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  1. 05 10月, 2015 17 次提交
  3. 03 10月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      sched, bpf: add helper for retrieving routing realms · c46646d0
      由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于 
      Using routing realms as part of the classifier is quite useful, it
can be viewed as a tag for one or multiple routing entries (think of
an analogy to net_cls cgroup for processes), set by user space routing
daemons or via iproute2 as an indicator for traffic classifiers and
later on processed in the eBPF program.

Unlike actions, the classifier can inspect device flags and enable
netif_keep_dst() if necessary. tc actions don't have that possibility,
but in case people know what they are doing, it can be used from there
as well (e.g. via devs that must keep dsts by design anyway).

If a realm is set, the handler returns the non-zero realm. User space
can set the full 32bit realm for the dst.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c46646d0
  5. 02 10月, 2015 1 次提交
  7. 30 9月, 2015 2 次提交
    • D
      net: Add support for filtering neigh dump by master device · 21fdd092
      由 David Ahern 提交于 
      Add support for filtering neighbor dumps by master device by adding
the NDA_MASTER attribute to the dump request. A new netlink flag,
NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED, is added to indicate the kernel supports the
request and output is filtered as requested.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Acked-by: NRoopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      21fdd092
    • N
      bridge: vlan: add per-vlan struct and move to rhashtables · 2594e906
      由 Nikolay Aleksandrov 提交于 
      This patch changes the bridge vlan implementation to use rhashtables
instead of bitmaps. The main motivation behind this change is that we
need extensible per-vlan structures (both per-port and global) so more
advanced features can be introduced and the vlan support can be
extended. I've tried to break this up but the moment net_port_vlans is
changed and the whole API goes away, thus this is a larger patch.
A few short goals of this patch are:
- Extensible per-vlan structs stored in rhashtables and a sorted list
- Keep user-visible behaviour (compressed vlans etc)
- Keep fastpath ingress/egress logic the same (optimizations to come
  later)

Here's a brief list of some of the new features we'd like to introduce:
- per-vlan counters
- vlan ingress/egress mapping
- per-vlan igmp configuration
- vlan priorities
- avoid fdb entries replication (e.g. local fdb scaling issues)

The structure is kept single for both global and per-port entries so to
avoid code duplication where possible and also because we'll soon introduce
"port0 / aka bridge as port" which should simplify things further
(thanks to Vlad for the suggestion!).

Now we have per-vlan global rhashtable (bridge-wide) and per-vlan port
rhashtable, if an entry is added to a port it'll get a pointer to its
global context so it can be quickly accessed later. There's also a
sorted vlan list which is used for stable walks and some user-visible
behaviour such as the vlan ranges, also for error paths.
VLANs are stored in a "vlan group" which currently contains the
rhashtable, sorted vlan list and the number of "real" vlan entries.
A good side-effect of this change is that it resembles how hw keeps
per-vlan data.
One important note after this change is that if a VLAN is being looked up
in the bridge's rhashtable for filtering purposes (or to check if it's an
existing usable entry, not just a global context) then the new helper
br_vlan_should_use() needs to be used if the vlan is found. In case the
lookup is done only with a port's vlan group, then this check can be
skipped.

Things tested so far:
- basic vlan ingress/egress
- pvids
- untagged vlans
- undef CONFIG_BRIDGE_VLAN_FILTERING
- adding/deleting vlans in different scenarios (with/without global ctx,
  while transmitting traffic, in ranges etc)
- loading/removing the module while having/adding/deleting vlans
- extracting bridge vlan information (user ABI), compressed requests
- adding/deleting fdbs on vlans
- bridge mac change, promisc mode
- default pvid change
- kmemleak ON during the whole time
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      2594e906
  9. 25 9月, 2015 1 次提交
    • J
      lwtunnel: remove source and destination UDP port config option · b194f30c
      由 Jiri Benc 提交于 
      The UDP tunnel config is asymmetric wrt. to the ports used. The source and
destination ports from one direction of the tunnel are not related to the
ports of the other direction. We need to be able to respond to ARP requests
using the correct ports without involving routing.

As the consequence, UDP ports need to be fixed property of the tunnel
interface and cannot be set per route. Remove the ability to set ports per
route. This is still okay to do, as no kernel has been released with these
attributes yet.

Note that the ability to specify source and destination ports is preserved
for other users of the lwtunnel API which don't use routes for tunnel key
specification (like openvswitch).

