- 18 10月, 2018 5 次提交
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
We only need to allocate blocks for zeroing for reflink inodes, and for we currently have a special case for reflink files in the otherwise direct I/O path that I'd like to get rid of. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
The option to enable unwritten extents was made default in 2003, removed from mkfs in 2007, and cannot be disabled in v5. We also rely on it for a lot of common functionality, so filesystems without it will run a completely untested and buggy code path. Enabling the support also is a simple bit flip using xfs_db, so legacy file systems can still be brought forward. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
The invalid state isn't any different from a hole, so merge the two states. Use the more descriptive hole name, but keep it as the first value of the enum to catch uninitialized fields. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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- 06 10月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
When reflinking sub-file ranges, a data corruption can occur when the source file range includes a partial EOF block. This shares the unknown data beyond EOF into the second file at a position inside EOF, exposing stale data in the second file. XFS only supports whole block sharing, but we still need to support whole file reflink correctly. Hence if the reflink request includes the last block of the souce file, only proceed with the reflink operation if it lands at or past the destination file's current EOF. If it lands within the destination file EOF, reject the entire request with -EINVAL and make the caller go the hard way. This avoids the data corruption vector, but also avoids disruption of returning EINVAL to userspace for the common case of whole file cloning. Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
A deduplication data corruption is Exposed by fstests generic/505 on XFS. It is caused by extending the block match range to include the partial EOF block, but then allowing unknown data beyond EOF to be considered a "match" to data in the destination file because the comparison is only made to the end of the source file. This corrupts the destination file when the source extent is shared with it. XFS only supports whole block dedupe, but we still need to appear to support whole file dedupe correctly. Hence if the dedupe request includes the last block of the souce file, don't include it in the actual XFS dedupe operation. If the rest of the range dedupes successfully, then report the partial last block as deduped, too, so that userspace sees it as a successful dedupe rather than return EINVAL because we can't dedupe unaligned blocks. Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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- 05 10月, 2018 3 次提交
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由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于
Before cloning into a file, update the ctime and remove sensitive attributes like suid, just like we'd do for a regular file write. Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于
When we're reflinking between two files and the destination file range is well beyond the destination file's EOF marker, zero any posteof speculative preallocations in the destination file so that we don't expose stale disk contents. The previous strategy of trying to clear the preallocations does not work if the destination file has the PREALLOC flag set. Uncovered by shared/010. Reported-by: NZorro Lang <zlang@redhat.com> Bugzilla-id: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201259Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于
Refactor all the reflink preparation steps into a separate helper that we'll use to land all the upcoming fixes for insufficient input checks. This rework also moves the invalidation of the destination range to the prep function so that it is done before the range is remapped. This ensures that nobody can access the data in range being remapped until the remap is complete. [dgc: fix xfs_reflink_remap_prep() return value and caller check to handle vfs_clone_file_prep_inodes() returning 0 to mean "nothing to do". ] [dgc: make sure length changed by vfs_clone_file_prep_inodes() gets propagated back to XFS code that does the remapping. ] Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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- 01 10月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
