1. 06 8月, 2016 3 次提交
    • D
      ipv4: panic in leaf_walk_rcu due to stale node pointer · 94d9f1c5
      David Forster 提交于
      Panic occurs when issuing "cat /proc/net/route" whilst
      populating FIB with > 1M routes.
      
      Use of cached node pointer in fib_route_get_idx is unsafe.
      
       BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffc90001630024
       IP: [<ffffffff814cf6a0>] leaf_walk_rcu+0x10/0xe0
       PGD 11b08d067 PUD 11b08e067 PMD dac4b067 PTE 0
       Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
       Modules linked in: nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscac
       snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep virti
       acpi_cpufreq button parport_pc ppdev lp parport autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd
      tio_ring virtio floppy uhci_hcd ehci_hcd usbcore usb_common libata scsi_mod
       CPU: 1 PID: 785 Comm: cat Not tainted 4.2.0-rc8+ #4
       Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
       task: ffff8800da1c0bc0 ti: ffff88011a05c000 task.ti: ffff88011a05c000
       RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814cf6a0>]  [<ffffffff814cf6a0>] leaf_walk_rcu+0x10/0xe0
       RSP: 0018:ffff88011a05fda0  EFLAGS: 00010202
       RAX: ffff8800d8a40c00 RBX: ffff8800da4af940 RCX: ffff88011a05ff20
       RDX: ffffc90001630020 RSI: 0000000001013531 RDI: ffff8800da4af950
       RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8800da1f9a00 R09: 0000000000000000
       R10: ffff8800db45b7e4 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffff8800da4af950
       R13: ffff8800d97a74c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8800d97a7480
       FS:  00007fd3970e0700(0000) GS:ffff88011fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
       CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
       CR2: ffffc90001630024 CR3: 000000011a7e4000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
       Stack:
        ffffffff814d00d3 0000000000000000 ffff88011a05ff20 ffff8800da1f9a00
        ffffffff811dd8b9 0000000000000800 0000000000020000 00007fd396f35000
        ffffffff811f8714 0000000000003431 ffffffff8138dce0 0000000000000f80
       Call Trace:
        [<ffffffff814d00d3>] ? fib_route_seq_start+0x93/0xc0
        [<ffffffff811dd8b9>] ? seq_read+0x149/0x380
        [<ffffffff811f8714>] ? fsnotify+0x3b4/0x500
        [<ffffffff8138dce0>] ? process_echoes+0x70/0x70
        [<ffffffff8121cfa7>] ? proc_reg_read+0x47/0x70
        [<ffffffff811bb823>] ? __vfs_read+0x23/0xd0
        [<ffffffff811bbd42>] ? rw_verify_area+0x52/0xf0
        [<ffffffff811bbe61>] ? vfs_read+0x81/0x120
        [<ffffffff811bcbc2>] ? SyS_read+0x42/0xa0
        [<ffffffff81549ab2>] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
       Code: 48 85 c0 75 d8 f3 c3 31 c0 c3 f3 c3 66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00
      a 04 89 f0 33 02 44 89 c9 48 d3 e8 0f b6 4a 05 49 89
       RIP  [<ffffffff814cf6a0>] leaf_walk_rcu+0x10/0xe0
        RSP <ffff88011a05fda0>
       CR2: ffffc90001630024
      Signed-off-by: NDave Forster <dforster@brocade.com>
      Acked-by: NAlexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      94d9f1c5
    • D
      rxrpc: Fix races between skb free, ACK generation and replying · 372ee163
      David Howells 提交于
      Inside the kafs filesystem it is possible to occasionally have a call
      processed and terminated before we've had a chance to check whether we need
      to clean up the rx queue for that call because afs_send_simple_reply() ends
      the call when it is done, but this is done in a workqueue item that might
      happen to run to completion before afs_deliver_to_call() completes.
      
      Further, it is possible for rxrpc_kernel_send_data() to be called to send a
      reply before the last request-phase data skb is released.  The rxrpc skb
      destructor is where the ACK processing is done and the call state is
      advanced upon release of the last skb.  ACK generation is also deferred to
      a work item because it's possible that the skb destructor is not called in
      a context where kernel_sendmsg() can be invoked.
      
      To this end, the following changes are made:
      
       (1) kernel_rxrpc_data_consumed() is added.  This should be called whenever
           an skb is emptied so as to crank the ACK and call states.  This does
           not release the skb, however.  kernel_rxrpc_free_skb() must now be
           called to achieve that.  These together replace
           rxrpc_kernel_data_delivered().
      