If in the future we rework ARP handling to allow port specification, the
attributes can be added back.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b194f30c
  11. 23 9月, 2015 1 次提交
  13. 18 9月, 2015 2 次提交
    • A
      bpf: add bpf_redirect() helper · 27b29f63
      由 Alexei Starovoitov 提交于 
      Existing bpf_clone_redirect() helper clones skb before redirecting
it to RX or TX of destination netdev.
Introduce bpf_redirect() helper that does that without cloning.

Benchmarked with two hosts using 10G ixgbe NICs.
One host is doing line rate pktgen.
Another host is configured as:
$ tc qdisc add dev $dev ingress
$ tc filter add dev $dev root pref 10 u32 match u32 0 0 flowid 1:2 \
   action bpf run object-file tcbpf1_kern.o section clone_redirect_xmit drop
so it receives the packet on $dev and immediately xmits it on $dev + 1
The section 'clone_redirect_xmit' in tcbpf1_kern.o file has the program
that does bpf_clone_redirect() and performance is 2.0 Mpps

$ tc filter add dev $dev root pref 10 u32 match u32 0 0 flowid 1:2 \
   action bpf run object-file tcbpf1_kern.o section redirect_xmit drop
which is using bpf_redirect() - 2.4 Mpps

and using cls_bpf with integrated actions as:
$ tc filter add dev $dev root pref 10 \
  bpf run object-file tcbpf1_kern.o section redirect_xmit integ_act classid 1
performance is 2.5 Mpps

To summarize:
u32+act_bpf using clone_redirect - 2.0 Mpps
u32+act_bpf using redirect - 2.4 Mpps
cls_bpf using redirect - 2.5 Mpps

For comparison linux bridge in this setup is doing 2.1 Mpps
and ixgbe rx + drop in ip_rcv - 7.8 Mpps
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.r.fastabend@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      27b29f63
    • D
      cls_bpf: introduce integrated actions · 045efa82
      由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于 
      Often cls_bpf classifier is used with single action drop attached.
Optimize this use case and let cls_bpf return both classid and action.
For backwards compatibility reasons enable this feature under
TCA_BPF_FLAG_ACT_DIRECT flag.

Then more interesting programs like the following are easier to write:
int cls_bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
  /* classify arp, ip, ipv6 into different traffic classes
   * and drop all other packets
   */
  switch (skb->protocol) {
  case htons(ETH_P_ARP):
    skb->tc_classid = 1;
    break;
  case htons(ETH_P_IP):
    skb->tc_classid = 2;
    break;
  case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
    skb->tc_classid = 3;
    break;
  default:
    return TC_ACT_SHOT;
  }

  return TC_ACT_OK;
}

Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      045efa82
  15. 16 9月, 2015 3 次提交
  17. 12 9月, 2015 1 次提交
    • M
      sys_membarrier(): system-wide memory barrier (generic, x86) · 5b25b13a
      由 Mathieu Desnoyers 提交于 
      Here is an implementation of a new system call, sys_membarrier(), which
executes a memory barrier on all threads running on the system.  It is
implemented by calling synchronize_sched().  It can be used to
distribute the cost of user-space memory barriers asymmetrically by
transforming pairs of memory barriers into pairs consisting of
sys_membarrier() and a compiler barrier.  For synchronization primitives
that distinguish between read-side and write-side (e.g.  userspace RCU
[1], rwlocks), the read-side can be accelerated significantly by moving
the bulk of the memory barrier overhead to the write-side.

The existing applications of which I am aware that would be improved by
this system call are as follows:

* Through Userspace RCU library (http://urcu.so)
  - DNS server (Knot DNS) https://www.knot-dns.cz/
  - Network sniffer (http://netsniff-ng.org/)
  - Distributed object storage (https://sheepdog.github.io/sheepdog/)
  - User-space tracing (http://lttng.org)
  - Network storage system (https://www.gluster.org/)
  - Virtual routers (https://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/DPDK_RCU_0MQ.pdf)
  - Financial software (https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/23/189)

Those projects use RCU in userspace to increase read-side speed and
scalability compared to locking.  Especially in the case of RCU used by
libraries, sys_membarrier can speed up the read-side by moving the bulk of
the memory barrier cost to synchronize_rcu().

