- 31 10月, 2019 2 次提交
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
VMX already does so if the host has SMEP, in order to support the combination of CR0.WP=1 and CR4.SMEP=1. However, it is perfectly safe to always do so, and in fact VMX already ends up running with EFER.NXE=1 on old processors that lack the "load EFER" controls, because it may help avoiding a slow MSR write. Removing all the conditionals simplifies the code. SVM does not have similar code, but it should since recent AMD processors do support SMEP. So this patch also makes the code for the two vendors more similar while fixing NPT=0, CR0.WP=1 and CR4.SMEP=1 on AMD processors. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Kairui Song 提交于
Currently, kernel fails to boot on some HyperV VMs when using EFI. And it's a potential issue on all x86 platforms. It's caused by broken kernel relocation on EFI systems, when below three conditions are met: 1. Kernel image is not loaded to the default address (LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR) by the loader. 2. There isn't enough room to contain the kernel, starting from the default load address (eg. something else occupied part the region). 3. In the memmap provided by EFI firmware, there is a memory region starts below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, and suitable for containing the kernel. EFI stub will perform a kernel relocation when condition 1 is met. But due to condition 2, EFI stub can't relocate kernel to the preferred address, so it fallback to ask EFI firmware to alloc lowest usable memory region, got the low region mentioned in condition 3, and relocated kernel there. It's incorrect to relocate the kernel below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR. This is the lowest acceptable kernel relocation address. The first thing goes wrong is in arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S. Kernel decompression will force use LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR as the output address if kernel is located below it. Then the relocation before decompression, which move kernel to the end of the decompression buffer, will overwrite other memory region, as there is no enough memory there. To fix it, just don't let EFI stub relocate the kernel to any address lower than lowest acceptable address. [ ardb: introduce efi_low_alloc_above() to reduce the scope of the change ] Signed-off-by: NKairui Song <kasong@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Acked-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-6-ardb@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 28 10月, 2019 11 次提交
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
The events in the same group don't start or stop simultaneously. Here is the ftrace when enabling event group for uncore_iio_0: # perf stat -e "{uncore_iio_0/event=0x1/,uncore_iio_0/event=0xe/}" <idle>-0 [000] d.h. 8959.064832: read_msr: a41, value b2b0b030 //Read counter reg of IIO unit0 counter0 <idle>-0 [000] d.h. 8959.064835: write_msr: a48, value 400001 //Write Ctrl reg of IIO unit0 counter0 to enable counter0. <------ Although counter0 is enabled, Unit Ctrl is still freezed. Nothing will count. We are still good here. <idle>-0 [000] d.h. 8959.064836: read_msr: a40, value 30100 //Read Unit Ctrl reg of IIO unit0 <idle>-0 [000] d.h. 8959.064838: write_msr: a40, value 30000 //Write Unit Ctrl reg of IIO unit0 to enable all counters in the unit by clear Freeze bit <------Unit0 is un-freezed. Counter0 has been enabled. Now it starts counting. But counter1 has not been enabled yet. The issue starts here. <idle>-0 [000] d.h. 8959.064846: read_msr: a42, value 0 //Read counter reg of IIO unit0 counter1 <idle>-0 [000] d.h. 8959.064847: write_msr: a49, value 40000e //Write Ctrl reg of IIO unit0 counter1 to enable counter1. <------ Now, counter1 just starts to count. Counter0 has been running for a while. Current code un-freezes the Unit Ctrl right after the first counter is enabled. The subsequent group events always loses some counter values. Implement pmu_enable and pmu_disable support for uncore, which can help to batch hardware accesses. No one uses uncore_enable_box and uncore_disable_box. Remove them. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: linux-drivers-review@eclists.intel.com Cc: linux-perf@eclists.intel.com Fixes: 087bfbb0 ("perf/x86: Add generic Intel uncore PMU support") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1572014593-31591-1-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kim Phillips 提交于
This saves us writing the IBS control MSR twice when disabling the event. I searched revision guides for all families since 10h, and did not find occurrence of erratum #420, nor anything remotely similar: so we isolate the secondary MSR write to family 10h only. Also unconditionally update the count mask for IBS Op implementations that have read & writeable current count (CurCnt) fields in addition to the MaxCnt field. These bits were reserved on prior implementations, and therefore shouldn't have negative impact. Signed-off-by: NKim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Fixes: c9574fe0 ("perf/x86-ibs: Implement workaround for IBS erratum #420") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191023150955.30292-2-kim.phillips@amd.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kim Phillips 提交于
The loop that reads all the IBS MSRs into *buf stopped one MSR short of reading the IbsOpData register, which contains the RipInvalid status bit. Fix the offset_max assignment so the MSR gets read, so the RIP invalid evaluation is based on what the IBS h/w output, instead of what was left in memory. Signed-off-by: NKim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Fixes: d47e8238 ("perf/x86-ibs: Take instruction pointer from ibs sample") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191023150955.30292-1-kim.phillips@amd.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Michal Hocko 提交于
