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  1. 20 6月, 2022 1 次提交
    • A
      efi: avoid efivars layer when loading SSDTs from variables · 3881ee0b
      由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于 
      The efivars intermediate variable access layer provides an abstraction
that permits the EFI variable store to be replaced by something else
that implements a compatible interface, and caches all variables in the
variable store for fast access via the efivarfs pseudo-filesystem.

The SSDT override feature does not take advantage of either feature, as
it is only used when the generic EFI implementation of efivars is used,
and it traverses all variables only once to find the ones it is
interested in, and frees all data structures that the efivars layer
keeps right after.

So in this case, let's just call EFI's code directly, using the function
pointers in struct efi.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
      3881ee0b
  3. 15 6月, 2022 1 次提交
  5. 14 4月, 2022 3 次提交
  7. 01 3月, 2022 1 次提交
    • R
      efi: fix return value of __setup handlers · 9feaf8b3
      由 Randy Dunlap 提交于 
      When "dump_apple_properties" is used on the kernel boot command line,
it causes an Unknown parameter message and the string is added to init's
argument strings:

  Unknown kernel command line parameters "dump_apple_properties
    BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc6 efivar_ssdt=newcpu_ssdt", will be
    passed to user space.

 Run /sbin/init as init process
   with arguments:
     /sbin/init
     dump_apple_properties
   with environment:
     HOME=/
     TERM=linux
     BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc6
     efivar_ssdt=newcpu_ssdt

Similarly when "efivar_ssdt=somestring" is used, it is added to the
Unknown parameter message and to init's environment strings, polluting
them (see examples above).

Change the return value of the __setup functions to 1 to indicate
that the __setup options have been handled.

Fixes: 58c5475a ("x86/efi: Retrieve and assign Apple device properties")
Fixes: 475fb4e8 ("efi / ACPI: load SSTDs from EFI variables")
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: NIgor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru>
Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Octavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220301041851.12459-1-rdunlap@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
      9feaf8b3
  9. 23 1月, 2022 1 次提交
    • A
      efi: runtime: avoid EFIv2 runtime services on Apple x86 machines · f5390cd0
      由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于 
      Aditya reports [0] that his recent MacbookPro crashes in the firmware
when using the variable services at runtime. The culprit appears to be a
call to QueryVariableInfo(), which we did not use to call on Apple x86
machines in the past as they only upgraded from EFI v1.10 to EFI v2.40
firmware fairly recently, and QueryVariableInfo() (along with
UpdateCapsule() et al) was added in EFI v2.00.

The only runtime service introduced in EFI v2.00 that we actually use in
Linux is QueryVariableInfo(), as the capsule based ones are optional,
generally not used at runtime (all the LVFS/fwupd firmware update
infrastructure uses helper EFI programs that invoke capsule update at
boot time, not runtime), and not implemented by Apple machines in the
first place. QueryVariableInfo() is used to 'safely' set variables,
i.e., only when there is enough space. This prevents machines with buggy
firmwares from corrupting their NVRAMs when they run out of space.

Given that Apple machines have been using EFI v1.10 services only for
the longest time (the EFI v2.0 spec was released in 2006, and Linux
support for the newly introduced runtime services was added in 2011, but
the MacbookPro12,1 released in 2015 still claims to be EFI v1.10 only),
let's avoid the EFI v2.0 ones on all Apple x86 machines.

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/6D757C75-65B1-468B-842D-10410081A8E4@live.com/

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Reported-by: NAditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com>
Tested-by: NOrlando Chamberlain <redecorating@protonmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Tested-by: NAditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215277
      f5390cd0
  11. 29 9月, 2021 2 次提交
  13. 17 7月, 2021 1 次提交
    • M
      firmware/efi: Tell memblock about EFI iomem reservations · 2bab693a
      由 Marc Zyngier 提交于 
      kexec_load_file() relies on the memblock infrastructure to avoid
stamping over regions of memory that are essential to the survival
of the system.

However, nobody seems to agree how to flag these regions as reserved,
and (for example) EFI only publishes its reservations in /proc/iomem
for the benefit of the traditional, userspace based kexec tool.

On arm64 platforms with GICv3, this can result in the payload being
placed at the location of the LPI tables. Shock, horror!

Let's augment the EFI reservation code with a memblock_reserve() call,
protecting our dear tables from the secondary kernel invasion.
Reported-by: NMoritz Fischer <mdf@kernel.org>
Tested-by: NMoritz Fischer <mdf@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
      2bab693a
  15. 19 3月, 2021 1 次提交
  17. 16 12月, 2020 1 次提交
    • J
      mm/gup: prevent gup_fast from racing with COW during fork · 57efa1fe
      由 Jason Gunthorpe 提交于 
      Since commit 70e806e4 ("mm: Do early cow for pinned pages during
fork() for ptes") pages under a FOLL_PIN will not be write protected
during COW for fork.  This means that pages returned from
pin_user_pages(FOLL_WRITE) should not become write protected while the pin
is active.

