- 14 5月, 2018 3 次提交
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由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于
In order to use the helper macros that perform type mangling with the EFI PCI I/O protocol struct typedefs, align their Linux typenames with the convention we use for definitionns that originate in the UEFI spec, and add the trailing _t to each. Tested-by: NHans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504060003.19618-14-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Daniel Kiper 提交于
Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot. Otherwise the kernel may not even know that it runs on secure boot enabled platform. Note that part of drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c is duplicated by this patch, only in this case, it runs in the context of the kernel proper rather than UEFI boot context. The reason for the duplication is that maintaining the original code to run correctly on ARM/arm64 as well as on all the quirky x86 firmware we support is enough of a burden as it is, and adding the x86/Xen execution context to that mix just so we can reuse a single routine just isn't worth it. [ardb: explain rationale for code duplication] Signed-off-by: NDaniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504060003.19618-2-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于
Mixed mode allows a kernel built for x86_64 to interact with 32-bit EFI firmware, but requires us to define all struct definitions carefully when it comes to pointer sizes. 'struct efi_pci_io_protocol_32' currently uses a 'void *' for the 'romimage' field, which will be interpreted as a 64-bit field on such kernels, potentially resulting in bogus memory references and subsequent crashes. Tested-by: NHans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504060003.19618-13-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 08 5月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 van der Linden, Frank 提交于
This patch fixes crashes during boot for HVM guests on older (pre HVM vector callback) Xen versions. Without this, current kernels will always fail to boot on those Xen versions. Sample stack trace: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffff200000 IP: __xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x1e/0x80 PGD 1e0e067 P4D 1e0e067 PUD 1e10067 PMD 235c067 PTE 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 512 Comm: kworker/u2:0 Not tainted 4.14.33-52.13.amzn1.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 3.4.3.amazon 11/11/2016 task: ffff88002531d700 task.stack: ffffc90000480000 RIP: 0010:__xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x1e/0x80 RSP: 0000:ffff880025403ef0 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: ffffffff813cc760 RBX: ffffffffff200000 RCX: ffffc90000483ef0 RDX: ffff880020540a00 RSI: ffff880023c78000 RDI: 000000000000001c RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff880025403f5c R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880025400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffff200000 CR3: 0000000001e0a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <IRQ> do_hvm_evtchn_intr+0xa/0x10 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x43/0x1a0 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x20/0x50 handle_irq_event+0x39/0x60 handle_fasteoi_irq+0x80/0x140 handle_irq+0xaf/0x120 do_IRQ+0x41/0xd0 common_interrupt+0x7d/0x7d </IRQ> During boot, the HYPERVISOR_shared_info page gets remapped to make it work with KASLR. This means that any pointer derived from it needs to be adjusted. The only value that this applies to is the vcpu_info pointer for VCPU 0. For PV and HVM with the callback vector feature, this gets done via the smp_ops prepare_boot_cpu callback. Older Xen versions do not support the HVM callback vector, so there is no Xen-specific smp_ops set up in that scenario. So, the vcpu_info pointer for VCPU 0 never gets set to the proper value, and the first reference of it will be bad. Fix this by resetting it immediately after the remap. Signed-off-by: NFrank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: NEduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: NAlakesh Haloi <alakeshh@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: NVallish Vaidyeshwara <vallish@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
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- 06 5月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Anthoine Bourgeois 提交于