Commit 01239d77 ("xfs: fix a null pointer dereference in xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree") attempted to fix a null pointer dreference when a fuzzing corruption of some kind was found. This fix was flawed, resulting in assert failures like: XFS: Assertion failed: ifp->if_broot == NULL, file: fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c, line: 715 ..... Call Trace: xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree+0x6b9/0x7b0 __xfs_bunmapi+0xae7/0xf00 ? xfs_log_reserve+0x1c8/0x290 xfs_reflink_remap_extent+0x20b/0x620 xfs_reflink_remap_blocks+0x7e/0x290 xfs_reflink_remap_range+0x311/0x530 vfs_dedupe_file_range_one+0xd7/0xe0 vfs_dedupe_file_range+0x15b/0x1a0 do_vfs_ioctl+0x267/0x6c0 The problem is that the error handling code now asserts that the inode fork is not in btree format before the error handling code undoes the modifications that put the fork back in extent format. Fix this by moving the assert back to after the xfs_iroot_realloc() call that returns the fork to extent format, and clean up the jump labels to be meaningful. Also, returning ENOSPC when xfs_btree_get_bufl() fails to instantiate the buffer that was allocated (the actual fix in the commit mentioned above) is incorrect. This is a fatal error - only an invalid block address or a filesystem shutdown can result in failing to get a buffer here. Hence change this to EFSCORRUPTED so that the higher layer knows this was a corruption related failure and should not treat it as an ENOSPC error. This should result in a shutdown (via cancelling a dirty transaction) which is necessary as we do not attempt to clean up the (invalid) block that we have already allocated. Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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- 29 9月, 2018 14 次提交
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由 Brian Foster 提交于
The iomap page fault mechanism currently dirties the associated page after the full block range of the page has been allocated. This leaves the page susceptible to delayed allocations without ever being set dirty on sub-page block sized filesystems. For example, consider a page fault on a page with one preexisting real (non-delalloc) block allocated in the middle of the page. The first iomap_apply() iteration performs delayed allocation on the range up to the preexisting block, the next iteration finds the preexisting block, and the last iteration attempts to perform delayed allocation on the range after the prexisting block to the end of the page. If the first allocation succeeds and the final allocation fails with -ENOSPC, iomap_apply() returns the error and iomap_page_mkwrite() fails to dirty the page having already performed partial delayed allocation. This eventually results in the page being invalidated without ever converting the delayed allocation to real blocks. This problem is reliably reproduced by generic/083 on XFS on ppc64 systems (64k page size, 4k block size). It results in leaked delalloc blocks on inode reclaim, which triggers an assert failure in xfs_fs_destroy_inode() and filesystem accounting inconsistency. Move the set_page_dirty() call from iomap_page_mkwrite() to the actor callback, similar to how the buffer head implementation works. The actor callback is called iff ->iomap_begin() returns success, so ensures the page is dirtied as soon as possible after an allocation. Signed-off-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Brian Foster 提交于
One of the first steps of log recovery is to check for the special case of a zeroed log. If the first cycle in the log is zero or the tail portion of the log is zeroed, the head is set to the first instance of cycle 0. xlog_find_zeroed() includes a sanity check that enforces that the first cycle in the log must be 1 if the last cycle is 0. While this is true in most cases, the check is not totally valid because it doesn't consider the case where the filesystem crashed after a partial/out of order log buffer completion that wraps around the end of the physical log. For example, consider a filesystem that has completed most of the first cycle of the log, reaches the end of the physical log and splits the next single log buffer write into two in order to wrap around the end of the log. If these I/Os are reordered, the second (wrapped) I/O completes and the first happens to fail, the log is left in a state where the last cycle of the log is 0 and the first cycle is 2. This causes the xlog_find_zeroed() sanity check to fail and prevents the filesystem from mounting. This situation has been reproduced on particular systems via repeated runs of generic/475. This is an expected state that log recovery already knows how to deal with, however. Since the log is still partially zeroed, the head is detected correctly and points to a valid tail. The subsequent stale block detection clears blocks beyond the head up to the tail (within a maximum range), with the express purpose of clearing such out of order writes. As expected, this removes the out of order cycle 2 blocks at the physical start of the log. In other words, the only thing that prevents a clean mount and recovery of the filesystem in this scenario is the specific (last == 0 && first != 1) sanity check in xlog_find_zeroed(). Since the log head/tail are now independently validated via cycle, log record and CRC checks, this highly specific first cycle check is of dubious value. Remove it and rely on the higher level validation to determine whether log content is sane and recoverable. Signed-off-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Eric Sandeen 提交于
Verify the inode di_forkoff, lifted from xfs_repair's process_check_inode_forkoff(). Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
