1. 19 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  2. 16 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  3. 27 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  4. 20 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  5. 15 11月, 2013 1 次提交
  6. 25 10月, 2013 1 次提交
  7. 07 9月, 2013 2 次提交
  8. 29 6月, 2013 1 次提交
  9. 08 6月, 2013 10 次提交
  10. 10 5月, 2013 1 次提交
    • T
      eCryptfs: Use the ablkcipher crypto API · 4dfea4f0
      Tyler Hicks 提交于
      Make the switch from the blkcipher kernel crypto interface to the
      ablkcipher interface.
      
      encrypt_scatterlist() and decrypt_scatterlist() now use the ablkcipher
      interface but, from the eCryptfs standpoint, still treat the crypto
      operation as a synchronous operation. They submit the async request and
      then wait until the operation is finished before they return. Most of
      the changes are contained inside those two functions.
      
      Despite waiting for the completion of the crypto operation, the
      ablkcipher interface provides performance increases in most cases when
      used on AES-NI capable hardware.
      Signed-off-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Acked-by: NColin King <colin.king@canonical.com>
      Reviewed-by: NZeev Zilberman <zeev@annapurnaLabs.com>
      Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gazzang.com>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@intel.com>
      Cc: Ying Huang <ying.huang@intel.com>
      Cc: Thieu Le <thieule@google.com>
      Cc: Li Wang <dragonylffly@163.com>
      Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@iki.fi>
      4dfea4f0
  11. 29 1月, 2013 1 次提交
  12. 19 12月, 2012 1 次提交
  13. 17 2月, 2012 1 次提交
  14. 26 1月, 2012 3 次提交
  15. 24 11月, 2011 2 次提交
    • T
      eCryptfs: Extend array bounds for all filename chars · 0f751e64
      Tyler Hicks 提交于
      From mhalcrow's original commit message:
      
          Characters with ASCII values greater than the size of
          filename_rev_map[] are valid filename characters.
          ecryptfs_decode_from_filename() will access kernel memory beyond
          that array, and ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet() will then decrypt
          those characters. The attacker, using the FNEK of the crafted file,
          can then re-encrypt the characters to reveal the kernel memory past
          the end of the filename_rev_map[] array. I expect low security
          impact since this array is statically allocated in the text area,
          and the amount of memory past the array that is accessible is
          limited by the largest possible ASCII filename character.
      
      This patch solves the issue reported by mhalcrow but with an
      implementation suggested by Linus to simply extend the length of
      filename_rev_map[] to 256. Characters greater than 0x7A are mapped to
      0x00, which is how invalid characters less than 0x7A were previously
      being handled.
      Signed-off-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Reported-by: NMichael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
      Cc: stable@kernel.org
      0f751e64
    • T
      eCryptfs: Prevent file create race condition · b59db43a
      Tyler Hicks 提交于
      The file creation path prematurely called d_instantiate() and
      unlock_new_inode() before the eCryptfs inode info was fully
      allocated and initialized and before the eCryptfs metadata was written
      to the lower file.
      
      This could result in race conditions in subsequent file and inode
      operations leading to unexpected error conditions or a null pointer
      dereference while attempting to use the unallocated memory.
      
      https://launchpad.net/bugs/813146Signed-off-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Cc: stable@kernel.org
      b59db43a
  16. 30 5月, 2011 4 次提交
  17. 26 4月, 2011 1 次提交
    • T
      eCryptfs: Handle failed metadata read in lookup · 3aeb86ea
      Tyler Hicks 提交于
      When failing to read the lower file's crypto metadata during a lookup,
      eCryptfs must continue on without throwing an error. For example, there
      may be a plaintext file in the lower mount point that the user wants to
      delete through the eCryptfs mount.
      
      If an error is encountered while reading the metadata in lookup(), the
      eCryptfs inode's size could be incorrect. We must be sure to reread the
      plaintext inode size from the metadata when performing an open() or
      setattr(). The metadata is already being read in those paths, so this
      adds minimal performance overhead.
      
      This patch introduces a flag which will track whether or not the
      plaintext inode size has been read so that an incorrect i_size can be
      fixed in the open() or setattr() paths.
      
      https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/509180
      
      Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      3aeb86ea
  18. 28 3月, 2011 2 次提交
  19. 18 1月, 2011 2 次提交
  20. 27 8月, 2010 2 次提交
  21. 17 6月, 2010 1 次提交