* Direct users of sys_membarrier
  - core dotnet garbage collector (https://github.com/dotnet/coreclr/issues/198)

Microsoft core dotnet GC developers are planning to use the mprotect()
side-effect of issuing memory barriers through IPIs as a way to implement
Windows FlushProcessWriteBuffers() on Linux.  They are referring to
sys_membarrier in their github thread, specifically stating that
sys_membarrier() is what they are looking for.

To explain the benefit of this scheme, let's introduce two example threads:

Thread A (non-frequent, e.g. executing liburcu synchronize_rcu())
Thread B (frequent, e.g. executing liburcu
rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock())

In a scheme where all smp_mb() in thread A are ordering memory accesses
with respect to smp_mb() present in Thread B, we can change each
smp_mb() within Thread A into calls to sys_membarrier() and each
smp_mb() within Thread B into compiler barriers "barrier()".

Before the change, we had, for each smp_mb() pairs:

Thread A                    Thread B
previous mem accesses       previous mem accesses
smp_mb()                    smp_mb()
following mem accesses      following mem accesses

After the change, these pairs become:

Thread A                    Thread B
prev mem accesses           prev mem accesses
sys_membarrier()            barrier()
follow mem accesses         follow mem accesses

As we can see, there are two possible scenarios: either Thread B memory
accesses do not happen concurrently with Thread A accesses (1), or they
do (2).

1) Non-concurrent Thread A vs Thread B accesses:

Thread A                    Thread B
prev mem accesses
sys_membarrier()
follow mem accesses
                            prev mem accesses
                            barrier()
                            follow mem accesses

In this case, thread B accesses will be weakly ordered. This is OK,
because at that point, thread A is not particularly interested in
ordering them with respect to its own accesses.

2) Concurrent Thread A vs Thread B accesses

Thread A                    Thread B
prev mem accesses           prev mem accesses
sys_membarrier()            barrier()
follow mem accesses         follow mem accesses

In this case, thread B accesses, which are ensured to be in program
order thanks to the compiler barrier, will be "upgraded" to full
smp_mb() by synchronize_sched().

* Benchmarks

On Intel Xeon E5405 (8 cores)
(one thread is calling sys_membarrier, the other 7 threads are busy
looping)

1000 non-expedited sys_membarrier calls in 33s =3D 33 milliseconds/call.

* User-space user of this system call: Userspace RCU library

Both the signal-based and the sys_membarrier userspace RCU schemes
permit us to remove the memory barrier from the userspace RCU
rcu_read_lock() and rcu_read_unlock() primitives, thus significantly
accelerating them. These memory barriers are replaced by compiler
barriers on the read-side, and all matching memory barriers on the
write-side are turned into an invocation of a memory barrier on all
active threads in the process. By letting the kernel perform this
synchronization rather than dumbly sending a signal to every process
threads (as we currently do), we diminish the number of unnecessary wake
ups and only issue the memory barriers on active threads. Non-running
threads do not need to execute such barrier anyway, because these are
implied by the scheduler context switches.

Results in liburcu:

Operations in 10s, 6 readers, 2 writers:

memory barriers in reader:    1701557485 reads, 2202847 writes
signal-based scheme:          9830061167 reads,    6700 writes
sys_membarrier:               9952759104 reads,     425 writes
sys_membarrier (dyn. check):  7970328887 reads,     425 writes

The dynamic sys_membarrier availability check adds some overhead to
the read-side compared to the signal-based scheme, but besides that,
sys_membarrier slightly outperforms the signal-based scheme. However,
this non-expedited sys_membarrier implementation has a much slower grace
period than signal and memory barrier schemes.

Besides diminishing the number of wake-ups, one major advantage of the
membarrier system call over the signal-based scheme is that it does not
need to reserve a signal. This plays much more nicely with libraries,
and with processes injected into for tracing purposes, for which we
cannot expect that signals will be unused by the application.

An expedited version of this system call can be added later on to speed
up the grace period. Its implementation will likely depend on reading
the cpu_curr()->mm without holding each CPU's rq lock.

This patch adds the system call to x86 and to asm-generic.

[1] http://urcu.so

membarrier(2) man page:

MEMBARRIER(2)              Linux Programmer's Manual             MEMBARRIER(2)

NAME
       membarrier - issue memory barriers on a set of threads

SYNOPSIS
       #include <linux/membarrier.h>

       int membarrier(int cmd, int flags);

DESCRIPTION
       The cmd argument is one of the following:

       MEMBARRIER_CMD_QUERY
              Query  the  set  of  supported commands. It returns a bitmask of
              supported commands.

