1. 10 11月, 2022 2 次提交
  2. 01 11月, 2022 1 次提交
  3. 31 5月, 2022 1 次提交
    • E
      inet: fully convert sk->sk_rx_dst to RCU rules · 78f2c9ec
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      mainline inclusion
      from mainline-v5.16-rc7
      commit 8f905c0e
      category: bugfix
      bugzilla: 186714 https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I57QUK
      
      --------------------------------
      
      syzbot reported various issues around early demux,
      one being included in this changelog [1]
      
      sk->sk_rx_dst is using RCU protection without clearly
      documenting it.
      
      And following sequences in tcp_v4_do_rcv()/tcp_v6_do_rcv()
      are not following standard RCU rules.
      
      [a]    dst_release(dst);
      [b]    sk->sk_rx_dst = NULL;
      
      They look wrong because a delete operation of RCU protected
      pointer is supposed to clear the pointer before
      the call_rcu()/synchronize_rcu() guarding actual memory freeing.
      
      In some cases indeed, dst could be freed before [b] is done.
      
      We could cheat by clearing sk_rx_dst before calling
      dst_release(), but this seems the right time to stick
      to standard RCU annotations and debugging facilities.
      
      [1]
      BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dst_check include/net/dst.h:470 [inline]
      BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_v4_early_demux+0x95b/0x960 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1792
      Read of size 2 at addr ffff88807f1cb73a by task syz-executor.5/9204
      
      CPU: 0 PID: 9204 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
      Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
      Call Trace:
       <TASK>
       __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
       dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
       print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x320 mm/kasan/report.c:247
       __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:433 [inline]
       kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:450
       dst_check include/net/dst.h:470 [inline]
       tcp_v4_early_demux+0x95b/0x960 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1792
       ip_rcv_finish_core.constprop.0+0x15de/0x1e80 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:340
       ip_list_rcv_finish.constprop.0+0x1b2/0x6e0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:583
       ip_sublist_rcv net/ipv4/ip_input.c:609 [inline]
       ip_list_rcv+0x34e/0x490 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:644
       __netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5508 [inline]
       __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x549/0x8e0 net/core/dev.c:5556
       __netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5608 [inline]
       netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x75e/0xd80 net/core/dev.c:5699
       gro_normal_list net/core/dev.c:5853 [inline]
       gro_normal_list net/core/dev.c:5849 [inline]
       napi_complete_done+0x1f1/0x880 net/core/dev.c:6590
       virtqueue_napi_complete drivers/net/virtio_net.c:339 [inline]
       virtnet_poll+0xca2/0x11b0 drivers/net/virtio_net.c:1557
       __napi_poll+0xaf/0x440 net/core/dev.c:7023
       napi_poll net/core/dev.c:7090 [inline]
       net_rx_action+0x801/0xb40 net/core/dev.c:7177
       __do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558
       invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:432 [inline]
       __irq_exit_rcu+0x123/0x180 kernel/softirq.c:637
       irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:649
       common_interrupt+0x52/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:240
       asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:629
      RIP: 0033:0x7f5e972bfd57
      Code: 39 d1 73 14 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 8b 50 f8 48 83 e8 08 48 39 ca 77 f3 48 39 c3 73 3e 48 89 13 48 8b 50 f8 48 89 38 49 8b 0e <48> 8b 3e 48 83 c3 08 48 83 c6 08 eb bc 48 39 d1 72 9e 48 39 d0 73
      RSP: 002b:00007fff8a413210 EFLAGS: 00000283
      RAX: 00007f5e97108990 RBX: 00007f5e97108338 RCX: ffffffff81d3aa45
      RDX: ffffffff81d3aa45 RSI: 00007f5e97108340 RDI: ffffffff81d3aa45
      RBP: 00007f5e97107eb8 R08: 00007f5e97108d88 R09: 0000000093c2e8d9
      R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00007f5e97107eb0
      R13: 00007f5e97108338 R14: 00007f5e97107ea8 R15: 0000000000000019
       </TASK>
      
