Commit 7457c0da ("x86/alternatives: Add int3_emulate_call()
selftest") is used to ensure there is a gap setup in int3 exception stack
which could be used for inserting call return address.

This gap is missed in XEN PV int3 exception entry path, then below panic
triggered:

[    0.772876] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[    0.772886] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.2.0+ #11
[    0.772893] RIP: e030:int3_magic+0x0/0x7
[    0.772905] RSP: 3507:ffffffff82203e98 EFLAGS: 00000246
[    0.773334] Call Trace:
[    0.773334]  alternative_instructions+0x3d/0x12e
[    0.773334]  check_bugs+0x7c9/0x887
[    0.773334]  ? __get_locked_pte+0x178/0x1f0
[    0.773334]  start_kernel+0x4ff/0x535
[    0.773334]  ? set_init_arg+0x55/0x55
[    0.773334]  xen_start_kernel+0x571/0x57a

For 64bit PV guests, Xen's ABI enters the kernel with using SYSRET, with
%rcx/%r11 on the stack. To convert back to "normal" looking exceptions,
the xen thunks do 'xen_*: pop %rcx; pop %r11; jmp *'.

E.g. Extracting 'xen_pv_trap xenint3' we have:
xen_xenint3:
 pop %rcx;
 pop %r11;
 jmp xenint3

As xenint3 and int3 entry code are same except xenint3 doesn't generate
a gap, we can fix it by using int3 and drop useless xenint3.
Signed-off-by: NZhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

PVH guest needs PV extentions to work, so "nopv" parameter should be
ignored for PVH but not for HVM guest.

If PVH guest boots up via the Xen-PVH boot entry, xen_pvh is set early,
we know it's PVH guest and ignore "nopv" parameter directly.

If PVH guest boots up via the normal boot entry same as HVM guest, it's
hard to distinguish PVH and HVM guest at that time. In this case, we
have to panic early if PVH is detected and nopv is enabled to avoid a
worse situation later.

Remove static from bool_x86_init_noop/x86_op_int_noop so they could be
used globally. Move xen_platform_hvm() after xen_hvm_guest_late_init()
to avoid compile error.
Signed-off-by: NZhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

.. as "nopv" support needs it to be changeable at boot up stage.

Checkpatch reports warning, so move variable declarations from
hypervisor.c to hypervisor.h
Signed-off-by: NZhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

Clean up unnecessory code after that operation.
Signed-off-by: NZhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

In virtualization environment, PV extensions (drivers, interrupts,
timers, etc) are enabled in the majority of use cases which is the
best option.

However, in some cases (kexec not fully working, benchmarking)
we want to disable PV extensions. We have "xen_nopv" for that purpose
but only for XEN. For a consistent admin experience a common command
line parameter "nopv" set across all PV guest implementations is a
better choice.

There are guest types which just won't work without PV extensions,
like Xen PV, Xen PVH and jailhouse. add a "ignore_nopv" member to
struct hypervisor_x86 set to true for those guest types and call
the detect functions only if nopv is false or ignore_nopv is true.
Suggested-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NZhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

.. as they are only called at early bootup stage. In fact, other
functions in x86_hyper_xen_hvm.init.* are all marked as __init.

Unexport xen_hvm_need_lapic as it's never used outside.
Signed-off-by: NZhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

This reverts commit ca5d376e.

Commit 8990cac6 ("x86/jump_label: Initialize static branching
early") adds jump_label_init() call in setup_arch() to make static
keys initialized early, so we could use the original simpler code
again.
Signed-off-by: NZhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

Drop the pgtable_t variable from all implementation for pte_fn_t as none
of them use it.  apply_to_pte_range() should stop computing it as well.
Should help us save some cycles.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1556803126-26596-1-git-send-email-anshuman.khandual@arm.comSigned-off-by: NAnshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Acked-by: NMatthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The pinning of sensitive CR0 and CR4 bits caused a boot crash when loading
the kvm_intel module on a kernel compiled with CONFIG_PARAVIRT=n.

The reason is that the static key which controls the pinning is marked RO
after init. The kvm_intel module contains a CR4 write which requires to
update the static key entry list. That obviously does not work when the key
is in a RO section.

With CONFIG_PARAVIRT enabled this does not happen because the CR4 write
uses the paravirt indirection and the actual write function is built in.

As the key is intended to be immutable after init, move
native_write_cr0/4() out of line.

While at it consolidate the update of the cr4 shadow variable and store the
value right away when the pinning is initialized on a booting CPU. No point
in reading it back 20 instructions later. This allows to confine the static
key and the pinning variable to cpu/common and allows to mark them static.

