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  1. 14 11月, 2014 5 次提交
  3. 04 11月, 2014 2 次提交
  5. 29 10月, 2014 2 次提交
  7. 01 10月, 2014 1 次提交
  9. 20 9月, 2014 1 次提交
    • I
      net/mlx4_core: Enable CQE/EQE stride support · 77507aa2
      由 Ido Shamay 提交于 
      This feature is intended for archs having cache line larger then 64B.

Since our CQE/EQEs are generally 64B in those systems, HW will write
twice to the same cache line consecutively, causing pipe locks due to
he hazard prevention mechanism. For elements in a cyclic buffer, writes
are consecutive, so entries smaller than a cache line should be
avoided, especially if they are written at a high rate.

Reduce consecutive writes to same cache line in CQs/EQs, by allowing the
driver to increase the distance between entries so that each will reside
in a different cache line. Until the introduction of this feature, there
were two types of CQE/EQE:

1. 32B stride and context in the [0-31] segment
2. 64B stride and context in the [32-63] segment

This feature introduces two additional types:

3. 128B stride and context in the [0-31] segment (128B cache line)
4. 256B stride and context in the [0-31] segment (256B cache line)

Modify the mlx4_core driver to query the device for the CQE/EQE cache
line stride capability and to enable that capability when the host
cache line size is larger than 64 bytes (supported cache lines are
128B and 256B).

The mlx4 IB driver and libmlx4 need not be aware of this change. The PF
context behaviour is changed to require this change in VF drivers
running on such archs.
Signed-off-by: NIdo Shamay <idos@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: NOr Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      77507aa2
  11. 05 8月, 2014 1 次提交
    • J
      mlx4_core: Add support for secure-host and SMP firewall · 114840c3
      由 Jack Morgenstein 提交于 
      Secure-host is the general term for the capability of a device
to protect itself and the subnet from malicious host software.

This is achieved by:
1. Not allowing un-trusted entities to access device configuration
   registers, directly (through pci_cr or pci_conf) and indirectly
   (through MADs).

2. Hiding M_Key from untrusted entities.

3. Preventing the modification of GUID0 by un-trusted entities

4. Not allowing drivers on untrusted hosts to receive nor to transmit
   packets over QP0 (SMP Firewall).

The secure-host capability depends on firmware handling all QP0
packets, and not passing these packets up to the driver. Any information
required by the driver for proper operation (e.g., SM lid) is passed
via events generated by the firmware while processing QP0 MADs.

Driver support mainly requires using the MAD_DEMUX FW command at startup,
where the feature is enabled/disabled through a procedure described in
the Mellanox HCA tools package.
Signed-off-by: NJack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: NOr Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>

[ Fix error path in mlx4_setup_hca to go to err_mcg_table_free. - Roland ]
Signed-off-by: NRoland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
      114840c3
  13. 30 5月, 2014 2 次提交
  15. 09 5月, 2014 1 次提交
  17. 29 3月, 2014 1 次提交
  19. 21 3月, 2014 1 次提交
    • M
      net/mlx4: Adapt code for N-Port VF · 449fc488
      由 Matan Barak 提交于 
      Adds support for N-Port VFs, this includes:
1. Adding support in the wrapped FW command
	In wrapped commands, we need to verify and convert
	the slave's port into the real physical port.
	Furthermore, when sending the response back to the slave,
	a reverse conversion should be made.
2. Adjusting sqpn for QP1 para-virtualization
	The slave assumes that sqpn is used for QP1 communication.
	If the slave is assigned to a port != (first port), we need
	to adjust the sqpn that will direct its QP1 packets into the
	correct endpoint.
3. Adjusting gid[5] to modify the port for raw ethernet
	In B0 steering, gid[5] contains the port. It needs
	to be adjusted into the physical port.
4. Adjusting number of ports in the query / ports caps in the FW commands
	When a slave queries the hardware, it needs to view only
	the physical ports it's assigned to.
5. Adjusting the sched_qp according to the port number
	The QP port is encoded in the sched_qp, thus in modify_qp we need
	to encode the correct port in sched_qp.
Signed-off-by: NMatan Barak <matanb@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NOr Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      449fc488
  21. 13 3月, 2014 2 次提交
  23. 07 3月, 2014 1 次提交
  25. 03 3月, 2014 1 次提交
  27. 15 1月, 2014 1 次提交
  29. 01 1月, 2014 1 次提交
  31. 20 12月, 2013 4 次提交
  33. 08 11月, 2013 1 次提交
  35. 05 11月, 2013 2 次提交
    • J
      net/mlx4_core: Fix quota handling in the QUERY_FUNC_CAP wrapper · eb456a68
      由 Jack Morgenstein 提交于 
      In current kernels, the mlx4 driver running on a VM does not
differentiate between max resource numbers for the HCA and
max quotas -- it simply takes the quota values passed to it
as max-resource values.

