Every other directory has a .child member and we look at the .child
for our entries.  Do the same for the root_table.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Factor out a routing to initialize the sysctl_table_header.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Add nreg to ctl_table_header.  When nreg drops to 0 the ctl_table_header
will be unregistered.

Factor out drop_sysctl_table from unregister_sysctl_table, and add
the logic for decrementing nreg.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Instead of relying on sysct_head_next(NULL) to magically
return the right header for the root directory instead
explicitly transform NULL into the root directories header.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

While useful at one time for selinux and the sysctl sanity
checks those users no longer use the parent field and we can
safely remove it.
Inspired-by: NLucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmil.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

- Stop validating subdirectories now that we only register leaf tables

- Cleanup and improve the duplicate filename check.
  * Run the duplicate filename check under the sysctl_lock to guarantee
    we never add duplicate names.
  * Reduce the duplicate filename check to nearly O(M*N) where M is the
    number of entries in tthe table we are registering and N is the
    number of entries in the directory before we got there.

- Move the duplicate filename check into it's own function and call
  it directtly from __register_sysctl_table

- Kill the config option as the sanity checks are now cheap enough
  the config option is unnecessary. The original reason for the config
  option was because we had a huge table used to verify the proc filename
  to binary sysctl mapping.  That table has now evolved into the binary_sysctl
  translation layer and is no longer part of the sysctl_check code.

- Tighten up the permission checks.  Guarnateeing that files only have read
  or write permissions.

- Removed redudant check for parents having a procname as now everything has
  a procname.

- Generalize the backtrace logic so that we print a backtrace from
  any failure of __register_sysctl_table that was not caused by
  a memmory allocation failure.  The backtrace allows us to track
  down who erroneously registered a sysctl table.

Bechmark before (CONFIG_SYSCTL_CHECK=y):
    make-dummies 0 999 -> 12s
    rmmod dummy        -> 0.08s

Bechmark before (CONFIG_SYSCTL_CHECK=n):
    make-dummies 0 999 -> 0.7s
    rmmod dummy        -> 0.06s
    make-dummies 0 99999 -> 1m13s
    rmmod dummy          -> 0.38s

Benchmark after:
    make-dummies 0 999 -> 0.65s
    rmmod dummy        -> 0.055s
    make-dummies 0 9999 -> 1m10s
    rmmod dummy         -> 0.39s

The sysctl sanity checks now impose no measurable cost.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Split the registration of a complex ctl_table array which may have
arbitrary numbers of directories (->child != NULL) and tables of files
into a series of simpler registrations that only register tables of files.

Graphically:

   register('dir', { + file-a
                     + file-b
                     + subdir1
                       + file-c
                     + subdir2
                       + file-d
                       + file-e })

is transformed into:
   wrapper->subheaders[0] = register('dir', {file1-a, file1-b})
   wrapper->subheaders[1] = register('dir/subdir1', {file-c})
   wrapper->subheaders[2] = register('dir/subdir2', {file-d, file-e})
   return wrapper

This guarantees that __register_sysctl_table will only see a simple
ctl_table array with all entries having (->child == NULL).

Care was taken to pass the original simple ctl_table arrays to
__register_sysctl_table whenever possible.

This change is derived from a similar patch written
by Lucrian Grijincu.
Inspired-by: NLucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

For any component of table passed to __register_sysctl_paths
that actually serves as a path, add that to the cstring path
that is passed to __register_sysctl_table.

The result is that for most calls to __register_sysctl_paths
we only pass a table to __register_sysctl_table that contains
no child directories.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Make __register_sysctl_table the core sysctl registration operation and
make it take a char * string as path.

Now that binary paths have been banished into the real of backwards
compatibility in kernel/binary_sysctl.c where they can be safely
ignored there is no longer a need to use struct ctl_path to represent
path names when registering ctl_tables.

Start the transition to using normal char * strings to represent
pathnames when registering sysctl tables.  Normal strings are easier
to deal with both in the internal sysctl implementation and for
programmers registering sysctl tables.

__register_sysctl_paths is turned into a backwards compatibility wrapper
that converts a ctl_path array into a normal char * string.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Creating local copies of directory names is a good idea for
two reasons.
- The dynamic names used by callers must be copied into new
  strings by the callers today to ensure the strings do not
  change between register and unregister of the sysctl table.