      Allocated by task 13:
       kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:38
       kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:46 [inline]
       set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:434 [inline]
       __kasan_slab_alloc+0x90/0xc0 mm/kasan/common.c:467
       kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:259 [inline]
       slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:519 [inline]
       slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3234 [inline]
       slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3242 [inline]
       kmem_cache_alloc+0x202/0x3a0 mm/slub.c:3247
       dst_alloc+0x146/0x1f0 net/core/dst.c:92
       rt_dst_alloc+0x73/0x430 net/ipv4/route.c:1613
       ip_route_input_slow+0x1817/0x3a20 net/ipv4/route.c:2340
       ip_route_input_rcu net/ipv4/route.c:2470 [inline]
       ip_route_input_noref+0x116/0x2a0 net/ipv4/route.c:2415
       ip_rcv_finish_core.constprop.0+0x288/0x1e80 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:354
       ip_list_rcv_finish.constprop.0+0x1b2/0x6e0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:583
       ip_sublist_rcv net/ipv4/ip_input.c:609 [inline]
       ip_list_rcv+0x34e/0x490 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:644
       __netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5508 [inline]
       __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x549/0x8e0 net/core/dev.c:5556
       __netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5608 [inline]
       netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x75e/0xd80 net/core/dev.c:5699
       gro_normal_list net/core/dev.c:5853 [inline]
       gro_normal_list net/core/dev.c:5849 [inline]
       napi_complete_done+0x1f1/0x880 net/core/dev.c:6590
       virtqueue_napi_complete drivers/net/virtio_net.c:339 [inline]
       virtnet_poll+0xca2/0x11b0 drivers/net/virtio_net.c:1557
       __napi_poll+0xaf/0x440 net/core/dev.c:7023
       napi_poll net/core/dev.c:7090 [inline]
       net_rx_action+0x801/0xb40 net/core/dev.c:7177
       __do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558
      
      Freed by task 13:
       kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:38
       kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:46
       kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:370
       ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:366 [inline]
       ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:328 [inline]
       __kasan_slab_free+0xff/0x130 mm/kasan/common.c:374
       kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 [inline]
       slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1723 [inline]
       slab_free_freelist_hook+0x8b/0x1c0 mm/slub.c:1749
       slab_free mm/slub.c:3513 [inline]
       kmem_cache_free+0xbd/0x5d0 mm/slub.c:3530
       dst_destroy+0x2d6/0x3f0 net/core/dst.c:127
       rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2506 [inline]
       rcu_core+0x7ab/0x1470 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2741
       __do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558
      
      Last potentially related work creation:
       kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:38
       __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xf5/0x120 mm/kasan/generic.c:348
       __call_rcu kernel/rcu/tree.c:2985 [inline]
       call_rcu+0xb1/0x740 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3065
       dst_release net/core/dst.c:177 [inline]
       dst_release+0x79/0xe0 net/core/dst.c:167
       tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x612/0x8d0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1712
       sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1030 [inline]
       __release_sock+0x134/0x3b0 net/core/sock.c:2768
       release_sock+0x54/0x1b0 net/core/sock.c:3300
       tcp_sendmsg+0x36/0x40 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1441
       inet_sendmsg+0x99/0xe0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:819
       sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]
       sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724
       sock_write_iter+0x289/0x3c0 net/socket.c:1057
       call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2162 [inline]
       new_sync_write+0x429/0x660 fs/read_write.c:503
       vfs_write+0x7cd/0xae0 fs/read_write.c:590
       ksys_write+0x1ee/0x250 fs/read_write.c:643
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
      