The iomap direct I/O code issues a single ->end_io call for the whole I/O request, and if some of the extents cowered needed a COW operation it will call xfs_reflink_end_cow over the whole range. When we do AIO writes we drop the iolock after doing the initial setup, but before the I/O completion. Between dropping the lock and completing the I/O we can have a racing buffered write create new delalloc COW fork extents in the region covered by the outstanding direct I/O write, and thus see delalloc COW fork extents in xfs_reflink_end_cow. As concurrent writes are fundamentally racy and no guarantees are given we can simply skip those. This can be easily reproduced with xfstests generic/208 in always_cow mode. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Eric Sandeen 提交于
xchk_inode_flags2() currently treats any di_flags2 values that the running kernel doesn't recognize as corruption, and calls xchk_ino_set_corrupt() if they are set. However, it's entirely possible that these flags were set in some newer kernel and are quite valid, but ignored in this kernel. (Validators don't care one bit about unknown di_flags2.) Call xchk_ino_set_warning instead, because this may or may not actually indicate a problem. Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 YueHaibing 提交于
Remove duplicated include xfs_alloc.h Signed-off-by: NYueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
This function is only used to punch out delayed allocations on I/O failure, which means we need to have read the extents earlier. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
When xfs_reflink_allocate_cow() allocates a transaction, it drops the ILOCK to perform the operation. This Introduces a race condition where another thread modifying the file can perform the COW allocation operation underneath us. This result in the retry loop finding an allocated block and jumping straight to the conversion code. It does not, however, cancel the transaction it holds and so this gets leaked. This results in a lockdep warning: ================================================ WARNING: lock held when returning to user space! 4.18.5 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------ worker/6123 is leaving the kernel with locks still held! 1 lock held by worker/6123: #0: 000000009eab4f1b (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: xfs_trans_alloc+0x17c/0x220 And eventually the filesystem deadlocks because it runs out of log space that is reserved by the leaked transaction and never gets released. The logic flow in xfs_reflink_allocate_cow() is a convoluted mess of gotos - it's no surprise that it has bug where the flow through several goto jumps then fails to clean up context from a non-obvious logic path. CLean up the logic flow and make sure every path does the right thing. Reported-by: NAlexander Y. Fomichev <git.user@gmail.com> Tested-by: NAlexander Y. Fomichev <git.user@gmail.com> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200981Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> [hch: slight refactor] Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
We've had a few reports of lockdep tripping over memory reclaim context vs filesystem freeze "deadlocks". They all have looked to be false positives on analysis, but it seems that they are being tripped because we take freeze references before we run a GFP_KERNEL allocation for the struct xfs_trans. We can avoid this false positive vector just by re-ordering the operations in xfs_trans_alloc(). That is. we need allocate the structure before we take the freeze reference and enter the GFP_NOFS allocation context that follows the xfs_trans around. This prevents lockdep from seeing the GFP_KERNEL allocation inside the transaction context, and that prevents it from triggering the freeze level vs alloc context vs reclaim warnings. Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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由 Brian Foster 提交于
The xfs_buf_log_item structure has a reference counter with slightly tricky semantics. In the common case, a buffer is logged and committed in a transaction, committed to the on-disk log (added to the AIL) and then finally written back and removed from the AIL. The bli refcount covers two potentially overlapping timeframes: 1. the bli is held in an active transaction 2. the bli is pinned by the log The caveat to this approach is that the reference counter does not purely dictate the lifetime of the bli. IOW, when a dirty buffer is physically logged and unpinned, the bli refcount may go to zero as the log item is inserted into the AIL. Only once the buffer is written back can the bli finally be freed. The above semantics means that it is not enough for the various refcount decrementing contexts to release the bli on decrement to zero. xfs_trans_brelse(), transaction commit (->iop_unlock()) and unpin (->iop_unpin()) must all drop the associated reference and make additional checks to determine if the current context is responsible for freeing the item. For example, if a transaction holds but does not dirty a particular bli, the commit may drop the refcount to zero. If the bli itself is clean, it is also not AIL resident and must be freed at this time. The same is true for xfs_trans_brelse(). If the transaction dirties a bli and then aborts or an unpin results in an abort due to a log I/O error, the last reference count holder is expected to explicitly remove the item from the AIL and release it (since an abort means filesystem shutdown and metadata writeback will never occur). This leads to fairly complex checks being replicated in a few different places. Since ->iop_unlock() and xfs_trans_brelse() are nearly identical, refactor the logic into a common helper that implements and documents the semantics in one place. This patch does not change behavior. Signed-off-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Brian Foster 提交于
