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  1. 14 6月, 2019 2 次提交
  3. 30 5月, 2019 1 次提交
  5. 20 5月, 2019 1 次提交
  7. 23 2月, 2019 1 次提交
    • G
      security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing break · 09186e50
      由 Gustavo A. R. Silva 提交于 
      In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
cases where we are expecting to fall through.

This patch fixes the following warnings:

security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c:85:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:940:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:943:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:972:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:974:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3391:9: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]

Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3

Also, add a missing break statement to fix the following warning:

security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:116:26: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Acked-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
      09186e50
  9. 01 2月, 2019 1 次提交
  11. 18 12月, 2018 1 次提交
  13. 13 12月, 2018 1 次提交
    • P
      security: audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.h · 876979c9
      由 Paul Gortmaker 提交于 
      Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends.  That changed
when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.
This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig.

The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself
sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed
cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using.

Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h
(for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each
instance for the presence of either and replace as needed.

Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
      876979c9
  15. 11 12月, 2018 3 次提交
  17. 18 7月, 2018 4 次提交
  19. 17 7月, 2018 2 次提交
  21. 31 5月, 2018 1 次提交
  23. 23 5月, 2018 1 次提交
    • M
      ima: fix updating the ima_appraise flag · 6f0911a6
      由 Mimi Zohar 提交于 
      As IMA policy rules are added, a mask of the type of rule (eg. kernel
modules, firmware, IMA policy) is updated.  Unlike custom IMA policy
rules, which replace the original builtin policy rules and update the
mask, the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules were loaded, but did not
update the mask.

This patch refactors the code to load custom policies, defining a new
function named ima_appraise_flag().  The new function is called either
when loading the builtin "secure_boot" or custom policies.

Fixes: 503ceaef ("ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures")
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      6f0911a6
  25. 22 5月, 2018 1 次提交
    • M
      ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name · f1b08bbc
      由 Mimi Zohar 提交于 
      If/when file data signatures are distributed with the file data, this
patch will not be needed.  In the current environment where only some
files are signed, the ability to differentiate between file systems is
needed.  Some file systems consider the file system magic number
internal to the file system.

This patch defines a new IMA policy condition named "fsname", based on
the superblock's file_system_type (sb->s_type) name. This allows policy
rules to be expressed in terms of the filesystem name.

The following sample rules require file signatures on rootfs files
executed or mmap'ed.

appraise func=BPRM_CHECK fsname=rootfs appraise_type=imasig
appraise func=FILE_MMAP fsname=rootfs appraise_type=imasig
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      f1b08bbc
  27. 25 3月, 2018 1 次提交
  29. 23 3月, 2018 3 次提交
    • M
      ima: fail signature verification based on policy · 9e67028e
      由 Mimi Zohar 提交于 
      This patch addresses the fuse privileged mounted filesystems in
environments which are unwilling to accept the risk of trusting the
signature verification and want to always fail safe, but are for example
using a pre-built kernel.

This patch defines a new builtin policy named "fail_securely", which can
be specified on the boot command line as an argument to "ima_policy=".
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>
Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      9e67028e
    • M
      ima: clear IMA_HASH · a9a4935d
      由 Mimi Zohar 提交于 
      The IMA_APPRAISE and IMA_HASH policies overlap. Clear IMA_HASH properly.

Fixes: da1b0029 ("ima: support new "hash" and "dont_hash" policy actions")
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      a9a4935d
    • M
      IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy · d906c10d
      由 Matthew Garrett 提交于 
      The existing BPRM_CHECK functionality in IMA validates against the
credentials of the existing process, not any new credentials that the
child process may transition to. Add an additional CREDS_CHECK target
and refactor IMA to pass the appropriate creds structure. In
ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and
the credentials that will be committed when the new process is started.
This will not change behaviour unless the system policy is extended to
include CREDS_CHECK targets - BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same
credentials that it did previously.

After this patch, an IMA policy rule along the lines of:

measure func=CREDS_CHECK subj_type=unconfined_t

will trigger if a process is executed and runs as unconfined_t, ignoring
the context of the parent process. This is in contrast to:

measure func=BPRM_CHECK subj_type=unconfined_t

which will trigger if the process that calls exec() is already executing
in unconfined_t, ignoring the context that the child process executes
into.
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Changelog:
- initialize ima_creds_status
      d906c10d
  31. 19 1月, 2018 1 次提交
  33. 18 12月, 2017 1 次提交
    • M
      ima: support new "hash" and "dont_hash" policy actions · da1b0029
      由 Mimi Zohar 提交于 
      The builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy, which is specified on the boot
command line, can be replaced with a custom policy, normally early in
the boot process.  Custom policies can be more restrictive in some ways,
like requiring file signatures, but can be less restrictive in other
ways, like not appraising mutable files.  With a less restrictive policy
in place, files in the builtin policy might not be hashed and labeled
with a security.ima hash.  On reboot, files which should be labeled in
the ima_appraise_tcb are not labeled, possibly preventing the system
from booting properly.

To resolve this problem, this patch extends the existing IMA policy
actions "measure", "dont_measure", "appraise", "dont_appraise", and
"audit" with "hash" and "dont_hash".  The new "hash" action will write
the file hash as security.ima, but without requiring the file to be
appraised as well.

For example, the builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy includes the rule,
"appraise fowner=0".  Adding the "hash fowner=0" rule to a custom
policy, will cause the needed file hashes to be calculated and written
as security.ima xattrs.
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NStefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      da1b0029
  35. 09 11月, 2017 1 次提交
  37. 22 6月, 2017 5 次提交
  39. 05 6月, 2017 3 次提交
  41. 13 3月, 2017 1 次提交
    • M
      ima: provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules. · 3dd0c8d0
      由 Mikhail Kurinnoi 提交于 
      For now we have only "=" operator for fowner/uid/euid rules. This
patch provide two more operators - ">" and "<" in order to make
fowner/uid/euid rules more flexible.

Examples of usage.

 Appraise all files owned by special and system users (SYS_UID_MAX 999):
    appraise fowner<1000
 Don't appraise files owned by normal users (UID_MIN 1000):
    dont_appraise fowner>999
 Appraise all files owned by users with UID 1000-1010:
    dont_appraise fowner>1010
    appraise fowner>999

Changelog v3:
- Removed code duplication in ima_parse_rule().
- Fix ima_policy_show() - (Mimi)

Changelog v2:
- Fixed default policy rules.
Signed-off-by: NMikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
      3dd0c8d0
  43. 07 3月, 2017 1 次提交
  45. 30 6月, 2016 2 次提交
  47. 21 5月, 2016 1 次提交