      The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88807f1cb700
       which belongs to the cache ip_dst_cache of size 176
      The buggy address is located 58 bytes inside of
       176-byte region [ffff88807f1cb700, ffff88807f1cb7b0)
      The buggy address belongs to the page:
      page:ffffea0001fc72c0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x7f1cb
      flags: 0xfff00000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
      raw: 00fff00000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff8881413bb780
      raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
      page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
      page_owner tracks the page as allocated
      page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x112a20(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_HARDWALL), pid 5, ts 108466983062, free_ts 108048976062
       prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2418 [inline]
       get_page_from_freelist+0xa72/0x2f50 mm/page_alloc.c:4149
       __alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5369
       alloc_pages+0x1a7/0x300 mm/mempolicy.c:2191
       alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1793 [inline]
       allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1930 [inline]
       new_slab+0x32d/0x4a0 mm/slub.c:1993
       ___slab_alloc+0x918/0xfe0 mm/slub.c:3022
       __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x4d/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3109
       slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3200 [inline]
       slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3242 [inline]
       kmem_cache_alloc+0x35c/0x3a0 mm/slub.c:3247
       dst_alloc+0x146/0x1f0 net/core/dst.c:92
       rt_dst_alloc+0x73/0x430 net/ipv4/route.c:1613
       __mkroute_output net/ipv4/route.c:2564 [inline]
       ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x921/0x2d00 net/ipv4/route.c:2791
       ip_route_output_key_hash+0x18b/0x300 net/ipv4/route.c:2619
       __ip_route_output_key include/net/route.h:126 [inline]
       ip_route_output_flow+0x23/0x150 net/ipv4/route.c:2850
       ip_route_output_key include/net/route.h:142 [inline]
       geneve_get_v4_rt+0x3a6/0x830 drivers/net/geneve.c:809
       geneve_xmit_skb drivers/net/geneve.c:899 [inline]
       geneve_xmit+0xc4a/0x3540 drivers/net/geneve.c:1082
       __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4994 [inline]
       netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5008 [inline]
       xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3590 [inline]
       dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1eb/0x920 net/core/dev.c:3606
       __dev_queue_xmit+0x299a/0x3650 net/core/dev.c:4229
      page last free stack trace:
       reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
       free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1338 [inline]
       free_pcp_prepare+0x374/0x870 mm/page_alloc.c:1389
       free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3309 [inline]
       free_unref_page+0x19/0x690 mm/page_alloc.c:3388
       qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:146 [inline]
       qlist_free_all+0x5a/0xc0 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:165
       kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x180/0x200 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:272
       __kasan_slab_alloc+0xa2/0xc0 mm/kasan/common.c:444
       kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:259 [inline]
       slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:519 [inline]
       slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3234 [inline]
       kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x255/0x3f0 mm/slub.c:3270
       __alloc_skb+0x215/0x340 net/core/skbuff.c:414
       alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1126 [inline]
       alloc_skb_with_frags+0x93/0x620 net/core/skbuff.c:6078
       sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x783/0x910 net/core/sock.c:2575
       mld_newpack+0x1df/0x770 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1754
       add_grhead+0x265/0x330 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1857
       add_grec+0x1053/0x14e0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1995
       mld_send_initial_cr.part.0+0xf6/0x230 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2242
       mld_send_initial_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:1232 [inline]
       mld_dad_work+0x1d3/0x690 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2268
       process_one_work+0x9b2/0x1690 kernel/workqueue.c:2298
       worker_thread+0x658/0x11f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2445
      
      Memory state around the buggy address:
       ffff88807f1cb600: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
       ffff88807f1cb680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      >ffff88807f1cb700: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                              ^
       ffff88807f1cb780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
       ffff88807f1cb800: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
      
      Fixes: 41063e9d ("ipv4: Early TCP socket demux.")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211220143330.680945-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NZhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>
      Conflict:
      	include/net/sock.h
      	net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
      	net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
      	net/ipv6/udp.c
      Reviewed-by: NWei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
      Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
      78f2c9ec
  4. 07 1月, 2022 1 次提交
  5. 15 11月, 2021 1 次提交
  6. 19 10月, 2021 1 次提交
  7. 15 10月, 2021 2 次提交
  8. 08 2月, 2021 2 次提交
  9. 10 12月, 2020 1 次提交
  10. 25 11月, 2020 1 次提交
    • A
      tcp: Set ECT0 bit in tos/tclass for synack when BPF needs ECN · 407c85c7
      Alexander Duyck 提交于
      When a BPF program is used to select between a type of TCP congestion
      control algorithm that uses either ECN or not there is a case where the
      synack for the frame was coming up without the ECT0 bit set. A bit of
      research found that this was due to the final socket being configured to
      dctcp while the listener socket was staying in cubic.
      