       (2) kernel_rxrpc_data_consumed() is wrapped by afs_data_consumed().
      
           This makes afs_deliver_to_call() easier to work as the skb can simply
           be discarded unconditionally here without trying to work out what the
           return value of the ->deliver() function means.
      
           The ->deliver() functions can, via afs_data_complete(),
           afs_transfer_reply() and afs_extract_data() mark that an skb has been
           consumed (thereby cranking the state) without the need to
           conditionally free the skb to make sure the state is correct on an
           incoming call for when the call processor tries to send the reply.
      
       (3) rxrpc_recvmsg() now has to call kernel_rxrpc_data_consumed() when it
           has finished with a packet and MSG_PEEK isn't set.
      
       (4) rxrpc_packet_destructor() no longer calls rxrpc_hard_ACK_data().
      
           Because of this, we no longer need to clear the destructor and put the
           call before we free the skb in cases where we don't want the ACK/call
           state to be cranked.
      
       (5) The ->deliver() call-type callbacks are made to return -EAGAIN rather
           than 0 if they expect more data (afs_extract_data() returns -EAGAIN to
           the delivery function already), and the caller is now responsible for
           producing an abort if that was the last packet.
      
       (6) There are many bits of unmarshalling code where:
      
       		ret = afs_extract_data(call, skb, last, ...);
      		switch (ret) {
      		case 0:		break;
      		case -EAGAIN:	return 0;
      		default:	return ret;
      		}
      
           is to be found.  As -EAGAIN can now be passed back to the caller, we
           now just return if ret < 0:
      
       		ret = afs_extract_data(call, skb, last, ...);
      		if (ret < 0)
      			return ret;
      
       (7) Checks for trailing data and empty final data packets has been
           consolidated as afs_data_complete().  So:
      
      		if (skb->len > 0)
      			return -EBADMSG;
      		if (!last)
      			return 0;
      
           becomes:
      
      		ret = afs_data_complete(call, skb, last);
      		if (ret < 0)
      			return ret;
      
       (8) afs_transfer_reply() now checks the amount of data it has against the
           amount of data desired and the amount of data in the skb and returns
           an error to induce an abort if we don't get exactly what we want.
      
      Without these changes, the following oops can occasionally be observed,
      particularly if some printks are inserted into the delivery path:
      
      general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
      Modules linked in: kafs(E) af_rxrpc(E) [last unloaded: af_rxrpc]
      CPU: 0 PID: 1305 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Tainted: G            E   4.7.0-fsdevel+ #1303
      Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014
      Workqueue: kafsd afs_async_workfn [kafs]
      task: ffff88040be041c0 ti: ffff88040c070000 task.ti: ffff88040c070000
      RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8108fd3c>]  [<ffffffff8108fd3c>] __lock_acquire+0xcf/0x15a1
      RSP: 0018:ffff88040c073bc0  EFLAGS: 00010002
      RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88040d29a710
      RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88040d29a710
      RBP: ffff88040c073c70 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
      R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
      R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88040be041c0 R15: ffffffff814c928f
      FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88041fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      CR2: 00007fa4595f4750 CR3: 0000000001c14000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
      Stack:
       0000000000000006 000000000be04930 0000000000000000 ffff880400000000
       ffff880400000000 ffffffff8108f847 ffff88040be041c0 ffffffff81050446
       ffff8803fc08a920 ffff8803fc08a958 ffff88040be041c0 ffff88040c073c38
      Call Trace:
       [<ffffffff8108f847>] ? mark_held_locks+0x5e/0x74
       [<ffffffff81050446>] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x9b/0xa1
       [<ffffffff8108f9ca>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16d/0x189
       [<ffffffff810915f4>] lock_acquire+0x122/0x1b6
       [<ffffffff810915f4>] ? lock_acquire+0x122/0x1b6
       [<ffffffff814c928f>] ? skb_dequeue+0x18/0x61
       [<ffffffff81609dbf>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x35/0x49
       [<ffffffff814c928f>] ? skb_dequeue+0x18/0x61
       [<ffffffff814c928f>] skb_dequeue+0x18/0x61
       [<ffffffffa009aa92>] afs_deliver_to_call+0x344/0x39d [kafs]
       [<ffffffffa009ab37>] afs_process_async_call+0x4c/0xd5 [kafs]
       [<ffffffffa0099e9c>] afs_async_workfn+0xe/0x10 [kafs]
       [<ffffffff81063a3a>] process_one_work+0x29d/0x57c
       [<ffffffff81064ac2>] worker_thread+0x24a/0x385
       [<ffffffff81064878>] ? rescuer_thread+0x2d0/0x2d0
       [<ffffffff810696f5>] kthread+0xf3/0xfb
       [<ffffffff8160a6ff>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
       [<ffffffff81069602>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1cf/0x1cf
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      372ee163
    • I
      OVS: Ignore negative headroom value · 5ef9f289
      Ian Wienand 提交于
      net_device->ndo_set_rx_headroom (introduced in
      871b642a) says
      
