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  1. 18 5月, 2017 11 次提交
    • T
      bridge: netlink: check vlan_default_pvid range · a2858602
      由 Tobias Jungel 提交于 
      Currently it is allowed to set the default pvid of a bridge to a value
above VLAN_VID_MASK (0xfff). This patch adds a check to br_validate and
returns -EINVAL in case the pvid is out of bounds.

Reproduce by calling:

[root@test ~]# ip l a type bridge
[root@test ~]# ip l a type dummy
[root@test ~]# ip l s bridge0 type bridge vlan_filtering 1
[root@test ~]# ip l s bridge0 type bridge vlan_default_pvid 9999
[root@test ~]# ip l s dummy0 master bridge0
[root@test ~]# bridge vlan
port	vlan ids
bridge0	 9999 PVID Egress Untagged

dummy0	 9999 PVID Egress Untagged

Fixes: 0f963b75 ("bridge: netlink: add support for default_pvid")
Acked-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: NTobias Jungel <tobias.jungel@bisdn.de>
Acked-by: NSabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      a2858602
    • G
      net: ethernet: faraday: To support device tree usage. · 47ab37a1
      由 Greentime Hu 提交于 
      To support device tree usage for ftmac100.
Signed-off-by: NGreentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      47ab37a1
    • L
      net: x25: fix one potential use-after-free issue · 64df6d52
      由 linzhang 提交于 
      The function x25_init is not properly unregister related resources
on error handler.It is will result in kernel oops if x25_init init
failed, so add properly unregister call on error handler.

Also, i adjust the coding style and make x25_register_sysctl properly
return failure.
Signed-off-by: Nlinzhang <xiaolou4617@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      64df6d52
    • D
      bpf: adjust verifier heuristics · 3c2ce60b
      由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于 
      Current limits with regards to processing program paths do not
really reflect today's needs anymore due to programs becoming
more complex and verifier smarter, keeping track of more data
such as const ALU operations, alignment tracking, spilling of
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ registers, and other features allowing for
smarter matching of what LLVM generates.

This also comes with the side-effect that we result in fewer
opportunities to prune search states and thus often need to do
more work to prove safety than in the past due to different
register states and stack layout where we mismatch. Generally,
it's quite hard to determine what caused a sudden increase in
complexity, it could be caused by something as trivial as a
single branch somewhere at the beginning of the program where
LLVM assigned a stack slot that is marked differently throughout
other branches and thus causing a mismatch, where verifier
then needs to prove safety for the whole rest of the program.
Subsequently, programs with even less than half the insn size
limit can get rejected. We noticed that while some programs
load fine under pre 4.11, they get rejected due to hitting
limits on more recent kernels. We saw that in the vast majority
of cases (90+%) pruning failed due to register mismatches. In
case of stack mismatches, majority of cases failed due to
different stack slot types (invalid, spill, misc) rather than
differences in spilled registers.

This patch makes pruning more aggressive by also adding markers
that sit at conditional jumps as well. Currently, we only mark
jump targets for pruning. For example in direct packet access,
these are usually error paths where we bail out. We found that
adding these markers, it can reduce number of processed insns
by up to 30%. Another option is to ignore reg->id in probing
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers, which can help pruning
slightly as well by up to 7% observed complexity reduction as
stand-alone. Meaning, if a previous path with register type
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL for map X was found to be safe, then
in the current state a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL register for
the same map X must be safe as well. Last but not least the
patch also adds a scheduling point and bumps the current limit
for instructions to be processed to a more adequate value.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      3c2ce60b
    • D
      ipv6: Check ip6_find_1stfragopt() return value properly. · 7dd7eb95
      由 David S. Miller 提交于 
      Do not use unsigned variables to see if it returns a negative
error or not.

Fixes: 2423496a ("ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options")
Reported-by: NJulia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7dd7eb95
    • Y
      selftests/bpf: fix broken build due to types.h · 579f1d92
      由 Yonghong Song 提交于 
      Commit 0a5539f6 ("bpf: Provide a linux/types.h override
for bpf selftests.") caused a build failure for tools/testing/selftest/bpf
because of some missing types:
    $ make -C tools/testing/selftests/bpf/
    ...
    In file included from /home/yhs/work/net-next/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_pkt_access.c:8:
    ../../../include/uapi/linux/bpf.h:170:3: error: unknown type name '__aligned_u64'
                    __aligned_u64   key;
    ...
    /usr/include/linux/swab.h:160:8: error: unknown type name '__always_inline'
    static __always_inline __u16 __swab16p(const __u16 *p)
    ...
The type __aligned_u64 is defined in linux:include/uapi/linux/types.h.

