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  1. 18 6月, 2006 3 次提交
    • C
      [LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize · c8c05a8e
      由 Catherine Zhang 提交于 
      This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security
contexts to IPsec policies and security associations.  In the previous
patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to
SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security
assocations with security contexts.  Thus a user authorized to change
SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply
deleteing policies with security contexts.  To fix this security hole,
an additional authorization check is added for removing security
policies and security associations with security contexts.

Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on
policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change
unconditionally.  The hook is called on deletion when no context is
present, which we may want to change.  At present, I left it up to the
module.

LSM changes:

The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and
xfrm_state_delete.  The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion
of IPsec policies that have security contexts.  The existing hooks
xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the
authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and
memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM
interface.

Use:

The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are
deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy,
xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete).

SELinux changes:

The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added.
Signed-off-by: NCatherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c8c05a8e
    • H
      [IPSEC] xfrm: Abstract out encapsulation modes · b59f45d0
      由 Herbert Xu 提交于 
      This patch adds the structure xfrm_mode.  It is meant to represent
the operations carried out by transport/tunnel modes.

By doing this we allow additional encapsulation modes to be added
without clogging up the xfrm_input/xfrm_output paths.

Candidate modes include 4-to-6 tunnel mode, 6-to-4 tunnel mode, and
BEET modes.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b59f45d0
    • H
      [IPSEC] xfrm: Undo afinfo lock proliferation · 546be240
      由 Herbert Xu 提交于 
      The number of locks used to manage afinfo structures can easily be reduced
down to one each for policy and state respectively.  This is based on the
observation that the write locks are only held by module insertion/removal
which are very rare events so there is no need to further differentiate
between the insertion of modules like ipv6 versus esp6.

The removal of the read locks in xfrm4_policy.c/xfrm6_policy.c might look
suspicious at first.  However, after you realise that nobody ever takes
the corresponding write lock you'll feel better :)

As far as I can gather it's an attempt to guard against the removal of
the corresponding modules.  Since neither module can be unloaded at all
we can leave it to whoever fixes up IPv6 unloading :)
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      546be240
  3. 23 5月, 2006 1 次提交
  5. 30 4月, 2006 3 次提交
    • I
      [XFRM]: fix incorrect xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock use · e959d812
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock can be taken in bh context, at:

 [<c013fe1a>] lockdep_acquire_read+0x54/0x6d
 [<c0f6e024>] _read_lock+0x15/0x22
 [<c0e8fcdb>] xfrm_policy_get_afinfo+0x1a/0x3d
 [<c0e8fd10>] xfrm_decode_session+0x12/0x32
 [<c0e66094>] ip_route_me_harder+0x1c9/0x25b
 [<c0e770d3>] ip_nat_local_fn+0x94/0xad
 [<c0e2bbc8>] nf_iterate+0x2e/0x7a
 [<c0e2bc50>] nf_hook_slow+0x3c/0x9e
 [<c0e3a342>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x2de/0x3a7
 [<c0e53e19>] icmp_push_reply+0x136/0x141
 [<c0e543fb>] icmp_reply+0x118/0x1a0
 [<c0e54581>] icmp_echo+0x44/0x46
 [<c0e53fad>] icmp_rcv+0x111/0x138
 [<c0e36764>] ip_local_deliver+0x150/0x1f9
 [<c0e36be2>] ip_rcv+0x3d5/0x413
 [<c0df760f>] netif_receive_skb+0x337/0x356
 [<c0df76c3>] process_backlog+0x95/0x110
 [<c0df5fe2>] net_rx_action+0xa5/0x16d
 [<c012d8a7>] __do_softirq+0x6f/0xe6
 [<c0105ec2>] do_softirq+0x52/0xb1

this means that all write-locking of xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock must be
bh-safe. This patch fixes xfrm_policy_register_afinfo() and
xfrm_policy_unregister_afinfo().
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e959d812
    • I
      [XFRM]: fix incorrect xfrm_state_afinfo_lock use · f3111502
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      xfrm_state_afinfo_lock can be read-locked from bh context, so take it
in a bh-safe manner in xfrm_state_register_afinfo() and
xfrm_state_unregister_afinfo(). Found by the lock validator.
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f3111502
    • I
      [XFRM]: fix softirq-unsafe xfrm typemap->lock use · 8dff7c29
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      xfrm typemap->lock may be used in softirq context, so all write_lock()
uses must be softirq-safe.
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      8dff7c29
  7. 15 4月, 2006 1 次提交
  9. 01 4月, 2006 1 次提交
  11. 21 3月, 2006 11 次提交
  13. 28 2月, 2006 1 次提交
    • H
      [IPSEC]: Kill post_input hook and do NAT-T in esp_input directly · 752c1f4c
      由 Herbert Xu 提交于 
      The only reason post_input exists at all is that it gives us the
potential to adjust the checksums incrementally in future which
we ought to do.

