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  1. 12 9月, 2022 1 次提交
    • L
      page_ext: introduce boot parameter 'early_page_ext' · c4f20f14
      由 Li Zhe 提交于 
      In commit 2f1ee091 ("Revert "mm: use early_pfn_to_nid in
page_ext_init""), we call page_ext_init() after page_alloc_init_late() to
avoid some panic problem.  It seems that we cannot track early page
allocations in current kernel even if page structure has been initialized
early.

This patch introduces a new boot parameter 'early_page_ext' to resolve
this problem.  If we pass it to the kernel, page_ext_init() will be moved
up and the feature 'deferred initialization of struct pages' will be
disabled to initialize the page allocator early and prevent the panic
problem above.  It can help us to catch early page allocations.  This is
useful especially when we find that the free memory value is not the same
right after different kernel booting.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix section issue by removing __meminitdata]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220825102714.669-1-lizhe.67@bytedance.comSigned-off-by: NLi Zhe <lizhe.67@bytedance.com>
Suggested-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark-PK Tsai <mark-pk.tsai@mediatek.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      c4f20f14
  3. 23 8月, 2022 1 次提交
    • M
      arm64: fix rodata=full · 2e8cff0a
      由 Mark Rutland 提交于 
      On arm64, "rodata=full" has been suppored (but not documented) since
commit:

  c55191e9 ("arm64: mm: apply r/o permissions of VM areas to its linear alias as well")

As it's necessary to determine the rodata configuration early during
boot, arm64 has an early_param() handler for this, whereas init/main.c
has a __setup() handler which is run later.

Unfortunately, this split meant that since commit:

  f9a40b08 ("init/main.c: return 1 from handled __setup() functions")

... passing "rodata=full" would result in a spurious warning from the
__setup() handler (though RO permissions would be configured
appropriately).

Further, "rodata=full" has been broken since commit:

  0d6ea3ac ("lib/kstrtox.c: add "false"/"true" support to kstrtobool()")

... which caused strtobool() to parse "full" as false (in addition to
many other values not documented for the "rodata=" kernel parameter.

This patch fixes this breakage by:

* Moving the core parameter parser to an __early_param(), such that it
  is available early.

* Adding an (optional) arch hook which arm64 can use to parse "full".

* Updating the documentation to mention that "full" is valid for arm64.

* Having the core parameter parser handle "on" and "off" explicitly,
  such that any undocumented values (e.g. typos such as "ful") are
  reported as errors rather than being silently accepted.

Note that __setup() and early_param() have opposite conventions for
their return values, where __setup() uses 1 to indicate a parameter was
handled and early_param() uses 0 to indicate a parameter was handled.

Fixes: f9a40b08 ("init/main.c: return 1 from handled __setup() functions")
Fixes: 0d6ea3ac ("lib/kstrtox.c: add "false"/"true" support to kstrtobool()")
Signed-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Jagdish Gediya <jvgediya@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220817154022.3974645-1-mark.rutland@arm.comSigned-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
      2e8cff0a
  5. 02 7月, 2022 1 次提交
  7. 18 5月, 2022 1 次提交
    • J
      random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init() · 2f14062b
      由 Jason A. Donenfeld 提交于 
      Currently, start_kernel() adds latent entropy and the command line to
the entropy bool *after* the RNG has been initialized, deferring when
it's actually used by things like stack canaries until the next time
the pool is seeded. This surely is not intended.

Rather than splitting up which entropy gets added where and when between
start_kernel() and random_init(), just do everything in random_init(),
which should eliminate these kinds of bugs in the future.

While we're at it, rename the awkwardly titled "rand_initialize()" to
the more standard "random_init()" nomenclature.
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
      2f14062b
  9. 14 5月, 2022 1 次提交
    • J
      init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() · fe222a6c
      由 Jason A. Donenfeld 提交于 
      Currently time_init() is called after rand_initialize(), but
rand_initialize() makes use of the timer on various platforms, and
sometimes this timer needs to be initialized by time_init() first. In
order for random_get_entropy() to not return zero during early boot when
it's potentially used as an entropy source, reverse the order of these
two calls. The block doing random initialization was right before
time_init() before, so changing the order shouldn't have any complicated
effects.

Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: NStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
      fe222a6c
  11. 07 5月, 2022 1 次提交
    • E
      kthread: Don't allocate kthread_struct for init and umh · 343f4c49
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      If kthread_is_per_cpu runs concurrently with free_kthread_struct the
kthread_struct that was just freed may be read from.

This bug was introduced by commit 40966e31 ("kthread: Ensure
struct kthread is present for all kthreads").  When kthread_struct
started to be allocated for all tasks that have PF_KTHREAD set.  This
in turn required the kthread_struct to be freed in kernel_execve and
violated the assumption that kthread_struct will have the same
lifetime as the task.

Looking a bit deeper this only applies to callers of kernel_execve
which is just the init process and the user mode helper processes.
These processes really don't want to be kernel threads but are for
historical reasons.  Mostly that copy_thread does not know how to take
a kernel mode function to the process with for processes without
PF_KTHREAD or PF_IO_WORKER set.

Solve this by not allocating kthread_struct for the init process and
the user mode helper processes.

This is done by adding a kthread member to struct kernel_clone_args.
Setting kthread in fork_idle and kernel_thread.  Adding
user_mode_thread that works like kernel_thread except it does not set
kthread.  In fork only allocating the kthread_struct if .kthread is set.

I have looked at kernel/kthread.c and since commit 40966e31
("kthread: Ensure struct kthread is present for all kthreads") there
have been no assumptions added that to_kthread or __to_kthread will
not return NULL.

There are a few callers of to_kthread or __to_kthread that assume a
non-NULL struct kthread pointer will be returned.  These functions are
kthread_data(), kthread_parmme(), kthread_exit(), kthread(),
kthread_park(), kthread_unpark(), kthread_stop().  All of those functions
can reasonably expected to be called when it is know that a task is a
kthread so that assumption seems reasonable.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 40966e31 ("kthread: Ensure struct kthread is present for all kthreads")
Reported-by: NМаксим Кутявин <maximkabox13@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220506141512.516114-1-ebiederm@xmission.comSigned-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      343f4c49
  13. 27 4月, 2022 2 次提交
  15. 24 3月, 2022 2 次提交
  17. 15 2月, 2022 1 次提交
  19. 06 2月, 2022 1 次提交
    • E
      net: initialize init_net earlier · 9c1be193
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      While testing a patch that will follow later
("net: add netns refcount tracker to struct nsproxy")
I found that devtmpfs_init() was called before init_net
was initialized.

This is a bug, because devtmpfs_setup() calls
ksys_unshare(CLONE_NEWNS);

This has the effect of increasing init_net refcount,
which will be later overwritten to 1, as part of setup_net(&init_net)

We had too many prior patches [1] trying to work around the root cause.

Really, make sure init_net is in BSS section, and that net_ns_init()
is called earlier at boot time.

Note that another patch ("vfs: add netns refcount tracker
to struct fs_context") also will need net_ns_init() being called
before vfs_caches_init()

As a bonus, this patch saves around 4KB in .data section.

[1]

f8c46cb3 ("netns: do not call pernet ops for not yet set up init_net namespace")
b5082df8 ("net: Initialise init_net.count to 1")
734b6541 ("net: Statically initialize init_net.dev_base_head")

v2: fixed a build error reported by kernel build bots (CONFIG_NET=n)
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      9c1be193
  21. 22 1月, 2022 1 次提交
    • V
      lib/stackdepot: allow optional init and stack_table allocation by kvmalloc() · 2dba5eb1
      由 Vlastimil Babka 提交于 
      Currently, enabling CONFIG_STACKDEPOT means its stack_table will be
allocated from memblock, even if stack depot ends up not actually used.
The default size of stack_table is 4MB on 32-bit, 8MB on 64-bit.

