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  1. 10 2月, 2019 2 次提交
    • C
      ipmi: Fix SSIF flag requests · a1466ec5
      由 Corey Minyard 提交于 
      Commit 89986496 ("ipmi: Turn off all activity on an idle ipmi
interface") modified the IPMI code to only request events when the
driver had somethine waiting for events.  The SSIF code, however,
was using the event fetch request to also fetch the flags.

Add a timer and the proper handling for the upper layer telling
whether flags fetches are required.
Reported-by: NKamlakant Patel <Kamlakant.Patel@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: NCorey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Tested-by: NKamlakant Patel <kamlakant.patel@cavium.com>
      a1466ec5
    • Y
      ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name · 401e7e88
      由 Yang Yingliang 提交于 
      When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports

[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383]   ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385]   Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390]   CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G            E     5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068]  string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071]  vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517]  seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009]  seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530]  r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558]  seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877]  proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346]  __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564]  vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339]  ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939]  __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077]  el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035]  el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757]  el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!

If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.

Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.

Fixes: 93c303d2 ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NNuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: NCorey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCorey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
      401e7e88
  3. 24 1月, 2019 5 次提交
    • C
      ipmi: Don't initialize anything in the core until something uses it · 913a89f0
      由 Corey Minyard 提交于 
      The IPMI driver was recently modified to use SRCU, but it turns out
this uses a chunk of percpu memory, even if IPMI is never used.

So modify thing to on initialize on the first use.  There was already
code to sort of handle this for handling init races, so piggy back
on top of that, and simplify it in the process.
Signed-off-by: NCorey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Reported-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
      913a89f0
    • Y
      ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda · 77f82696
      由 Yang Yingliang 提交于 
      When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
	service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done

---------------------------------------------------------------
[  294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[  294.230188] Mem abort info:
[  294.230190]   ESR = 0x96000004
[  294.230191]   Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[  294.230193]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[  294.230194]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[  294.230195] Data abort info:
[  294.230196]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[  294.230197]   CM = 0, WnR = 0
[  294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[  294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[  294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[  294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[  294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[  294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[  294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[  294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[  294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[  294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[  294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[  294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[  294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[  294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[  294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[  294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[  294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[  294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[  294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[  294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[  294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[  294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[  294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[  294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[  294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[  294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[  294.398791] Call trace:
[  294.401266]  __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[  294.405154]  acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[  294.410716]  deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[  294.416189]  deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[  294.422193]  handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[  294.432050]  handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[  294.441984]  smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[  294.451618]  tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[  294.460661]  tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[  294.468191]  __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[  294.475561]  irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[  294.482445]  __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[  294.489954]  gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[  294.497037]  el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[  294.503381]  arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[  294.510096]  do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[  294.516322]  cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[  294.523230]  secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[  294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[  294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[  294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[  294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[  294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[  294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[  294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[  294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[  294.594314] Bye!

Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.

Fixes: e86ee2d4 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NCorey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
      77f82696
    • F
      ipmi: Prevent use-after-free in deliver_response · 479d6b39
      由 Fred Klassen 提交于 
      Some IPMI modules (e.g. ibmpex_msg_handler()) will have ipmi_usr_hdlr
handlers that call ipmi_free_recv_msg() directly. This will essentially
kfree(msg), leading to use-after-free.

This does not happen in the ipmi_devintf module, which will queue the
message and run ipmi_free_recv_msg() later.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in deliver_response+0x12f/0x1b0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888a7bf20018 by task ksoftirqd/3/27
CPU: 3 PID: 27 Comm: ksoftirqd/3 Tainted: G           O      4.19.11-amd64-ani99-debug #12.0.1.601133+pv
Hardware name: AppNeta r1000/X11SPW-TF, BIOS 2.1a-AP 09/17/2018
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x92/0xeb
print_address_description+0x73/0x290
kasan_report+0x258/0x380
deliver_response+0x12f/0x1b0
? ipmi_free_recv_msg+0x50/0x50
deliver_local_response+0xe/0x50
handle_one_recv_msg+0x37a/0x21d0
handle_new_recv_msgs+0x1ce/0x440
...

Allocated by task 9885:
kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x116/0x290
ipmi_alloc_recv_msg+0x28/0x70
i_ipmi_request+0xb4a/0x1640
ipmi_request_settime+0x1b8/0x1e0
...

