1. 12 11月, 2019 2 次提交
  2. 17 7月, 2019 1 次提交
  3. 08 4月, 2019 1 次提交
  4. 05 1月, 2019 1 次提交
    • L
      x86: re-introduce non-generic memcpy_{to,from}io · 170d13ca
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      This has been broken forever, and nobody ever really noticed because
      it's purely a performance issue.
      
      Long long ago, in commit 6175ddf0 ("x86: Clean up mem*io functions")
      Brian Gerst simplified the memory copies to and from iomem, since on
      x86, the instructions to access iomem are exactly the same as the
      regular instructions.
      
      That is technically true, and things worked, and nobody said anything.
      Besides, back then the regular memcpy was pretty simple and worked fine.
      
      Nobody noticed except for David Laight, that is.  David has a testing a
      TLP monitor he was writing for an FPGA, and has been occasionally
      complaining about how memcpy_toio() writes things one byte at a time.
      
      Which is completely unacceptable from a performance standpoint, even if
      it happens to technically work.
      
      The reason it's writing one byte at a time is because while it's
      technically true that accesses to iomem are the same as accesses to
      regular memory on x86, the _granularity_ (and ordering) of accesses
      matter to iomem in ways that they don't matter to regular cached memory.
      
      In particular, when ERMS is set, we default to using "rep movsb" for
      larger memory copies.  That is indeed perfectly fine for real memory,
      since the whole point is that the CPU is going to do cacheline
      optimizations and executes the memory copy efficiently for cached
      memory.
      
      With iomem? Not so much.  With iomem, "rep movsb" will indeed work, but
      it will copy things one byte at a time. Slowly and ponderously.
      
      Now, originally, back in 2010 when commit 6175ddf0 was done, we
      didn't use ERMS, and this was much less noticeable.
      
      Our normal memcpy() was simpler in other ways too.
      
      Because in fact, it's not just about using the string instructions.  Our
      memcpy() these days does things like "read and write overlapping values"
      to handle the last bytes of the copy.  Again, for normal memory,
      overlapping accesses isn't an issue.  For iomem? It can be.
      
      So this re-introduces the specialized memcpy_toio(), memcpy_fromio() and
      memset_io() functions.  It doesn't particularly optimize them, but it
      tries to at least not be horrid, or do overlapping accesses.  In fact,
      this uses the existing __inline_memcpy() function that we still had
      lying around that uses our very traditional "rep movsl" loop followed by
      movsw/movsb for the final bytes.
      
      Somebody may decide to try to improve on it, but if we've gone almost a
      decade with only one person really ever noticing and complaining, maybe
      it's not worth worrying about further, once it's not _completely_ broken?
      Reported-by: NDavid Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      170d13ca
  5. 06 10月, 2018 1 次提交
    • L
      x86/ioremap: Add an ioremap_encrypted() helper · c3a7a61c
      Lianbo Jiang 提交于
      When SME is enabled, the memory is encrypted in the first kernel. In
      this case, SME also needs to be enabled in the kdump kernel, and we have
      to remap the old memory with the memory encryption mask.
      
      The case of concern here is if SME is active in the first kernel,
      and it is active too in the kdump kernel. There are four cases to be
      considered:
      
      a. dump vmcore
         It is encrypted in the first kernel, and needs be read out in the
         kdump kernel.
      
      b. crash notes
         When dumping vmcore, the people usually need to read useful
         information from notes, and the notes is also encrypted.
      
      c. iommu device table
         It's encrypted in the first kernel, kdump kernel needs to access its
         content to analyze and get information it needs.
      
      d. mmio of AMD iommu
         not encrypted in both kernels
      
      Add a new bool parameter @encrypted to __ioremap_caller(). If set,
      memory will be remapped with the SME mask.
      
      Add a new function ioremap_encrypted() to explicitly pass in a true
      value for @encrypted. Use ioremap_encrypted() for the above a, b, c
      cases.
      