This is fine for use-cases such as KASAN which is also a config option
and has overhead on its own.  But it's an issue for functionality that
has to be actually enabled on boot (page_owner) or depends on hardware
(GPU drivers) and thus the memory might be wasted.  This was raised as
an issue [1] when attempting to add stackdepot support for SLUB's debug
object tracking functionality.  It's common to build kernels with
CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG and enable slub_debug on boot only when needed, or
create only specific kmem caches with debugging for testing purposes.

It would thus be more efficient if stackdepot's table was allocated only
when actually going to be used.  This patch thus makes the allocation
(and whole stack_depot_init() call) optional:

 - Add a CONFIG_STACKDEPOT_ALWAYS_INIT flag to keep using the current
   well-defined point of allocation as part of mem_init(). Make
   CONFIG_KASAN select this flag.

 - Other users have to call stack_depot_init() as part of their own init
   when it's determined that stack depot will actually be used. This may
   depend on both config and runtime conditions. Convert current users
   which are page_owner and several in the DRM subsystem. Same will be
   done for SLUB later.

 - Because the init might now be called after the boot-time memblock
   allocation has given all memory to the buddy allocator, change
   stack_depot_init() to allocate stack_table with kvmalloc() when
   memblock is no longer available. Also handle allocation failure by
   disabling stackdepot (could have theoretically happened even with
   memblock allocation previously), and don't unnecessarily align the
   memblock allocation to its own size anymore.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAMuHMdW=eoVzM1Re5FVoEN87nKfiLmM2+Ah7eNu2KXEhCvbZyA@mail.gmail.com/

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211013073005.11351-1-vbabka@suse.czSigned-off-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> # stackdepot
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Oliver Glitta <glittao@gmail.com>
Cc: Imran Khan <imran.f.khan@oracle.com>
From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Subject: lib/stackdepot: fix spelling mistake and grammar in pr_err message

There is a spelling mistake of the work allocation so fix this and
re-phrase the message to make it easier to read.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211015104159.11282-1-colin.king@canonical.comSigned-off-by: NColin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Subject: lib/stackdepot: allow optional init and stack_table allocation by kvmalloc() - fixup

On FLATMEM, we call page_ext_init_flatmem_late() just before
kmem_cache_init() which means stack_depot_init() (called by page owner
init) will not recognize properly it should use kvmalloc() and not
memblock_alloc().  memblock_alloc() will also not issue a warning and
return a block memory that can be invalid and cause kernel page fault when
saving stacks, as reported by the kernel test robot [1].

Fix this by moving page_ext_init_flatmem_late() below kmem_cache_init() so
that slab_is_available() is true during stack_depot_init().  SPARSEMEM
doesn't have this issue, as it doesn't do page_ext_init_flatmem_late(),
but a different page_ext_init() even later in the boot process.

Thanks to Mike Rapoport for pointing out the FLATMEM init ordering issue.

While at it, also actually resolve a checkpatch warning in stack_depot_init()
from DRM CI, which was supposed to be in the original patch already.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211014085450.GC18719@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6abd9213-19a9-6d58-cedc-2414386d2d81@suse.czSigned-off-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Nkernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Subject: lib/stackdepot: allow optional init and stack_table allocation by kvmalloc() - fixup3

Due to cd06ab2f ("drm/locking: add backtrace for locking contended
locks without backoff") landing recently to -next adding a new stack depot
user in drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modeset_lock.c we need to add an appropriate
call to stack_depot_init() there as well.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2a692365-cfa1-64f2-34e0-8aa5674dce5e@suse.czSigned-off-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Cc: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Oliver Glitta <glittao@gmail.com>
Cc: Imran Khan <imran.f.khan@oracle.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Subject: lib/stackdepot: allow optional init and stack_table allocation by kvmalloc() - fixup4

Due to 4e66934e ("lib: add reference counting tracking
infrastructure") landing recently to net-next adding a new stack depot
user in lib/ref_tracker.c we need to add an appropriate call to
stack_depot_init() there as well.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/45c1b738-1a2f-5b5f-2f6d-86fab206d01c@suse.czSigned-off-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Slab <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      2dba5eb1
  23. 10 11月, 2021 1 次提交
  25. 07 11月, 2021 2 次提交
  27. 18 10月, 2021 1 次提交
  29. 11 10月, 2021 4 次提交
  31. 23 9月, 2021 1 次提交
  33. 15 9月, 2021 1 次提交
    • L
      memblock: introduce saner 'memblock_free_ptr()' interface · 77e02cf5
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      The boot-time allocation interface for memblock is a mess, with
'memblock_alloc()' returning a virtual pointer, but then you are
supposed to free it with 'memblock_free()' that takes a _physical_
address.