There is a general consensus that TSX usage is not largely spread while the history shows there is a non trivial space for side channel attacks possible. Therefore the tsx is disabled by default even on platforms that might have a safe implementation of TSX according to the current knowledge. This is a fair trade off to make. There are, however, workloads that really do benefit from using TSX and updating to a newer kernel with TSX disabled might introduce a noticeable regressions. This would be especially a problem for Linux distributions which will provide TAA mitigations. Introduce config options X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF, X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_ON and X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO to control the TSX feature. The config setting can be overridden by the tsx cmdline options. [ bp: Text cleanups from Josh. ] Suggested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
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由 Pawan Gupta 提交于
Platforms which are not affected by X86_BUG_TAA may want the TSX feature enabled. Add "auto" option to the TSX cmdline parameter. When tsx=auto disable TSX when X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enable TSX. More details on X86_BUG_TAA can be found here: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html [ bp: Extend the arg buffer to accommodate "auto\0". ] Signed-off-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
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由 Pawan Gupta 提交于
Export the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0 to guests on TSX Async Abort(TAA) affected hosts that have TSX enabled and updated microcode. This is required so that the guests don't complain, "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode" when the host has the updated microcode to clear CPU buffers. Microcode update also adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is enumerated by the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. Guests can't do this check themselves when the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit is not exported to the guests. In this case export MDS_NO=0 to the guests. When guests have CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1, they deploy MDS mitigation which also mitigates TAA. Signed-off-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NNeelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com> Reviewed-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
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由 Pawan Gupta 提交于
Add the sysfs reporting file for TSX Async Abort. It exposes the vulnerability and the mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities. Sysfs file path is: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort Signed-off-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NNeelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com> Reviewed-by: NMark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
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由 Pawan Gupta 提交于
TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel vulnerability to the internal buffers in some Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data Sampling (MDS). In this case, certain loads may speculatively pass invalid data to dependent operations when an asynchronous abort condition is pending in a TSX transaction. This includes loads with no fault or assist condition. Such loads may speculatively expose stale data from the uarch data structures as in MDS. Scope of exposure is within the same-thread and cross-thread. This issue affects all current processors that support TSX, but do not have ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO (bit 8) set in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. On CPUs which have their IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0, CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1 and the MDS mitigation is clearing the CPU buffers using VERW or L1D_FLUSH, there is no additional mitigation needed for TAA. On affected CPUs with MDS_NO=1 this issue can be mitigated by disabling the Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. A new MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL in future and current processors after a microcode update can be used to control the TSX feature. There are two bits in that MSR: * TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE disables the TSX sub-feature Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM). * TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR clears the RTM enumeration in CPUID. The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is unconditionally disabled with updated microcode but still enumerated as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}. The second mitigation approach is similar to MDS which is clearing the affected CPU buffers on return to user space and when entering a guest. Relevant microcode update is required for the mitigation to work. More details on this approach can be found here: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html The TSX feature can be controlled by the "tsx" command line parameter. If it is force-enabled then "Clear CPU buffers" (MDS mitigation) is deployed. The effective mitigation state can be read from sysfs. [ bp: - massage + comments cleanup - s/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLE/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED/g - Josh. - remove partial TAA mitigation in update_mds_branch_idle() - Josh. - s/tsx_async_abort_cmdline/tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline/g ] Signed-off-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