Fixes: 8dbec27a ("x86/asm: Pin sensitive CR0 bits")
Fixes: 873d50d5 ("x86/asm: Pin sensitive CR4 bits")
Reported-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: NXi Ruoyao <xry111@mengyan1223.wang>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: NXi Ruoyao <xry111@mengyan1223.wang>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1907102140340.1758@nanos.tec.linutronix.de

Add a special Kconfig symbol X86_HV_CALLBACK_VECTOR so that the guests
using the hypervisor interrupt callback counter can select and thus
enable that counter. Select it when xen or hyperv support is enabled. No
functional changes.
Signed-off-by: NZhao Yakui <yakui.zhao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1559108037-18813-2-git-send-email-yakui.zhao@intel.com

When calling debugfs functions, there is no need to ever check the
return value.  The function can work or not, but the code logic should
never do something different based on this.

Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Create CPU topology sysfs attributes: "core_cpus" and "core_cpus_list"

These attributes represent all of the logical CPUs that share the
same core.

These attriutes is synonymous with the existing "thread_siblings" and
"thread_siblings_list" attribute, which will be deprecated.

Create CPU topology sysfs attributes: "die_cpus" and "die_cpus_list".
These attributes represent all of the logical CPUs that share the
same die.
Suggested-by: NBrice Goglin <Brice.Goglin@inria.fr>
Signed-off-by: NLen Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/071c23a298cd27ede6ed0b6460cae190d193364f.1557769318.git.len.brown@intel.com

text_poke() can potentially compromise security as it sets temporary
PTEs in the fixmap. These PTEs might be used to rewrite the kernel code
from other cores accidentally or maliciously, if an attacker gains the
ability to write onto kernel memory.

Moreover, since remote TLBs are not flushed after the temporary PTEs are
removed, the time-window in which the code is writable is not limited if
the fixmap PTEs - maliciously or accidentally - are cached in the TLB.
To address these potential security hazards, use a temporary mm for
patching the code.

Finally, text_poke() is also not conservative enough when mapping pages,
as it always tries to map 2 pages, even when a single one is sufficient.
So try to be more conservative, and do not map more than needed.
Signed-off-by: NNadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: NRick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: <deneen.t.dock@intel.com>
Cc: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Cc: <kristen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <linux_dti@icloud.com>
Cc: <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-8-namit@vmware.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

This involves initializing the boot params EFI related fields and the
efi global variable.

Without this fix a PVH dom0 doesn't detect when booted from EFI, and
thus doesn't support accessing any of the EFI related data.
Reported-by: NPGNet Dev <pgnet.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NRoger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+

Or else xen_domain() returns false despite xen_pvh being set.
Signed-off-by: NRoger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+

Add a new command-line option "xen_timer_slop=<INT>" that sets the
minimum delta of virtual Xen timers. This commit does not change the
default timer slop value for virtual Xen timers.

Lowering the timer slop value should improve the accuracy of virtual
timers (e.g., better process dispatch latency), but it will likely
increase the number of virtual timer interrupts (relative to the
original slop setting).

The original timer slop value has not changed since the introduction
of the Xen-aware Linux kernel code. This commit provides users an
opportunity to tune timer performance given the refinements to
hardware and the Xen event channel processing. It also mirrors
a feature in the Xen hypervisor - the "timer_slop" Xen command line
option.

[boris: updated comment describing TIMER_SLOP]
Signed-off-by: NRyan Thibodeaux <ryan.thibodeaux@starlab.io>
Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>

Currently, the IRQ stack is hardcoded as the first page of the percpu
area, and the stack canary lives on the IRQ stack. The former gets in
the way of adding an IRQ stack guard page, and the latter is a potential
weakness in the stack canary mechanism.

Split the IRQ stack into its own private percpu pages.

[ tglx: Make 64 and 32 bit share struct irq_stack ]
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Jordan Borgner <mail@jordan-borgner.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Maran Wilson <maran.wilson@oracle.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Cc: "Rafael Ávila de Espíndola" <rafael@espindo.la>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160146.267376656@linutronix.de

irq_ctx_init() crashes hard on page allocation failures. While that's ok
during early boot, it's just wrong in the CPU hotplug bringup code.

Check the page allocation failure and return -ENOMEM and handle it at the
call sites. On early boot the only way out is to BUG(), but on CPU hotplug
there is no reason to crash, so just abort the operation.