       MEMBARRIER_CMD_SHARED
              Execute a memory barrier on all threads running on  the  system.
              Upon  return from system call, the caller thread is ensured that
              all running threads have passed through a state where all memory
              accesses  to  user-space  addresses  match program order between
              entry to and return from the system  call  (non-running  threads
              are de facto in such a state). This covers threads from all pro=E2=80=90
              cesses running on the system.  This command returns 0.

       The flags argument needs to be 0. For future extensions.

       All memory accesses performed  in  program  order  from  each  targeted
       thread is guaranteed to be ordered with respect to sys_membarrier(). If
       we use the semantic "barrier()" to represent a compiler barrier forcing
       memory  accesses  to  be performed in program order across the barrier,
       and smp_mb() to represent explicit memory barriers forcing full  memory
       ordering  across  the barrier, we have the following ordering table for
       each pair of barrier(), sys_membarrier() and smp_mb():

       The pair ordering is detailed as (O: ordered, X: not ordered):

                              barrier()   smp_mb() sys_membarrier()
              barrier()          X           X            O
              smp_mb()           X           O            O
              sys_membarrier()   O           O            O

RETURN VALUE
       On success, these system calls return zero.  On error, -1 is  returned,
       and errno is set appropriately. For a given command, with flags
       argument set to 0, this system call is guaranteed to always return the
       same value until reboot.

ERRORS
       ENOSYS System call is not implemented.

       EINVAL Invalid arguments.

Linux                             2015-04-15                     MEMBARRIER(2)
Signed-off-by: NMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NJosh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Nicholas Miell <nmiell@comcast.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      5b25b13a
  19. 11 9月, 2015 2 次提交
  21. 10 9月, 2015 2 次提交
  23. 05 9月, 2015 6 次提交
    • A
      userfaultfd: UFFDIO_COPY|UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE uAPI · 1f1c6f07
      由 Andrea Arcangeli 提交于 
      This implements the uABI of UFFDIO_COPY and UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE.
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@gmail.com>
Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" <peter.huangpeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      1f1c6f07
    • A
      userfaultfd: change the read API to return a uffd_msg · a9b85f94
      由 Andrea Arcangeli 提交于 
      I had requests to return the full address (not the page aligned one) to
userland.

It's not entirely clear how the page offset could be relevant because
userfaults aren't like SIGBUS that can sigjump to a different place and it
actually skip resolving the fault depending on a page offset.  There's
currently no real way to skip the fault especially because after a
UFFDIO_COPY|ZEROPAGE, the fault is optimized to be retried within the
kernel without having to return to userland first (not even self modifying
code replacing the .text that touched the faulting address would prevent
the fault to be repeated).  Userland cannot skip repeating the fault even
more so if the fault was triggered by a KVM secondary page fault or any
get_user_pages or any copy-user inside some syscall which will return to
kernel code.  The second time FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT won't be set leading
to a SIGBUS being raised because the userfault can't wait if it cannot
release the mmap_map first (and FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT is required for
that).

Still returning userland a proper structure during the read() on the uffd,
can allow to use the current UFFD_API for the future non-cooperative
extensions too and it looks cleaner as well.  Once we get additional
fields there's no point to return the fault address page aligned anymore
to reuse the bits below PAGE_SHIFT.

The only downside is that the read() syscall will read 32bytes instead of
8bytes but that's not going to be measurable overhead.

The total number of new events that can be extended or of new future bits
for already shipped events, is limited to 64 by the features field of the
uffdio_api structure.  If more will be needed a bump of UFFD_API will be
required.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use __packed]
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@gmail.com>
Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" <peter.huangpeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      a9b85f94
    • P
      userfaultfd: Rename uffd_api.bits into .features · 3f602d27
      由 Pavel Emelyanov 提交于 
      This is (seems to be) the minimal thing that is required to unblock
standard uffd usage from the non-cooperative one.  Now more bits can be
added to the features field indicating e.g.  UFFD_FEATURE_FORK and others
needed for the latter use-case.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@gmail.com>
Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" <peter.huangpeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      3f602d27
    • A
      userfaultfd: uAPI · 1038628d
      由 Andrea Arcangeli 提交于 
      Defines the uAPI of the userfaultfd, notably the ioctl numbers and protocol.
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@gmail.com>
Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" <peter.huangpeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      1038628d
    • A
      capabilities: add a securebit to disable PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE · 746bf6d6
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      Per Andrew Morgan's request, add a securebit to allow admins to disable
PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE.  This securebit will prevent processes from adding
capabilities to their ambient set.