       [ bp: cleanup commit message, extern defs in io.h and drop forgotten
         include. ]
      Signed-off-by: NLianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Reviewed-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
      Cc: tglx@linutronix.de
      Cc: mingo@redhat.com
      Cc: hpa@zytor.com
      Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
      Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
      Cc: bhelgaas@google.com
      Cc: baiyaowei@cmss.chinamobile.com
      Cc: tiwai@suse.de
      Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com
      Cc: dyoung@redhat.com
      Cc: bhe@redhat.com
      Cc: jroedel@suse.de
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180927071954.29615-2-lijiang@redhat.com
      c3a7a61c
  6. 26 9月, 2018 3 次提交
  7. 25 9月, 2018 1 次提交
  8. 18 5月, 2018 1 次提交
    • A
      x86/io: Define readq()/writeq() to use 64-bit type · 6469a0ee
      Andy Shevchenko 提交于
      Since non atomic readq() and writeq() were added some of the drivers
      would like to use it in a manner of:
      
       #include <io-64-nonatomic-lo-hi.h>
       ...
       pr_debug("Debug value of some register: %016llx\n", readq(addr));
      
      However, lo_hi_readq() always returns __u64 data, while readq()
      on x86_64 defines it as unsigned long. and thus compiler warns
      about type mismatch, although they are both 64-bit on x86_64.
      
      Convert readq() and writeq() on x86 to operate on deterministic
      64-bit type. The most of architectures in the kernel already are using
      either unsigned long long, or u64 type for readq() / writeq().
      This change propagates consistency in that sense.
      
      While this is not an issue per se, though if someone wants to address it,
      the anchor could be the commit:
      
        797a796a ("asm-generic: architecture independent readq/writeq for 32bit environment")
      
      where non-atomic variants had been introduced.
      
      Note, there are only few users of above pattern and they will not be
      affected because they do cast returned value. The actual warning has
      been issued on not-yet-upstreamed code.
      
      Potentially we might get a new warnings if some 64-bit only code
      assigns returned value to unsigned long type of variable. This is
      assumed to be addressed on case-by-case basis.
      Reported-by: Nlkp <lkp@intel.com>
      Tested-by: NSohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180515115211.55050-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      6469a0ee
  9. 20 3月, 2018 1 次提交
  10. 16 11月, 2017 1 次提交
    • C
      x86/mm: Limit mmap() of /dev/mem to valid physical addresses · be62a320
      Craig Bergstrom 提交于
      One thing /dev/mem access APIs should verify is that there's no way
      that excessively large pfn's can leak into the high bits of the
      page table entry.
      
      In particular, if people can use "very large physical page addresses"
      through /dev/mem to set the bits past bit 58 - SOFTW4 and permission
      key bits and NX bit, that could *really* confuse the kernel.
      
      We had an earlier attempt:
      
        ce56a86e ("x86/mm: Limit mmap() of /dev/mem to valid physical addresses")
      
      ... which turned out to be too restrictive (breaking mem=... bootups for example) and
      had to be reverted in:
      
        90edaac6 ("Revert "x86/mm: Limit mmap() of /dev/mem to valid physical addresses"")
      
      This v2 attempt modifies the original patch and makes sure that mmap(/dev/mem)
      limits the pfns so that it at least fits in the actual pteval_t architecturally:
      
       - Make sure mmap_mem() actually validates that the offset fits in phys_addr_t
      
          ( This may be indirectly true due to some other check, but it's not
            entirely obvious. )
      
       - Change valid_mmap_phys_addr_range() to just use phys_addr_valid()
         on the top byte
      
          ( Top byte is sufficient, because mmap_mem() has already checked that
            it cannot wrap. )
      
       - Add a few comments about what the valid_phys_addr_range() vs.
         valid_mmap_phys_addr_range() difference is.
      Signed-off-by: NCraig Bergstrom <craigb@google.com>
      [ Fixed the checks and added comments. ]
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      [ Collected the discussion and patches into a commit. ]
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
      Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
      Cc: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFyEcOMb657vWSmrM13OxmHxC-XxeBmNis=DwVvpJUOogQ@mail.gmail.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      be62a320
  11. 07 11月, 2017 1 次提交
  12. 02 11月, 2017 1 次提交
    • G
      License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license · b2441318
      Greg Kroah-Hartman 提交于
      Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
      makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
      
      By default all files without license information are under the default
      license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
      
      Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
      SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
      shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
      
      This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
      Philippe Ombredanne.
      