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由 Pawan Gupta 提交于
Add a kernel cmdline parameter "tsx" to control the Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. On CPUs that support TSX control, use "tsx=on|off" to enable or disable TSX. Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx=off". This is because on certain processors TSX may be used as a part of a speculative side channel attack. Carve out the TSX controlling functionality into a separate compilation unit because TSX is a CPU feature while the TSX async abort control machinery will go to cpu/bugs.c. [ bp: - Massage, shorten and clear the arg buffer. - Clarifications of the tsx= possible options - Josh. - Expand on TSX_CTRL availability - Pawan. ] Signed-off-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
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由 Pawan Gupta 提交于
Add a helper function to read the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. Signed-off-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NNeelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com> Reviewed-by: NMark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
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由 Pawan Gupta 提交于
Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) may be used on certain processors as part of a speculative side channel attack. A microcode update for existing processors that are vulnerable to this attack will add a new MSR - IA32_TSX_CTRL to allow the system administrator the option to disable TSX as one of the possible mitigations. The CPUs which get this new MSR after a microcode upgrade are the ones which do not set MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO (bit 5) because those CPUs have CPUID.MD_CLEAR, i.e., the VERW implementation which clears all CPU buffers takes care of the TAA case as well. [ Note that future processors that are not vulnerable will also support the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. ] Add defines for the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR and its bits. TSX has two sub-features: 1. Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) is an explicitly-used feature where new instructions begin and end TSX transactions. 2. Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) is implicitly used when certain kinds of "old" style locks are used by software. Bit 7 of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES indicates the presence of the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR: Bit 0: When set, it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the XBEGIN instruction). Bit 1: When set, it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature (i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0). The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is unconditionally disabled by the new microcode but still enumerated as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}, unless disabled by IA32_TSX_CTRL_MSR[1] - TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR. Signed-off-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NNeelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com> Reviewed-by: NMark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
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- 25 10月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Juergen Gross 提交于
Support for the kernel as Xen 32-bit PV guest will soon be removed. Issue a warning when booted as such. Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
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- 23 10月, 2019 2 次提交
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由 Jim Mattson 提交于
If the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control is set in the VMCS, the APIC virtualization hardware is triggered when a page walk in VMX non-root mode terminates at a PTE wherein the address of the 4k page frame matches the APIC-access address specified in the VMCS. On hardware, the APIC-access address may be any valid 4k-aligned physical address. KVM's nVMX implementation enforces the additional constraint that the APIC-access address specified in the vmcs12 must be backed by a "struct page" in L1. If not, L0 will simply clear the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control in the vmcs02. The problem with this approach is that the L1 guest has arranged the vmcs12 EPT tables--or shadow page tables, if the "enable EPT" VM-execution control is clear in the vmcs12--so that the L2 guest physical address(es)--or L2 guest linear address(es)--that reference the L2 APIC map to the APIC-access address specified in the vmcs12. Without the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control in the vmcs02, the APIC accesses in the L2 guest will directly access the APIC-access page in L1. When there is no mapping whatsoever for the APIC-access address in L1, the L2 VM just loses the intended APIC virtualization. However, when the APIC-access address is mapped to an MMIO region in L1, the L2 guest gets direct access to the L1 MMIO device. For example, if the APIC-access address specified in the vmcs12 is 0xfee00000, then L2 gets direct access to L1's APIC. Since this vmcs12 configuration is something that KVM cannot faithfully emulate, the appropriate response is to exit to userspace with KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION. Fixes: fe3ef05c ("KVM: nVMX: Prepare vmcs02 from vmcs01 and vmcs12") Reported-by: NDan Cross <dcross@google.com> Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: NPeter Shier <pshier@google.com> Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Miaohe Lin 提交于