The fix is to copy missing type definition into
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/include/uapi/linux/types.h.
Adding additional include "string.h" resolves __always_inline issue.

Fixes: 0a5539f6 ("bpf: Provide a linux/types.h override for bpf selftests.")
Signed-off-by: NYonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      579f1d92
    • D
      Merge branch 'bnxt_en-DCBX-fixes' · f917174c
      由 David S. Miller 提交于 
      Michael Chan says:

====================
bnxt_en: DCBX fixes.

2 bug fixes for the case where the NIC's firmware DCBX agent is enabled.
With these fixes, we will return the proper information to lldpad.
====================
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f917174c
    • M
      bnxt_en: Check status of firmware DCBX agent before setting DCB_CAP_DCBX_HOST. · f667724b
      由 Michael Chan 提交于 
      Otherwise, all the host based DCBX settings from lldpad will fail if the
firmware DCBX agent is running.
Signed-off-by: NMichael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f667724b
    • M
      bnxt_en: Call bnxt_dcb_init() after getting firmware DCBX configuration. · 87fe6032
      由 Michael Chan 提交于 
      In the current code, bnxt_dcb_init() is called too early before we
determine if the firmware DCBX agent is running or not.  As a result,
we are not setting the DCB_CAP_DCBX_HOST and DCB_CAP_DCBX_LLD_MANAGED
flags properly to report to DCBNL.
Signed-off-by: NMichael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      87fe6032
    • E
      net: fix compile error in skb_orphan_partial() · 9142e900
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      If CONFIG_INET is not set, net/core/sock.c can not compile :

net/core/sock.c: In function ‘skb_orphan_partial’:
net/core/sock.c:1810:2: error: implicit declaration of function
‘skb_is_tcp_pure_ack’ [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
  if (skb_is_tcp_pure_ack(skb))
  ^

Fix this by always including <net/tcp.h>

Fixes: f6ba8d33 ("netem: fix skb_orphan_partial()")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Reported-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      9142e900
    • C
      ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options · 2423496a
      由 Craig Gallek 提交于 
      The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller
program.  The reproducer is basically:
  int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP);
  send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE);
  send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0);

The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to
NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero
byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path.

The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order
to figure out where to insert the fragment option.  Since nexthdr points
to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header
can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data
is read outside of it.

This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects
running out-of-bounds.

[   42.361487] ==================================================================
[   42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[   42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789
[   42.366469]
[   42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41
[   42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[   42.368824] Call Trace:
[   42.369183]  dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b
[   42.369664]  print_address_description+0x73/0x290
[   42.370325]  kasan_report+0x252/0x370
[   42.370839]  ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[   42.371396]  check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
[   42.371978]  memcpy+0x23/0x50
[   42.372395]  ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[   42.372920]  ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110
[   42.373681]  ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0
[   42.374263]  ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30
[   42.374803]  ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990
[   42.375350]  ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690
[   42.375836]  ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990
[   42.376411]  ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730
[   42.376968]  ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160
[   42.377471]  ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330
[   42.377969]  ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0
[   42.378589]  rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0
[   42.379129]  ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0
[   42.379633]  ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0
[   42.380193]  ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[   42.380878]  ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930
[   42.381427]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120
[   42.382074]  ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290
[   42.382614]  ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930
[   42.383173]  ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[   42.383727]  inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[   42.384226]  ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[   42.384748]  ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540
[   42.385263]  sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[   42.385758]  SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380
[   42.386249]  ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310
[   42.386783]  ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0
[   42.387324]  ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[   42.387880]  ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0
[   42.388403]  ? __fdget+0x18/0x20
[   42.388851]  ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0
[   42.389472]  ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260
[   42.390021]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe
[   42.390650]  SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50
[   42.391103]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[   42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383
[   42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[   42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383
[   42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003
[   42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018
[   42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad
[   42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00
[   42.397257]
[   42.397411] Allocated by task 3789:
[   42.397702]  save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[   42.398005]  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[   42.398267]  kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[   42.398548]  kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[   42.398848]  __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380
[   42.399224]  __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0
[   42.399654]  __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580
[   42.400003]  sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0
[   42.400346]  __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0
[   42.400813]  ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0
[   42.401122]  rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0
[   42.401505]  inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[   42.401860]  sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[   42.402209]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930
[   42.402582]  __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190
[   42.402941]  SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
[   42.403273]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[   42.403718]
[   42.403871] Freed by task 1794:
[   42.404146]  save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[   42.404515]  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[   42.404827]  kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
[   42.405167]  kfree+0xe8/0x2b0
[   42.405462]  skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0
[   42.405806]  skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0
[   42.406198]  skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60
[   42.406563]  consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0
[   42.406910]  skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0
[   42.407288]  netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40
[   42.407667]  sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110
[   42.408022]  ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580
[   42.408395]  __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190
[   42.408753]  SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50
[   42.409086]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[   42.409513]
[   42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780
[   42.409665]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[   42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
[   42.410846]  512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980)
[   42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[   42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[   42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
[   42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c
[   42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000
[   42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[   42.415604]
[   42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   42.416222]  ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   42.416904]  ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[   42.418273]                    ^
[   42.418588]  ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[   42.419273]  ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[   42.419882] ==================================================================
Reported-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NCraig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      2423496a
  3. 17 5月, 2017 8 次提交
    • I
      neighbour: update neigh timestamps iff update is effective · 77d71233
      由 Ihar Hrachyshka 提交于 
      It's a common practice to send gratuitous ARPs after moving an
IP address to another device to speed up healing of a service. To
fulfill service availability constraints, the timing of network peers
updating their caches to point to a new location of an IP address can be
particularly important.