      How this work was done:
      
      Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
      the use cases:
       - file had no licensing information it it.
       - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
       - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
      
      Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
      where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
      had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
      
      The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
      a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
      output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
      tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
      base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
      
      The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
      assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
      results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
      to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
      immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      
      Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
       - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
       - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
         lines of source
       - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
         lines).
      
      All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
      
      The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
      identifiers to apply.
      
       - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
         considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
         COPYING file license applied.
      
         For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
      
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         ---------------------------------------------------|-------
         GPL-2.0                                              11139
      
         and resulted in the first patch in this series.
      
         If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
         Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:
      
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         ---------------------------------------------------|-------
         GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930
      
         and resulted in the second patch in this series.
      
       - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
         of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
         any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
         it (per prior point).  Results summary:
      
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         ---------------------------------------------------|------
         GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
         GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
         LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
         GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
         ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
         LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
         LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1
      
         and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
      
       - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
         the concluded license(s).
      
       - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
         license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
         licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
      
       - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
         resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
         which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
      
       - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
         confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      
       - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
         the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
         in time.
      
      In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
      spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
      source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
      by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      
      Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
      FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
      disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
      Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
      they are related.
      
      Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
      for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
      files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
      in about 15000 files.
      
      In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
      copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
      correct identifier.
      
      Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
      inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
      version early this week with:
       - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
         license ids and scores
       - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
         files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
       - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
         was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
         SPDX license was correct
      
      This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
      worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
      different types of files to be modified.
      
      These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
      parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
      format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
      based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
      distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
      comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
      generate the patches.
      Reviewed-by: NKate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
      Reviewed-by: NPhilippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b2441318
  13. 27 10月, 2017 1 次提交
    • I
      Revert "x86/mm: Limit mmap() of /dev/mem to valid physical addresses" · 90edaac6
      Ingo Molnar 提交于
      This reverts commit ce56a86e.
      
      There's unanticipated interaction with some boot parameters like 'mem=',
      which now cause the new checks via valid_mmap_phys_addr_range() to be too
      restrictive, crashing a Qemu bootup in fact, as reported by Fengguang Wu.
      
      So while the motivation of the change is still entirely valid, we
      need a few more rounds of testing to get it right - it's way too late
      after -rc6, so revert it for now.
      Reported-by: NFengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Acked-by: NCraig Bergstrom <craigb@google.com>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
      Cc: dsafonov@virtuozzo.com
      Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
      Cc: mhocko@suse.com
      Cc: oleg@redhat.com
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      90edaac6
  14. 20 10月, 2017 1 次提交
    • C
      x86/mm: Limit mmap() of /dev/mem to valid physical addresses · ce56a86e
      Craig Bergstrom 提交于
      Currently, it is possible to mmap() any offset from /dev/mem.  If a
      program mmaps() /dev/mem offsets outside of the addressable limits
      of a system, the page table can be corrupted by setting reserved bits.
      
      For example if you mmap() offset 0x0001000000000000 of /dev/mem on an
      x86_64 system with a 48-bit bus, the page fault handler will be called
      with error_code set to RSVD.  The kernel then crashes with a page table
      corruption error.
      
      This change prevents this page table corruption on x86 by refusing
      to mmap offsets higher than the highest valid address in the system.
      Signed-off-by: NCraig Bergstrom <craigb@google.com>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
      Cc: dsafonov@virtuozzo.com
      Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
      Cc: mhocko@suse.com
      Cc: oleg@redhat.com
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171019192856.39672-1-craigb@google.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      ce56a86e
  15. 24 7月, 2017 5 次提交
  16. 20 7月, 2017 1 次提交
    • A
      x86/io: Add "memory" clobber to insb/insw/insl/outsb/outsw/outsl · 7206f9bf
      Arnd Bergmann 提交于
      The x86 version of insb/insw/insl uses an inline assembly that does
      not have the target buffer listed as an output. This can confuse
      the compiler, leading it to think that a subsequent access of the
      buffer is uninitialized:
      
        drivers/net/wireless/wl3501_cs.c: In function ‘wl3501_mgmt_scan_confirm’:
        drivers/net/wireless/wl3501_cs.c:665:9: error: ‘sig.status’ is used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=uninitialized]
        drivers/net/wireless/wl3501_cs.c:668:12: error: ‘sig.cap_info’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
        drivers/net/sb1000.c: In function 'sb1000_rx':
        drivers/net/sb1000.c:775:9: error: 'st[0]' is used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=uninitialized]
        drivers/net/sb1000.c:776:10: error: 'st[1]' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
        drivers/net/sb1000.c:784:11: error: 'st[1]' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
      