Guest physical APIC ID may not equal to vcpu->vcpu_id in some case. We may set the wrong physical id in avic_handle_ldr_update as we always use vcpu->vcpu_id. Get physical APIC ID from vAPIC page instead. Export and use kvm_xapic_id here and in avic_handle_apic_id_update as suggested by Vitaly. Signed-off-by: NMiaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 22 10月, 2019 6 次提交
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
After resetting the vCPU, the kvmclock MSR keeps the previous value but it is not enabled. This can be confusing, so fix it. Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 kbuild test robot 提交于
Use BUG_ON instead of a if condition followed by BUG. Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/misc/bugon.cocci Fixes: 4b526de5 ("KVM: x86: Check kvm_rebooting in kvm_spurious_fault()") CC: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Nkbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NJulia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Liran Alon 提交于
Commit bf653b78 ("KVM: vmx: Introduce handle_unexpected_vmexit and handle WAITPKG vmexit") introduced specialized handling of specific exit-reasons that should not be raised by CPU because KVM configures VMCS such that they should never be raised. However, since commit 7396d337 ("KVM: x86: Return to userspace with internal error on unexpected exit reason"), VMX & SVM exit handlers were modified to generically handle all unexpected exit-reasons by returning to userspace with internal error. Therefore, there is no need for specialized handling of specific unexpected exit-reasons (This specialized handling also introduced inconsistency for these exit-reasons to silently skip guest instruction instead of return to userspace on internal-error). Fixes: bf653b78 ("KVM: vmx: Introduce handle_unexpected_vmexit and handle WAITPKG vmexit") Signed-off-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Jim Mattson 提交于
When the RDPID instruction is supported on the host, enumerate it in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID. Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Thomas Hellstrom 提交于
The platform detection VMWARE_PORT macro uses the VMWARE_HYPERVISOR_PORT definition, but expects it to be an integer. However, when it was moved to the new vmware.h include file, it was changed to be a string to better fit into the VMWARE_HYPERCALL set of macros. This obviously breaks the platform detection VMWARE_PORT functionality. Change the VMWARE_HYPERVISOR_PORT and VMWARE_HYPERVISOR_PORT_HB definitions to be integers, and use __stringify() for their stringified form when needed. Signed-off-by: NThomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: b4dd4f6e ("Add a header file for hypercall definitions") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191021172403.3085-3-thomas_os@shipmail.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Thomas Hellstrom 提交于
LLVM's assembler doesn't accept the short form INL instruction: inl (%%dx) but instead insists on the output register to be explicitly specified. This was previously fixed for the VMWARE_PORT macro. Fix it also for the VMWARE_HYPERCALL macro. Suggested-by: NSami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: NNick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com Fixes: b4dd4f6e ("Add a header file for hypercall definitions") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191021172403.3085-2-thomas_os@shipmail.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 20 10月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Jiri Olsa 提交于
Jan reported failing ltp test for PT: https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp/blob/master/testcases/kernel/tracing/pt_test/pt_test.c It looks like the reason is this new commit added in this v5.4 merge window: 38bb8d77 ("perf/x86/intel/pt: Split ToPA metadata and page layout") which did not keep the TOPA_SHIFT for entry base. Add it back. Reported-by: NJan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Fixes: 38bb8d77 ("perf/x86/intel/pt: Split ToPA metadata and page layout") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191019220726.12213-1-jolsa@kernel.org [ Minor changelog edits. ] Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 18 10月, 2019 2 次提交
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由 Zhenzhong Duan 提交于
When building with "EXTRA_CFLAGS=-Wall" gcc warns: arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c:29:30: warning: get_cmdline_acpi_rsdp defined but not used [-Wunused-function] get_cmdline_acpi_rsdp() is only used when CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE and CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE are both enabled, so any build where one of these config options is disabled has this issue. Move the function under the same ifdef guard as the call site. [ tglx: Add context to the changelog so it becomes useful ] Fixes: 41fa1ee9 ("acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down") Signed-off-by: NZhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1569719633-32164-1-git-send-email-zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com
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由 Andrea Parri 提交于
Michael reported that the x86/hyperv initialization code prints the following dmesg when running in a VM on Hyper-V: [ 0.000738] Booting paravirtualized kernel on bare hardware Let the x86/hyperv initialization code set pv_info.name to "Hyper-V" so dmesg reports correctly: [ 0.000172] Booting paravirtualized kernel on Hyper-V [ tglx: Folded build fix provided by Yue ] Reported-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191015103502.13156-1-parri.andrea@gmail.com
