- 22 10月, 2019 8 次提交
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由 Nicholas Piggin 提交于
Acked-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: NNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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由 Greg Kurz 提交于
Add a new attribute to both XIVE and XICS-on-XIVE KVM devices so that userspace can tell how many interrupt servers it needs. If a VM needs less than the current default of KVM_MAX_VCPUS (2048), we can allocate less VPs in OPAL. Combined with a core stride (VSMT) that matches the number of guest threads per core, this may substantially increases the number of VMs that can run concurrently with an in-kernel XIVE device. Since the legacy XIVE KVM device is exposed to userspace through the XICS KVM API, a new attribute group is added to it for this purpose. While here, fix the syntax of the existing KVM_DEV_XICS_GRP_SOURCES in the XICS documentation. Signed-off-by: NGreg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: NCédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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由 Greg Kurz 提交于
The XIVE VP is an internal structure which allow the XIVE interrupt controller to maintain the interrupt context state of vCPUs non dispatched on HW threads. When a guest is started, the XIVE KVM device allocates a block of XIVE VPs in OPAL, enough to accommodate the highest possible vCPU id KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID (16384) packed down to KVM_MAX_VCPUS (2048). With a guest's core stride of 8 and a threading mode of 1 (QEMU's default), a VM must run at least 256 vCPUs to actually need such a range of VPs. A POWER9 system has a limited XIVE VP space : 512k and KVM is currently wasting this HW resource with large VP allocations, especially since a typical VM likely runs with a lot less vCPUs. Make the size of the VP block configurable. Add an nr_servers field to the XIVE structure and a function to set it for this purpose. Split VP allocation out of the device create function. Since the VP block isn't used before the first vCPU connects to the XIVE KVM device, allocation is now performed by kvmppc_xive_connect_vcpu(). This gives the opportunity to set nr_servers in between: kvmppc_xive_create() / kvmppc_xive_native_create() . . kvmppc_xive_set_nr_servers() . . kvmppc_xive_connect_vcpu() / kvmppc_xive_native_connect_vcpu() The connect_vcpu() functions check that the vCPU id is below nr_servers and if it is the first vCPU they allocate the VP block. This is protected against a concurrent update of nr_servers by kvmppc_xive_set_nr_servers() with the xive->lock mutex. Also, the block is allocated once for the device lifetime: nr_servers should stay constant otherwise connect_vcpu() could generate a boggus VP id and likely crash OPAL. It is thus forbidden to update nr_servers once the block is allocated. If the VP allocation fail, return ENOSPC which seems more appropriate to report the depletion of system wide HW resource than ENOMEM or ENXIO. A VM using a stride of 8 and 1 thread per core with 32 vCPUs would hence only need 256 VPs instead of 2048. If the stride is set to match the number of threads per core, this goes further down to 32. This will be exposed to userspace by a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: NGreg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: NCédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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由 Greg Kurz 提交于
Reduce code duplication by consolidating the checking of vCPU ids and VP ids to a common helper used by both legacy and native XIVE KVM devices. And explain the magic with a comment. Signed-off-by: NGreg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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由 Greg Kurz 提交于
Print out the VP id of each connected vCPU, this allow to see: - the VP block base in which OPAL encodes information that may be useful when debugging - the packed vCPU id which may differ from the raw vCPU id if the latter is >= KVM_MAX_VCPUS (2048) Signed-off-by: NGreg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: NCédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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由 Greg Kurz 提交于