        "Setting a negtaive value reset the rx headroom
         to the default value".
      
      It seems that the OVS implementation in
      3a927bc7 overlooked this and sets
      dev->needed_headroom unconditionally.
      
      This doesn't have an immediate effect, but can mess up later
      LL_RESERVED_SPACE calculations, such as done in
      net/ipv6/mcast.c:mld_newpack.  For reference, this issue was found
      from a skb_panic raised there after the length calculations had given
      the wrong result.
      
      Note the other current users of this interface
      (drivers/net/tun.c:tun_set_headroom and
      drivers/net/veth.c:veth_set_rx_headroom) are both checking this
      correctly thus need no modification.
      
      Thanks to Ben for some pointers from the crash dumps!
      
      Cc: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
      Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
      Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1361414Signed-off-by: NIan Wienand <iwienand@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5ef9f289
  2. 05 8月, 2016 4 次提交
  3. 04 8月, 2016 1 次提交
  4. 03 8月, 2016 1 次提交
  5. 02 8月, 2016 2 次提交
  6. 31 7月, 2016 6 次提交
  7. 28 7月, 2016 6 次提交
  8. 27 7月, 2016 9 次提交
  9. 26 7月, 2016 8 次提交
    • W
      net_sched: get rid of struct tcf_common · ec0595cc
      WANG Cong 提交于
      After the previous patch, struct tc_action should be enough
      to represent the generic tc action, tcf_common is not necessary
      any more. This patch gets rid of it to make tc action code
      more readable.
      
      Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
      Signed-off-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ec0595cc
    • W
      net_sched: move tc_action into tcf_common · a85a970a
      WANG Cong 提交于
      struct tc_action is confusing, currently we use it for two purposes:
      1) Pass in arguments and carry out results from helper functions
      2) A generic representation for tc actions
      
      The first one is error-prone, since we need to make sure we don't
      miss anything. This patch aims to get rid of this use, by moving
      tc_action into tcf_common, so that they are allocated together
      in hashtable and can be cast'ed easily.
      
      And together with the following patch, we could really make
      tc_action a generic representation for all tc actions and each
      type of action can inherit from it.
      
      Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
      Signed-off-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      a85a970a
    • D
      udp: use sk_filter_trim_cap for udp{,6}_queue_rcv_skb · ba66bbe5
      Daniel Borkmann 提交于
      After a6127697 ("udp: prevent bugcheck if filter truncates packet
      too much"), there followed various other fixes for similar cases such
      as f4979fce ("rose: limit sk_filter trim to payload").
      
      Latter introduced a new helper sk_filter_trim_cap(), where we can pass
      the trim limit directly to the socket filter handling. Make use of it
      here as well with sizeof(struct udphdr) as lower cap limit and drop the
      extra skb->len test in UDP's input path.
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
      Acked-by: NWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ba66bbe5
    • V
      net/sctp: terminate rhashtable walk correctly · 5fc382d8
      Vegard Nossum 提交于
      I was seeing a lot of these:
      
          BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slab.h:388
          in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 14971, name: trinity-c2
          Preemption disabled at:[<ffffffff819bcd46>] rhashtable_walk_start+0x46/0x150
      