      To reproduce it all that is needed is to monitor TCP traffic while running
      the sample bpf program "samples/bpf/tcp_cong_kern.c". What is observed,
      assuming tcp_dctcp module is loaded or compiled in and the traffic matches
      the rules in the sample file, is that for all frames with the exception of
      the synack the ECT0 bit is set.
      
      To address that it is necessary to make one additional call to
      tcp_bpf_ca_needs_ecn using the request socket and then use the output of
      that to set the ECT0 bit for the tos/tclass of the packet.
      
      Fixes: 91b5b21c ("bpf: Add support for changing congestion control")
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Duyck <alexanderduyck@fb.com>
      Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/160593039663.2604.1374502006916871573.stgit@localhost.localdomainSigned-off-by: NJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
      407c85c7
  11. 24 11月, 2020 1 次提交
    • R
      tcp: fix race condition when creating child sockets from syncookies · 01770a16
      Ricardo Dias 提交于
      When the TCP stack is in SYN flood mode, the server child socket is
      created from the SYN cookie received in a TCP packet with the ACK flag
      set.
      
      The child socket is created when the server receives the first TCP
      packet with a valid SYN cookie from the client. Usually, this packet
      corresponds to the final step of the TCP 3-way handshake, the ACK
      packet. But is also possible to receive a valid SYN cookie from the
      first TCP data packet sent by the client, and thus create a child socket
      from that SYN cookie.
      
      Since a client socket is ready to send data as soon as it receives the
      SYN+ACK packet from the server, the client can send the ACK packet (sent
      by the TCP stack code), and the first data packet (sent by the userspace
      program) almost at the same time, and thus the server will equally
      receive the two TCP packets with valid SYN cookies almost at the same
      instant.
      
      When such event happens, the TCP stack code has a race condition that
      occurs between the momement a lookup is done to the established
      connections hashtable to check for the existence of a connection for the
      same client, and the moment that the child socket is added to the
      established connections hashtable. As a consequence, this race condition
      can lead to a situation where we add two child sockets to the
      established connections hashtable and deliver two sockets to the
      userspace program to the same client.
      
      This patch fixes the race condition by checking if an existing child
      socket exists for the same client when we are adding the second child
      socket to the established connections socket. If an existing child
      socket exists, we drop the packet and discard the second child socket
      to the same client.
      Signed-off-by: NRicardo Dias <rdias@singlestore.com>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201120111133.GA67501@rdias-suse-pc.lanSigned-off-by: NJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
      01770a16
  12. 21 11月, 2020 1 次提交
    • A
      tcp: Allow full IP tos/IPv6 tclass to be reflected in L3 header · 861602b5
      Alexander Duyck 提交于
      An issue was recently found where DCTCP SYN/ACK packets did not have the
      ECT bit set in the L3 header. A bit of code review found that the recent
      change referenced below had gone though and added a mask that prevented the
      ECN bits from being populated in the L3 header.
      
      This patch addresses that by rolling back the mask so that it is only
      applied to the flags coming from the incoming TCP request instead of
      applying it to the socket tos/tclass field. Doing this the ECT bits were
      restored in the SYN/ACK packets in my testing.
      
      One thing that is not addressed by this patch set is the fact that
      tcp_reflect_tos appears to be incompatible with ECN based congestion
      avoidance algorithms. At a minimum the feature should likely be documented
      which it currently isn't.
      