If we cannot allocate the XIVE VPs in OPAL, the creation of a XIVE or XICS-on-XIVE device is aborted as expected, but we leave kvm->arch.xive set forever since the release method isn't called in this case. Any subsequent tentative to create a XIVE or XICS-on-XIVE for this VM will thus always fail (DoS). This is a problem for QEMU since it destroys and re-creates these devices when the VM is reset: the VM would be restricted to using the much slower emulated XIVE or XICS forever. As an alternative to adding rollback, do not assign kvm->arch.xive before making sure the XIVE VPs are allocated in OPAL. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2 Fixes: 5422e951 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Replace the 'destroy' method by a 'release' method") Signed-off-by: NGreg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: NCédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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由 Leonardo Bras 提交于
Given that in kvm_create_vm() there is: kvm->mm = current->mm; And that on every kvm_*_ioctl we have: if (kvm->mm != current->mm) return -EIO; I see no reason to keep using current->mm instead of kvm->mm. By doing so, we would reduce the use of 'global' variables on code, relying more in the contents of kvm struct. Signed-off-by: NLeonardo Bras <leonardo@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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由 Leonardo Bras 提交于
Reduces the number of calls to get_current() in order to get the value of current->mm by doing it once and storing the value, since it is not supposed to change inside the same process). Signed-off-by: NLeonardo Bras <leonardo@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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- 21 10月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Fabiano Rosas 提交于
When calling the KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG ioctl, userspace might request the next instruction to be single stepped via the KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP control bit of the kvm_guest_debug structure. This patch adds the KVM_CAP_PPC_GUEST_DEBUG_SSTEP capability in order to inform userspace about the state of single stepping support. We currently don't have support for guest single stepping implemented in Book3S HV so the capability is only present for Book3S PR and BookE. Signed-off-by: NFabiano Rosas <farosas@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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- 15 10月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Greg Kurz 提交于
Connecting a vCPU to a XIVE KVM device means establishing a 1:1 association between a vCPU id and the offset (VP id) of a VP structure within a fixed size block of VPs. We currently try to enforce the 1:1 relationship by checking that a vCPU with the same id isn't already connected. This is good but unfortunately not enough because we don't map VP ids to raw vCPU ids but to packed vCPU ids, and the packing function kvmppc_pack_vcpu_id() isn't bijective by design. We got away with it because QEMU passes vCPU ids that fit well in the packing pattern. But nothing prevents userspace to come up with a forged vCPU id resulting in a packed id collision which causes the KVM device to associate two vCPUs to the same VP. This greatly confuses the irq layer and ultimately crashes the kernel, as shown below. Example: a guest with 1 guest thread per core, a core stride of 8 and 300 vCPUs has vCPU ids 0,8,16...2392. If QEMU is patched to inject at some point an invalid vCPU id 348, which is the packed version of itself and 2392, we get: genirq: Flags mismatch irq 199. 00010000 (kvm-2-2392) vs. 00010000 (kvm-2-348) CPU: 24 PID: 88176 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Not tainted 5.3.0-xive-nr-servers-5.3-gku+ #38 Call Trace: [c000003f7f9937e0] [c000000000c0110c] dump_stack+0xb0/0xf4 (unreliable) [c000003f7f993820] [c0000000001cb480] __setup_irq+0xa70/0xad0 [c000003f7f9938d0] [c0000000001cb75c] request_threaded_irq+0x13c/0x260 [c000003f7f993940] [c00800000d44e7ac] kvmppc_xive_attach_escalation+0x104/0x270 [kvm] [c000003f7f9939d0] [c00800000d45013c] kvmppc_xive_connect_vcpu+0x424/0x620 [kvm] [c000003f7f993ac0] [c00800000d444428] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x260/0x448 [kvm] [c000003f7f993b90] [c00800000d43593c] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x154/0x7c8 [kvm] [c000003f7f993d00] [c0000000004840f0] do_vfs_ioctl+0xe0/0xc30 [c000003f7f993db0] [c000000000484d44] ksys_ioctl+0x104/0x120 [c000003f7f993e00] [c000000000484d88] sys_ioctl+0x28/0x80 [c000003f7f993e20] [c00000000000b278] system_call+0x5c/0x68 xive-kvm: Failed to request escalation interrupt for queue 0 of VCPU 2392 ------------[ cut here ]------------ remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'irq/199', leaking at least 'kvm-2-348' WARNING: CPU: 24 PID: 88176 at /home/greg/Work/linux/kernel-kvm-ppc/fs/proc/generic.c:684 remove_proc_entry+0x1ec/0x200 Modules linked in: kvm_hv kvm dm_mod vhost_net vhost tap xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle xt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat nf_nat xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter squashfs loop fuse i2c_dev sg ofpart ocxl powernv_flash at24 xts mtd uio_pdrv_genirq vmx_crypto opal_prd ipmi_powernv uio ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ibmpowernv ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 linear sd_mod ast i2c_algo_bit drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm ahci libahci libata tg3 drm_panel_orientation_quirks [last unloaded: kvm] CPU: 24 PID: 88176 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Not tainted 5.3.0-xive-nr-servers-5.3-gku+ #38 NIP: c00000000053b0cc LR: c00000000053b0c8 CTR: c0000000000ba3b0 REGS: c000003f7f9934b0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.3.0-xive-nr-servers-5.3-gku+) MSR: 9000000000029033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48228222 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c000000000131a50 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c00000000053b0c8 c000003f7f993740 c0000000015ec500 0000000000000057 GPR04: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 000049fb98484262 0000000000001bcf GPR08: 0000000000000007 0000000000000007 0000000000000001 9000000000001033 GPR12: 0000000000008000 c000003ffffeb800 0000000000000000 000000012f4ce5a1 GPR16: 000000012ef5a0c8 0000000000000000 000000012f113bb0 0000000000000000 GPR20: 000000012f45d918 c000003f863758b0 c000003f86375870 0000000000000006 GPR24: c000003f86375a30 0000000000000007 c0002039373d9020 c0000000014c4a48 GPR28: 0000000000000001 c000003fe62a4f6b c00020394b2e9fab c000003fe62a4ec0 NIP [c00000000053b0cc] remove_proc_entry+0x1ec/0x200 LR [c00000000053b0c8] remove_proc_entry+0x1e8/0x200 Call Trace: [c000003f7f993740] [c00000000053b0c8] remove_proc_entry+0x1e8/0x200 (unreliable) [c000003f7f9937e0] [c0000000001d3654] unregister_irq_proc+0x114/0x150 [c000003f7f993880] [c0000000001c6284] free_desc+0x54/0xb0 [c000003f7f9938c0] [c0000000001c65ec] irq_free_descs+0xac/0x100 [c000003f7f993910] [c0000000001d1ff8] irq_dispose_mapping+0x68/0x80 [c000003f7f993940] [c00800000d44e8a4] kvmppc_xive_attach_escalation+0x1fc/0x270 [kvm] [c000003f7f9939d0] [c00800000d45013c] kvmppc_xive_connect_vcpu+0x424/0x620 [kvm] [c000003f7f993ac0] [c00800000d444428] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x260/0x448 [kvm] [c000003f7f993b90] [c00800000d43593c] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x154/0x7c8 [kvm] [c000003f7f993d00] [c0000000004840f0] do_vfs_ioctl+0xe0/0xc30 [c000003f7f993db0] [c000000000484d44] ksys_ioctl+0x104/0x120 [c000003f7f993e00] [c000000000484d88] sys_ioctl+0x28/0x80 [c000003f7f993e20] [c00000000000b278] system_call+0x5c/0x68 Instruction dump: 2c230000 41820008 3923ff78 e8e900a0 3c82ff69 3c62ff8d 7fa6eb78 7fc5f378 3884f080 3863b948 4bbf6925 60000000 <0fe00000> 4bffff7c fba10088 4bbf6e41 ---[ end trace b925b67a74a1d8d1 ]--- BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000010 Faulting instruction address: 0xc00800000d44fc04 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV Modules linked in: kvm_hv kvm dm_mod vhost_net vhost tap xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle xt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat nf_nat xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter squashfs loop fuse i2c_dev sg ofpart ocxl powernv_flash at24 xts mtd uio_pdrv_genirq vmx_crypto opal_prd ipmi_powernv uio ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ibmpowernv ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 linear sd_mod ast i2c_algo_bit drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm ahci libahci libata tg3 drm_panel_orientation_quirks [last unloaded: kvm] CPU: 24 PID: 88176 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Tainted: G W 5.3.0-xive-nr-servers-5.3-gku+ #38 NIP: c00800000d44fc04 LR: c00800000d44fc00 CTR: c0000000001cd970 REGS: c000003f7f9938e0 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G W (5.3.0-xive-nr-servers-5.3-gku+) MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24228882 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c0000000001cd9ac DAR: 0000000000000010 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c00800000d44fc00 c000003f7f993b70 c00800000d468300 0000000000000000 GPR04: 00000000000000c7 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000003ffacd06d8 GPR08: 0000000000000000 c000003ffacd0738 0000000000000000 fffffffffffffffd GPR12: 0000000000000040 c000003ffffeb800 0000000000000000 000000012f4ce5a1 GPR16: 000000012ef5a0c8 0000000000000000 000000012f113bb0 0000000000000000 GPR20: 000000012f45d918 00007ffffe0d9a80 000000012f4f5df0 000000012ef8c9f8 GPR24: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 c000003fe4501ed0 