Since the commit "8003c9ae: add APIC Timer periodic/oneshot mode VMX preemption timer support", a Windows 10 guest has some erratic timer spikes. Here the results on a 150000 times 1ms timer without any load: Before 8003c9ae | After 8003c9ae Max 1834us | 86000us Mean 1100us | 1021us Deviation 59us | 149us Here the results on a 150000 times 1ms timer with a cpu-z stress test: Before 8003c9ae | After 8003c9ae Max 32000us | 140000us Mean 1006us | 1997us Deviation 140us | 11095us The root cause of the problem is starting hrtimer with an expiry time already in the past can take more than 20 milliseconds to trigger the timer function. It can be solved by forward such past timers immediately, rather than submitting them to hrtimer_start(). In case the timer is periodic, update the target expiration and call hrtimer_start with it. v2: Check if the tsc deadline is already expired. Thank you Mika. v3: Execute the past timers immediately rather than submitting them to hrtimer_start(). v4: Rearm the periodic timer with advance_periodic_target_expiration() a simpler version of set_target_expiration(). Thank you Paolo. Cc: Mika Penttilä <mika.penttila@nextfour.com> Cc: Wanpeng Li <kernellwp@gmail.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NAnthoine Bourgeois <anthoine.bourgeois@blade-group.com> 8003c9ae ("KVM: LAPIC: add APIC Timer periodic/oneshot mode VMX preemption timer support") Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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- 05 5月, 2018 5 次提交
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由 Jann Horn 提交于
commit da861e18 ("x86, vdso: Get rid of the fake section mechanism") left this file behind; nothing is using it anymore. Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: luto@amacapital.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504175935.104085-1-jannh@google.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
> arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c:307 cstate_pmu_event_init() warn: potential spectre issue 'pkg_msr' (local cap) Userspace controls @attr, sanitize cfg (attr->config) before using it to index an array. Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
> arch/x86/events/msr.c:178 msr_event_init() warn: potential spectre issue 'msr' (local cap) Userspace controls @attr, sanitize cfg (attr->config) before using it to index an array. Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
> arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c:307 cstate_pmu_event_init() warn: potential spectre issue 'pkg_msr' (local cap) > arch/x86/events/intel/core.c:337 intel_pmu_event_map() warn: potential spectre issue 'intel_perfmon_event_map' > arch/x86/events/intel/knc.c:122 knc_pmu_event_map() warn: potential spectre issue 'knc_perfmon_event_map' > arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c:722 p4_pmu_event_map() warn: potential spectre issue 'p4_general_events' > arch/x86/events/intel/p6.c:116 p6_pmu_event_map() warn: potential spectre issue 'p6_perfmon_event_map' > arch/x86/events/amd/core.c:132 amd_pmu_event_map() warn: potential spectre issue 'amd_perfmon_event_map' Userspace controls @attr, sanitize @attr->config before passing it on to x86_pmu::event_map(). Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
> arch/x86/events/core.c:319 set_ext_hw_attr() warn: potential spectre issue 'hw_cache_event_ids[cache_type]' (local cap) > arch/x86/events/core.c:319 set_ext_hw_attr() warn: potential spectre issue 'hw_cache_event_ids' (local cap) > arch/x86/events/core.c:328 set_ext_hw_attr() warn: potential spectre issue 'hw_cache_extra_regs[cache_type]' (local cap) > arch/x86/events/core.c:328 set_ext_hw_attr() warn: potential spectre issue 'hw_cache_extra_regs' (local cap) Userspace controls @config which contains 3 (byte) fields used for a 3 dimensional array deref. Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 03 5月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于
The JIT logic in jit_subprogs() is as follows: for all subprogs we allocate a bpf_prog_alloc(), populate it (prog->is_func = 1 here), and pass it to bpf_int_jit_compile(). If a failure occurred during JIT and prog->jited is not set, then we bail out from attempting to JIT the whole program, and punt to the interpreter instead. In case JITing went successful, we fixup BPF call offsets and do another pass to bpf_int_jit_compile() (extra_pass is true at that point) to complete JITing calls. Given that requires to pass JIT context around addrs and jit_data from x86 JIT are freed in the extra_pass in bpf_int_jit_compile() when calls are involved (if not, they can be freed immediately). However, if in the original pass, the JIT image didn't converge then we leak addrs and jit_data since image itself is NULL, the prog->is_func is set and extra_pass is false in that case, meaning both will become unreachable and are never cleaned up, therefore we need to free as well on !image. Only x64 JIT is affected. Fixes: 1c2a088a ("bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs") Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于
While reviewing x64 JIT code, I noticed that we leak the prior allocated JIT image in the case where proglen != oldproglen during the JIT passes. Prior to the commit e0ee9c12 ("x86: bpf_jit: fix two bugs in eBPF JIT compiler") we would just break out of the loop, and using the image as the JITed prog since it could only shrink in size anyway. After e0ee9c12, we would bail out to out_addrs label where we free addrs and jit_data but not the image coming from bpf_jit_binary_alloc(). Fixes: e0ee9c12 ("x86: bpf_jit: fix two bugs in eBPF JIT compiler") Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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- 02 5月, 2018 3 次提交
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