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- 15 10月, 2019 2 次提交
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由 Sean Christopherson 提交于
Check that the per-cpu cluster mask pointer has been set prior to clearing a dying cpu's bit. The per-cpu pointer is not set until the target cpu reaches smp_callin() during CPUHP_BRINGUP_CPU, whereas the teardown function, x2apic_dead_cpu(), is associated with the earlier CPUHP_X2APIC_PREPARE. If an error occurs before the cpu is awakened, e.g. if do_boot_cpu() itself fails, x2apic_dead_cpu() will dereference the NULL pointer and cause a panic. smpboot: do_boot_cpu failed(-22) to wakeup CPU#1 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 RIP: 0010:x2apic_dead_cpu+0x1a/0x30 Call Trace: cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x9a/0x580 _cpu_up+0x10d/0x140 do_cpu_up+0x69/0xb0 smp_init+0x63/0xa9 kernel_init_freeable+0xd7/0x229 ? rest_init+0xa0/0xa0 kernel_init+0xa/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 Fixes: 023a6117 ("x86/apic/x2apic: Simplify cluster management") Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191001205019.5789-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
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由 Roman Kagan 提交于
Now that there's Hyper-V IOMMU driver, Linux can switch to x2apic mode when supported by the vcpus. However, the apic access functions for Hyper-V enlightened apic assume xapic mode only. As a result, Linux fails to bring up secondary cpus when run as a guest in QEMU/KVM with both hv_apic and x2apic enabled. According to Michael Kelley, when in x2apic mode, the Hyper-V synthetic apic MSRs behave exactly the same as the corresponding architectural x2apic MSRs, so there's no need to override the apic accessors. The only exception is hv_apic_eoi_write, which benefits from lazy EOI when available; however, its implementation works for both xapic and x2apic modes. Fixes: 29217a47 ("iommu/hyper-v: Add Hyper-V stub IOMMU driver") Fixes: 6b48cb5f ("X86/Hyper-V: Enlighten APIC access") Suggested-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: NRoman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191010123258.16919-1-rkagan@virtuozzo.com
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- 12 10月, 2019 10 次提交
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
Tiger Lake is the followon to Ice Lake. From the perspective of Intel cstate residency counters, there is nothing changed compared with Ice Lake. Share icl_cstates with Ice Lake. Update the comments for Tiger Lake. The External Design Specification (EDS) is not published yet. It comes from an authoritative internal source. The patch has been tested on real hardware. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-10-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
Tiger Lake is the followon to Ice Lake. PPERF and SMI_COUNT MSRs are also supported. The External Design Specification (EDS) is not published yet. It comes from an authoritative internal source. The patch has been tested on real hardware. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-9-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
Tiger Lake is the followon to Ice Lake. From the perspective of Intel core PMU, there is little changes compared with Ice Lake, e.g. small changes in event list. But it doesn't impact on core PMU functionality. Share the perf code with Ice Lake. The event list patch will be submitted later separately. The patch has been tested on real hardware. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-8-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
There is no Core C3 C-State counter for Ice Lake. Package C8/C9/C10 C-State counters are added for Ice Lake. Introduce a new event list, icl_cstates, for Ice Lake. Update the comments accordingly. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: f08c47d1 ("perf/x86/intel/cstate: Add Icelake support") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-7-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
PPERF and SMI_COUNT MSRs are also supported by Ice Lake desktop and server. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-6-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
Comet Lake is the new 10th Gen Intel processor. From the perspective of Intel cstate residency counters, there is nothing changed compared with Kaby Lake. Share hswult_cstates with Kaby Lake. Update the comments for Comet Lake. Kaby Lake is missed in the comments for some Residency Counters. Update the comments for Kaby Lake as well. The External Design Specification (EDS) is not published yet. It comes from an authoritative internal source. The patch has been tested on real hardware. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-5-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
Comet Lake is the new 10th Gen Intel processor. PPERF and SMI_COUNT MSRs are also supported. The External Design Specification (EDS) is not published yet. It comes from an authoritative internal source. The patch has been tested on real hardware. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-4-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
Comet Lake is the new 10th Gen Intel processor. From the perspective of Intel PMU, there is nothing changed compared with Sky Lake. Share the perf code with Sky Lake. The patch has been tested on real hardware. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-3-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Steve Wahl 提交于