c000003f8b1d0000 GPR28: c0000033314689c0 c000003fe4501c00 c000003fe4501e70 c000003fe4501e90 NIP [c00800000d44fc04] kvmppc_xive_cleanup_vcpu+0xfc/0x210 [kvm] LR [c00800000d44fc00] kvmppc_xive_cleanup_vcpu+0xf8/0x210 [kvm] Call Trace: [c000003f7f993b70] [c00800000d44fc00] kvmppc_xive_cleanup_vcpu+0xf8/0x210 [kvm] (unreliable) [c000003f7f993bd0] [c00800000d450bd4] kvmppc_xive_release+0xdc/0x1b0 [kvm] [c000003f7f993c30] [c00800000d436a98] kvm_device_release+0xb0/0x110 [kvm] [c000003f7f993c70] [c00000000046730c] __fput+0xec/0x320 [c000003f7f993cd0] [c000000000164ae0] task_work_run+0x150/0x1c0 [c000003f7f993d30] [c000000000025034] do_notify_resume+0x304/0x440 [c000003f7f993e20] [c00000000000dcc4] ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74 Instruction dump: 3bff0008 7fbfd040 419e0054 847e0004 2fa30000 419effec e93d0000 8929203c 2f890000 419effb8 4800821d e8410018 <e9230010> e9490008 9b2a0039 7c0004ac ---[ end trace b925b67a74a1d8d2 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception This affects both XIVE and XICS-on-XIVE devices since the beginning. Check the VP id instead of the vCPU id when a new vCPU is connected. The allocation of the XIVE CPU structure in kvmppc_xive_connect_vcpu() is moved after the check to avoid the need for rollback. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: NGreg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: NCédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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- 12 10月, 2019 8 次提交
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
Tiger Lake is the followon to Ice Lake. From the perspective of Intel cstate residency counters, there is nothing changed compared with Ice Lake. Share icl_cstates with Ice Lake. Update the comments for Tiger Lake. The External Design Specification (EDS) is not published yet. It comes from an authoritative internal source. The patch has been tested on real hardware. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-10-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
Tiger Lake is the followon to Ice Lake. PPERF and SMI_COUNT MSRs are also supported. The External Design Specification (EDS) is not published yet. It comes from an authoritative internal source. The patch has been tested on real hardware. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-9-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
Tiger Lake is the followon to Ice Lake. From the perspective of Intel core PMU, there is little changes compared with Ice Lake, e.g. small changes in event list. But it doesn't impact on core PMU functionality. Share the perf code with Ice Lake. The event list patch will be submitted later separately. The patch has been tested on real hardware. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-8-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
There is no Core C3 C-State counter for Ice Lake. Package C8/C9/C10 C-State counters are added for Ice Lake. Introduce a new event list, icl_cstates, for Ice Lake. Update the comments accordingly. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: f08c47d1 ("perf/x86/intel/cstate: Add Icelake support") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-7-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
PPERF and SMI_COUNT MSRs are also supported by Ice Lake desktop and server. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-6-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
Comet Lake is the new 10th Gen Intel processor. From the perspective of Intel cstate residency counters, there is nothing changed compared with Kaby Lake. Share hswult_cstates with Kaby Lake. Update the comments for Comet Lake. Kaby Lake is missed in the comments for some Residency Counters. Update the comments for Kaby Lake as well. The External Design Specification (EDS) is not published yet. It comes from an authoritative internal source. The patch has been tested on real hardware. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-5-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
Comet Lake is the new 10th Gen Intel processor. PPERF and SMI_COUNT MSRs are also supported. The External Design Specification (EDS) is not published yet. It comes from an authoritative internal source. The patch has been tested on real hardware. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-4-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
Comet Lake is the new 10th Gen Intel processor. From the perspective of Intel PMU, there is nothing changed compared with Sky Lake. Share the perf code with Sky Lake. The patch has been tested on real hardware. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-3-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 11 10月, 2019 4 次提交