Not only is that all kinds of strange and illogical, but it actually
causes bugs, when people then use it like a normal allocation function,
and it fails spectacularly on a NULL pointer:

   https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210912140820.GD25450@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/

or just random memory corruption if the debug checks don't catch it:

   https://lore.kernel.org/all/61ab2d0c-3313-aaab-514c-e15b7aa054a0@suse.cz/

I really don't want to apply patches that treat the symptoms, when the
fundamental cause is this horribly confusing interface.

I started out looking at just automating a sane replacement sequence,
but because of this mix or virtual and physical addresses, and because
people have used the "__pa()" macro that can take either a regular
kernel pointer, or just the raw "unsigned long" address, it's all quite
messy.

So this just introduces a new saner interface for freeing a virtual
address that was allocated using 'memblock_alloc()', and that was kept
as a regular kernel pointer.  And then it converts a couple of users
that are obvious and easy to test, including the 'xbc_nodes' case in
lib/bootconfig.c that caused problems.
Reported-by: Nkernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Fixes: 40caa127 ("init: bootconfig: Remove all bootconfig data when the init memory is removed")
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      77e02cf5
  35. 09 9月, 2021 4 次提交
  37. 13 8月, 2021 1 次提交
  39. 03 8月, 2021 1 次提交
  41. 09 7月, 2021 1 次提交
  43. 02 7月, 2021 1 次提交
    • A
      init: print out unknown kernel parameters · 86d1919a
      由 Andrew Halaney 提交于 
      It is easy to foobar setting a kernel parameter on the command line
without realizing it, there's not much output that you can use to assess
what the kernel did with that parameter by default.

Make it a little more explicit which parameters on the command line
_looked_ like a valid parameter for the kernel, but did not match anything
and ultimately got tossed to init.  This is very similar to the unknown
parameter message received when loading a module.

This assumes the parameters are processed in a normal fashion, some
parameters (dyndbg= for example) don't register their parameter with the
rest of the kernel's parameters, and therefore always show up in this list
(and are also given to init - like the rest of this list).

Another example is BOOT_IMAGE= is highlighted as an offender, which it
technically is, but is passed by LILO and GRUB so most systems will see
that complaint.

An example output where "foobared" and "unrecognized" are intentionally
invalid parameters:

  Kernel command line: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.12-dirty debug log_buf_len=4M foobared unrecognized=foo
  Unknown command line parameters: foobared BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.12-dirty unrecognized=foo

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511211009.42259-1-ahalaney@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NAndrew Halaney <ahalaney@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Suggested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      86d1919a
  45. 11 6月, 2021 1 次提交
  47. 05 6月, 2021 1 次提交
    • M
      pid: take a reference when initializing `cad_pid` · 0711f0d7
      由 Mark Rutland 提交于 
      During boot, kernel_init_freeable() initializes `cad_pid` to the init
task's struct pid.  Later on, we may change `cad_pid` via a sysctl, and
when this happens proc_do_cad_pid() will increment the refcount on the
new pid via get_pid(), and will decrement the refcount on the old pid
via put_pid().  As we never called get_pid() when we initialized
`cad_pid`, we decrement a reference we never incremented, can therefore
free the init task's struct pid early.  As there can be dangling
references to the struct pid, we can later encounter a use-after-free
(e.g.  when delivering signals).

This was spotted when fuzzing v5.13-rc3 with Syzkaller, but seems to
have been around since the conversion of `cad_pid` to struct pid in
commit 9ec52099 ("[PATCH] replace cad_pid by a struct pid") from the
pre-KASAN stone age of v2.6.19.