      Fixes: ac8f1710 ("tcp: reflect tos value received in SYN to the socket")
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Duyck <alexanderduyck@fb.com>
      Acked-by: NWei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
      861602b5
  13. 06 10月, 2020 1 次提交
    • E
      tcp: fix receive window update in tcp_add_backlog() · 86bccd03
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      We got reports from GKE customers flows being reset by netfilter
      conntrack unless nf_conntrack_tcp_be_liberal is set to 1.
      
      Traces seemed to suggest ACK packet being dropped by the
      packet capture, or more likely that ACK were received in the
      wrong order.
      
       wscale=7, SYN and SYNACK not shown here.
      
       This ACK allows the sender to send 1871*128 bytes from seq 51359321 :
       New right edge of the window -> 51359321+1871*128=51598809
      
       09:17:23.389210 IP A > B: Flags [.], ack 51359321, win 1871, options [nop,nop,TS val 10 ecr 999], length 0
      
       09:17:23.389212 IP B > A: Flags [.], seq 51422681:51424089, ack 1577, win 268, options [nop,nop,TS val 999 ecr 10], length 1408
       09:17:23.389214 IP A > B: Flags [.], ack 51422681, win 1376, options [nop,nop,TS val 10 ecr 999], length 0
       09:17:23.389253 IP B > A: Flags [.], seq 51424089:51488857, ack 1577, win 268, options [nop,nop,TS val 999 ecr 10], length 64768
       09:17:23.389272 IP A > B: Flags [.], ack 51488857, win 859, options [nop,nop,TS val 10 ecr 999], length 0
       09:17:23.389275 IP B > A: Flags [.], seq 51488857:51521241, ack 1577, win 268, options [nop,nop,TS val 999 ecr 10], length 32384
      
       Receiver now allows to send 606*128=77568 from seq 51521241 :
       New right edge of the window -> 51521241+606*128=51598809
      
       09:17:23.389296 IP A > B: Flags [.], ack 51521241, win 606, options [nop,nop,TS val 10 ecr 999], length 0
      
       09:17:23.389308 IP B > A: Flags [.], seq 51521241:51553625, ack 1577, win 268, options [nop,nop,TS val 999 ecr 10], length 32384
      
       It seems the sender exceeds RWIN allowance, since 51611353 > 51598809
      
       09:17:23.389346 IP B > A: Flags [.], seq 51553625:51611353, ack 1577, win 268, options [nop,nop,TS val 999 ecr 10], length 57728
       09:17:23.389356 IP B > A: Flags [.], seq 51611353:51618393, ack 1577, win 268, options [nop,nop,TS val 999 ecr 10], length 7040
      
       09:17:23.389367 IP A > B: Flags [.], ack 51611353, win 0, options [nop,nop,TS val 10 ecr 999], length 0
      
       netfilter conntrack is not happy and sends RST
      
       09:17:23.389389 IP A > B: Flags [R], seq 92176528, win 0, length 0
       09:17:23.389488 IP B > A: Flags [R], seq 174478967, win 0, length 0
      
       Now imagine ACK were delivered out of order and tcp_add_backlog() sets window based on wrong packet.
       New right edge of the window -> 51521241+859*128=51631193
      
      Normally TCP stack handles OOO packets just fine, but it
      turns out tcp_add_backlog() does not. It can update the window
      field of the aggregated packet even if the ACK sequence
      of the last received packet is too old.
      
      Many thanks to Alexandre Ferrieux for independently reporting the issue
      and suggesting a fix.
      
      Fixes: 4f693b55 ("tcp: implement coalescing on backlog queue")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Reported-by: NAlexandre Ferrieux <alexandre.ferrieux@orange.com>
      Acked-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
      Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      86bccd03
  14. 11 9月, 2020 2 次提交
  15. 25 8月, 2020 2 次提交
    • R
      net: ipv4: delete repeated words · 2bdcc73c
      Randy Dunlap 提交于
      Drop duplicate words in comments in net/ipv4/.
      Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
      Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
      Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      2bdcc73c
    • M
      bpf: tcp: Add bpf_skops_hdr_opt_len() and bpf_skops_write_hdr_opt() · 331fca43
      Martin KaFai Lau 提交于
      The bpf prog needs to parse the SYN header to learn what options have
      been sent by the peer's bpf-prog before writing its options into SYNACK.
      This patch adds a "syn_skb" arg to tcp_make_synack() and send_synack().
      This syn_skb will eventually be made available (as read-only) to the
      bpf prog.  This will be the only SYN packet available to the bpf
      prog during syncookie.  For other regular cases, the bpf prog can
      also use the saved_syn.
      