- Sysctl directories have a potentially different lifetime
  than the time between register and unregister of any
  particular sysctl table.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

In sysctl_net register the two networking roots in the proper order.

In register_sysctl walk the sysctl sets in the reverse order of the
sysctl roots.

Remove parent from ctl_table_set and setup_sysctl_set as it is no
longer needed.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

This adds a small helper retire_sysctl_set to remove the intimate knowledge about
the how a sysctl_set is implemented from net/sysct_net.c
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

I goofed when I made sysctl directories have nlink == 0.
nlink == 0 means the directory has been deleted.
nlink == 1 meands a directory does not count subdirectories.

Use the default nlink == 1 for sysctl directories.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Move the core sysctl code from kernel/sysctl.c and kernel/sysctl_check.c
into fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c.

Currently sysctl maintenance is hampered by the sysctl implementation
being split across 3 files with artificial layering between them.
Consolidate the entire sysctl implementation into 1 file so that
it is easier to see what is going on and hopefully allowing for
simpler maintenance.

For functions that are now only used in fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c remove
their declarations from sysctl.h and make them static in fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Simplify the code by treating the base sysctl table like any other
sysctl table and register it with register_sysctl_table.

To ensure this table is registered early enough to avoid problems
call sysctl_init from proc_sys_init.

Rename sysctl_net.c:sysctl_init() to net_sysctl_init() to avoid
name conflicts now that kernel/sysctl.c:sysctl_init() is no longer
static.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Remove checks for conditions that will never happen. If procname is NULL
the loop would already had bailed out, so there's no need to check it
again.

At the same time this also compacts the function find_in_table() by
refactoring it to be easier to read.
Signed-off-by: NLucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
Reviewed-by: NJesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Jüri Aedla reported that the /proc/<pid>/mem handling really isn't very
robust, and it also doesn't match the permission checking of any of the
other related files.

This changes it to do the permission checks at open time, and instead of
tracking the process, it tracks the VM at the time of the open.  That
simplifies the code a lot, but does mean that if you hold the file
descriptor open over an execve(), you'll continue to read from the _old_
VM.

That is different from our previous behavior, but much simpler.  If
somebody actually finds a load where this matters, we'll need to revert
this commit.

I suspect that nobody will ever notice - because the process mapping
addresses will also have changed as part of the execve.  So you cannot
actually usefully access the fd across a VM change simply because all
the offsets for IO would have changed too.
Reported-by: NJüri Aedla <asd@ut.ee>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

At the moment we allow tasks to set their loginuid if they have
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.  In reality we want tasks to set the loginuid when they
log in and it be impossible to ever reset.  We had to make it mutable even
after it was once set (with the CAP) because on update and admin might have
to restart sshd.  Now sshd would get his loginuid and the next user which
logged in using ssh would not be able to set his loginuid.

Systemd has changed how userspace works and allowed us to make the kernel
work the way it should.  With systemd users (even admins) are not supposed
to restart services directly.  The system will restart the service for
them.  Thus since systemd is going to loginuid==-1, sshd would get -1, and
sshd would be allowed to set a new loginuid without special permissions.

If an admin in this system were to manually start an sshd he is inserting
himself into the system chain of trust and thus, logically, it's his
loginuid that should be used!  Since we have old systems I make this a
Kconfig option.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

The function always deals with current.  Don't expose an option
pretending one can use it for something.  You can't.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Commit 3292beb3 ("sched/accounting: Change cpustat fields to an array")
deleted the code which provides us with the sum of all interrupts in the
system, causing vmstat to report zero interrupts occuring in the system.

Fix this by restoring the code.
Signed-off-by: NRussell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Tested-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> # [on ARM]
Tested-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Tested-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Glauber Costa <glommer@parallels.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Tuner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

The mm->start_code/end_code, mm->start_data/end_data, mm->start_brk are
involved into calculation of program text/data segment sizes (which might
be seen in /proc/<pid>/statm) and into brk() call final address.

For restore we need to know all these values.  While
mm->start_code/end_code already present in /proc/$pid/stat, the rest
members are not, so this patch brings them in.