Fix this by getting a reference to the init task's struct pid when we
assign it to `cad_pid`.

Full KASAN splat below.

   ==================================================================
   BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ns_of_pid include/linux/pid.h:153 [inline]
   BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in task_active_pid_ns+0xc0/0xc8 kernel/pid.c:509
   Read of size 4 at addr ffff23794dda0004 by task syz-executor.0/273

   CPU: 1 PID: 273 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.12.0-00001-g9aef892b2d15 #1
   Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
   Call trace:
    ns_of_pid include/linux/pid.h:153 [inline]
    task_active_pid_ns+0xc0/0xc8 kernel/pid.c:509
    do_notify_parent+0x308/0xe60 kernel/signal.c:1950
    exit_notify kernel/exit.c:682 [inline]
    do_exit+0x2334/0x2bd0 kernel/exit.c:845
    do_group_exit+0x108/0x2c8 kernel/exit.c:922
    get_signal+0x4e4/0x2a88 kernel/signal.c:2781
    do_signal arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:882 [inline]
    do_notify_resume+0x300/0x970 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:936
    work_pending+0xc/0x2dc

   Allocated by task 0:
    slab_post_alloc_hook+0x50/0x5c0 mm/slab.h:516
    slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2907 [inline]
    slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2915 [inline]
    kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f4/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:2920
    alloc_pid+0xdc/0xc00 kernel/pid.c:180
    copy_process+0x2794/0x5e18 kernel/fork.c:2129
    kernel_clone+0x194/0x13c8 kernel/fork.c:2500
    kernel_thread+0xd4/0x110 kernel/fork.c:2552
    rest_init+0x44/0x4a0 init/main.c:687
    arch_call_rest_init+0x1c/0x28
    start_kernel+0x520/0x554 init/main.c:1064
    0x0

   Freed by task 270:
    slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1562 [inline]
    slab_free_freelist_hook+0x98/0x260 mm/slub.c:1600
    slab_free mm/slub.c:3161 [inline]
    kmem_cache_free+0x224/0x8e0 mm/slub.c:3177
    put_pid.part.4+0xe0/0x1a8 kernel/pid.c:114
    put_pid+0x30/0x48 kernel/pid.c:109
    proc_do_cad_pid+0x190/0x1b0 kernel/sysctl.c:1401
    proc_sys_call_handler+0x338/0x4b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:591
    proc_sys_write+0x34/0x48 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:617
    call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1977 [inline]
    new_sync_write+0x3ac/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518
    vfs_write fs/read_write.c:605 [inline]
    vfs_write+0x9c4/0x1018 fs/read_write.c:585
    ksys_write+0x124/0x240 fs/read_write.c:658
    __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:670 [inline]
    __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:667 [inline]
    __arm64_sys_write+0x78/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:667
    __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
    invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 [inline]
    el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x16c/0x388 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:129
    do_el0_svc+0xf8/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:168
    el0_svc+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:416
    el0_sync_handler+0x134/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:432
    el0_sync+0x154/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:701

   The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff23794dda0000
    which belongs to the cache pid of size 224
   The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of
    224-byte region [ffff23794dda0000, ffff23794dda00e0)
   The buggy address belongs to the page:
   page:(____ptrval____) refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x4dda0
   head:(____ptrval____) order:1 compound_mapcount:0
   flags: 0x3fffc0000010200(slab|head)
   raw: 03fffc0000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff23794d40d080
   raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
   page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

   Memory state around the buggy address:
    ffff23794dd9ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
    ffff23794dd9ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
   >ffff23794dda0000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                      ^
    ffff23794dda0080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
    ffff23794dda0100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   ==================================================================

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210524172230.38715-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Fixes: 9ec52099 ("[PATCH] replace cad_pid by a struct pid")
Signed-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      0711f0d7
  49. 01 6月, 2021 1 次提交
  51. 12 5月, 2021 1 次提交
    • V
      sched/core: Initialize the idle task with preemption disabled · f1a0a376
      由 Valentin Schneider 提交于 
      As pointed out by commit

  de9b8f5d ("sched: Fix crash trying to dequeue/enqueue the idle thread")

init_idle() can and will be invoked more than once on the same idle
task. At boot time, it is invoked for the boot CPU thread by
sched_init(). Then smp_init() creates the threads for all the secondary
CPUs and invokes init_idle() on them.