      I tried to mark the exact input buffer as an output here, but couldn't
      figure it out. As suggested by Linus, marking all memory as clobbered
      however is good enough too. For the outs operations, I also add the
      memory clobber, to force the input to be written to local variables.
      This is probably already guaranteed by the "asm volatile", but it can't
      hurt to do this for symmetry.
      Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170719125310.2487451-5-arnd@arndb.de
      Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/7/12/605Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      7206f9bf
  17. 18 7月, 2017 2 次提交
    • T
      x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem · 8458bf94
      Tom Lendacky 提交于
      When accessing memory using /dev/mem (or /dev/kmem) use the proper
      encryption attributes when mapping the memory.
      
      To insure the proper attributes are applied when reading or writing
      /dev/mem, update the xlate_dev_mem_ptr() function to use memremap()
      which will essentially perform the same steps of applying __va for
      RAM or using ioremap() if not RAM.
      
      To insure the proper attributes are applied when mmapping /dev/mem,
      update the phys_mem_access_prot() to call phys_mem_access_encrypted(),
      a new function which will check if the memory should be mapped encrypted
      or not. If it is not to be mapped encrypted then the VMA protection
      value is updated to remove the encryption bit.
      Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c917f403ab9f61cbfd455ad6425ed8429a5e7b54.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      8458bf94
    • T
      x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear · 8f716c9b
      Tom Lendacky 提交于
      Boot data (such as EFI related data) is not encrypted when the system is
      booted because UEFI/BIOS does not run with SME active. In order to access
      this data properly it needs to be mapped decrypted.
      
      Update early_memremap() to provide an arch specific routine to modify the
      pagetable protection attributes before they are applied to the new
      mapping. This is used to remove the encryption mask for boot related data.
      
      Update memremap() to provide an arch specific routine to determine if RAM
      remapping is allowed.  RAM remapping will cause an encrypted mapping to be
      generated. By preventing RAM remapping, ioremap_cache() will be used
      instead, which will provide a decrypted mapping of the boot related data.
      Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NMatt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/81fb6b4117a5df6b9f2eda342f81bbef4b23d2e5.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      8f716c9b
  18. 28 1月, 2017 1 次提交
  19. 26 10月, 2016 1 次提交
    • D
      x86/io: add interface to reserve io memtype for a resource range. (v1.1) · 8ef42276
      Dave Airlie 提交于
      A recent change to the mm code in:
      87744ab3 mm: fix cache mode tracking in vm_insert_mixed()
      
      started enforcing checking the memory type against the registered list for
      amixed pfn insertion mappings. It happens that the drm drivers for a number
      of gpus relied on this being broken. Currently the driver only inserted
      VRAM mappings into the tracking table when they came from the kernel,
      and userspace mappings never landed in the table. This led to a regression
      where all the mapping end up as UC instead of WC now.
      
      I've considered a number of solutions but since this needs to be fixed
      in fixes and not next, and some of the solutions were going to introduce
      overhead that hadn't been there before I didn't consider them viable at
      this stage. These mainly concerned hooking into the TTM io reserve APIs,
      but these API have a bunch of fast paths I didn't want to unwind to add
      this to.
      
      The solution I've decided on is to add a new API like the arch_phys_wc
      APIs (these would have worked but wc_del didn't take a range), and
      use them from the drivers to add a WC compatible mapping to the table
      for all VRAM on those GPUs. This means we can then create userspace
      mapping that won't get degraded to UC.
      
      v1.1: use CONFIG_X86_PAT + add some comments in io.h
      
      Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: x86@kernel.org
      Cc: mcgrof@suse.com
      Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
      Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: NDave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
      8ef42276
  20. 28 8月, 2015 1 次提交
    • R
      nd_blk: change aperture mapping from WC to WB · 67a3e8fe
      Ross Zwisler 提交于
      This should result in a pretty sizeable performance gain for reads.  For
      rough comparison I did some simple read testing using PMEM to compare
      reads of write combining (WC) mappings vs write-back (WB).  This was
      done on a random lab machine.
      