However, the driver actually requires the VFs to be aware of
the actual number of resources that the HCA was initialized with,
for QPs, CQs, SRQs and MPTs.

For QPs, CQs and SRQs, the reason is that in completion handling
the driver must know which of the 24 bits are the actual resource
number, and which are "padding" bits.

For MPTs, also, the driver assumes knowledge of the number of MPTs
in the system.

The previous commit fixes the quota logic on the VM for the quota values
passed to it by QUERY_FUNC_CAPS.

For QPs, CQs, SRQs, and MPTs, it takes the max resource numbers
from QUERY_HCA (and not QUERY_FUNC_CAPS).  The quotas passed
in QUERY_FUNC_CAPS are used to report max resource number values
in the response to ib_query_device.

However, the Hypervisor driver must consider that VMs
may be running previous kernels, and compatibility must be preserved.

To resolve the incompatibility with previous kernels running on VMs,
we deprecated the quota fields in mlx4_QUERY_FUNC_CAP.  In the
deprecated fields, we pass the max-resource values from INIT_HCA

The quota fields are moved to a new location, and the current kernel
driver takes the proper values from that location. There is
also a new flag in dword 0, bit 28 of the mlx4_QUERY_FUNC_CAP mailbox;
if this flag is set, the (VM) driver takes the quota values from the
new location.

VMs running previous kernels will work properly, except that the max resource
numbers reported in ib_query_device for these resources will be
too high.  The Hypervisor driver will, however, enforce the quotas
for these VMs.
Signed-off-by: NJack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: NOr Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      eb456a68
    • J
      mlx4: Structures and init/teardown for VF resource quotas · 5a0d0a61
      由 Jack Morgenstein 提交于 
      This is step #1 for implementing SRIOV resource quotas for VFs.

Quotas are implemented per resource type for VFs and the PF, to prevent
any entity from simply grabbing all the resources for itself and leaving
the other entities unable to obtain such resources.

Resources which are allocated using quotas:  QPs, CQs, SRQs, MPTs, MTTs, MAC,
                                             VLAN, and Counters.

The quota system works as follows:
Each entity (VF or PF) is given a max number of a given resource (its quota),
and a guaranteed minimum number for each resource (starvation prevention).

For QPs, CQs, SRQs, MPTs and MTTs:
50% of the available quantity for the resource is divided equally among
the PF and all the active VFs (i.e., the number of VFs in the mlx4_core module
parameter "num_vfs"). This 50% represents the "guaranteed minimum" pool.
The other 50% is the "free pool", allocated on a first-come-first-serve basis.
For each VF/PF, resources are first allocated from its "guaranteed-minimum"
pool. When that pool is exhausted, the driver attempts to allocate from
the resource "free-pool".

The quota (i.e., max) for the VFs and the PF is:
  The free-pool amount (50% of the real max) + the guaranteed minimum

For MACs:
  Guarantee 2 MACs per VF/PF per port. As a result, since we have only
  128 MACs per port, reduce the allowable number of VFs from 64 to 63.
  Any remaining MACs are put into a free pool.

For VLANs:
  For the PF, the per-port quota is 128 and guarantee is 64
     (to allow the PF to register at least a VLAN per VF in VST mode).
  For the VFs, the per-port quota is 64 and the guarantee is 0.
      We assume that VGT VFs are trusted not to abuse the VLAN resource.

For Counters:
  For all functions (PF and VFs), the quota is 128 and the guarantee is 0.

In this patch, we define the needed structures, which are added to the
resource-tracker struct.  In addition, we do initialization
for the resource quota, and adjust the query_device response to use quotas
rather than resource maxima.

As part of the implementation, we introduce a new field in
mlx4_dev: quotas.  This field holds the resource quotas used
to report maxima to the upper layers (ib_core, via query_device).

The HCA maxima of these values are passed to the VFs (via
QUERY_HCA) so that they may continue to use these in handling
QPs, CQs, SRQs and MPTs.
Signed-off-by: NJack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: NOr Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5a0d0a61
  37. 18 10月, 2013 2 次提交
  39. 14 10月, 2013 1 次提交
  41. 02 8月, 2013 1 次提交
  43. 29 7月, 2013 1 次提交
  45. 02 7月, 2013 1 次提交
  47. 14 6月, 2013 1 次提交
  49. 05 6月, 2013 1 次提交
  51. 12 5月, 2013 1 次提交
  53. 27 4月, 2013 1 次提交