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由 Christian Borntraeger 提交于
Depending on inlining decisions by the compiler, __get/put_user_fn might become out of line. Then the compiler is no longer able to tell that size can only be 1,2,4 or 8 due to the check in __get/put_user resulting in false positives like ./arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h: In function ‘__put_user_fn’: ./arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h:113:9: warning: ‘rc’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] 113 | return rc; | ^~ ./arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h: In function ‘__get_user_fn’: ./arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h:143:9: warning: ‘rc’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] 143 | return rc; | ^~ These functions are supposed to be always inlined. Mark it as such. Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NVasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
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由 Emmanuel Nicolet 提交于
The spu_fs_context was not set in fc->fs_private, this caused a crash when accessing ctx->mode in spufs_create_root(). Fixes: d2e0981c ("vfs: Convert spufs to use the new mount API") Signed-off-by: NEmmanuel Nicolet <emmanuel.nicolet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Acked-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191008141342.GA266797@gmail.com
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由 Paul Burton 提交于
GCC 9.x automatically enables support for Loongson MMI instructions when using some -march= flags, and then errors out when -msoft-float is specified with: cc1: error: ‘-mloongson-mmi’ must be used with ‘-mhard-float’ The kernel shouldn't be using these MMI instructions anyway, just as it doesn't use floating point instructions. Explicitly disable them in order to fix the build with GCC 9.x. Signed-off-by: NPaul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Fixes: 3702bba5 ("MIPS: Loongson: Add GCC 4.4 support for Loongson2E") Fixes: 6f7a251a ("MIPS: Loongson: Add basic Loongson 2F support") Fixes: 5188129b ("MIPS: Loongson-3: Improve -march option and move it to Platform") Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com> Cc: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.32+ Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
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由 Jiaxun Yang 提交于
A Golang developer reported MIPS hwcap isn't reflecting instructions that the processor actually supported so programs can't apply optimized code at runtime. Thus we export the ASEs that can be used in userspace programs. Reported-by: NMeng Zhuo <mengzhuo1203@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NJiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com> Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: NPaul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
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- 10 10月, 2019 3 次提交
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由 Valentin Schneider 提交于
Since the enabling and disabling of IRQs within preempt_schedule_irq() is contained in a need_resched() loop, we don't need the outer arch code loop. Reviewed-by: NPalmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Signed-off-by: NValentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: NPaul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
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由 Thomas Bogendoerfer 提交于
Use ARRAY_SIZE to caluculate the top of the o32 stack. Signed-off-by: NThomas Bogendoerfer <tbogendoerfer@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NPaul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
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由 Thomas Bogendoerfer 提交于
Commit ac7c3e4f ("compiler: enable CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING forcibly") allows compiler to uninline functions marked as 'inline'. In cace of __xchg this would cause to reference function __xchg_called_with_bad_pointer, which is an error case for catching bugs and will not happen for correct code, if __xchg is inlined. Signed-off-by: NThomas Bogendoerfer <tbogendoerfer@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NPhilippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org> Signed-off-by: NPaul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
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- 09 10月, 2019 5 次提交
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由 Tom Lendacky 提交于