Freed by task 27:
__kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180
kfree+0xe9/0x280
deliver_response+0x122/0x1b0
deliver_local_response+0xe/0x50
handle_one_recv_msg+0x37a/0x21d0
handle_new_recv_msgs+0x1ce/0x440
tasklet_action_common.isra.19+0xc4/0x250
__do_softirq+0x11f/0x51f

Fixes: e86ee2d4 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: NFred Klassen <fklassen@appneta.com>
Signed-off-by: NCorey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
      479d6b39
    • G
      ipmi: msghandler: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities · a7102c74
      由 Gustavo A. R. Silva 提交于 
      channel and addr->channel are indirectly controlled by user-space,
hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1
vulnerability.

These issues were detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1381 ipmi_set_my_address() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [w] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1401 ipmi_get_my_address() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1421 ipmi_set_my_LUN() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [w] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1441 ipmi_get_my_LUN() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:2260 check_addr() warn: potential spectre issue 'intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing channel and addr->channel before using them to
index user->intf->addrinfo and intf->addrinfo, correspondingly.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: NCorey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
      a7102c74
    • C
      ipmi:ssif: Fix handling of multi-part return messages · 7d6380cd
      由 Corey Minyard 提交于 
      The block number was not being compared right, it was off by one
when checking the response.

Some statistics wouldn't be incremented properly in some cases.

Check to see if that middle-part messages always have 31 bytes of
data.
Signed-off-by: NCorey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4
      7d6380cd
  5. 18 1月, 2019 1 次提交
  7. 04 1月, 2019 1 次提交
    • L
      Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function · 96d4f267
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.

It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access.  But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.

A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model.  And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.

This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.

There were a couple of notable cases:

 - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.

 - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
   values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
   really used it)

 - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout

but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.

I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something.  Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      96d4f267
  9. 29 12月, 2018 1 次提交
  11. 19 12月, 2018 6 次提交
  13. 17 12月, 2018 1 次提交
    • T
      tpm: add support for partial reads · 9488585b
      由 Tadeusz Struk 提交于 
      Currently to read a response from the TPM device an application needs
provide big enough buffer for the whole response and read it in one go.
The application doesn't know how big the response it beforehand so it
always needs to maintain a 4K buffer and read the max (4K).
In case if the user of the TSS library doesn't provide big enough
buffer the TCTI spec says that the library should set the required
size and return TSS2_TCTI_RC_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER error code so that the
application could allocate a bigger buffer and call receive again.
To make it possible in the TSS library, this requires being able to do
partial reads from the driver.
The library would read the 10 bytes header first to get the actual size
of the response from the header, and then read the rest of the response.

This patch adds support for partial reads, i.e. the user can read the
response in one or multiple reads, until the whole response is consumed.
The user can also read only part of the response and ignore
the rest by issuing a new write to send a new command.
Signed-off-by: NTadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
      9488585b
  15. 11 12月, 2018 1 次提交
  17. 06 12月, 2018 1 次提交
  19. 28 11月, 2018 1 次提交
  21. 27 11月, 2018 6 次提交
  23. 20 11月, 2018 1 次提交
    • E
      crypto: chacha20-generic - refactor to allow varying number of rounds · 1ca1b917
      由 Eric Biggers 提交于 
      In preparation for adding XChaCha12 support, rename/refactor
chacha20-generic to support different numbers of rounds.  The
justification for needing XChaCha12 support is explained in more detail
in the patch "crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support".

The only difference between ChaCha{8,12,20} are the number of rounds
itself; all other parts of the algorithm are the same.  Therefore,
remove the "20" from all definitions, structures, functions, files, etc.
that will be shared by all ChaCha versions.

Also make ->setkey() store the round count in the chacha_ctx (previously
chacha20_ctx).  The generic code then passes the round count through to
chacha_block().  There will be a ->setkey() function for each explicitly
allowed round count; the encrypt/decrypt functions will be the same.  I
decided not to do it the opposite way (same ->setkey() function for all
round counts, with different encrypt/decrypt functions) because that
would have required more boilerplate code in architecture-specific
implementations of ChaCha and XChaCha.
Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: NMartin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      1ca1b917
  25. 16 11月, 2018 1 次提交
  27. 13 11月, 2018 12 次提交