For simplicity, this disables PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE entirely rather than
just disabling setting previously cleared bits.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NAndrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      746bf6d6
    • A
      capabilities: ambient capabilities · 58319057
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with
a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn.  This patch is heavily based
on Christoph's patch.

===== The status quo =====

On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel.  To
perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that
they hold.

Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP),
inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X).  When the kernel checks for a
capability, it checks pE.  The other capability masks serve to modify
what capabilities can be in pE.

Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time.  If a
task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI.
If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it
can remove capabilities from X.

Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also
have capabilities.  A file can have no capabilty information at all [1].
If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP)
and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2].
File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them.

A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for
the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e.  the binary itself if that
binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In
the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old
value and pZ' represents the new value.  The rules are:

  pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
  pI' = pI
  pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0)
  X is unchanged

For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately
complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior.  Similarly, if
euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently
(primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set).  For nonroot
users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP
are empty and fE is false.

As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is
set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set,
LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc.

This is rather messy.  We've learned that making any changes is
dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged
program to change its security state in a way that persists cross
execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this
persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped
programs to be exploited for privilege escalation.

===== The problem =====

Capability inheritance is basically useless.

If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so
your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'.  This means that you
can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated
capabilities if you aren't root.

On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to
the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files.  This causes
pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works.  No one does this because
it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems.

If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with
secure exec rules, breaking many things.

This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use
capabilities for anything useful.

===== The proposed change =====

This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA).
pA does what most people expect pI to do.

pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not
set in both pP and pI.  Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from
pA.  This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities
still do so, with a complication.  Because capability inheritance is so
broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and
then calling execve effectively drops capabilities.  Therefore,
setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set.  Processes that don't like this can
re-add bits to pA afterwards.

The capability evolution rules are changed:

  pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA)
  pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
  pI' = pI
  pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA')
  X is unchanged

If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA.  If
you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE.  For
example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can
automatically bind low-numbered ports.  Hallelujah!

Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a
nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace)
and unprivileged process trees.  This is currently more or less
impossible.  Hallelujah!

You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped
program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the
resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch.

Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that
capability.  If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping
privileges will still work.

It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could
possibly be reduced without causing serious problems.  Specifically, if
we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries
and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could
leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker
*already* has those capabilities.  This would make me nervous, though --
setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so,
and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have
unexpected side effects.  (Whether these unexpected side effects would
be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more
paranoid route.  We can revisit this later.

An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting
ambient capabilities.  I think that this would be annoying and would
make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities
(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than
it is with this patch.

===== Footnotes =====

[1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have
unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false.
The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason.

[2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously
misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong.  fE is *not* a mask;
it's a single bit.  This has probably confused every single person who
has tried to use file capabilities.

[3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter
if applicable, for reasons that elude me.  The results from thinking
about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly
discarded.

Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2

Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality
(from Christoph):

/*
 * Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell
 * that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities.
 *
 * (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
 * Released under: GPL v3 or later.
 *
 *
 * Compile using:
 *
 *	gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng
 *
 * This program must have the following capabilities to run properly:
 * Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE
 *
 * A command to equip the binary with the right caps is:
 *
 *	setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test
 *
 *
 * To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes:
 *
 *	./ambient_test /bin/bash
 *
 *
 * Verifying that it works:
 *
 * From the bash spawed by ambient_test run
 *
 *	cat /proc/$$/status
 *
 * and have a look at the capabilities.
 */

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <cap-ng.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>

/*
 * Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed
 * when the /usr/include files have these defined.
 */
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4

static void set_ambient_cap(int cap)
{
	int rc;

	capng_get_caps_process();
	rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap);
	if (rc) {
		printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n");
		exit(2);
	}
	capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS);

	/* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */
	if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) {
		perror("Cannot set cap");
		exit(1);
	}
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	int rc;

	set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW);
	set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
	set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE);

	printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n");
	if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1))
		perror("Cannot exec");

	return 0;
}

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      58319057
  25. 01 9月, 2015 1 次提交