Sometimes neigh_update calls won't touch neither lladdr nor state, for
example if an update arrives in locktime interval. The neigh->updated
value is tested by the protocol specific neigh code, which in turn
will influence whether NEIGH_UPDATE_F_OVERRIDE gets set in the
call to neigh_update() or not. As a result, we may effectively ignore
the update request, bailing out of touching the neigh entry, except that
we still bump its timestamps inside neigh_update.

This may be a problem for updates arriving in quick succession. For
example, consider the following scenario:

A service is moved to another device with its IP address. The new device
sends three gratuitous ARP requests into the network with ~1 seconds
interval between them. Just before the first request arrives to one of
network peer nodes, its neigh entry for the IP address transitions from
STALE to DELAY.  This transition, among other things, updates
neigh->updated. Once the kernel receives the first gratuitous ARP, it
ignores it because its arrival time is inside the locktime interval. The
kernel still bumps neigh->updated. Then the second gratuitous ARP
request arrives, and it's also ignored because it's still in the (new)
locktime interval. Same happens for the third request. The node
eventually heals itself (after delay_first_probe_time seconds since the
initial transition to DELAY state), but it just wasted some time and
require a new ARP request/reply round trip. This unfortunate behaviour
both puts more load on the network, as well as reduces service
availability.

This patch changes neigh_update so that it bumps neigh->updated (as well
as neigh->confirmed) only once we are sure that either lladdr or entry
state will change). In the scenario described above, it means that the
second gratuitous ARP request will actually update the entry lladdr.

Ideally, we would update the neigh entry on the very first gratuitous
ARP request. The locktime mechanism is designed to ignore ARP updates in
a short timeframe after a previous ARP update was honoured by the kernel
layer. This would require tracking timestamps for state transitions
separately from timestamps when actual updates are received. This would
probably involve changes in neighbour struct. Therefore, the patch
doesn't tackle the issue of the first gratuitous APR ignored, leaving
it for a follow-up.
Signed-off-by: NIhar Hrachyshka <ihrachys@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      77d71233
    • I
      arp: honour gratuitous ARP _replies_ · 23d268eb
      由 Ihar Hrachyshka 提交于 
      When arp_accept is 1, gratuitous ARPs are supposed to override matching
entries irrespective of whether they arrive during locktime. This was
implemented in commit 56022a8f ("ipv4: arp: update neighbour address
when a gratuitous arp is received and arp_accept is set")

There is a glitch in the patch though. RFC 2002, section 4.6, "ARP,
Proxy ARP, and Gratuitous ARP", defines gratuitous ARPs so that they can
be either of Request or Reply type. Those Reply gratuitous ARPs can be
triggered with standard tooling, for example, arping -A option does just
that.

This patch fixes the glitch, making both Request and Reply flavours of
gratuitous ARPs to behave identically.

