs_create functions")
Signed-off-by: NGang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[5.3+]
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

If journal is dirty when mount, it will be replayed but jbd2 sb log tail
cannot be updated to mark a new start because journal->j_flag has
already been set with JBD2_ABORT first in journal_init_common.

When a new transaction is committed, it will be recored in block 1
first(journal->j_tail is set to 1 in journal_reset).  If emergency
restart happens again before journal super block is updated
unfortunately, the new recorded trans will not be replayed in the next
mount.

The following steps describe this procedure in detail.
1. mount and touch some files
2. these transactions are committed to journal area but not checkpointed
3. emergency restart
4. mount again and its journals are replayed
5. journal super block's first s_start is 1, but its s_seq is not updated
6. touch a new file and its trans is committed but not checkpointed
7. emergency restart again
8. mount and journal is dirty, but trans committed in 6 will not be
replayed.

This exception happens easily when this lun is used by only one node.
If it is used by multi-nodes, other node will replay its journal and its
journal super block will be updated after recovery like what this patch
does.

ocfs2_recover_node->ocfs2_replay_journal.

The following jbd2 journal can be generated by touching a new file after
journal is replayed, and seq 15 is the first valid commit, but first seq
is 13 in journal super block.

logdump:
  Block 0: Journal Superblock
  Seq: 0   Type: 4 (JBD2_SUPERBLOCK_V2)
  Blocksize: 4096   Total Blocks: 32768   First Block: 1
  First Commit ID: 13   Start Log Blknum: 1
  Error: 0
  Feature Compat: 0
  Feature Incompat: 2 block64
  Feature RO compat: 0
  Journal UUID: 4ED3822C54294467A4F8E87D2BA4BC36
  FS Share Cnt: 1   Dynamic Superblk Blknum: 0
  Per Txn Block Limit    Journal: 0    Data: 0

  Block 1: Journal Commit Block
  Seq: 14   Type: 2 (JBD2_COMMIT_BLOCK)

  Block 2: Journal Descriptor
  Seq: 15   Type: 1 (JBD2_DESCRIPTOR_BLOCK)
  No. Blocknum        Flags
   0. 587             none
  UUID: 00000000000000000000000000000000
   1. 8257792         JBD2_FLAG_SAME_UUID
   2. 619             JBD2_FLAG_SAME_UUID
   3. 24772864        JBD2_FLAG_SAME_UUID
   4. 8257802         JBD2_FLAG_SAME_UUID
   5. 513             JBD2_FLAG_SAME_UUID JBD2_FLAG_LAST_TAG
  ...
  Block 7: Inode
  Inode: 8257802   Mode: 0640   Generation: 57157641 (0x3682809)
  FS Generation: 2839773110 (0xa9437fb6)
  CRC32: 00000000   ECC: 0000
  Type: Regular   Attr: 0x0   Flags: Valid
  Dynamic Features: (0x1) InlineData
  User: 0 (root)   Group: 0 (root)   Size: 7
  Links: 1   Clusters: 0
  ctime: 0x5de5d870 0x11104c61 -- Tue Dec  3 11:37:20.286280801 2019
  atime: 0x5de5d870 0x113181a1 -- Tue Dec  3 11:37:20.288457121 2019
  mtime: 0x5de5d870 0x11104c61 -- Tue Dec  3 11:37:20.286280801 2019
  dtime: 0x0 -- Thu Jan  1 08:00:00 1970
  ...
  Block 9: Journal Commit Block
  Seq: 15   Type: 2 (JBD2_COMMIT_BLOCK)

The following is journal recovery log when recovering the upper jbd2
journal when mount again.

syslog:
  ocfs2: File system on device (252,1) was not unmounted cleanly, recovering it.
  fs/jbd2/recovery.c:(do_one_pass, 449): Starting recovery pass 0
  fs/jbd2/recovery.c:(do_one_pass, 449): Starting recovery pass 1
  fs/jbd2/recovery.c:(do_one_pass, 449): Starting recovery pass 2
  fs/jbd2/recovery.c:(jbd2_journal_recover, 278): JBD2: recovery, exit status 0, recovered transactions 13 to 13

Due to first commit seq 13 recorded in journal super is not consistent
with the value recorded in block 1(seq is 14), journal recovery will be
terminated before seq 15 even though it is an unbroken commit, inode
8257802 is a new file and it will be lost.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191217020140.2197-1-li.kai4@h3c.comSigned-off-by: NKai Li <li.kai4@h3c.com>
Reviewed-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: NChangwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fix kernel-doc warnings in fs/posix_acl.c.
Also fix one typo (setgit -> setgid).

  fs/posix_acl.c:647: warning: Function parameter or member 'inode' not described in 'posix_acl_update_mode'
  fs/posix_acl.c:647: warning: Function parameter or member 'mode_p' not described in 'posix_acl_update_mode'
  fs/posix_acl.c:647: warning: Function parameter or member 'acl' not described in 'posix_acl_update_mode'

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/29b0dc46-1f28-a4e5-b1d0-ba2b65629779@infradead.org
Fixes: 07393101 ("posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions")
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Make to_mnt_ns() static to address the following 'sparse' warning:

    fs/namespace.c:1731:22: warning: symbol 'to_mnt_ns' was not declared. Should it be static?

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191209234830.156260-1-ebiggers@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Include linux/proc_fs.h and fs/internal.h to address the following
'sparse' warnings:

    fs/nsfs.c:41:32: warning: symbol 'ns_dentry_operations' was not declared. Should it be static?
    fs/nsfs.c:145:5: warning: symbol 'open_related_ns' was not declared. Should it be static?

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191209234822.156179-1-ebiggers@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Include fs/internal.h to address the following 'sparse' warning:

    fs/direct-io.c:591:5: warning: symbol 'sb_init_dio_done_wq' was not declared. Should it be static?

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191209234544.128302-1-ebiggers@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

LTP memfd_create04 started failing for some huge page sizes
after v5.4-10135-gc3bfc5dd.

The problem is the check introduced to for_each_hstate() loop that
should skip default_hstate_idx.  Since it doesn't update 'i' counter,
all subsequent huge page sizes are skipped as well.

Fixes: 8fc312b3 ("mm/hugetlbfs: fix error handling when setting up mounts")
Signed-off-by: NJan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>