The recent commt which addresses the x86_phys_bits corruption with encrypted memory on CPUID reload after a microcode update lost the reload of CPUID_8000_0008_EBX as well. As a consequence IBRS and IBRS_FW are not longer detected Restore the behaviour by bringing the reload of CPUID_8000_0008_EBX back. This restore has a twist due to the convoluted way the cpuid analysis works: CPUID_8000_0008_EBX is used by AMD to enumerate IBRB, IBRS, STIBP. On Intel EBX is not used. But the speculation control code sets the AMD bits when running on Intel depending on the Intel specific speculation control bits. This was done to use the same bits for alternatives. The change which moved the 8000_0008 evaluation out of get_cpu_cap() broke this nasty scheme due to ordering. So that on Intel the store to CPUID_8000_0008_EBX clears the IBRB, IBRS, STIBP bits which had been set before by software. So the actual CPUID_8000_0008_EBX needs to go back to the place where it was and the phys/virt address space calculation cannot touch it. In hindsight this should have used completely synthetic bits for IBRB, IBRS, STIBP instead of reusing the AMD bits, but that's for 4.18. /me needs to find time to cleanup that steaming pile of ... Fixes: d94a155c ("x86/cpu: Prevent cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits adjustment corruption") Reported-by: NJörg Otte <jrg.otte@gmail.com> Reported-by: NTim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NJörg Otte <jrg.otte@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1805021043510.1668@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
mark_tsc_unstable() also needs to affect tsc_early, Now that clocksource_mark_unstable() can be used on a clocksource irrespective of its registration state, use it on both tsc_early and tsc. This does however require cs->list to be initialized empty, otherwise it cannot tell the registation state before registation. Fixes: aa83c457 ("x86/tsc: Introduce early tsc clocksource") Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NDiego Viola <diego.viola@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: len.brown@intel.com Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net Cc: rui.zhang@intel.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180430100344.533326547@infradead.org
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
Don't leave the tsc-early clocksource registered if it errors out early. This was reported by Diego, who on his Core2 era machine got TSC invalidated while it was running with tsc-early (due to C-states). This results in keeping tsc-early with very bad effects. Reported-and-Tested-by: NDiego Viola <diego.viola@gmail.com> Fixes: aa83c457 ("x86/tsc: Introduce early tsc clocksource") Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: len.brown@intel.com Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net Cc: diego.viola@gmail.com Cc: rui.zhang@intel.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180430100344.350507853@infradead.org
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- 28 4月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 KarimAllah Ahmed 提交于
Move DISABLE_EXITS KVM capability bits to the UAPI just like the rest of capabilities. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NKarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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- 27 4月, 2018 5 次提交
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由 Junaid Shahid 提交于
Currently, KVM flushes the TLB after a change to the APIC access page address or the APIC mode when EPT mode is enabled. However, even in shadow paging mode, a TLB flush is needed if VPIDs are being used, as specified in the Intel SDM Section 29.4.5. So replace vmx_flush_tlb_ept_only() with vmx_flush_tlb(), which will flush if either EPT or VPIDs are in use. Signed-off-by: NJunaid Shahid <junaids@google.com> Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
32-bit user code that uses int $80 doesn't care about r8-r11. There is, however, some 64-bit user code that intentionally uses int $0x80 to invoke 32-bit system calls. From what I've seen, basically all such code assumes that r8-r15 are all preserved, but the kernel clobbers r8-r11. Since I doubt that there's any code that depends on int $0x80 zeroing r8-r11, change the kernel to preserve them. I suspect that very little user code is broken by the old clobber, since r8-r11 are only rarely allocated by gcc, and they're clobbered by function calls, so they only way we'd see a problem is if the same function that invokes int $0x80 also spills something important to one of these registers. The current behavior seems to date back to the historical commit "[PATCH] x86-64 merge for 2.6.4". Before that, all regs were preserved. I can't find any explanation of why this change was made. Update the test_syscall_vdso_32 testcase as well to verify the new behavior, and it strengthens the test to make sure that the kernel doesn't accidentally permute r8..r15. Suggested-by: NDenys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d4c4d9985fbe64f8c9e19291886453914b48caee.1523975710.git.luto@kernel.org
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由 Arnd Bergmann 提交于