           [<ffffffff81149abb>] preempt_count_add+0x1fb/0x280
           [<ffffffff83295722>] _raw_spin_lock+0x12/0x40
           [<ffffffff811aac87>] console_unlock+0x2f7/0x930
           [<ffffffff811ab5bb>] vprintk_emit+0x2fb/0x520
           [<ffffffff811aba6a>] vprintk_default+0x1a/0x20
           [<ffffffff812c171a>] printk+0x94/0xb0
           [<ffffffff811d6ed0>] print_stack_trace+0xe0/0x170
           [<ffffffff8115835e>] ___might_sleep+0x3be/0x460
           [<ffffffff81158490>] __might_sleep+0x90/0x1a0
           [<ffffffff8139b823>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x153/0x1e0
           [<ffffffff819bca1e>] rhashtable_walk_init+0xfe/0x2d0
           [<ffffffff82ec64de>] sctp_transport_walk_start+0x1e/0x60
           [<ffffffff82edd8ad>] sctp_transport_seq_start+0x4d/0x150
           [<ffffffff8143a82b>] seq_read+0x27b/0x1180
           [<ffffffff814f97fc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
           [<ffffffff813d471b>] __vfs_read+0xdb/0x610
           [<ffffffff813d4d3a>] vfs_read+0xea/0x2d0
           [<ffffffff813d615b>] SyS_pread64+0x11b/0x150
           [<ffffffff8100334c>] do_syscall_64+0x19c/0x410
           [<ffffffff832960a5>] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
           [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
      
      Apparently we always need to call rhashtable_walk_stop(), even when
      rhashtable_walk_start() fails:
      
       * rhashtable_walk_start - Start a hash table walk
       * @iter:       Hash table iterator
       *
       * Start a hash table walk.  Note that we take the RCU lock in all
       * cases including when we return an error.  So you must always call
       * rhashtable_walk_stop to clean up.
      
      otherwise we never call rcu_read_unlock() and we get the splat above.
      
      Fixes: 53fa1036 ("sctp: fix some rhashtable functions using in sctp proc/diag")
      See-also: 53fa1036 ("sctp: fix some rhashtable functions using in sctp proc/diag")
      See-also: f2dba9c6 ("rhashtable: Introduce rhashtable_walk_*")
      Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
      Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NVegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
      Acked-by: NMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5fc382d8
    • V
      net/irda: fix NULL pointer dereference on memory allocation failure · d3e6952c
      Vegard Nossum 提交于
      I ran into this:
      
          kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
          kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
          general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
          CPU: 2 PID: 2012 Comm: trinity-c3 Not tainted 4.7.0-rc7+ #19
          Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
          task: ffff8800b745f2c0 ti: ffff880111740000 task.ti: ffff880111740000
          RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82bbf066>]  [<ffffffff82bbf066>] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710
          RSP: 0018:ffff880111747bb8  EFLAGS: 00010286
          RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000069dd8358
          RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: 0000000000000048
          RBP: ffff880111747c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
          R10: 0000000069dd8358 R11: 1ffffffff0759723 R12: 0000000000000000
          R13: ffff88011a7e4780 R14: 0000000000000027 R15: 0000000000000000
          FS:  00007fc738404700(0000) GS:ffff88011af00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
          CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
          CR2: 00007fc737fdfb10 CR3: 0000000118087000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
          Stack:
           0000000000000200 ffff880111747bd8 ffffffff810ee611 ffff880119f1f220
           ffff880119f1f4f8 ffff880119f1f4f0 ffff88011a7e4780 ffff880119f1f232
           ffff880119f1f220 ffff880111747d58 ffffffff82bca542 0000000000000000
          Call Trace:
           [<ffffffff82bca542>] irda_connect+0x562/0x1190
           [<ffffffff825ae582>] SYSC_connect+0x202/0x2a0
           [<ffffffff825b4489>] SyS_connect+0x9/0x10
           [<ffffffff8100334c>] do_syscall_64+0x19c/0x410
           [<ffffffff83295ca5>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
          Code: 41 89 ca 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 d7 53 48 89 fb 48 83 c7 48 48 89 fa 41 89 f6 48 c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 20 4c 8b 65 10 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 84 c0 0f 8e 4c 04 00 00 80 7b 48 00 74
          RIP  [<ffffffff82bbf066>] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710
           RSP <ffff880111747bb8>
          ---[ end trace 4cda2588bc055b30 ]---
      
      The problem is that irda_open_tsap() can fail and leave self->tsap = NULL,
      and then irttp_connect_request() almost immediately dereferences it.
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NVegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      d3e6952c
    • M
      sctp: also point GSO head_skb to the sk when it's available · 52253db9
      Marcelo Ricardo Leitner 提交于
      The head skb for GSO packets won't travel through the inner depths of
      SCTP stack as it doesn't contain any chunks on it. That means skb->sk
      doesn't get set and then when sctp_recvmsg() calls
      sctp_inet6_skb_msgname() on the head_skb it panics, as this last needs
      to check flags at the socket (sp->v4mapped).
      