      When writing options, the bpf prog will first be called to tell the
      kernel its required number of bytes.  It is done by the new
      bpf_skops_hdr_opt_len().  The bpf prog will only be called when the new
      BPF_SOCK_OPS_WRITE_HDR_OPT_CB_FLAG is set in tp->bpf_sock_ops_cb_flags.
      When the bpf prog returns, the kernel will know how many bytes are needed
      and then update the "*remaining" arg accordingly.  4 byte alignment will
      be included in the "*remaining" before this function returns.  The 4 byte
      aligned number of bytes will also be stored into the opts->bpf_opt_len.
      "bpf_opt_len" is a newly added member to the struct tcp_out_options.
      
      Then the new bpf_skops_write_hdr_opt() will call the bpf prog to write the
      header options.  The bpf prog is only called if it has reserved spaces
      before (opts->bpf_opt_len > 0).
      
      The bpf prog is the last one getting a chance to reserve header space
      and writing the header option.
      
      These two functions are half implemented to highlight the changes in
      TCP stack.  The actual codes preparing the bpf running context and
      invoking the bpf prog will be added in the later patch with other
      necessary bpf pieces.
      Signed-off-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      Reviewed-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200820190052.2885316-1-kafai@fb.com
      331fca43
  16. 26 7月, 2020 2 次提交
  17. 25 7月, 2020 1 次提交
  18. 22 7月, 2020 1 次提交
  19. 20 7月, 2020 2 次提交
  20. 02 7月, 2020 1 次提交
    • E
      tcp: md5: refine tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key() barriers · e6ced831
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      My prior fix went a bit too far, according to Herbert and Mathieu.
      
      Since we accept that concurrent TCP MD5 lookups might see inconsistent
      keys, we can use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() instead of smp_rmb()/smp_wmb()
      
      Clearing all key->key[] is needed to avoid possible KMSAN reports,
      if key->keylen is increased. Since tcp_md5_do_add() is not fast path,
      using __GFP_ZERO to clear all struct tcp_md5sig_key is simpler.
      
      data_race() was added in linux-5.8 and will prevent KCSAN reports,
      this can safely be removed in stable backports, if data_race() is
      not yet backported.
      
      v2: use data_race() both in tcp_md5_hash_key() and tcp_md5_do_add()
      
      Fixes: 6a2febec ("tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key()")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
      Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
      Acked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e6ced831
  21. 01 7月, 2020 1 次提交
    • E
      tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key() · 6a2febec
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      MD5 keys are read with RCU protection, and tcp_md5_do_add()
      might update in-place a prior key.
      
      Normally, typical RCU updates would allocate a new piece
      of memory. In this case only key->key and key->keylen might
      be updated, and we do not care if an incoming packet could
      see the old key, the new one, or some intermediate value,
      since changing the key on a live flow is known to be problematic
      anyway.
      