A bugfix broke the x32 shmid64_ds and msqid64_ds data structure layout (as seen from user space) a few years ago: Originally, __BITS_PER_LONG was defined as 64 on x32, so we did not have padding after the 64-bit __kernel_time_t fields, After __BITS_PER_LONG got changed to 32, applications would observe extra padding. In other parts of the uapi headers we seem to have a mix of those expecting either 32 or 64 on x32 applications, so we can't easily revert the path that broke these two structures. Instead, this patch decouples x32 from the other architectures and moves it back into arch specific headers, partially reverting the even older commit 73a2d096 ("x86: remove all now-duplicate header files"). It's not clear whether this ever made any difference, since at least glibc carries its own (correct) copy of both of these header files, so possibly no application has ever observed the definitions here. Based on a suggestion from H.J. Lu, I tried out the tool from https://github.com/hjl-tools/linux-header to find other such bugs, which pointed out the same bug in statfs(), which also has a separate (correct) copy in glibc. Fixes: f4b4aae1 ("x86/headers/uapi: Fix __BITS_PER_LONG value for x32 builds") Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180424212013.3967461-1-arnd@arndb.de
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由 Petr Tesarik 提交于
Xen PV domains cannot shut down and start a crash kernel. Instead, the crashing kernel makes a SCHEDOP_shutdown hypercall with the reason code SHUTDOWN_crash, cf. xen_crash_shutdown() machine op in arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c. A crash kernel reservation is merely a waste of RAM in this case. It may also confuse users of kexec_load(2) and/or kexec_file_load(2). When flags include KEXEC_ON_CRASH or KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH, respectively, these syscalls return success, which is technically correct, but the crash kexec image will never be actually used. Signed-off-by: NPetr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180425120835.23cef60c@ezekiel.suse.cz
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由 jacek.tomaka@poczta.fm 提交于
Make kernel print the correct number of TLB entries on Intel Xeon Phi 7210 (and others) Before: [ 0.320005] Last level dTLB entries: 4KB 0, 2MB 0, 4MB 0, 1GB 0 After: [ 0.320005] Last level dTLB entries: 4KB 256, 2MB 128, 4MB 128, 1GB 16 The entries do exist in the official Intel SMD but the type column there is incorrect (states "Cache" where it should read "TLB"), but the entries for the values 0x6B, 0x6C and 0x6D are correctly described as 'Data TLB'. Signed-off-by: NJacek Tomaka <jacek.tomaka@poczta.fm> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180423161425.24366-1-jacekt@dugeo.com
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- 26 4月, 2018 6 次提交
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由 Yazen Ghannam 提交于
Recent AMD systems support using MWAIT for C1 state. However, MWAIT will not allow deeper cstates than C1 on current systems. play_dead() expects to use the deepest state available. The deepest state available on AMD systems is reached through SystemIO or HALT. If MWAIT is available, it is preferred over the other methods, so the CPU never reaches the deepest possible state. Don't try to use MWAIT to play_dead() on AMD systems. Instead, use CPUIDLE to enter the deepest state advertised by firmware. If CPUIDLE is not available then fallback to HALT. Signed-off-by: NYazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Yazen Ghannam <Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180403140228.58540-1-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
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由 Jiri Kosina 提交于
Commits 9b46a051 ("x86/mm: Initialize vmemmap_base at boot-time") and a7412546 ("x86/mm: Adjust vmalloc base and size at boot-time") lost the type information for __VMALLOC_BASE_L4, __VMALLOC_BASE_L5, __VMEMMAP_BASE_L4 and __VMEMMAP_BASE_L5 constants. Declare them explicitly unsigned long again. Fixes: 9b46a051 ("x86/mm: Initialize vmemmap_base at boot-time") Fixes: a7412546 ("x86/mm: Adjust vmalloc base and size at boot-time") Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: N"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1804121437350.28129@cbobk.fhfr.pm
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由 Dou Liyang 提交于
The macro FPU_IRQ has never been used since v3.10, So remove it. Signed-off-by: NDou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180426060832.27312-1-douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
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由 Dou Liyang 提交于
Now, Linux uses matrix allocator for vector assignment, the original assignment code which used VECTOR_OFFSET_START has been removed. So remove the stale macro as well. Fixes: commit 69cde000 ("x86/vector: Use matrix allocator for vector assignment") Signed-off-by: NDou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180425020553.17210-1-douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Fenghua Yu 提交于