Rename the function to something more sensible while at it.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Shaokun Zhang <zhangshaokun@hisilicon.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Cc: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Cc: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160146.089060584@linutronix.de

%pF and %pf are functionally equivalent to %pS and %ps conversion
specifiers. The former are deprecated, therefore switch the current users
to use the preferred variant.

The changes have been produced by the following command:

	git grep -l '%p[fF]' | grep -v '^\(tools\|Documentation\)/' | \
	while read i; do perl -i -pe 's/%pf/%ps/g; s/%pF/%pS/g;' $i; done

And verifying the result.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325193229.23390-1-sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-um@lists.infradead.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: drbd-dev@lists.linbit.com
Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> (for btrfs)
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> (for mm/memblock.c)
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> (for drivers/pci)
Acked-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>

Add check for the return value of memblock_alloc*() functions and call
panic() in case of error.  The panic message repeats the one used by
panicing memblock allocators with adjustment of parameters to include
only relevant ones.

The replacement was mostly automated with semantic patches like the one
below with manual massaging of format strings.

  @@
  expression ptr, size, align;
  @@
  ptr = memblock_alloc(size, align);
  + if (!ptr)
  + 	panic("%s: Failed to allocate %lu bytes align=0x%lx\n", __func__, size, align);

[anders.roxell@linaro.org: use '%pa' with 'phys_addr_t' type]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131161046.21886-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org
[rppt@linux.ibm.com: fix format strings for panics after memblock_alloc]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548950940-15145-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com
[rppt@linux.ibm.com: don't panic if the allocation in sparse_buffer_init fails]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131074018.GD28876@rapoport-lnx
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix xtensa printk warning]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548057848-15136-20-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NMike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <ren_guo@c-sky.com>		[c-sky]
Acked-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>		[MIPS]
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>	[s390]
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>		[Xen]
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>	[m68k]
Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>		[xtensa]
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org>
Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Commit f7c90c2a ("x86/xen: don't write ptes directly in 32-bit
PV guests") introduced a regression for booting dom0 on huge systems
with lots of RAM (in the TB range).

Reason is that on those hosts the p2m list needs to be moved early in
the boot process and this requires temporary page tables to be created.
Said commit modified xen_set_pte_init() to use a hypercall for writing
a PTE, but this requires the page table being in the direct mapped
area, which is not the case for the temporary page tables used in
xen_relocate_p2m().

As the page tables are completely written before being linked to the
actual address space instead of set_pte() a plain write to memory can
be used in xen_relocate_p2m().

Fixes: f7c90c2a ("x86/xen: don't write ptes directly in 32-bit PV guests")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

Patch series "NestMMU pte upgrade workaround for mprotect", v5.

We can upgrade pte access (R -> RW transition) via mprotect.  We need to
make sure we follow the recommended pte update sequence as outlined in
commit bd5050e3 ("powerpc/mm/radix: Change pte relax sequence to
handle nest MMU hang") for such updates.  This patch series does that.

This patch (of 5):

Some architectures may want to call flush_tlb_range from these helpers.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190116085035.29729-2-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NAneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Don't allow memory to be added above the allowed maximum allocation
limit set by Xen.

Trying to do so would result in cases like the following:

[  584.559652] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  584.564897] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1 at ../arch/x86/xen/multicalls.c:129 xen_alloc_pte+0x1c7/0x390()
[  584.575151] Modules linked in:
[  584.578643] Supported: Yes
[  584.581750] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.4.120-92.70-default #1
[  584.590000] Hardware name: Cisco Systems Inc UCSC-C460-M4/UCSC-C460-M4, BIOS C460M4.4.0.1b.0.0629181419 06/29/2018
[  584.601862]  0000000000000000 ffffffff813175a0 0000000000000000 ffffffff8184777c
[  584.610200]  ffffffff8107f4e1 ffff880487eb7000 ffff8801862b79c0 ffff88048608d290
[  584.618537]  0000000000487eb7 ffffea0000000201 ffffffff81009de7 ffffffff81068561
[  584.626876] Call Trace:
[  584.629699]  [<ffffffff81019ad9>] dump_trace+0x59/0x340
[  584.635645]  [<ffffffff81019eaa>] show_stack_log_lvl+0xea/0x170
[  584.642391]  [<ffffffff8101ac51>] show_stack+0x21/0x40
[  584.648238]  [<ffffffff813175a0>] dump_stack+0x5c/0x7c
[  584.654085]  [<ffffffff8107f4e1>] warn_slowpath_common+0x81/0xb0
[  584.660932]  [<ffffffff81009de7>] xen_alloc_pte+0x1c7/0x390
[  584.667289]  [<ffffffff810647f0>] pmd_populate_kernel.constprop.6+0x40/0x80
[  584.675241]  [<ffffffff815ecfe8>] phys_pmd_init+0x210/0x255
[  584.681587]  [<ffffffff815ed207>] phys_pud_init+0x1da/0x247
[  584.687931]  [<ffffffff815edb3b>] kernel_physical_mapping_init+0xf5/0x1d4
[  584.695682]  [<ffffffff815e9bdd>] init_memory_mapping+0x18d/0x380
[  584.702631]  [<ffffffff81064699>] arch_add_memory+0x59/0xf0
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