The restore procedure of these members is addressed in another patch using
prctl().
Signed-off-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NKAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

get_proc_task() can fail to search the task and return NULL,
put_task_struct() will then bomb the kernel with following oops:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
  IP: [<ffffffff81217d34>] proc_pid_permission+0x64/0xe0
  PGD 112075067 PUD 112814067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP

This is a regression introduced by commit 0499680a ("procfs: add hidepid=
and gid= mount options").  The kernel should return -ESRCH if
get_proc_task() failed.
Signed-off-by: NXiaotian Feng <dannyfeng@tencent.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Acked-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add support for mount options to restrict access to /proc/PID/
directories.  The default backward-compatible "relaxed" behaviour is left
untouched.

The first mount option is called "hidepid" and its value defines how much
info about processes we want to be available for non-owners:

hidepid=0 (default) means the old behavior - anybody may read all
world-readable /proc/PID/* files.

hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/ directories, but
their own.  Sensitive files like cmdline, sched*, status are now protected
against other users.  As permission checking done in proc_pid_permission()
and files' permissions are left untouched, programs expecting specific
files' modes are not confused.

hidepid=2 means hidepid=1 plus all /proc/PID/ will be invisible to other
users.  It doesn't mean that it hides whether a process exists (it can be
learned by other means, e.g.  by kill -0 $PID), but it hides process' euid
and egid.  It compicates intruder's task of gathering info about running
processes, whether some daemon runs with elevated privileges, whether
another user runs some sensitive program, whether other users run any
program at all, etc.

gid=XXX defines a group that will be able to gather all processes' info
(as in hidepid=0 mode).  This group should be used instead of putting
nonroot user in sudoers file or something.  However, untrusted users (like
daemons, etc.) which are not supposed to monitor the tasks in the whole
system should not be added to the group.

hidepid=1 or higher is designed to restrict access to procfs files, which
might reveal some sensitive private information like precise keystrokes
timings:

http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/05/3

hidepid=1/2 doesn't break monitoring userspace tools.  ps, top, pgrep, and
conky gracefully handle EPERM/ENOENT and behave as if the current user is
the only user running processes.  pstree shows the process subtree which
contains "pstree" process.

Note: the patch doesn't deal with setuid/setgid issues of keeping
preopened descriptors of procfs files (like
https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/7/368).  We rely on that the leaked
information like the scheduling counters of setuid apps doesn't threaten
anybody's privacy - only the user started the setuid program may read the
counters.
Signed-off-by: NVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@MIT.EDU>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add support for procfs mount options.  Actual mount options are coming in
the next patches.
Signed-off-by: NVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@MIT.EDU>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
"vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.

For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/

 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so

This *helps* checkpointing process in three ways:

1. When dumping a task mappings we do know exact file that is mapped
   by particular region.  We do this by opening
   /proc/$pid/map_files/$address symlink the way we do with file
   descriptors.

2. This also helps in determining which anonymous shared mappings are
   shared with each other by comparing the inodes of them.

3. When restoring a set of processes in case two of them has a mapping
   shared, we map the memory by the 1st one and then open its
   /proc/$pid/map_files/$address file and map it by the 2nd task.

Using /proc/$pid/maps for this is quite inconvenient since it brings
repeatable re-reading and reparsing for this text file which slows down
restore procedure significantly.  Also as being pointed in (3) it is a way
easier to use top level shared mapping in children as
/proc/$pid/map_files/$address when needed.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[gorcunov@openvz.org: make map_files depend on CHECKPOINT_RESTORE]
Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: NVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Reviewed-by: N"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Prepare the ground for the next "map_files" patch which needs a name of a
link file to analyse.
Signed-off-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

oom_score_adj is used for guarding processes from OOM-Killer.  One of
problem is that it's inherited at fork().  When a daemon set oom_score_adj
and make children, it's hard to know where the value is set.

This patch adds some tracepoints useful for debugging. This patch adds
3 trace points.
  - creating new task
  - renaming a task (exec)
  - set oom_score_adj

To debug, users need to enable some trace pointer. Maybe filtering is useful as

# EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/task/
# echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_newtask/filter
# echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_rename/filter
# echo 1 > $EVENT/enable
# EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/oom/
# echo 1 > $EVENT/enable

output will be like this.
# grep oom /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace
bash-7699  [007] d..3  5140.744510: oom_score_adj_update: pid=7699 comm=bash oom_score_adj=-1000
bash-7699  [007] ...1  5151.818022: task_newtask: pid=7729 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000
ls-7729  [003] ...2  5151.818504: task_rename: pid=7729 oldcomm=bash newcomm=ls oom_score_adj=-1000
bash-7699  [002] ...1  5175.701468: task_newtask: pid=7730 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000
grep-7730  [007] ...2  5175.701993: task_rename: pid=7730 oldcomm=bash newcomm=grep oom_score_adj=-1000
Signed-off-by: NKAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Reading /proc/pid/stat of another process checks if one has ptrace permissions
on that process.  If one does have permissions it outputs some data about the
process which might have security and attack implications.  If the current
task does not have ptrace permissions the read still works, but those fields
are filled with inocuous (0) values.  Since this check and a subsequent denial
is not a violation of the security policy we should not audit such denials.