      PMEM reads from a write combining mapping:
      	# dd of=/dev/null if=/dev/pmem0 bs=4096 count=100000
      	100000+0 records in
      	100000+0 records out
      	409600000 bytes (410 MB) copied, 9.2855 s, 44.1 MB/s
      
      PMEM reads from a write-back mapping:
      	# dd of=/dev/null if=/dev/pmem0 bs=4096 count=1000000
      	1000000+0 records in
      	1000000+0 records out
      	4096000000 bytes (4.1 GB) copied, 3.44034 s, 1.2 GB/s
      
      To be able to safely support a write-back aperture I needed to add
      support for the "read flush" _DSM flag, as outlined in the DSM spec:
      
      http://pmem.io/documents/NVDIMM_DSM_Interface_Example.pdf
      
      This flag tells the ND BLK driver that it needs to flush the cache lines
      associated with the aperture after the aperture is moved but before any
      new data is read.  This ensures that any stale cache lines from the
      previous contents of the aperture will be discarded from the processor
      cache, and the new data will be read properly from the DIMM.  We know
      that the cache lines are clean and will be discarded without any
      writeback because either a) the previous aperture operation was a read,
      and we never modified the contents of the aperture, or b) the previous
      aperture operation was a write and we must have written back the dirtied
      contents of the aperture to the DIMM before the I/O was completed.
      
      In order to add support for the "read flush" flag I needed to add a
      generic routine to invalidate cache lines, mmio_flush_range().  This is
      protected by the ARCH_HAS_MMIO_FLUSH Kconfig variable, and is currently
      only supported on x86.
      Signed-off-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
      67a3e8fe
  21. 15 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  22. 21 7月, 2015 1 次提交
    • L
      x86/mm, asm-generic: Add IOMMU ioremap_uc() variant default · 8c7ea50c
      Luis R. Rodriguez 提交于
      We currently have no safe way of currently defining architecture
      agnostic IOMMU ioremap_*() variants. The trend is for folks to
      *assume* that ioremap_nocache() should be the default everywhere
      and then add this mapping on each architectures -- this is not
      correct today for a variety of reasons.
      
      We have two options:
      
        1) Sit and wait for every architecture in Linux to get a
           an ioremap_*() variant defined before including it upstream.
      
        2) Gather consensus on a safe architecture agnostic ioremap_*()
           default.
      
      Approach 1) introduces development latencies, and since 2) will
      take time and work on clarifying semantics the only remaining
      sensible thing to do to avoid issues is returning NULL on
      ioremap_*() variants.
      
      In order for this to work we must have all architectures declare
      their own ioremap_*() variants as defined. This will take some
      work, do this for ioremp_uc() to set the example as its only
      currently implemented on x86. Document all this.
      
      We only provide implementation support for ioremap_uc() as the
      other ioremap_*() variants are well defined all over the kernel
      for other architectures already.
      Signed-off-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: arnd@arndb.de
      Cc: benh@kernel.crashing.org
      Cc: bp@suse.de
      Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
      Cc: geert@linux-m68k.org
      Cc: hch@lst.de
      Cc: hmh@hmh.eng.br
      Cc: jgross@suse.com
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Cc: luto@amacapital.net
      Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au
      Cc: mst@redhat.com
      Cc: ralf@linux-mips.org
      Cc: ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com
      Cc: stefan.bader@canonical.com
      Cc: tj@kernel.org
      Cc: tomi.valkeinen@ti.com
      Cc: toshi.kani@hp.com
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1436488096-3165-1-git-send-email-mcgrof@do-not-panic.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      8c7ea50c
  23. 26 6月, 2015 1 次提交
  24. 07 6月, 2015 1 次提交
  25. 03 6月, 2015 1 次提交
    • S
      x86/mm: Decouple <linux/vmalloc.h> from <asm/io.h> · d6472302
      Stephen Rothwell 提交于
      Nothing in <asm/io.h> uses anything from <linux/vmalloc.h>, so
      remove it from there and fix up the resulting build problems
      triggered on x86 {64|32}-bit {def|allmod|allno}configs.
      
