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  1. 06 7月, 2017 2 次提交
  3. 03 7月, 2017 1 次提交
  5. 29 6月, 2017 1 次提交
    • J
      block: provide bio_uninit() free freeing integrity/task associations · 9ae3b3f5
      由 Jens Axboe 提交于 
      Wen reports significant memory leaks with DIF and O_DIRECT:

"With nvme devive + T10 enabled, On a system it has 256GB and started
logging /proc/meminfo & /proc/slabinfo for every minute and in an hour
it increased by 15968128 kB or ~15+GB.. Approximately 256 MB / minute
leaking.

/proc/meminfo | grep SUnreclaim...

SUnreclaim:      6752128 kB
SUnreclaim:      6874880 kB
SUnreclaim:      7238080 kB
....
SUnreclaim:     22307264 kB
SUnreclaim:     22485888 kB
SUnreclaim:     22720256 kB

When testcases with T10 enabled call into __blkdev_direct_IO_simple,
code doesn't free memory allocated by bio_integrity_alloc. The patch
fixes the issue. HTX has been run with +60 hours without failure."

Since __blkdev_direct_IO_simple() allocates the bio on the stack, it
doesn't go through the regular bio free. This means that any ancillary
data allocated with the bio through the stack is not freed. Hence, we
can leak the integrity data associated with the bio, if the device is
using DIF/DIX.

Fix this by providing a bio_uninit() and export it, so that we can use
it to free this data. Note that this is a minimal fix for this issue.
Any current user of bio's that are allocated outside of
bio_alloc_bioset() suffers from this issue, most notably some drivers.
We will fix those in a more comprehensive patch for 4.13. This also
means that the commit marked as being fixed by this isn't the real
culprit, it's just the most obvious one out there.

Fixes: 542ff7bf ("block: new direct I/O implementation")
Reported-by: NWen Xiong <wenxiong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
      9ae3b3f5
  7. 28 6月, 2017 6 次提交
  9. 24 6月, 2017 4 次提交
  11. 22 6月, 2017 1 次提交
    • D
      xfs: don't allow bmap on rt files · eb5e248d
      由 Darrick J. Wong 提交于 
      bmap returns a dumb LBA address but not the block device that goes with
that LBA.  Swapfiles don't care about this and will blindly assume that
the data volume is the correct blockdev, which is totally bogus for
files on the rt subvolume.  This results in the swap code doing IOs to
arbitrary locations on the data device(!) if the passed in mapping is a
realtime file, so just turn off bmap for rt files.
Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
      eb5e248d
  13. 21 6月, 2017 5 次提交
  15. 19 6月, 2017 1 次提交
    • H
      mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas · 1be7107f
      由 Hugh Dickins 提交于 
      Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.
Original-patch-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Original-patch-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      1be7107f
  17. 18 6月, 2017 3 次提交
  19. 17 6月, 2017 1 次提交
  21. 16 6月, 2017 1 次提交
  23. 15 6月, 2017 13 次提交
  25. 12 6月, 2017 1 次提交