As the hotplug machinery brings the secondaries to life, it will issue
calls to idle_thread_get(), which itself invokes init_idle() yet again.
In this case it's invoked twice more per secondary: at _cpu_up(), and at
bringup_cpu().

Given smp_init() already initializes the idle tasks for all *possible*
CPUs, no further initialization should be required. Now, removing
init_idle() from idle_thread_get() exposes some interesting expectations
with regards to the idle task's preempt_count: the secondary startup always
issues a preempt_disable(), requiring some reset of the preempt count to 0
between hot-unplug and hotplug, which is currently served by
idle_thread_get() -> idle_init().

Given the idle task is supposed to have preemption disabled once and never
see it re-enabled, it seems that what we actually want is to initialize its
preempt_count to PREEMPT_DISABLED and leave it there. Do that, and remove
init_idle() from idle_thread_get().

Secondary startups were patched via coccinelle:

  @begone@
  @@

  -preempt_disable();
  ...
  cpu_startup_entry(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_IDLE);
Signed-off-by: NValentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210512094636.2958515-1-valentin.schneider@arm.com
      f1a0a376
  53. 11 5月, 2021 1 次提交
    • F
      srcu: Initialize SRCU after timers · 8e9c01c7
      由 Frederic Weisbecker 提交于 
      Once srcu_init() is called, the SRCU core will make use of delayed
workqueues, which rely on timers.  However init_timers() is called
several steps after rcu_init().  This means that a call_srcu() after
rcu_init() but before init_timers() would find itself within a dangerously
uninitialized timer core.

This commit therefore creates a separate call to srcu_init() after
init_timer() completes, which ensures that we stay in early SRCU mode
until timers are safe(r).
Signed-off-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraju@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
      8e9c01c7
  55. 07 5月, 2021 1 次提交
    • R
      init/initramfs.c: do unpacking asynchronously · e7cb072e
      由 Rasmus Villemoes 提交于 
      Patch series "background initramfs unpacking, and CONFIG_MODPROBE_PATH", v3.

These two patches are independent, but better-together.

The second is a rather trivial patch that simply allows the developer to
change "/sbin/modprobe" to something else - e.g.  the empty string, so
that all request_module() during early boot return -ENOENT early, without
even spawning a usermode helper, needlessly synchronizing with the
initramfs unpacking.

The first patch delegates decompressing the initramfs to a worker thread,
allowing do_initcalls() in main.c to proceed to the device_ and late_
initcalls without waiting for that decompression (and populating of
rootfs) to finish.  Obviously, some of those later calls may rely on the
initramfs being available, so I've added synchronization points in the
firmware loader and usermodehelper paths - there might be other places
that would need this, but so far no one has been able to think of any
places I have missed.

There's not much to win if most of the functionality needed during boot is
only available as modules.  But systems with a custom-made .config and
initramfs can boot faster, partly due to utilizing more than one cpu
earlier, partly by avoiding known-futile modprobe calls (which would still
trigger synchronization with the initramfs unpacking, thus eliminating
most of the first benefit).

This patch (of 2):

Most of the boot process doesn't actually need anything from the
initramfs, until of course PID1 is to be executed.  So instead of doing
the decompressing and populating of the initramfs synchronously in
populate_rootfs() itself, push that off to a worker thread.

This is primarily motivated by an embedded ppc target, where unpacking
even the rather modest sized initramfs takes 0.6 seconds, which is long
enough that the external watchdog becomes unhappy that it doesn't get
attention soon enough.  By doing the initramfs decompression in a worker
thread, we get to do the device_initcalls and hence start petting the
watchdog much sooner.