This can be quite useful to removing ptrace broadly across a system without
flooding the logs when ps is run or something which harmlessly walks proc.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

[folded fix for missing magic.h from Tetsuo Handa]
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

rationale: that stuff is far tighter bound to fs/namespace.c than to
the guts of procfs proper.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

both proc_dir_entry ->mode and populating functions
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Seeing that just about every destructor got that INIT_LIST_HEAD() copied into
it, there is no point whatsoever keeping this INIT_LIST_HEAD in inode_init_once();
the cost of taking it into inode_init_always() will be negligible for pipes
and sockets and negative for everything else.  Not to mention the removal of
boilerplate code from ->destroy_inode() instances...
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Commit 2a95ea6c ("procfs: do not overflow get_{idle,iowait}_time
for nohz") did not take into account that one some architectures jiffies
and cputime use different units.

This causes get_idle_time() to return numbers in the wrong units, making
the idle time fields in /proc/stat wrong.

Instead of converting the usec value returned by
get_cpu_{idle,iowait}_time_us to units of jiffies, use the new function
usecs_to_cputime64 to convert it to the correct unit of cputime64_t.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "Artem S. Tashkinov" <t.artem@mailcity.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

For 32-bit architectures using standard jiffies the idletime calculation
in uptime_proc_show will quickly overflow. It takes (2^32 / HZ) seconds
of idle-time, or e.g. 12.45 days with no load on a quad-core with HZ=1000.
Switch to 64-bit calculations.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Michael Abbott <michael.abbott@diamond.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>

Make cputime_t and cputime64_t nocast to enable sparse checking to
detect incorrect use of cputime. Drop the cputime macros for simple
scalar operations. The conversion macros are still needed.
Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>

Since commit a25cac51 ("proc: Consider NO_HZ when printing idle and
iowait times") we are reporting idle/io_wait time also while a CPU is
tickless.  We rely on get_{idle,iowait}_time functions to retrieve
proper data.

These functions, however, use usecs_to_cputime to translate micro
seconds time to cputime64_t.  This is just an alias to usecs_to_jiffies
which reduces the data type from u64 to unsigned int and also checks
whether the given parameter overflows jiffies_to_usecs(MAX_JIFFY_OFFSET)
and returns MAX_JIFFY_OFFSET in that case.

When we overflow depends on CONFIG_HZ but especially for CONFIG_HZ_300
it is quite low (1431649781) so we are getting MAX_JIFFY_OFFSET for
>3000s! until we overflow unsigned int.  Just for reference
CONFIG_HZ_100 has an overflow window around 20s, CONFIG_HZ_250 ~8s and
CONFIG_HZ_1000 ~2s.

This results in a bug when people saw [h]top going mad reporting 100%
CPU usage even though there was basically no CPU load.  The reason was
simply that /proc/stat stopped reporting idle/io_wait changes (and
reported MAX_JIFFY_OFFSET) and so the only change happening was for user
system time.

Let's use nsecs_to_jiffies64 instead which doesn't reduce the precision
to 32b type and it is much more appropriate for cumulative time values
(unlike usecs_to_jiffies which intended for timeout calculations).
Signed-off-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Tested-by: NArtem S. Tashkinov <t.artem@mailcity.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fix the error message "directives may not be used inside a macro argument"
which appears when the kernel is compiled for the cris architecture.
Signed-off-by: NClaudio Scordino <claudio@evidence.eu.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

kern_mount() doesn't pair with plain mntput()...
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

This patch changes fields in cpustat from a structure, to an
u64 array. Math gets easier, and the code is more flexible.
Signed-off-by: NGlauber Costa <glommer@parallels.com>
Reviewed-by: NKAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Tuner <pjt@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1322498719-2255-2-git-send-email-glommer@parallels.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>