As per RFC, if gratuitous ARPs are of Reply type, their Target Hardware
Address field should also be set to the link-layer address to which this
cache entry should be updated. The field is present in ARP over Ethernet
but not in IEEE 1394. In this patch, I don't consider any broadcasted
ARP replies as gratuitous if the field is not present, to conform the
standard. It's not clear whether there is such a thing for IEEE 1394 as
a gratuitous ARP reply; until it's cleared up, we will ignore such
broadcasts. Note that they will still update existing ARP cache entries,
assuming they arrive out of locktime time interval.
Signed-off-by: NIhar Hrachyshka <ihrachys@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      23d268eb
    • A
      mlx5e: add CONFIG_INET dependency · 2432a3fb
      由 Arnd Bergmann 提交于 
      We now reference the arp_tbl, which requires IPv4 support to be
enabled in the kernel, otherwise we get a link error:

drivers/net/built-in.o: In function `mlx5e_tc_update_neigh_used_value':
(.text+0x16afec): undefined reference to `arp_tbl'
drivers/net/built-in.o: In function `mlx5e_rep_neigh_init':
en_rep.c:(.text+0x16c16d): undefined reference to `arp_tbl'
drivers/net/built-in.o: In function `mlx5e_rep_netevent_event':
en_rep.c:(.text+0x16cbb5): undefined reference to `arp_tbl'

This adds a Kconfig dependency for it.

Fixes: 232c0013 ("net/mlx5e: Add support to neighbour update flow")
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      2432a3fb
    • D
      net: Improve handling of failures on link and route dumps · f6c5775f
      由 David Ahern 提交于 
      In general, rtnetlink dumps do not anticipate failure to dump a single
object (e.g., link or route) on a single pass. As both route and link
objects have grown via more attributes, that is no longer a given.

netlink dumps can handle a failure if the dump function returns an
error; specifically, netlink_dump adds the return code to the response
if it is <= 0 so userspace is notified of the failure. The missing
piece is the rtnetlink dump functions returning the error.

Fix route and link dump functions to return the errors if no object is
added to an skb (detected by skb->len != 0). IPv6 route dumps
(rt6_dump_route) already return the error; this patch updates IPv4 and
link dumps. Other dump functions may need to be ajusted as well.
Reported-by: NJan Moskyto Matejka <mq@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f6c5775f
    • C
      net/smc: Add warning about remote memory exposure · 19a0f7e3
      由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于 
      The driver explicitly bypasses APIs to register all memory once a
connection is made, and thus allows remote access to memory.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NUrsula Braun <ubraun@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      19a0f7e3
    • U
      smc: switch to usage of IB_PD_UNSAFE_GLOBAL_RKEY · 263eec9b
      由 Ursula Braun 提交于 
      Currently, SMC enables remote access to physical memory when a user
has successfully configured and established an SMC-connection until ten
minutes after the last SMC connection is closed. Because this is considered
a security risk, drivers are supposed to use IB_PD_UNSAFE_GLOBAL_RKEY in
such a case.

This patch changes the current SMC code to use IB_PD_UNSAFE_GLOBAL_RKEY.
This improves user awareness, but does not remove the security risk itself.
Signed-off-by: NUrsula Braun <ubraun@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      263eec9b
    • T
      ipmr: vrf: Find VIFs using the actual device · bcfc7d33
      由 Thomas Winter 提交于 
      The skb->dev that is passed into ip_mr_input is
the loX device for VRFs. When we lookup a vif
for this dev, none is found as we do not create
vifs for loopbacks. Instead lookup a vif for the
actual device that the packet was received on,
eg the vlan.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Winter <Thomas.Winter@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
cc: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
cc: roopa <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      bcfc7d33
    • S
      tcp: eliminate negative reordering in tcp_clean_rtx_queue · bafbb9c7
      由 Soheil Hassas Yeganeh 提交于 
      tcp_ack() can call tcp_fragment() which may dededuct the
value tp->fackets_out when MSS changes. When prior_fackets
is larger than tp->fackets_out, tcp_clean_rtx_queue() can
invoke tcp_update_reordering() with negative values. This
results in absurd tp->reodering values higher than
sysctl_tcp_max_reordering.

Note that tcp_update_reordering indeeds sets tp->reordering
to min(sysctl_tcp_max_reordering, metric), but because
the comparison is signed, a negative metric always wins.

Fixes: c7caf8d3 ("[TCP]: Fix reord detection due to snd_una covered holes")
Reported-by: NRebecca Isaacs <risaacs@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      bafbb9c7
  5. 16 5月, 2017 13 次提交
  7. 15 5月, 2017 1 次提交
  9. 14 5月, 2017 7 次提交