Normal desktops might benefit as well.  On my mostly stock Ubuntu kernel,
my initramfs is a 26M xz-compressed blob, decompressing to around 126M.
That takes almost two seconds:

[    0.201454] Trying to unpack rootfs image as initramfs...
[    1.976633] Freeing initrd memory: 29416K

Before this patch, these lines occur consecutively in dmesg.  With this
patch, the timestamps on these two lines is roughly the same as above, but
with 172 lines inbetween - so more than one cpu has been kept busy doing
work that would otherwise only happen after the populate_rootfs()
finished.

Should one of the initcalls done after rootfs_initcall time (i.e., device_
and late_ initcalls) need something from the initramfs (say, a kernel
module or a firmware blob), it will simply wait for the initramfs
unpacking to be done before proceeding, which should in theory make this
completely safe.

But if some driver pokes around in the filesystem directly and not via one
of the official kernel interfaces (i.e.  request_firmware*(),
call_usermodehelper*) that theory may not hold - also, I certainly might
have missed a spot when sprinkling wait_for_initramfs().  So there is an
escape hatch in the form of an initramfs_async= command line parameter.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210313212528.2956377-1-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210313212528.2956377-2-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dkSigned-off-by: NRasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Reviewed-by: NLuis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      e7cb072e
  57. 01 5月, 2021 2 次提交
  59. 08 4月, 2021 1 次提交
    • K
      stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall · 39218ff4
      由 Kees Cook 提交于 
      This provides the ability for architectures to enable kernel stack base
address offset randomization. This feature is controlled by the boot
param "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", with its default value set by
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT.

This feature is based on the original idea from the last public release
of PaX's RANDKSTACK feature: https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/randkstack.txt
All the credit for the original idea goes to the PaX team. Note that
the design and implementation of this upstream randomize_kstack_offset
feature differs greatly from the RANDKSTACK feature (see below).

Reasoning for the feature:

This feature aims to make harder the various stack-based attacks that
rely on deterministic stack structure. We have had many such attacks in
past (just to name few):

https://jon.oberheide.org/files/infiltrate12-thestackisback.pdf
https://jon.oberheide.org/files/stackjacking-infiltrate11.pdf
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/06/exploiting-recursion-in-linux-kernel_20.html

As Linux kernel stack protections have been constantly improving
(vmap-based stack allocation with guard pages, removal of thread_info,
STACKLEAK), attackers have had to find new ways for their exploits
to work. They have done so, continuing to rely on the kernel's stack
determinism, in situations where VMAP_STACK and THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK_STRUCT
were not relevant. For example, the following recent attacks would have
been hampered if the stack offset was non-deterministic between syscalls:

https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf
(page 70: targeting the pt_regs copy with linear stack overflow)

https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html
(leaked stack address from one syscall as a target during next syscall)

The main idea is that since the stack offset is randomized on each system
call, it is harder for an attack to reliably land in any particular place
on the thread stack, even with address exposures, as the stack base will
change on the next syscall. Also, since randomization is performed after
placing pt_regs, the ptrace-based approach[1] to discover the randomized
offset during a long-running syscall should not be possible.

Design description:

During most of the kernel's execution, it runs on the "thread stack",
which is pretty deterministic in its structure: it is fixed in size,
and on every entry from userspace to kernel on a syscall the thread
stack starts construction from an address fetched from the per-cpu
cpu_current_top_of_stack variable. The first element to be pushed to the
thread stack is the pt_regs struct that stores all required CPU registers
and syscall parameters. Finally the specific syscall function is called,
with the stack being used as the kernel executes the resulting request.

The goal of randomize_kstack_offset feature is to add a random offset
after the pt_regs has been pushed to the stack and before the rest of the
thread stack is used during the syscall processing, and to change it every
time a process issues a syscall. The source of randomness is currently
architecture-defined (but x86 is using the low byte of rdtsc()). Future
improvements for different entropy sources is possible, but out of scope
for this patch. Further more, to add more unpredictability, new offsets
are chosen at the end of syscalls (the timing of which should be less
easy to measure from userspace than at syscall entry time), and stored
in a per-CPU variable, so that the life of the value does not stay
explicitly tied to a single task.