xfs_trans_brelse() is a bit of a historical mess, similar to xfs_buf_item_unlock(). It is unnecessarily verbose, has snippets of commented out code, inconsistency with regard to stale items, etc. Clean up xfs_trans_brelse() to use similar logic and flow as xfs_buf_item_unlock() with regard to bli reference count handling. This patch makes no functional changes, but facilitates further refactoring of the common bli reference count handling code. Signed-off-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Brian Foster 提交于
xfstests generic/388,475 occasionally reproduce assertion failures in xfs_buf_item_unpin() when the final bli reference is dropped on an invalidated buffer and the buffer is not locked as it is expected to be. Invalidated buffers should remain locked on transaction commit until the final unpin, at which point the buffer is removed from the AIL and the bli is freed since stale buffers are not written back. The assert failures are associated with filesystem shutdown, typically due to log I/O errors injected by the test. The problematic situation can occur if the shutdown happens to cause a race between an active transaction that has invalidated a particular buffer and an I/O error on a log buffer that contains the bli associated with the same (now stale) buffer. Both transaction and log contexts acquire a bli reference. If the transaction has already invalidated the buffer by the time the I/O error occurs and ends up aborting due to shutdown, the transaction and log hold the last two references to a stale bli. If the transaction cancel occurs first, it treats the buffer as non-stale due to the aborted state: the bli reference is dropped and the buffer is released/unlocked. The log buffer I/O error handling eventually calls into xfs_buf_item_unpin(), drops the final reference to the bli and treats it as stale. The buffer wasn't left locked by xfs_buf_item_unlock(), however, so the assert fails and the buffer is double unlocked. The latter problem is mitigated by the fact that the fs is shutdown and no further damage is possible. ->iop_unlock() of an invalidated buffer should behave consistently with respect to the bli refcount, regardless of aborted state. If the refcount remains elevated on commit, we know the bli is awaiting an unpin (since it can't be in another transaction) and will be handled appropriately on log buffer completion. If the final bli reference of an invalidated buffer is dropped in ->iop_unlock(), we can assume the transaction has aborted because invalidation implies a dirty transaction. In the non-abort case, the log would have acquired a bli reference in ->iop_pin() and prevented bli release at ->iop_unlock() time. In the abort case the item must be freed and buffer unlocked because it wasn't pinned by the log. Rework xfs_buf_item_unlock() to simplify the currently circuitous and duplicate logic and leave invalidated buffers locked based on bli refcount, regardless of aborted state. This ensures that a pinned, stale buffer is always found locked when eventually unpinned. Signed-off-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Brian Foster 提交于
Now that deferred operations are completely managed via transactions, it's no longer necessary to cancel the dfops in error paths that already cancel the associated transaction. There are a few such calls lingering throughout the codebase. Remove all remaining unnecessary calls to xfs_defer_cancel(). This leaves xfs_defer_cancel() calls in two places. The first is the call in the transaction cancel path itself, which facilitates this patch. The second is made via the xfs_defer_finish() error path to provide consistent error semantics with transaction commit. For example, xfs_trans_commit() expects an xfs_defer_finish() failure to clean up the dfops structure before it returns. Signed-off-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于
The VFS routine that calls ->get_link blindly copies whatever's returned into the user's buffer. If we return a NULL pointer, the vfs will crash on the null pointer. Therefore, return -EFSCORRUPTED instead of blowing up the kernel. [dgc: clean up with hch's suggestions] Reported-by: wen.xu@gatech.edu Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NAllison Henderson <allison.henderson@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
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- 26 8月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Colin Ian King 提交于
At the point where r is being checked for different values, r is always going to be equal to 2 as the previous if statements jump to end or end1 if r is not 2. Hence the assignment to err can be simplified to just err an assignment without any checks on the value or r. Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1226737 ("Logically dead code") Signed-off-by: NColin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: NMikulas Patocka <mikulas@artax.karlin.mff.cuni.cz> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 24 8月, 2018 13 次提交
