1. 31 10月, 2019 2 次提交
    • P
      KVM: vmx, svm: always run with EFER.NXE=1 when shadow paging is active · 9167ab79
      Paolo Bonzini 提交于
      VMX already does so if the host has SMEP, in order to support the combination of
      CR0.WP=1 and CR4.SMEP=1.  However, it is perfectly safe to always do so, and in
      fact VMX already ends up running with EFER.NXE=1 on old processors that lack the
      "load EFER" controls, because it may help avoiding a slow MSR write.  Removing
      all the conditionals simplifies the code.
      
      SVM does not have similar code, but it should since recent AMD processors do
      support SMEP.  So this patch also makes the code for the two vendors more similar
      while fixing NPT=0, CR0.WP=1 and CR4.SMEP=1 on AMD processors.
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      9167ab79
    • K
      x86, efi: Never relocate kernel below lowest acceptable address · 220dd769
      Kairui Song 提交于
      Currently, kernel fails to boot on some HyperV VMs when using EFI.
      And it's a potential issue on all x86 platforms.
      
      It's caused by broken kernel relocation on EFI systems, when below three
      conditions are met:
      
      1. Kernel image is not loaded to the default address (LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR)
         by the loader.
      2. There isn't enough room to contain the kernel, starting from the
         default load address (eg. something else occupied part the region).
      3. In the memmap provided by EFI firmware, there is a memory region
         starts below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, and suitable for containing the
         kernel.
      
      EFI stub will perform a kernel relocation when condition 1 is met. But
      due to condition 2, EFI stub can't relocate kernel to the preferred
      address, so it fallback to ask EFI firmware to alloc lowest usable memory
      region, got the low region mentioned in condition 3, and relocated
      kernel there.
      
      It's incorrect to relocate the kernel below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR. This
      is the lowest acceptable kernel relocation address.
      
      The first thing goes wrong is in arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S.
      Kernel decompression will force use LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR as the output
      address if kernel is located below it. Then the relocation before
      decompression, which move kernel to the end of the decompression buffer,
      will overwrite other memory region, as there is no enough memory there.
      
      To fix it, just don't let EFI stub relocate the kernel to any address
      lower than lowest acceptable address.
      
      [ ardb: introduce efi_low_alloc_above() to reduce the scope of the change ]
      Signed-off-by: NKairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Acked-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-6-ardb@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      220dd769
  2. 28 10月, 2019 11 次提交
  3. 25 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  4. 23 10月, 2019 2 次提交
    • J
      KVM: nVMX: Don't leak L1 MMIO regions to L2 · 671ddc70
      Jim Mattson 提交于
      If the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control is set in the
      VMCS, the APIC virtualization hardware is triggered when a page walk
      in VMX non-root mode terminates at a PTE wherein the address of the 4k
      page frame matches the APIC-access address specified in the VMCS. On
      hardware, the APIC-access address may be any valid 4k-aligned physical
      address.
      
      KVM's nVMX implementation enforces the additional constraint that the
      APIC-access address specified in the vmcs12 must be backed by
      a "struct page" in L1. If not, L0 will simply clear the "virtualize
      APIC accesses" VM-execution control in the vmcs02.
      
      The problem with this approach is that the L1 guest has arranged the
      vmcs12 EPT tables--or shadow page tables, if the "enable EPT"
      VM-execution control is clear in the vmcs12--so that the L2 guest
      physical address(es)--or L2 guest linear address(es)--that reference
      the L2 APIC map to the APIC-access address specified in the
      vmcs12. Without the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control in
      the vmcs02, the APIC accesses in the L2 guest will directly access the
      APIC-access page in L1.
      
      When there is no mapping whatsoever for the APIC-access address in L1,
      the L2 VM just loses the intended APIC virtualization. However, when
      the APIC-access address is mapped to an MMIO region in L1, the L2
      guest gets direct access to the L1 MMIO device. For example, if the
      APIC-access address specified in the vmcs12 is 0xfee00000, then L2
      gets direct access to L1's APIC.
      
      Since this vmcs12 configuration is something that KVM cannot
      faithfully emulate, the appropriate response is to exit to userspace
      with KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION.
      
      Fixes: fe3ef05c ("KVM: nVMX: Prepare vmcs02 from vmcs01 and vmcs12")
      Reported-by: NDan Cross <dcross@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NPeter Shier <pshier@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      671ddc70
    • M
      KVM: SVM: Fix potential wrong physical id in avic_handle_ldr_update · 5c94ac5d
      Miaohe Lin 提交于
      Guest physical APIC ID may not equal to vcpu->vcpu_id in some case.
      We may set the wrong physical id in avic_handle_ldr_update as we
      always use vcpu->vcpu_id. Get physical APIC ID from vAPIC page
      instead.
      Export and use kvm_xapic_id here and in avic_handle_apic_id_update
      as suggested by Vitaly.
      Signed-off-by: NMiaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      5c94ac5d
  5. 22 10月, 2019 6 次提交
  6. 20 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  7. 18 10月, 2019 2 次提交
  8. 15 10月, 2019 2 次提交
  9. 12 10月, 2019 10 次提交
  10. 09 10月, 2019 2 次提交
    • T
      perf/x86/amd: Change/fix NMI latency mitigation to use a timestamp · df4d2973
      Tom Lendacky 提交于
      It turns out that the NMI latency workaround from commit:
      
        6d3edaae ("x86/perf/amd: Resolve NMI latency issues for active PMCs")
      
      ends up being too conservative and results in the perf NMI handler claiming
      NMIs too easily on AMD hardware when the NMI watchdog is active.
      
      This has an impact, for example, on the hpwdt (HPE watchdog timer) module.
      This module can produce an NMI that is used to reset the system. It
      registers an NMI handler for the NMI_UNKNOWN type and relies on the fact
      that nothing has claimed an NMI so that its handler will be invoked when
      the watchdog device produces an NMI. After the referenced commit, the
      hpwdt module is unable to process its generated NMI if the NMI watchdog is
      active, because the current NMI latency mitigation results in the NMI
      being claimed by the perf NMI handler.
      
      Update the AMD perf NMI latency mitigation workaround to, instead, use a
      window of time. Whenever a PMC is handled in the perf NMI handler, set a
      timestamp which will act as a perf NMI window. Any NMIs arriving within
      that window will be claimed by perf. Anything outside that window will
      not be claimed by perf. The value for the NMI window is set to 100 msecs.
      This is a conservative value that easily covers any NMI latency in the
      hardware. While this still results in a window in which the hpwdt module
      will not receive its NMI, the window is now much, much smaller.
      Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hpe.com>
      Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Fixes: 6d3edaae ("x86/perf/amd: Resolve NMI latency issues for active PMCs")
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Message-ID:
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      df4d2973
    • K
      x86/cpu: Add Comet Lake to the Intel CPU models header · 8d7c6ac3
      Kan Liang 提交于
      Comet Lake is the new 10th Gen Intel processor. Add two new CPU model
      numbers to the Intel family list.
      
      The CPU model numbers are not published in the SDM yet but they come
      from an authoritative internal source.
      
       [ bp: Touch up commit message. ]
      Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Reviewed-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-2-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
      8d7c6ac3
  11. 08 10月, 2019 1 次提交