      The breakages were triggering in places where x86 builds relied
      on vmalloc() facilities but did not include <linux/vmalloc.h>
      explicitly and relied on the implicit inclusion via <asm/io.h>.
      
      Also add:
      
        - <linux/init.h> to <linux/io.h>
        - <asm/pgtable_types> to <asm/io.h>
      
      ... which were two other implicit header file dependencies.
      Suggested-by: NDavid Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
      [ Tidied up the changelog. ]
      Acked-by: NDavid Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Acked-by: NTakashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
      Acked-by: NViresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
      Acked-by: NVinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
      Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
      Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <JBottomley@odin.com>
      Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
      Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
      Cc: Suma Ramars <sramars@cisco.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      d6472302
  26. 27 5月, 2015 1 次提交
    • L
      x86/mm/mtrr: Avoid #ifdeffery with phys_wc_to_mtrr_index() · 7d010fdf
      Luis R. Rodriguez 提交于
      There is only one user but since we're going to bury MTRR next
      out of access to drivers, expose this last piece of API to
      drivers in a general fashion only needing io.h for access to
      helpers.
      Signed-off-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
      Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Abhilash Kesavan <a.kesavan@samsung.com>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Antonino Daplas <adaplas@gmail.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com>
      Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
      Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Jean-Christophe Plagniol-Villard <plagnioj@jcrosoft.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com>
      Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Suresh Siddha <sbsiddha@gmail.com>
      Cc: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ti.com>
      Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
      Cc: Ville Syrjälä <syrjala@sci.fi>
      Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1429722736-4473-1-git-send-email-mcgrof@do-not-panic.com
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1432628901-18044-11-git-send-email-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      7d010fdf
  27. 11 5月, 2015 1 次提交
    • L
      x86/mm: Add ioremap_uc() helper to map memory uncacheable (not UC-) · e4b6be33
      Luis R. Rodriguez 提交于
      ioremap_nocache() currently uses UC- by default. Our goal is to
      eventually make UC the default. Linux maps UC- to PCD=1, PWT=0
      page attributes on non-PAT systems. Linux maps UC to PCD=1,
      PWT=1 page attributes on non-PAT systems. On non-PAT and PAT
      systems a WC MTRR has different effects on pages with either of
      these attributes. In order to help with a smooth transition its
      best to enable use of UC (PCD,1, PWT=1) on a region as that
      ensures a WC MTRR will have no effect on a region, this however
      requires us to have an way to declare a region as UC and we
      currently do not have a way to do this.
      
        WC MTRR on non-PAT system with PCD=1, PWT=0 (UC-) yields WC.
        WC MTRR on non-PAT system with PCD=1, PWT=1 (UC)  yields UC.
      
        WC MTRR on PAT system with PCD=1, PWT=0 (UC-) yields WC.
        WC MTRR on PAT system with PCD=1, PWT=1 (UC)  yields UC.
      
      A flip of the default ioremap_nocache() behaviour from UC- to UC
      can therefore regress a memory region from effective memory type
      WC to UC if MTRRs are used. Use of MTRRs should be phased out
      and in the best case only arch_phys_wc_add() use will remain,
      even if this happens arch_phys_wc_add() will have an effect on
      non-PAT systems and changes to default ioremap_nocache()
      behaviour could regress drivers.
      
      Now, ideally we'd use ioremap_nocache() on the regions in which
      we'd need uncachable memory types and avoid any MTRRs on those
      regions. There are however some restrictions on MTRRs use, such
      as the requirement of having the base and size of variable sized
      MTRRs to be powers of two, which could mean having to use a WC
      MTRR over a large area which includes a region in which
      write-combining effects are undesirable.
      
      Add ioremap_uc() to help with the both phasing out of MTRR use
      and also provide a way to blacklist small WC undesirable regions
      in devices with mixed regions which are size-implicated to use
      large WC MTRRs. Use of ioremap_uc() helps phase out MTRR use by
      avoiding regressions with an eventual flip of default behaviour
      or ioremap_nocache() from UC- to UC.
      