      The fix is to initialize skb->sk for th head skb once we are able to do
      it. That is, when the first chunk is processed.
      Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      52253db9
    • M
      sctp: fix BH handling on socket backlog · eefc1b1d
      Marcelo Ricardo Leitner 提交于
      Now that the backlog processing is called with BH enabled, we have to
      disable BH before taking the socket lock via bh_lock_sock() otherwise
      it may dead lock:
      
      sctp_backlog_rcv()
                      bh_lock_sock(sk);
      
                      if (sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
                              if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, sk->sk_rcvbuf))
                                      sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
                              else
                                      backloged = 1;
                      } else
                              sctp_inq_push(inqueue, chunk);
      
                      bh_unlock_sock(sk);
      
      while sctp_inq_push() was disabling/enabling BH, but enabling BH
      triggers pending softirq, which then may try to re-lock the socket in
      sctp_rcv().
      
      [  219.187215]  <IRQ>
      [  219.187217]  [<ffffffff817ca3e0>] _raw_spin_lock+0x20/0x30
      [  219.187223]  [<ffffffffa041888c>] sctp_rcv+0x48c/0xba0 [sctp]
      [  219.187225]  [<ffffffff816e7db2>] ? nf_iterate+0x62/0x80
      [  219.187226]  [<ffffffff816f1b14>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x94/0x1e0
      [  219.187228]  [<ffffffff816f1e1f>] ip_local_deliver+0x6f/0xf0
      [  219.187229]  [<ffffffff816f1a80>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x3b0/0x3b0
      [  219.187230]  [<ffffffff816f17a8>] ip_rcv_finish+0xd8/0x3b0
      [  219.187232]  [<ffffffff816f2122>] ip_rcv+0x282/0x3a0
      [  219.187233]  [<ffffffff810d8bb6>] ? update_curr+0x66/0x180
      [  219.187235]  [<ffffffff816abac4>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x524/0xa90
      [  219.187236]  [<ffffffff810d8e00>] ? update_cfs_shares+0x30/0xf0
      [  219.187237]  [<ffffffff810d557c>] ? __enqueue_entity+0x6c/0x70
      [  219.187239]  [<ffffffff810dc454>] ? enqueue_entity+0x204/0xdf0
      [  219.187240]  [<ffffffff816ac048>] __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x60
      [  219.187242]  [<ffffffff816ad1ce>] process_backlog+0x9e/0x140
      [  219.187243]  [<ffffffff816ac8ec>] net_rx_action+0x22c/0x370
      [  219.187245]  [<ffffffff817cd352>] __do_softirq+0x112/0x2e7
      [  219.187247]  [<ffffffff817cc3bc>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
      [  219.187247]  <EOI>
      [  219.187248]  [<ffffffff810aa1c8>] do_softirq.part.14+0x38/0x40
      [  219.187249]  [<ffffffff810aa24d>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x7d/0x80
      [  219.187254]  [<ffffffffa0408428>] sctp_inq_push+0x68/0x80 [sctp]
      [  219.187258]  [<ffffffffa04190f1>] sctp_backlog_rcv+0x151/0x1c0 [sctp]
      [  219.187260]  [<ffffffff81692b07>] __release_sock+0x87/0xf0
      [  219.187261]  [<ffffffff81692ba0>] release_sock+0x30/0xa0
      [  219.187265]  [<ffffffffa040e46d>] sctp_accept+0x17d/0x210 [sctp]
      [  219.187266]  [<ffffffff810e7510>] ? prepare_to_wait_event+0xf0/0xf0
      [  219.187268]  [<ffffffff8172d52c>] inet_accept+0x3c/0x130
      [  219.187269]  [<ffffffff8168d7a3>] SYSC_accept4+0x103/0x210
      [  219.187271]  [<ffffffff817ca2ba>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x1a/0x20
      [  219.187272]  [<ffffffff81692bfc>] ? release_sock+0x8c/0xa0
      [  219.187276]  [<ffffffffa0413e22>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x62/0x1b0 [sctp]
      [  219.187277]  [<ffffffff8168f2d0>] SyS_accept+0x10/0x20
      
      Fixes: 860fbbc3 ("sctp: prepare for socket backlog behavior change")
      Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      eefc1b1d
    • C
      kcm: remove redundant -ve error check and return path · 0a58f474
      Colin Ian King 提交于
      The check for a -ve error is redundant, remove it and just
      immediately return the return value from the call to
      seq_open_net.
      Signed-off-by: NColin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      0a58f474