Commit f94c8d11 ("sched/clock, x86/tsc: Rework the x86 'unstable'
sched_clock() interface") broke Xen guest time handling across
migration:

[  187.249951] Freezing user space processes ... (elapsed 0.001 seconds) done.
[  187.251137] OOM killer disabled.
[  187.251137] Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.001 seconds) done.
[  187.252299] suspending xenstore...
[  187.266987] xen:grant_table: Grant tables using version 1 layout
[18446743811.706476] OOM killer enabled.
[18446743811.706478] Restarting tasks ... done.
[18446743811.720505] Setting capacity to 16777216

Fix that by setting xen_sched_clock_offset at resume time to ensure a
monotonic clock value.

[boris: replaced pr_info() with pr_info_once() in xen_callback_vector()
 to avoid printing with incorrect timestamp during resume (as we
 haven't re-adjusted the clock yet)]

Fixes: f94c8d11 ("sched/clock, x86/tsc: Rework the x86 'unstable' sched_clock() interface")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.11
Reported-by: NHans van Kranenburg <hans.van.kranenburg@mendix.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tested-by: NHans van Kranenburg <hans.van.kranenburg@mendix.com>
Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>

Commit e657fccb clears cpu capability bit instead of using fake cpuid
value, the EXTD should always be off for PV guest without depending
on cpuid value. So remove the cpuid check in xen_read_msr_safe() to
always clear the X2APIC_ENABLE bit.
Signed-off-by: NTalons Lee <xin.li@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>

Blacklist symbols in Xen probe-prohibited areas, so that user can see
these prohibited symbols in debugfs.

See also: a50480cb.
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>

We need to refactor PVH entry code so that support for other hypervisors
like Qemu/KVM can be added more easily.

The original design for PVH entry in Xen guests relies on being able to
obtain the memory map from the hypervisor using a hypercall. When we
extend the PVH entry ABI to support other hypervisors like Qemu/KVM,
a new mechanism will be added that allows the guest to get the memory
map without needing to use hypercalls.

For Xen guests, the hypercall approach will still be supported. In
preparation for adding support for other hypervisors, we can move the
code that uses hypercalls into the Xen specific file. This will allow us
to compile kernels in the future without CONFIG_XEN that are still capable
of being booted as a Qemu/KVM guest via the PVH entry point.
Signed-off-by: NMaran Wilson <maran.wilson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>

We need to refactor PVH entry code so that support for other hypervisors
like Qemu/KVM can be added more easily.

This patch moves the small block of code used for initializing Xen PVH
virtual machines into the Xen specific file. This initialization is not
going to be needed for Qemu/KVM guests. Moving it out of the common file
is going to allow us to compile kernels in the future without CONFIG_XEN
that are still capable of being booted as a Qemu/KVM guest via the PVH
entry point.
Signed-off-by: NMaran Wilson <maran.wilson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>

We need to refactor PVH entry code so that support for other hypervisors
like Qemu/KVM can be added more easily.

The first step in that direction is to create a new file that will
eventually hold the Xen specific routines.
Signed-off-by: NMaran Wilson <maran.wilson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>

Once hypervisors other than Xen start using the PVH entry point for
starting VMs, we would like the option of being able to compile PVH entry
capable kernels without enabling CONFIG_XEN and all the code that comes
along with that. To allow that, we are moving the PVH code out of Xen and
into files sitting at a higher level in the tree.

This patch is not introducing any code or functional changes, just moving
files from one location to another.
Signed-off-by: NMaran Wilson <maran.wilson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>

In order to pave the way for hypervisors other than Xen to use the PVH
entry point for VMs, we need to factor the PVH entry code into Xen specific
and hypervisor agnostic components. The first step in doing that, is to
create a new config option for PVH entry that can be enabled
independently from CONFIG_XEN.
Signed-off-by: NMaran Wilson <maran.wilson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>

There is a guard hole at the beginning of the kernel address space, also
used by hypervisors. It occupies 16 PGD entries.