However, there is a small race where get_user_pages_fast(FOLL_PIN) can
establish a FOLL_PIN at the same time copy_present_page() is write
protecting it:

        CPU 0                             CPU 1
   get_user_pages_fast()
    internal_get_user_pages_fast()
                                       copy_page_range()
                                         pte_alloc_map_lock()
                                           copy_present_page()
                                             atomic_read(has_pinned) == 0
					     page_maybe_dma_pinned() == false
     atomic_set(has_pinned, 1);
     gup_pgd_range()
      gup_pte_range()
       pte_t pte = gup_get_pte(ptep)
       pte_access_permitted(pte)
       try_grab_compound_head()
                                             pte = pte_wrprotect(pte)
	                                     set_pte_at();
                                         pte_unmap_unlock()
      // GUP now returns with a write protected page

The first attempt to resolve this by using the write protect caused
problems (and was missing a barrrier), see commit f3c64eda ("mm: avoid
early COW write protect games during fork()")

Instead wrap copy_p4d_range() with the write side of a seqcount and check
the read side around gup_pgd_range().  If there is a collision then
get_user_pages_fast() fails and falls back to slow GUP.

Slow GUP is safe against this race because copy_page_range() is only
called while holding the exclusive side of the mmap_lock on the src
mm_struct.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]
  Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wi=iCnYCARbPGjkVJu9eyYeZ13N64tZYLdOB8CP5Q_PLw@mail.gmail.com

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2-v4-908497cf359a+4782-gup_fork_jgg@nvidia.com
Fixes: f3c64eda ("mm: avoid early COW write protect games during fork()")
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: NPeter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Acked-by: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <a.darwish@linutronix.de>	[seqcount_t parts]
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kirill Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      57efa1fe
  19. 25 11月, 2020 1 次提交
  21. 26 9月, 2020 1 次提交
  23. 16 9月, 2020 1 次提交
    • L
      efi: Support for MOK variable config table · 58c90902
      由 Lenny Szubowicz 提交于 
      Because of system-specific EFI firmware limitations, EFI volatile
variables may not be capable of holding the required contents of
the Machine Owner Key (MOK) certificate store when the certificate
list grows above some size. Therefore, an EFI boot loader may pass
the MOK certs via a EFI configuration table created specifically for
this purpose to avoid this firmware limitation.

An EFI configuration table is a much more primitive mechanism
compared to EFI variables and is well suited for one-way passage
of static information from a pre-OS environment to the kernel.

This patch adds initial kernel support to recognize, parse,
and validate the EFI MOK configuration table, where named
entries contain the same data that would otherwise be provided
in similarly named EFI variables.

Additionally, this patch creates a sysfs binary file for each
EFI MOK configuration table entry found. These files are read-only
to root and are provided for use by user space utilities such as
mokutil.

A subsequent patch will load MOK certs into the trusted platform
key ring using this infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: NLenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200905013107.10457-2-lszubowi@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
      58c90902
  25. 20 8月, 2020 1 次提交
  27. 09 7月, 2020 1 次提交
    • A
      efi/efivars: Expose RT service availability via efivars abstraction · f88814cc
      由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于 
      Commit

  bf67fad1 ("efi: Use more granular check for availability for variable services")

introduced a check into the efivarfs, efi-pstore and other drivers that
aborts loading of the module if not all three variable runtime services
(GetVariable, SetVariable and GetNextVariable) are supported. However, this
results in efivarfs being unavailable entirely if only SetVariable support
is missing, which is only needed if you want to make any modifications.
Also, efi-pstore and the sysfs EFI variable interface could be backed by
another implementation of the 'efivars' abstraction, in which case it is
completely irrelevant which services are supported by the EFI firmware.

So make the generic 'efivars' abstraction dependent on the availibility of
the GetVariable and GetNextVariable EFI runtime services, and add a helper
'efivar_supports_writes()' to find out whether the currently active efivars
abstraction supports writes (and wire it up to the availability of
SetVariable for the generic one).

Then, use the efivar_supports_writes() helper to decide whether to permit
efivarfs to be mounted read-write, and whether to enable efi-pstore or the
sysfs EFI variable interface altogether.