cldemote is a new instruction in future x86 processors. It hints to hardware that a specified cache line should be moved ("demoted") from the cache(s) closest to the processor core to a level more distant from the processor core. This instruction is faster than snooping to make the cache line available for other cores. cldemote instruction is indicated by the presence of the CPUID feature flag CLDEMOTE (CPUID.(EAX=0x7, ECX=0):ECX[bit25]). More details on cldemote instruction can be found in the latest Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions and Future Features Programming Reference. Signed-off-by: NFenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "Ravi V Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: "Ashok Raj" <ashok.raj@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524508162-192587-1-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
The SMM freeze feature was introduced since PerfMon V2. But the current code unconditionally enables the feature for all platforms. It can generate #GP exception, if the related FREEZE_WHILE_SMM bit is set for the machine with PerfMon V1. To disable the feature for PerfMon V1, perf needs to - Remove the freeze_on_smi sysfs entry by moving intel_pmu_attrs to intel_pmu, which is only applied to PerfMon V2 and later. - Check the PerfMon version before flipping the SMM bit when starting CPU Fixes: 6089327f ("perf/x86: Add sysfs entry to freeze counters on SMI") Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: eranian@google.com Cc: acme@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524682637-63219-1-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
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- 25 4月, 2018 7 次提交
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由 Gianluca Borello 提交于
Commit 2a5418a1 ("bpf: improve dead code sanitizing") replaced dead code with a series of ja-1 instructions, for safety. That made JIT compilation much more complex for some BPF programs. One instance of such programs is, for example: bool flag = false ... /* A bunch of other code */ ... if (flag) do_something() In some cases llvm is not able to remove at compile time the code for do_something(), so the generated BPF program ends up with a large amount of dead instructions. In one specific real life example, there are two series of ~500 and ~1000 dead instructions in the program. When the verifier replaces them with a series of ja-1 instructions, it causes an interesting behavior at JIT time. During the first pass, since all the instructions are estimated at 64 bytes, the ja-1 instructions end up being translated as 5 bytes JMP instructions (0xE9), since the jump offsets become increasingly large (> 127) as each instruction gets discovered to be 5 bytes instead of the estimated 64. Starting from the second pass, the first N instructions of the ja-1 sequence get translated into 2 bytes JMPs (0xEB) because the jump offsets become <= 127 this time. In particular, N is defined as roughly 127 / (5 - 2) ~= 42. So, each further pass will make the subsequent N JMP instructions shrink from 5 to 2 bytes, making the image shrink every time. This means that in order to have the entire program converge, there need to be, in the real example above, at least ~1000 / 42 ~= 24 passes just for translating the dead code. If we add this number to the passes needed to translate the other non dead code, it brings such program to 40+ passes, and JIT doesn't complete. Ultimately the userspace loader fails because such BPF program was supposed to be part of a prog array owner being JITed. While it is certainly possible to try to refactor such programs to help the compiler remove dead code, the behavior is not really intuitive and it puts further burden on the BPF developer who is not expecting such behavior. To make things worse, such programs are working just fine in all the kernel releases prior to the ja-1 fix. A possible approach to mitigate this behavior consists into noticing that for ja-1 instructions we don't really need to rely on the estimated size of the previous and current instructions, we know that a -1 BPF jump offset can be safely translated into a 0xEB instruction with a jump offset of -2. Such fix brings the BPF program in the previous example to complete again in ~9 passes. Fixes: 2a5418a1 ("bpf: improve dead code sanitizing") Signed-off-by: NGianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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由 Steven Rostedt (VMware) 提交于
Arnaldo noticed that the latest kernel is missing the syscall event system directory in x86. I bisected it down to d5a00528 ("syscalls/core, syscalls/x86: Rename struct pt_regs-based sys_*() to __x64_sys_*()"). The system call trace events are special, as there is only one trace event for all system calls (the raw_syscalls). But a macro that wraps the system calls creates meta data for them that copies the name to find the system call that maps to the system call table (the number). At boot up, it does a kallsyms lookup of the system call table to find the function that maps to the meta data of the system call. If it does not find a function, then that system call is ignored. Because the x86 system calls had "__x64_", or "__ia32_" prefixed to the "sys" for the names, they do not match the default compare algorithm. As this was a problem for power pc, the algorithm can be overwritten by the architecture. The solution is to have x86 have its own algorithm to do the compare and this brings back the system call trace events. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417174128.0f3457f0@gandalf.local.homeReported-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Tested-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Acked-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Acked-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: d5a00528 ("syscalls/core, syscalls/x86: Rename struct pt_regs-based sys_*() to __x64_sys_*()") Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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由 Dave Hansen 提交于