This reserved range is not defined explicitely, it is calculated relative
to other entities: direct mapping and user space ranges.

The calculation got broken by recent changes of the kernel memory layout:
LDT remap range is now mapped before direct mapping and makes the
calculation invalid.

The breakage leads to crash on Xen dom0 boot[1].

Define the reserved range explicitely. It's part of kernel ABI (hypervisors
expect it to be stable) and must not depend on changes in the rest of
kernel memory layout.

[1] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2018-11/msg03313.html

Fixes: d52888aa ("x86/mm: Move LDT remap out of KASLR region on 5-level paging")
Reported-by: NHans van Kranenburg <hans.van.kranenburg@mendix.com>
Signed-off-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: NHans van Kranenburg <hans.van.kranenburg@mendix.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181130202328.65359-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com

Go over arch/x86/ and fix common typos in comments,
and a typo in an actual function argument name.

No change in functionality intended.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

This reverts commit b3cf8528.

That commit unintentionally broke Xen balloon memory hotplug with
"hotplug_unpopulated" set to 1. As long as "System RAM" resource
got assigned under a new "Unusable memory" resource in IO/Mem tree
any attempt to online this memory would fail due to general kernel
restrictions on having "System RAM" resources as 1st level only.

The original issue that commit has tried to workaround fa564ad9
("x86/PCI: Enable a 64bit BAR on AMD Family 15h (Models 00-1f, 30-3f,
60-7f)") also got amended by the following 03a55173 ("x86/PCI: Move
and shrink AMD 64-bit window to avoid conflict") which made the
original fix to Xen ballooning unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: NIgor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

Failure of an element of a Xen multicall is signalled via a WARN()
only if the kernel is compiled with MC_DEBUG. It is impossible to
know which element failed and why it did so.

Change that by printing the related information even without MC_DEBUG,
even if maybe in some limited form (e.g. without information which
caller produced the failing element).

Move the printing out of the switch statement in order to have the
same information for a single call.
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c includes several headers which are not needed.
Remove the #includes.
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

Commit a8565319 ("xen: make xen_qlock_wait() nestable")
introduced a regression for Xen guests running fully virtualized
(HVM or PVH mode). The Xen hypervisor wouldn't return from the poll
hypercall with interrupts disabled in case of an interrupt (for PV
guests it does).

So instead of disabling interrupts in xen_qlock_wait() use a nesting
counter to avoid calling xen_clear_irq_pending() in case
xen_qlock_wait() is nested.

Fixes: a8565319 ("xen: make xen_qlock_wait() nestable")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NSander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Tested-by: NSander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

Commit 9da3f2b7 ("x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on
kernel addresses") introduced a regression for booting Xen PV guests.

Xen PV guests are using __put_user() and __get_user() for accessing the
p2m map (physical to machine frame number map) as accesses might fail
in case of not populated areas of the map.

With above commit using __put_user() and __get_user() for accessing
kernel pages is no longer valid. So replace the Xen hack by adding
appropriate p2m access functions using the default fixup handler.

Fixes: 9da3f2b7 ("x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses")
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

On 5-level paging the LDT remap area is placed in the middle of the KASLR
randomization region and it can overlap with the direct mapping, the
vmalloc or the vmap area.

The LDT mapping is per mm, so it cannot be moved into the P4D page table
next to the CPU_ENTRY_AREA without complicating PGD table allocation for
5-level paging.

The 4 PGD slot gap just before the direct mapping is reserved for
hypervisors, so it cannot be used.

Move the direct mapping one slot deeper and use the resulting gap for the
LDT remap area. The resulting layout is the same for 4 and 5 level paging.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Fixes: f55f0501 ("x86/pti: Put the LDT in its own PGD if PTI is on")
Signed-off-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: willy@infradead.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181026122856.66224-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com

Move remaining definitions and declarations from include/linux/bootmem.h
into include/linux/memblock.h and remove the redundant header.

The includes were replaced with the semantic patch below and then
semi-automated removal of duplicated '#include <linux/memblock.h>

@@
@@
- #include <linux/bootmem.h>
+ #include <linux/memblock.h>

[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: dma-direct: fix up for the removal of linux/bootmem.h]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002185342.133d1680@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: powerpc: fix up for removal of linux/bootmem.h]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181005161406.73ef8727@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: x86/kaslr, ACPI/NUMA: fix for linux/bootmem.h removal]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181008190341.5e396491@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536927045-23536-30-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NMike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>