Fixes: bf67fad1 ("efi: Use more granular check for availability for variable services")
Reported-by: NHeinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Acked-by: NIlias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Tested-by: NIlias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
      f88814cc
  29. 16 6月, 2020 1 次提交
  31. 15 6月, 2020 1 次提交
    • G
      efi: Replace zero-length array and use struct_size() helper · 29637951
      由 Gustavo A. R. Silva 提交于 
      The current codebase makes use of the zero-length array language
extension to the C90 standard, but the preferred mechanism to declare
variable-length types such as these ones is a flexible array member[1][2],
introduced in C99:

struct foo {
        int stuff;
        struct boo array[];
};

By making use of the mechanism above, we will get a compiler warning
in case the flexible array does not occur last in the structure, which
will help us prevent some kind of undefined behavior bugs from being
inadvertently introduced[3] to the codebase from now on.

Also, notice that, dynamic memory allocations won't be affected by
this change:

"Flexible array members have incomplete type, and so the sizeof operator
may not be applied. As a quirk of the original implementation of
zero-length arrays, sizeof evaluates to zero."[1]

sizeof(flexible-array-member) triggers a warning because flexible array
members have incomplete type[1]. There are some instances of code in
which the sizeof operator is being incorrectly/erroneously applied to
zero-length arrays and the result is zero. Such instances may be hiding
some bugs. So, this work (flexible-array member conversions) will also
help to get completely rid of those sorts of issues.

Lastly, make use of the sizeof_field() helper instead of an open-coded
version.

This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle and audited _manually_.

[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21
[3] commit 76497732 ("cxgb3/l2t: Fix undefined behaviour")
Signed-off-by: NGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200527171425.GA4053@embeddedorSigned-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
      29637951
  33. 10 6月, 2020 1 次提交
  35. 17 5月, 2020 1 次提交
  37. 24 4月, 2020 2 次提交
    • A
      efi: Move arch_tables check to caller · 4eb8320b
      由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于 
      Instead of making match_config_table() test its table_types pointer for
NULL-ness, omit the call entirely if no arch_tables pointer was provided
to efi_config_parse_tables().
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
      4eb8320b
    • A
      efi: Clean up config table description arrays · 4e9a0f73
      由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于 
      Increase legibility by adding whitespace to the efi_config_table_type_t
arrays that describe which EFI config tables we look for when going over
the firmware provided list. While at it, replace the 'name' char pointer
with a char array, which is more space efficient on relocatable 64-bit
kernels, as it avoids a 8 byte pointer and the associated relocation
data (24 bytes when using RELA format)
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
      4e9a0f73
  39. 08 3月, 2020 1 次提交
    • A
      efi/x86: Ignore the memory attributes table on i386 · dd09fad9
      由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于 
      Commit:

  3a6b6c6f ("efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE initialization common across all architectures")

moved the call to efi_memattr_init() from ARM specific to the generic
EFI init code, in order to be able to apply the restricted permissions
described in that table on x86 as well.

We never enabled this feature fully on i386, and so mapping and
reserving this table is pointless. However, due to the early call to
memblock_reserve(), the memory bookkeeping gets confused to the point
where it produces the splat below when we try to map the memory later
on:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  ioremap on RAM at 0x3f251000 - 0x3fa1afff
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:166 __ioremap_caller ...
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.20.0 #48
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  EIP: __ioremap_caller.constprop.0+0x249/0x260
  Code: 90 0f b7 05 4e 38 40 de 09 45 e0 e9 09 ff ff ff 90 8d 45 ec c6 05 ...
  EAX: 00000029 EBX: 00000000 ECX: de59c228 EDX: 00000001
  ESI: 3f250fff EDI: 00000000 EBP: de3edf20 ESP: de3edee0
  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00200296
  CR0: 80050033 CR2: ffd17000 CR3: 1e58c000 CR4: 00040690
  Call Trace:
   ioremap_cache+0xd/0x10
   ? old_map_region+0x72/0x9d
   old_map_region+0x72/0x9d
   efi_map_region+0x8/0xa
   efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x260/0x43b
   start_kernel+0x329/0x3aa
   i386_start_kernel+0xa7/0xab
   startup_32_smp+0x164/0x168
  ---[ end trace e15ccf6b9f356833 ]---

Let's work around this by disregarding the memory attributes table
altogether on i386, which does not result in a loss of functionality
or protection, given that we never consumed the contents.

Fixes: 3a6b6c6f ("efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE ... ")
Tested-by: NArvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200304165917.5893-1-ardb@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200308080859.21568-21-ardb@kernel.org
      dd09fad9
  41. 03 3月, 2020 1 次提交
  43. 29 2月, 2020 3 次提交
  45. 26 2月, 2020 1 次提交
  47. 24 2月, 2020 11 次提交