      We only want to make sure that in the case key->keylen
      is changed, cpus in tcp_md5_hash_key() wont try to use
      uninitialized data, or crash because key->keylen was
      read twice to feed sg_init_one() and ahash_request_set_crypt()
      
      Fixes: 9ea88a15 ("tcp: md5: check md5 signature without socket lock")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      6a2febec
  22. 25 6月, 2020 2 次提交
  23. 29 5月, 2020 1 次提交
    • E
      tcp: ipv6: support RFC 6069 (TCP-LD) · d2924569
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      Make tcp_ld_RTO_revert() helper available to IPv6, and
      implement RFC 6069 :
      
      Quoting this RFC :
      
      3. Connectivity Disruption Indication
      
         For Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) [RFC2460], the counterpart of
         the ICMP destination unreachable message of code 0 (net unreachable)
         and of code 1 (host unreachable) is the ICMPv6 destination
         unreachable message of code 0 (no route to destination) [RFC4443].
         As with IPv4, a router should generate an ICMPv6 destination
         unreachable message of code 0 in response to a packet that cannot be
         delivered to its destination address because it lacks a matching
         entry in its routing table.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Acked-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
      Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      d2924569
  24. 28 5月, 2020 2 次提交
  25. 27 5月, 2020 1 次提交
  26. 26 5月, 2020 1 次提交
    • E
      tcp: allow traceroute -Mtcp for unpriv users · 45af29ca
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      Unpriv users can use traceroute over plain UDP sockets, but not TCP ones.
      
      $ traceroute -Mtcp 8.8.8.8
      You do not have enough privileges to use this traceroute method.
      
      $ traceroute -n -Mudp 8.8.8.8
      traceroute to 8.8.8.8 (8.8.8.8), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets
       1  192.168.86.1  3.631 ms  3.512 ms  3.405 ms
       2  10.1.10.1  4.183 ms  4.125 ms  4.072 ms
       3  96.120.88.125  20.621 ms  19.462 ms  20.553 ms
       4  96.110.177.65  24.271 ms  25.351 ms  25.250 ms
       5  69.139.199.197  44.492 ms  43.075 ms  44.346 ms
       6  68.86.143.93  27.969 ms  25.184 ms  25.092 ms
       7  96.112.146.18  25.323 ms 96.112.146.22  25.583 ms 96.112.146.26  24.502 ms
       8  72.14.239.204  24.405 ms 74.125.37.224  16.326 ms  17.194 ms
       9  209.85.251.9  18.154 ms 209.85.247.55  14.449 ms 209.85.251.9  26.296 ms^C
      
      We can easily support traceroute over TCP, by queueing an error message
      into socket error queue.
      
      Note that applications need to set IP_RECVERR/IPV6_RECVERR option to
      enable this feature, and that the error message is only queued
      while in SYN_SNT state.
      
      socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_IP) = 3
      setsockopt(3, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_RECVERR, [1], 4) = 0
      setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TIMESTAMP_OLD, [1], 4) = 0
      setsockopt(3, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS, [5], 4) = 0
      connect(3, {sa_family=AF_INET6, sin6_port=htons(8787), sin6_flowinfo=htonl(0),
              inet_pton(AF_INET6, "2002:a05:6608:297::", &sin6_addr), sin6_scope_id=0}, 28) = -1 EHOSTUNREACH (No route to host)
      recvmsg(3, {msg_name={sa_family=AF_INET6, sin6_port=htons(8787), sin6_flowinfo=htonl(0),
              inet_pton(AF_INET6, "2002:a05:6608:297::", &sin6_addr), sin6_scope_id=0},
              msg_namelen=1024->28, msg_iov=[{iov_base="`\r\337\320\0004\6\1&\7\370\260\200\231\16\27\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \2\n\5f\10\2\227"..., iov_len=1024}],
              msg_iovlen=1, msg_control=[{cmsg_len=32, cmsg_level=SOL_SOCKET, cmsg_type=SO_TIMESTAMP_OLD, cmsg_data={tv_sec=1590340680, tv_usec=272424}},
                                         {cmsg_len=60, cmsg_level=SOL_IPV6, cmsg_type=IPV6_RECVERR}],
              msg_controllen=96, msg_flags=MSG_ERRQUEUE}, MSG_ERRQUEUE) = 144
      
      Suggested-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NMaciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      45af29ca
  27. 01 5月, 2020 1 次提交
  28. 13 3月, 2020 1 次提交
  29. 25 2月, 2020 1 次提交
  30. 10 1月, 2020 2 次提交