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由 Richard Weinberger 提交于
This empty file sneaked into the tree by mistake. Remove it. Fixes: 6eb61d58 ("ubifs: Pass struct ubifs_info to ubifs_assert()") Signed-off-by: NRichard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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由 Souptick Joarder 提交于
Use new return type vm_fault_t for fault handler. For now, this is just documenting that the function returns a VM_FAULT value rather than an errno. Once all instances are converted, vm_fault_t will become a distinct type. Ref-> commit 1c8f4220 ("mm: change return type to vm_fault_t") The aim is to change the return type of finish_fault() and handle_mm_fault() to vm_fault_t type. As part of that clean up return type of all other recursively called functions have been changed to vm_fault_t type. The places from where handle_mm_fault() is getting invoked will be change to vm_fault_t type but in a separate patch. vmf_error() is the newly introduce inline function in 4.17-rc6. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: don't shadow outer local `ret' in __do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180604171727.GA20279@jordon-HP-15-Notebook-PCSigned-off-by: NSouptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NMatthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Arnd Bergmann 提交于
Without CONFIG_MMU, we get a build warning: fs/proc/vmcore.c:228:12: error: 'vmcoredd_mmap_dumps' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-function] static int vmcoredd_mmap_dumps(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long dst, The function is only referenced from an #ifdef'ed caller, so this uses the same #ifdef around it. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180525213526.2117790-1-arnd@arndb.de Fixes: 7efe48df ("vmcore: append device dumps to vmcore as elf notes") Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Ganesh Goudar <ganeshgr@chelsio.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Rahul Lakkireddy <rahul.lakkireddy@chelsio.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Souptick Joarder 提交于
Use new return type vm_fault_t for fault handler in struct vm_operations_struct. For now, this is just documenting that the function returns a VM_FAULT value rather than an errno. Once all instances are converted, vm_fault_t will become a distinct type. See 1c8f4220 ("mm: change return type to vm_fault_t") for reference. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180702152017.GA3780@jordon-HP-15-Notebook-PCSigned-off-by: NSouptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NMatthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Salvatore Mesoraca 提交于
Disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world writable sticky directories, unless the owner is the same as that of the directory or the file is opened without the O_CREAT flag. The purpose is to make data spoofing attacks harder. This protection can be turned on and off separately for FIFOs and regular files via sysctl, just like the symlinks/hardlinks protection. This patch is based on Openwall's "HARDEN_FIFO" feature by Solar Designer. This is a brief list of old vulnerabilities that could have been prevented by this feature, some of them even allow for privilege escalation: CVE-2000-1134 CVE-2007-3852 CVE-2008-0525 CVE-2009-0416 CVE-2011-4834 CVE-2015-1838 CVE-2015-7442 CVE-2016-7489 This list is not meant to be complete. It's difficult to track down all vulnerabilities of this kind because they were often reported without any mention of this particular attack vector. In fact, before hardlinks/symlinks restrictions, fifos/regular files weren't the favorite vehicle to exploit them. [s.mesoraca16@gmail.com: fix bug reported by Dan Carpenter] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180426081456.GA7060@mwanda Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524829819-11275-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com [keescook@chromium.org: drop pr_warn_ratelimited() in favor of audit changes in the future] [keescook@chromium.org: adjust commit subjet] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180416175918.GA13494@beastSigned-off-by: NSalvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: NSolar Designer <solar@openwall.com> Suggested-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Ernesto A. Fernández 提交于
hfs_find_exit() expects fd->bnode to be NULL after a search has failed. hfs_brec_insert() may instead set it to an error-valued pointer. Fix this to prevent a crash. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/53d9749a029c41b4016c495fc5838c9dba3afc52.1530294815.git.ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NErnesto A. Fernández <ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.com> Cc: Anatoly Trosinenko <anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com> Cc: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Ernesto A. Fernandez 提交于
hfs_find_exit() expects fd->bnode to be NULL after a search has failed. hfs_brec_insert() may instead set it to an error-valued pointer. Fix this to prevent a crash. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/803590a35221fbf411b2c141419aea3233a6e990.1530294813.git.ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NErnesto A. Fernandez <ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.com> Reported-by: NAnatoly Trosinenko <anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NVyacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Ernesto A. Fernández 提交于