The kernel image map is created using PMD pages, which can include some extra space beyond what's actually needed. Round the size of the memory hole we search for up to the next PMD boundary, to be certain all of the space to be mapped is usable RAM and includes no reserved areas. Signed-off-by: NSteve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: dimitri.sivanich@hpe.com Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jordan Borgner <mail@jordan-borgner.de> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: mike.travis@hpe.com Cc: russ.anderson@hpe.com Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/df4f49f05c0c27f108234eb93db5c613d09ea62e.1569358539.git.steve.wahl@hpe.com
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由 Steve Wahl 提交于
Our hardware (UV aka Superdome Flex) has address ranges marked reserved by the BIOS. Access to these ranges is caught as an error, causing the BIOS to halt the system. Initial page tables mapped a large range of physical addresses that were not checked against the list of BIOS reserved addresses, and sometimes included reserved addresses in part of the mapped range. Including the reserved range in the map allowed processor speculative accesses to the reserved range, triggering a BIOS halt. Used early in booting, the page table level2_kernel_pgt addresses 1 GiB divided into 2 MiB pages, and it was set up to linearly map a full 1 GiB of physical addresses that included the physical address range of the kernel image, as chosen by KASLR. But this also included a large range of unused addresses on either side of the kernel image. And unlike the kernel image's physical address range, this extra mapped space was not checked against the BIOS tables of usable RAM addresses. So there were times when the addresses chosen by KASLR would result in processor accessible mappings of BIOS reserved physical addresses. The kernel code did not directly access any of this extra mapped space, but having it mapped allowed the processor to issue speculative accesses into reserved memory, causing system halts. This was encountered somewhat rarely on a normal system boot, and much more often when starting the crash kernel if "crashkernel=512M,high" was specified on the command line (this heavily restricts the physical address of the crash kernel, in our case usually within 1 GiB of reserved space). The solution is to invalidate the pages of this table outside the kernel image's space before the page table is activated. It fixes this problem on our hardware. [ bp: Touchups. ] Signed-off-by: NSteve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: dimitri.sivanich@hpe.com Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jordan Borgner <mail@jordan-borgner.de> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: mike.travis@hpe.com Cc: russ.anderson@hpe.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9c011ee51b081534a7a15065b1681d200298b530.1569358539.git.steve.wahl@hpe.com
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- 09 10月, 2019 2 次提交
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由 Tom Lendacky 提交于
It turns out that the NMI latency workaround from commit: 6d3edaae ("x86/perf/amd: Resolve NMI latency issues for active PMCs") ends up being too conservative and results in the perf NMI handler claiming NMIs too easily on AMD hardware when the NMI watchdog is active. This has an impact, for example, on the hpwdt (HPE watchdog timer) module. This module can produce an NMI that is used to reset the system. It registers an NMI handler for the NMI_UNKNOWN type and relies on the fact that nothing has claimed an NMI so that its handler will be invoked when the watchdog device produces an NMI. After the referenced commit, the hpwdt module is unable to process its generated NMI if the NMI watchdog is active, because the current NMI latency mitigation results in the NMI being claimed by the perf NMI handler. Update the AMD perf NMI latency mitigation workaround to, instead, use a window of time. Whenever a PMC is handled in the perf NMI handler, set a timestamp which will act as a perf NMI window. Any NMIs arriving within that window will be claimed by perf. Anything outside that window will not be claimed by perf. The value for the NMI window is set to 100 msecs. This is a conservative value that easily covers any NMI latency in the hardware. While this still results in a window in which the hpwdt module will not receive its NMI, the window is now much, much smaller. Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hpe.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: 6d3edaae ("x86/perf/amd: Resolve NMI latency issues for active PMCs") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Message-ID: Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
Comet Lake is the new 10th Gen Intel processor. Add two new CPU model numbers to the Intel family list. The CPU model numbers are not published in the SDM yet but they come from an authoritative internal source. [ bp: Touch up commit message. ] Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-2-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
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- 08 10月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Sami Tolvanen 提交于
LLVM's assembler doesn't accept the short form INL instruction: inl (%%dx) but instead insists on the output register to be explicitly specified: <inline asm>:1:7: error: invalid operand for instruction inl (%dx) ^ LLVM ERROR: Error parsing inline asm Use the full form of the instruction to fix the build. Signed-off-by: NSami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NNick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: NThomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: "VMware, Inc." <pv-drivers@vmware.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/734 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191007192129.104336-1-samitolvanen@google.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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