As suggested by Andy Lutomirski, the offset is added using alloca()
and an empty asm() statement with an output constraint, since it avoids
changes to assembly syscall entry code, to the unwinder, and provides
correct stack alignment as defined by the compiler.

In order to make this available by default with zero performance impact
for those that don't want it, it is boot-time selectable with static
branches. This way, if the overhead is not wanted, it can just be
left turned off with no performance impact.

The generated assembly for x86_64 with GCC looks like this:

...
ffffffff81003977: 65 8b 05 02 ea 00 7f  mov %gs:0x7f00ea02(%rip),%eax
					    # 12380 <kstack_offset>
ffffffff8100397e: 25 ff 03 00 00        and $0x3ff,%eax
ffffffff81003983: 48 83 c0 0f           add $0xf,%rax
ffffffff81003987: 25 f8 07 00 00        and $0x7f8,%eax
ffffffff8100398c: 48 29 c4              sub %rax,%rsp
ffffffff8100398f: 48 8d 44 24 0f        lea 0xf(%rsp),%rax
ffffffff81003994: 48 83 e0 f0           and $0xfffffffffffffff0,%rax
...

As a result of the above stack alignment, this patch introduces about
5 bits of randomness after pt_regs is spilled to the thread stack on
x86_64, and 6 bits on x86_32 (since its has 1 fewer bit required for
stack alignment). The amount of entropy could be adjusted based on how
much of the stack space we wish to trade for security.

My measure of syscall performance overhead (on x86_64):

lmbench: /usr/lib/lmbench/bin/x86_64-linux-gnu/lat_syscall -N 10000 null
    randomize_kstack_offset=y	Simple syscall: 0.7082 microseconds
    randomize_kstack_offset=n	Simple syscall: 0.7016 microseconds

So, roughly 0.9% overhead growth for a no-op syscall, which is very
manageable. And for people that don't want this, it's off by default.

There are two gotchas with using the alloca() trick. First,
compilers that have Stack Clash protection (-fstack-clash-protection)
enabled by default (e.g. Ubuntu[3]) add pagesize stack probes to
any dynamic stack allocations. While the randomization offset is
always less than a page, the resulting assembly would still contain
(unreachable!) probing routines, bloating the resulting assembly. To
avoid this, -fno-stack-clash-protection is unconditionally added to
the kernel Makefile since this is the only dynamic stack allocation in
the kernel (now that VLAs have been removed) and it is provably safe
from Stack Clash style attacks.

The second gotcha with alloca() is a negative interaction with
-fstack-protector*, in that it sees the alloca() as an array allocation,
which triggers the unconditional addition of the stack canary function
pre/post-amble which slows down syscalls regardless of the static
branch. In order to avoid adding this unneeded check and its associated
performance impact, architectures need to carefully remove uses of
-fstack-protector-strong (or -fstack-protector) in the compilation units
that use the add_random_kstack() macro and to audit the resulting stack
mitigation coverage (to make sure no desired coverage disappears). No
change is visible for this on x86 because the stack protector is already
unconditionally disabled for the compilation unit, but the change is
required on arm64. There is, unfortunately, no attribute that can be
used to disable stack protector for specific functions.

Comparison to PaX RANDKSTACK feature:

The RANDKSTACK feature randomizes the location of the stack start
(cpu_current_top_of_stack), i.e. including the location of pt_regs
structure itself on the stack. Initially this patch followed the same
approach, but during the recent discussions[2], it has been determined
to be of a little value since, if ptrace functionality is available for
an attacker, they can use PTRACE_PEEKUSR/PTRACE_POKEUSR to read/write
different offsets in the pt_regs struct, observe the cache behavior of
the pt_regs accesses, and figure out the random stack offset. Another
difference is that the random offset is stored in a per-cpu variable,
rather than having it be per-thread. As a result, these implementations
differ a fair bit in their implementation details and results, though
obviously the intent is similar.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4BC57C1@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/
[3] https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-devel/2019-June/040741.htmlCo-developed-by: NElena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NElena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-4-keescook@chromium.org
      39218ff4