An HFS+ filesystem can be mounted read-only without having a metadata directory, which is needed to support hardlinks. But if the catalog data is corrupted, a directory lookup may still find dentries claiming to be hardlinks. hfsplus_lookup() does check that ->hidden_dir is not NULL in such a situation, but mistakenly does so after dereferencing it for the first time. Reorder this check to prevent a crash. This happens when looking up corrupted catalog data (dentry) on a filesystem with no metadata directory (this could only ever happen on a read-only mount). Wen Xu sent the replication steps in detail to the fsdevel list: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200297 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180712215344.q44dyrhymm4ajkao@eafSigned-off-by: NErnesto A. Fernández <ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.com> Reported-by: NWen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu> Cc: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Steve French 提交于
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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由 Nicholas Mc Guire 提交于
The kmalloc was not being checked - if it fails issue a warning and return -ENOMEM to the caller. Signed-off-by: NNicholas Mc Guire <hofrat@osadl.org> Fixes: b8da344b ("cifs: dynamic allocation of ntlmssp blob") Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>`
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由 Ronnie Sahlberg 提交于
Some SMB2/3 servers, Win2016 but possibly others too, adds padding not only between PDUs in a compound but also to the final PDU. This padding extends the PDU to a multiple of 8 bytes. Check if the unexpected length looks like this might be the case and avoid triggering the log messages for : "SMB2 server sent bad RFC1001 len %d not %d\n" Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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由 Ronnie Sahlberg 提交于
Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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由 Christian Brauner 提交于
When running in a container with a user namespace, if you call getxattr with name = "system.posix_acl_access" and size % 8 != 4, then getxattr silently skips the user namespace fixup that it normally does resulting in un-fixed-up data being returned. This is caused by posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() being passed the total buffer size and not the actual size of the xattr as returned by vfs_getxattr(). This commit passes the actual length of the xattr as returned by vfs_getxattr() down. A reproducer for the issue is: touch acl_posix setfacl -m user:0:rwx acl_posix and the compile: #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <errno.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <attr/xattr.h> /* Run in user namespace with nsuid 0 mapped to uid != 0 on the host. */ int main(int argc, void **argv) { ssize_t ret1, ret2; char buf1[128], buf2[132]; int fret = EXIT_SUCCESS; char *file; if (argc < 2) { fprintf(stderr, "Please specify a file with " "\"system.posix_acl_access\" permissions set\n"); _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } file = argv[1]; ret1 = getxattr(file, "system.posix_acl_access", buf1, sizeof(buf1)); if (ret1 < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s - Failed to retrieve " "\"system.posix_acl_access\" " "from \"%s\"\n", strerror(errno), file); _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } ret2 = getxattr(file, "system.posix_acl_access", buf2, sizeof(buf2)); if (ret2 < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s - Failed to retrieve " "\"system.posix_acl_access\" " "from \"%s\"\n", strerror(errno), file); _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } if (ret1 != ret2) { fprintf(stderr, "The value of \"system.posix_acl_" "access\" for file \"%s\" changed " "between two successive calls\n", file); _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } for (ssize_t i = 0; i < ret2; i++) { if (buf1[i] == buf2[i]) continue; fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected different in byte %zd: " "%02x != %02x\n", i, buf1[i], buf2[i]); fret = EXIT_FAILURE; } if (fret == EXIT_SUCCESS) fprintf(stderr, "Test passed\n"); else fprintf(stderr, "Test failed\n"); _exit(fret); } and run: ./tester acl_posix On a non-fixed up kernel this should return something like: root@c1:/# ./t Unexpected different in byte 16: ffffffa0 != 00 Unexpected different in byte 17: ffffff86 != 00 Unexpected different in byte 18: 01 != 00 and on a fixed kernel: root@c1:~# ./t Test passed Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2f6f0654 ("userns: Convert vfs posix_acl support to use kuids and kgids") Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199945Reported-by: NColin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 23 8月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Chuck Lever 提交于
Clean up: The global callback_cred is no longer used, so it can be removed. Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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