Note: THIS_MODULE and header addition aren't technically needed because
      this code is not modular, but let's keep it anyway because people
      can copy this code into modular code.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Now that last dozen or so users of ->get_info were removed, ditch it too.
Everyone sane shouldd have switched to seq_file interface long ago.

P.S.: Co-existing 3 interfaces (->get_info/->read_proc/->proc_fops) for proc
      is long-standing crap, BTW, thus
      a) put ->read_proc/->write_proc/read_proc_entry() users on death row,
      b) new such users should be rejected,
      c) everyone is encouraged to convert his favourite ->read_proc user or
         I'll do it, lazy bastards.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Note 1: 0644 should be used, but root bypasses permissions, so writing
	to /proc/scsi/device_info still works.
Note 2: looks like scsi_dev_info_list is unprotected
Note 3: probably make proc whine about "unwriteable but with ->write hook"
	entries. Probably.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@SteelEye.com>
Cc: Mike Christie <michaelc@cs.wisc.edu>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew@wil.cx>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

/******************************************/
/* Remove useless comment, while I am it. */
/******************************************/
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Probably interface misuse, because of the way iterating over hashbin is done.
However! Printing of socket number ("IrNET socket %d - ", i++") made conversion
to proper ->start/->next difficult enough to do blindly without hardware.
Said that, please apply.

Remove useless comment while I am it.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Thomas Koeller <thomas.koeller@baslerweb.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Acked-by: NRussell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Yani Ioannou <yani.ioannou@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Entry creation was commented for a long time and right now it stands on
the way of ->get_info removal, so unless nobody objects...
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: Simon Arlott <simon@fire.lp0.eu>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Joern Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: Josef Sipek <jsipek@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Remove proc_root export.  Creation and removal works well if parent PDE is
supplied as NULL -- it worked always that way.

So, one useless export removed and consistency added, some drivers created
PDEs with &proc_root as parent but removed them as NULL and so on.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Use creation by full path: "driver/foo".
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Use creation by full path instead: "fs/foo".
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Remove proc_bus export and variable itself. Using pathnames works fine
and is slightly more understandable and greppable.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

proc-misc code is noticeably full of "if (de)" checks when PDE passed is
always valid.  Remove them.

Addition of such check in proc_lookup_de() is for failed lookup case.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

If valid "parent" is passed to proc_create/remove_proc_entry(), then name of
PDE should consist of only one path component, otherwise creation or or
removal will fail.  However, if NULL is passed as parent then create/remove
accept full path as a argument.  This is arbitrary restriction -- all
infrastructure is in place.

So, patch allows the following to succeed:

	create_proc_entry("foo/bar", 0, pde_baz);
	remove_proc_entry("baz/foo/bar", &proc_root);

Also makes the following to behave identically:

	create_proc_entry("foo/bar", 0, NULL);
	create_proc_entry("foo/bar", 0, &proc_root);

Discrepancy noticed by Den Lunev (IIRC).
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

proc_subdir_lock protects only modifying and walking through PDE lists, so
after we've found PDE to remove and actually removed it from lists, there is
no need to hold proc_subdir_lock for the rest of operation.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This cleans up the permission checks done for /proc/PID/mem i/o calls.  It
puts all the logic in a new function, check_mem_permission().

The old code repeated the (!MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task))
magical expression multiple times.  The new function does all that work in one
place, with clear comments.

The old code called security_ptrace() twice on successful checks, once in
MAY_PTRACE() and once in __ptrace_may_attach().  Now it's only called once,
and only if all other checks have succeeded.
Signed-off-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The kernel implements readlink of /proc/pid/exe by getting the file from
the first executable VMA.  Then the path to the file is reconstructed and
reported as the result.

Because of the VMA walk the code is slightly different on nommu systems.
This patch avoids separate /proc/pid/exe code on nommu systems.  Instead of
walking the VMAs to find the first executable file-backed VMA we store a
reference to the exec'd file in the mm_struct.

That reference would prevent the filesystem holding the executable file
from being unmounted even after unmapping the VMAs.  So we track the number
of VM_EXECUTABLE VMAs and drop the new reference when the last one is
unmapped.  This avoids pinning the mounted filesystem.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: improve comments]
[yamamoto@valinux.co.jp: fix dup_mmap]
Signed-off-by: NMatt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc:"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: NYAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This usually saves one recompile to insert similar printk like below. :)

Sample nastygram:

remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory '/proc/foo', leaking at least 'bar'
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: at fs/proc/generic.c:776 remove_proc_entry+0x18a/0x200()
Modules linked in: foo(-) container fan battery dock sbs ac sbshc backlight ipv6 loop af_packet amd_rng sr_mod i2c_amd8111 i2c_amd756 cdrom i2c_core button thermal processor
Pid: 3034, comm: rmmod Tainted: G   M     2.6.25-rc1 #5

Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff80231974>] warn_on_slowpath+0x64/0x90
 [<ffffffff80232a6e>] printk+0x4e/0x60
 [<ffffffff802d6c8a>] remove_proc_entry+0x18a/0x200
 [<ffffffff8045cd88>] mutex_lock_nested+0x1c8/0x2d0
 [<ffffffff8025f0f0>] __try_stop_module+0x0/0x40
 [<ffffffff8025effd>] sys_delete_module+0x14d/0x200
 [<ffffffff8045df3d>] lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x35/0x67
 [<ffffffff8031c307>] __up_read+0x27/0xa0
 [<ffffffff8045decc>] trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x35/0x3a
 [<ffffffff8020b6ab>] system_call_after_swapgs+0x7b/0x80

---[ end trace 10ef850597e89c54 ]---
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Make key_serial() an inline function rather than a macro if CONFIG_KEYS=y.
This prevents double evaluation of the key pointer and also provides better
type checking.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Since these two source files invoke kmalloc(), they should explicitly
include <linux/slab.h>.
Signed-off-by: NRobert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys files:

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that root may have and the maximum total number of
     bytes of data that root may have stored in those keys.

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that each non-root user may have and the maximum
     total number of bytes of data that each of those users may have stored in
     their keys.

Also increase the quotas as a number of people have been complaining that it's
not big enough.  I'm not sure that it's big enough now either, but on the
other hand, it can now be set in /etc/sysctl.conf.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Cc: <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Don't generate the per-UID user and user session keyrings unless they're
explicitly accessed.  This solves a problem during a login process whereby
set*uid() is called before the SELinux PAM module, resulting in the per-UID
keyrings having the wrong security labels.

This also cures the problem of multiple per-UID keyrings sometimes appearing
due to PAM modules (including pam_keyinit) setuiding and causing user_structs
to come into and go out of existence whilst the session keyring pins the user
keyring.  This is achieved by first searching for extant per-UID keyrings
before inventing new ones.

The serial bound argument is also dropped from find_keyring_by_name() as it's
not currently made use of (setting it to 0 disables the feature).
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Cc: <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The key_create_or_update() function provided by the keyring code has a default
set of permissions that are always applied to the key when created.  This
might not be desirable to all clients.

Here's a patch that adds a "perm" parameter to the function to address this,
which can be set to KEY_PERM_UNDEF to revert to the current behaviour.
Signed-off-by: NArun Raghavan <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Satyam Sharma <ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key.

The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt:

 (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key.

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,
		    size_t buflen)

     This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context
     attached to a key in the buffer provided.

     Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could
     produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more
     than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy
     will take place.

     A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is
     sufficiently big.  This is included in the returned count.  If no LSM is
     in force then an empty string will be returned.

     A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be
     successful.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()]
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string for
internal kernel services that call any request_key_*() interface other than
request_key().  request_key() itself still takes a NUL-terminated string.

The functions that change are:

	request_key_with_auxdata()
	request_key_async()
	request_key_async_with_auxdata()
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Check the starting keyring as part of the search to (a) see if that is what
we're searching for, and (b) to check it is still valid for searching.

The scenario: User in process A does things that cause things to be created in
its process session keyring.  The user then does an su to another user and
starts a new process, B.  The two processes now share the same process session
keyring.

Process B does an NFS access which results in an upcall to gssd.  When gssd
attempts to instantiate the context key (to be linked into the process session
keyring), it is denied access even though it has an authorization key.

The order of calls is:

   keyctl_instantiate_key()
      lookup_user_key()				    (the default: case)
         search_process_keyrings(current)
	    search_process_keyrings(rka->context)   (recursive call)
	       keyring_search_aux()

keyring_search_aux() verifies the keys and keyrings underneath the top-level
keyring it is given, but that top-level keyring is neither fully validated nor
checked to see if it is the thing being searched for.

This patch changes keyring_search_aux() to:
1) do more validation on the top keyring it is given and
2) check whether that top-level keyring is the thing being searched for
Signed-off-by: NKevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Increase the size of a payload that can be used to instantiate a key in
add_key() and keyctl_instantiate_key().  This permits huge CIFS SPNEGO blobs
to be passed around.  The limit is raised to 1MB.  If kmalloc() can't allocate
a buffer of sufficient size, vmalloc() will be tried instead.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fix these sparse warings:
fs/binfmt_elf.c:1749:29: warning: symbol 'tmp' shadows an earlier one
fs/binfmt_elf.c:1734:28: originally declared here
fs/binfmt_elf.c:2009:26: warning: symbol 'vma' shadows an earlier one
fs/binfmt_elf.c:1892:24: originally declared here

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: chose better variable name]
Signed-off-by: NWANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This patch does simplify fill_elf_header function by setting
to zero the whole elf header first. So we fillup the fields
we really need only.

before:
   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
  11735      80       0   11815    2e27 fs/binfmt_elf.o

after:
   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
  11710      80       0   11790    2e0e fs/binfmt_elf.o

viola, 25 bytes of text is freed
Signed-off-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

A void returning function returned the return value of another void
returning function...

Spotted by sparse.
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NCorey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Make the needlessly global ipmi_alloc_recv_msg() static.
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NCorey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NRobert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca>
Signed-off-by: NCorey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

IPMI code theoretically allows ->write_proc users, but nobody uses this thus
far.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NCorey Minyard <minyard@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Kbuild system handles this automatically.
Signed-off-by: NDenis Cheng <crquan@gmail.com>
Cc: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org>
Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>