It turns out that the NMI latency workaround from commit: 6d3edaae ("x86/perf/amd: Resolve NMI latency issues for active PMCs") ends up being too conservative and results in the perf NMI handler claiming NMIs too easily on AMD hardware when the NMI watchdog is active. This has an impact, for example, on the hpwdt (HPE watchdog timer) module. This module can produce an NMI that is used to reset the system. It registers an NMI handler for the NMI_UNKNOWN type and relies on the fact that nothing has claimed an NMI so that its handler will be invoked when the watchdog device produces an NMI. After the referenced commit, the hpwdt module is unable to process its generated NMI if the NMI watchdog is active, because the current NMI latency mitigation results in the NMI being claimed by the perf NMI handler. Update the AMD perf NMI latency mitigation workaround to, instead, use a window of time. Whenever a PMC is handled in the perf NMI handler, set a timestamp which will act as a perf NMI window. Any NMIs arriving within that window will be claimed by perf. Anything outside that window will not be claimed by perf. The value for the NMI window is set to 100 msecs. This is a conservative value that easily covers any NMI latency in the hardware. While this still results in a window in which the hpwdt module will not receive its NMI, the window is now much, much smaller. Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hpe.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: 6d3edaae ("x86/perf/amd: Resolve NMI latency issues for active PMCs") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Message-ID: Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Jordan Niethe 提交于
kvmhv_switch_to_host() in arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S needs to set kvmppc_vcore->in_guest to 0 to signal secondary CPUs to continue. This happens after resetting the PCR. Before commit 13c7bb3c ("powerpc/64s: Set reserved PCR bits"), r0 would always be 0 before it was stored to kvmppc_vcore->in_guest. However because of this change in the commit: /* Reset PCR */ ld r0, VCORE_PCR(r5) - cmpdi r0, 0 + LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r6, PCR_MASK) + cmpld r0, r6 beq 18f - li r0, 0 - mtspr SPRN_PCR, r0 + mtspr SPRN_PCR, r6 18: /* Signal secondary CPUs to continue */ stb r0,VCORE_IN_GUEST(r5) We are no longer comparing r0 against 0 and loading it with 0 if it contains something else. Hence when we store r0 to kvmppc_vcore->in_guest, it might not be 0. This means that secondary CPUs will not be signalled to continue. Those CPUs get stuck and errors like the following are logged: KVM: CPU 1 seems to be stuck KVM: CPU 2 seems to be stuck KVM: CPU 3 seems to be stuck KVM: CPU 4 seems to be stuck KVM: CPU 5 seems to be stuck KVM: CPU 6 seems to be stuck KVM: CPU 7 seems to be stuck This can be reproduced with: $ for i in `seq 1 7` ; do chcpu -d $i ; done ; $ taskset -c 0 qemu-system-ppc64 -smp 8,threads=8 \ -M pseries,accel=kvm,kvm-type=HV -m 1G -nographic -vga none \ -kernel vmlinux -initrd initrd.cpio.xz Fix by making sure r0 is 0 before storing it to kvmppc_vcore->in_guest. Fixes: 13c7bb3c ("powerpc/64s: Set reserved PCR bits") Reported-by: NAlexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by: NJordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NAlistair Popple <alistair@popple.id.au> Tested-by: NAlexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191004025317.19340-1-jniethe5@gmail.com
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由 Laurent Dufour 提交于
Since commit 1211ee61 ("powerpc/pseries: Read TLB Block Invalidate Characteristics"), a warning message is displayed when booting a guest on top of KVM: lpar: arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lpar.c pseries_lpar_read_hblkrm_characteristics Error calling get-system-parameter (0xfffffffd) This message is displayed because this hypervisor is not supporting the H_BLOCK_REMOVE hcall and thus is not exposing the corresponding feature. Reading the TLB Block Invalidate Characteristics should not be done if the feature is not exposed. Fixes: 1211ee61 ("powerpc/pseries: Read TLB Block Invalidate Characteristics") Reported-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: NLaurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191001132928.72555-1-ldufour@linux.ibm.com
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由 Stephen Rothwell 提交于
After merging the powerpc tree, today's linux-next build (powerpc64 allnoconfig) failed like this: arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/pgtable.c:216:3: error: implicit declaration of function 'radix__flush_all_lpid_guest' radix__flush_all_lpid_guest() is only declared for CONFIG_PPC_RADIX_MMU which is not set for this build. Fix it by adding an empty version for the RADIX_MMU=n case, which should never be called. Fixes: 99161de3 ("powerpc/64s/radix: tidy up TLB flushing code") Signed-off-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> [mpe: Munge change log] Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190930101342.36c1afa0@canb.auug.org.au