      Drivers working with WC MTRRs can use the below table to review
      and consider the use of ioremap*() and similar helpers to ensure
      appropriate behaviour long term even if default
      ioremap_nocache() behaviour changes from UC- to UC.
      
      Although ioremap_uc() is being added we leave set_memory_uc() to
      use UC- as only initial memory type setup is required to be able
      to accommodate existing device drivers and phase out MTRR use.
      It should also be clarified that set_memory_uc() cannot be used
      with IO memory, even though its use will not return any errors,
      it really has no effect.
      
        ----------------------------------------------------------------------
        MTRR Non-PAT   PAT    Linux ioremap value        Effective memory type
        ----------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Non-PAT |  PAT
             PAT
             |PCD
             ||PWT
             |||
        WC   000      WB      _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WB            WC   |   WC
        WC   001      WC      _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WC            WC*  |   WC
        WC   010      UC-     _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC_MINUS      WC*  |   WC
        WC   011      UC      _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC            UC   |   UC
        ----------------------------------------------------------------------
      Signed-off-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
      Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Acked-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Antonino Daplas <adaplas@gmail.com>
      Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
      Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
      Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jean-Christophe Plagniol-Villard <plagnioj@jcrosoft.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
      Cc: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Suresh Siddha <sbsiddha@gmail.com>
      Cc: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ti.com>
      Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
      Cc: Ville Syrjälä <syrjala@sci.fi>
      Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1430343851-967-2-git-send-email-mcgrof@do-not-panic.com
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1431332153-18566-9-git-send-email-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      e4b6be33
  28. 16 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  29. 10 11月, 2014 1 次提交
    • T
      /dev/mem: Use more consistent data types · 4707a341
      Thierry Reding 提交于
      The xlate_dev_{kmem,mem}_ptr() functions take either a physical address
      or a kernel virtual address, so data types should be phys_addr_t and
      void *. They both return a kernel virtual address which is only ever
      used in calls to copy_{from,to}_user(), so make variables that store it
      void * rather than char * for consistency.
      
      Also only define a weak unxlate_dev_mem_ptr() function if architectures
      haven't overridden them in the asm/io.h header file.
      Signed-off-by: NThierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
      4707a341
  30. 21 10月, 2014 1 次提交
    • W
      x86: io: implement dummy relaxed accessor macros for writes · cbc908ef
      Will Deacon 提交于
      write{b,w,l,q}_relaxed are implemented by some architectures in order to
      permit memory-mapped I/O accesses with weaker barrier semantics than the
      non-relaxed variants.
      
      This patch adds dummy macros for the write accessors to x86, in the
      same vein as the dummy definitions for the relaxed read accessors.
      
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      cbc908ef
  31. 08 4月, 2014 2 次提交
    • M
      x86: use generic early_ioremap · 5b7c73e0
      Mark Salter 提交于
      Move x86 over to the generic early ioremap implementation.
      Signed-off-by: NMark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      5b7c73e0
    • D
      x86/mm: sparse warning fix for early_memremap · 6b550f6f
      Dave Young 提交于
      This patch series takes the common bits from the x86 early ioremap
      implementation and creates a generic implementation which may be used by
      other architectures.  The early ioremap interfaces are intended for
      situations where boot code needs to make temporary virtual mappings
      before the normal ioremap interfaces are available.  Typically, this
      means before paging_init() has run.
      
      This patch (of 6):
      
      There's a lot of sparse warnings for code like below: void *a =
      early_memremap(phys_addr, size);
      
      early_memremap intend to map kernel memory with ioremap facility, the
      return pointer should be a kernel ram pointer instead of iomem one.
      
      For making the function clearer and supressing sparse warnings this patch
      do below two things:
      1. cast to (__force void *) for the return value of early_memremap
      2. add early_memunmap function and pass (__force void __iomem *) to iounmap
      
      From Boris:
        "Ingo told me yesterday, it makes sense too.  I'd guess we can try it.
         FWIW, all callers of early_memremap use the memory they get remapped
         as normal memory so we should be safe"
      Signed-off-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      6b550f6f