commit ce9962bf7e22bb3891655c349faff618922d4a73 0day reported warnings at boot on 32-bit systems without NX support: attempted to set unsupported pgprot: 8000000000000025 bits: 8000000000000000 supported: 7fffffffffffffff WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h:540 handle_mm_fault+0xfc1/0xfe0: check_pgprot at arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h:535 (inlined by) pfn_pte at arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h:549 (inlined by) do_anonymous_page at mm/memory.c:3169 (inlined by) handle_pte_fault at mm/memory.c:3961 (inlined by) __handle_mm_fault at mm/memory.c:4087 (inlined by) handle_mm_fault at mm/memory.c:4124 The problem is that due to the recent commit which removed auto-massaging of page protections, filtering page permissions at PTE creation time is not longer done, so vma->vm_page_prot is passed unfiltered to PTE creation. Filter the page protections before they are installed in vma->vm_page_prot. Fixes: fb43d6cb ("x86/mm: Do not auto-massage page protections") Reported-by: NFengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420222028.99D72858@viggo.jf.intel.com
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由 Dave Hansen 提交于
commit 26d35ca6c3776784f8156e1d6f80cc60d9a2a915 RANDSTRUCT derives its hardening benefits from the attacker's lack of knowledge about the layout of kernel data structures. Keep the kernel image non-global in cases where RANDSTRUCT is in use to help keep the layout a secret. Fixes: 8c06c774 (x86/pti: Leave kernel text global for !PCID) Reported-by: NKees Cook <keescook@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420222026.D0B4AAC9@viggo.jf.intel.com
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由 Dave Hansen 提交于
commit abb67605203687c8b7943d760638d0301787f8d9 Kees reported to me that I made too much of the kernel image global. It was far more than just text: I think this is too much set global: _end is after data, bss, and brk, and all kinds of other stuff that could hold secrets. I think this should match what mark_rodata_ro() is doing. This does exactly that. We use __end_rodata_hpage_align as our marker both because it is huge-page-aligned and it does not contain any sections we expect to hold secrets. Kees's logic was that r/o data is in the kernel image anyway and, in the case of traditional distributions, can be freely downloaded from the web, so there's no reason to hide it. Fixes: 8c06c774 (x86/pti: Leave kernel text global for !PCID) Reported-by: NKees Cook <keescook@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420222023.1C8B2B20@viggo.jf.intel.com
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由 Dave Hansen 提交于
commit 231df823c4f04176f607afc4576c989895cff40e The pageattr.c code attempts to process "faults" when it goes looking for PTEs to change and finds non-present entries. It allows these faults in the linear map which is "expected to have holes", but WARN()s about them elsewhere, like when called on the kernel image. However, change_page_attr_clear() is now called on the kernel image in the process of trying to clear the Global bit. This trips the warning in __cpa_process_fault() if a non-present PTE is encountered in the kernel image. The "holes" in the kernel image result from free_init_pages()'s use of set_memory_np(). These holes are totally fine, and result from normal operation, just as they would be in the kernel linear map. Just silence the warning when holes in the kernel image are encountered. Fixes: 39114b7a (x86/pti: Never implicitly clear _PAGE_GLOBAL for kernel image) Reported-by: NMariusz Ceier <mceier@gmail.com> Reported-by: NAaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NAaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com> Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420222021.1C7D2B3F@viggo.jf.intel.com
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由 Dave Hansen 提交于
commit 16dce603adc9de4237b7bf2ff5c5290f34373e7b Part of the global bit _setting_ patches also includes clearing the Global bit when it should not be enabled. That is done with set_memory_nonglobal(), which uses change_page_attr_clear() in pageattr.c under the covers. The TLB flushing code inside pageattr.c has has checks like BUG_ON(irqs_disabled()), looking for interrupt disabling that might cause deadlocks. But, these also trip in early boot on certain preempt configurations. Just copy the existing BUG_ON() sequence from cpa_flush_range() to the other two sites and check for early boot. Fixes: 39114b7a (x86/pti: Never implicitly clear _PAGE_GLOBAL for kernel image) Reported-by: NMariusz Ceier <mceier@gmail.com> Reported-by: NAaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NAaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com> Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420222019.20C4A410@viggo.jf.intel.com