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
Comet Lake is the new 10th Gen Intel processor. Add two new CPU model numbers to the Intel family list. The CPU model numbers are not published in the SDM yet but they come from an authoritative internal source. [ bp: Touch up commit message. ] Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-2-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
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- 08 10月, 2019 9 次提交
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由 Yunfeng Ye 提交于
There are no return value checking when using kzalloc() and kcalloc() for memory allocation. so add it. Signed-off-by: NYunfeng Ye <yeyunfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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由 Sami Tolvanen 提交于
LLVM's assembler doesn't accept the short form INL instruction: inl (%%dx) but instead insists on the output register to be explicitly specified: <inline asm>:1:7: error: invalid operand for instruction inl (%dx) ^ LLVM ERROR: Error parsing inline asm Use the full form of the instruction to fix the build. Signed-off-by: NSami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NNick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: NThomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: "VMware, Inc." <pv-drivers@vmware.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/734 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191007192129.104336-1-samitolvanen@google.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Janakarajan Natarajan 提交于
As per "AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 3: General-Purpose and System Instructions", MWAITX EAX[7:4]+1 specifies the optional hint of the optimized C-state. For C0 state, EAX[7:4] should be set to 0xf. Currently, a value of 0xf is set for EAX[3:0] instead of EAX[7:4]. Fix this by changing MWAITX_DISABLE_CSTATES from 0xf to 0xf0. This hasn't had any implications so far because setting reserved bits in EAX is simply ignored by the CPU. [ bp: Fixup comment in delay_mwaitx() and massage. ] Signed-off-by: NJanakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191007190011.4859-1-Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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由 Boris Ostrovsky 提交于
Currently execution of panic() continues until Xen's panic notifier (xen_panic_event()) is called at which point we make a hypercall that never returns. This means that any notifier that is supposed to be called later as well as significant part of panic() code (such as pstore writes from kmsg_dump()) is never executed. There is no reason for xen_panic_event() to be this last point in execution since panic()'s emergency_restart() will call into xen_emergency_restart() from where we can perform our hypercall. Nevertheless, we will provide xen_legacy_crash boot option that will preserve original behavior during crash. This option could be used, for example, if running kernel dumper (which happens after panic notifiers) is undesirable. Reported-by: NJames Dingwall <james@dingwall.me.uk> Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
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由 Vincent Chen 提交于
For the kernel space, all ebreak instructions are determined at compile time because the kernel space debugging module is currently unsupported. Hence, it should be treated as a bug if an ebreak instruction which does not belong to BUG_TRAP_TYPE_WARN or BUG_TRAP_TYPE_BUG is executed in kernel space. For the userspace, debugging module or user problem may intentionally insert an ebreak instruction to trigger a SIGTRAP signal. To approach the above two situations, the do_trap_break() will direct the BUG_TRAP_TYPE_NONE ebreak exception issued in kernel space to die() and will send a SIGTRAP to the trapped process only when the ebreak is in userspace. Signed-off-by: NVincent Chen <vincent.chen@sifive.com> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> [paul.walmsley@sifive.com: fixed checkpatch issue] Signed-off-by: NPaul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
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由 Vincent Chen 提交于
On RISC-V, when the kernel runs code on behalf of a user thread, and the kernel executes a WARN() or WARN_ON(), the user thread will be sent a bogus SIGTRAP. Fix the RISC-V kernel code to not send a SIGTRAP when a WARN()/WARN_ON() is executed. Signed-off-by: NVincent Chen <vincent.chen@sifive.com> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> [paul.walmsley@sifive.com: fixed subject] Signed-off-by: NPaul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
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由 Vincent Chen 提交于
When the CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG is disabled by disabling CONFIG_BUG, if a kernel thread is trapped by BUG(), the whole system will be in the loop that infinitely handles the ebreak exception instead of entering the die function. To fix this problem, the do_trap_break() will always call the die() to deal with the break exception as the type of break is BUG_TRAP_TYPE_BUG. Signed-off-by: NVincent Chen <vincent.chen@sifive.com> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NPaul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
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由 Linus Torvalds 提交于
In commit 9f79b78e ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()") I made filldir() use unsafe_put_user(), which improves code generation on x86 enormously. But because we didn't have a "unsafe_copy_to_user()", the dirent name copy was also done by hand with unsafe_put_user() in a loop, and it turns out that a lot of other architectures didn't like that, because unlike x86, they have various alignment issues. Most non-x86 architectures trap and fix it up, and some (like xtensa) will just fail unaligned put_user() accesses unconditionally. Which makes that "copy using put_user() in a loop" not work for them at all. I could make that code do explicit alignment etc, but the architectures that don't like unaligned accesses also don't really use the fancy "user_access_begin/end()" model, so they might just use the regular old __copy_to_user() interface. So this commit takes that looping implementation, turns it into the x86 version of "unsafe_copy_to_user()", and makes other architectures implement the unsafe copy version as __copy_to_user() (the same way they do for the other unsafe_xyz() accessor functions). Note that it only does this for the copying _to_ user space, and we still don't have a unsafe version of copy_from_user(). That's partly because we have no current users of it, but also partly because the copy_from_user() case is slightly different and cannot efficiently be implemented in terms of a unsafe_get_user() loop (because gcc can't do asm goto with outputs). It would be trivial to do this using "rep movsb", which would work really nicely on newer x86 cores, but really badly on some older ones. Al Viro is looking at cleaning up all our user copy routines to make this all a non-issue, but for now we have this simple-but-stupid version for x86 that works fine for the dirent name copy case because those names are short strings and we simply don't need anything fancier. Fixes: 9f79b78e ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()") Reported-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Reported-and-tested-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Thomas Bogendoerfer 提交于
Commit ac7c3e4f ("compiler: enable CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING forcibly") allows compiler to uninline functions marked as 'inline'. In cace of cmpxchg this would cause to reference function __cmpxchg_called_with_bad_pointer, which is a error case for catching bugs and will not happen for correct code, if __cmpxchg is inlined. Signed-off-by: NThomas Bogendoerfer <tbogendoerfer@suse.de> [paul.burton@mips.com: s/__cmpxchd/__cmpxchg in subject] Signed-off-by: NPaul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
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- 07 10月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Dave Young 提交于
kexec reboot fails randomly in UEFI based KVM guest. The firmware just resets while calling efi_delete_dummy_variable(); Unfortunately I don't know how to debug the firmware, it is also possible a potential problem on real hardware as well although nobody reproduced it. The intention of the efi_delete_dummy_variable is to trigger garbage collection when entering virtual mode. But SetVirtualAddressMap can only run once for each physical reboot, thus kexec_enter_virtual_mode() is not necessarily a good place to clean a dummy object. Drop the efi_delete_dummy_variable so that kexec reboot can work. Signed-off-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Acked-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Cc: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Cc: Octavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Scott Talbert <swt@techie.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191002165904.8819-8-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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