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- 24 4月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Borislav Petkov 提交于
Vitezslav reported a case where the "Timeout during microcode update!" panic would hit. After a deeper look, it turned out that his .config had CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU disabled which practically made save_mc_for_early() a no-op. When that happened, the discovered microcode patch wasn't saved into the cache and the late loading path wouldn't find any. This, then, lead to early exit from __reload_late() and thus CPUs waiting until the timeout is reached, leading to the panic. In hindsight, that function should have been written so it does not return before the post-synchronization. Oh well, I know better now... Fixes: bb8c13d6 ("x86/microcode: Fix CPU synchronization routine") Reported-by: NVitezslav Samel <vitezslav@samel.cz> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NVitezslav Samel <vitezslav@samel.cz> Tested-by: NAshok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180418081140.GA2439@pc11.op.pod.cz Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180421081930.15741-2-bp@alien8.de
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由 Borislav Petkov 提交于
save_mc_for_early() was a no-op on !CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU but the generic_load_microcode() path saves the microcode patches it has found into the cache of patches which is used for late loading too. Regardless of whether CPU hotplug is used or not. Make the saving unconditional so that late loading can find the proper patch. Reported-by: NVitezslav Samel <vitezslav@samel.cz> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NVitezslav Samel <vitezslav@samel.cz> Tested-by: NAshok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180418081140.GA2439@pc11.op.pod.cz Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180421081930.15741-1-bp@alien8.de
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- 23 4月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
GPL2.0 is not a valid SPDX identiier. Replace it with GPL-2.0. Fixes: 4a362601 ("x86/jailhouse: Add infrastructure for running in non-root cell") Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NJan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180422220832.815346488@linutronix.de
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- 21 4月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Dave Young 提交于
Chun-Yi reported a kernel warning message below: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at ../mm/early_ioremap.c:182 early_iounmap+0x4f/0x12c() early_iounmap(ffffffffff200180, 00000118) [0] size not consistent 00000120 The problem is x86 kexec_file_load adds extra alignment to the efi memmap: in bzImage64_load(): efi_map_sz = efi_get_runtime_map_size(); efi_map_sz = ALIGN(efi_map_sz, 16); And __efi_memmap_init maps with the size including the alignment bytes but efi_memmap_unmap use nr_maps * desc_size which does not include the extra bytes. The alignment in kexec code is only needed for the kexec buffer internal use Actually kexec should pass exact size of the efi memmap to 2nd kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417083600.GA1972@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.comSigned-off-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Reported-by: Njoeyli <jlee@suse.com> Tested-by: NRandy Wright <rwright@hpe.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 20 4月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Oskar Senft 提交于
SBOX on some Broadwell CPUs is broken because it's enabled unconditionally despite the fact that there are no SBOXes available. Check the Power Control Unit CAPID4 register to determine the number of available SBOXes on the particular CPU before trying to enable them. If there are none, nullify the SBOX descriptor so it isn't tried to be initialized. Signed-off-by: NOskar Senft <osk@google.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NMark van Dijk <mark@voidzero.net> Reviewed-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com> Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: eranian@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1521810690-2576-2-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
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由 Stephane Eranian 提交于
This reverts commit 3b94a891 ("perf/x86/intel/uncore: Remove SBOX support for Broadwell server") Revert because there exists a proper workaround for Broadwell-EP servers without SBOX now. Note that BDX-DE does not have a SBOX. Signed-off-by: NStephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com> Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: osk@google.com Cc: mark@voidzero.net Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1521810690-2576-1-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
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