However, after thinking about it for a bit we can adjust the
checksums without using this post_input stuff at all.  The crucial
point is that only the inner-most NAT-T SA needs to be considered
when adjusting checksums.  What's more, the checksum adjustment
comes down to a single u32 due to the linearity of IP checksums.

We just happen to have a spare u32 lying around in our skb structure :)
When ip_summed is set to CHECKSUM_NONE on input, the value of skb->csum
is currently unused.  All we have to do is to make that the checksum
adjustment and voila, there goes all the post_input and decap structures!

I've left in the decap data structures for now since it's intricately
woven into the sec_path stuff.  We can kill them later too.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      752c1f4c
  15. 24 2月, 2006 2 次提交
  17. 20 2月, 2006 1 次提交
    • P
      [XFRM]: Fix policy double put · 99511014
      由 Patrick McHardy 提交于 
      The policy is put once immediately and once at the error label, which results
in the following Oops:

kernel BUG at net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:250!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#2]
PREEMPT
[...]
CPU:    0
EIP:    0060:[<c028caf7>]    Not tainted VLI
EFLAGS: 00210246   (2.6.16-rc3 #39)
EIP is at __xfrm_policy_destroy+0xf/0x46
eax: d49f2000   ebx: d49f2000   ecx: f74bd880   edx: f74bd280
esi: d49f2000   edi: 00000001   ebp: cd506dcc   esp: cd506dc8
ds: 007b   es: 007b   ss: 0068
Process ssh (pid: 31970, threadinfo=cd506000 task=cfb04a70)
Stack: <0>cd506000 cd506e34 c028e92b ebde7280 cd506e58 cd506ec0 f74bd280 00000000
       00000214 0000000a 0000000a 00000000 00000002 f7ae6000 00000000 cd506e58
       cd506e14 c0299e36 f74bd280 e873fe00 c02943fd cd506ec0 ebde7280 f271f440
Call Trace:
 [<c0103a44>] show_stack_log_lvl+0xaa/0xb5
 [<c0103b75>] show_registers+0x126/0x18c
 [<c0103e68>] die+0x14e/0x1db
 [<c02b6809>] do_trap+0x7c/0x96
 [<c0104237>] do_invalid_op+0x89/0x93
 [<c01035af>] error_code+0x4f/0x54
 [<c028e92b>] xfrm_lookup+0x349/0x3c2
 [<c02b0b0d>] ip6_datagram_connect+0x317/0x452
 [<c0281749>] inet_dgram_connect+0x49/0x54
 [<c02404d2>] sys_connect+0x51/0x68
 [<c0240928>] sys_socketcall+0x6f/0x166
 [<c0102aa1>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      99511014
  19. 14 2月, 2006 1 次提交
    • H
      [IPSEC]: Fix strange IPsec freeze. · 00de651d
      由 Herbert Xu 提交于 
      Problem discovered and initial patch by Olaf Kirch:

	there's a problem with IPsec that has been bugging some of our users
	for the last couple of kernel revs. Every now and then, IPsec will
	freeze the machine completely. This is with openswan user land,
	and with kernels up to and including 2.6.16-rc2.

	I managed to debug this a little, and what happens is that we end
	up looping in xfrm_lookup, and never get out. With a bit of debug
	printks added, I can this happening:

		ip_route_output_flow calls xfrm_lookup

		xfrm_find_bundle returns NULL (apparently we're in the
			middle of negotiating a new SA or something)

		We therefore call xfrm_tmpl_resolve. This returns EAGAIN
			We go to sleep, waiting for a policy update.
			Then we loop back to the top

		Apparently, the dst_orig that was passed into xfrm_lookup
			has been dropped from the routing table (obsolete=2)
			This leads to the endless loop, because we now create
			a new bundle, check the new bundle and find it's stale
			(stale_bundle -> xfrm_bundle_ok -> dst_check() return 0)

	People have been testing with the patch below, which seems to fix the
	problem partially. They still see connection hangs however (things
	only clear up when they start a new ping or new ssh). So the patch
	is obvsiouly not sufficient, and something else seems to go wrong.

	I'm grateful for any hints you may have...

I suggest that we simply bail out always.  If the dst decides to die
on us later on, the packet will be dropped anyway.  So there is no
great urgency to retry here.  Once we have the proper resolution
queueing, we can then do the retry again.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: NOlaf Kirch <okir@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      00de651d
  21. 08 2月, 2006 1 次提交
  23. 10 1月, 2006 1 次提交
  25. 08 1月, 2006 2 次提交
  27. 07 1月, 2006 1 次提交
  29. 04 1月, 2006 1 次提交
    • T
      [LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. · df71837d
      由 Trent Jaeger 提交于 
      This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets.  Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.

This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,
pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a
socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security
association) to send/receive network packets.

Patch purpose:

The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on
the strongly authenticated IPSec security association.  Such access
controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP
address.  The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be
spoofed.  By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote
hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.
This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application
if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to
enforce the access control policy.

Patch design approach:

The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by
user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a
security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM
subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via
security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those
policies.

A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.

Patch implementation details:

On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or
xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of
the socket and the same security context is required for resultant
security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in
ipsec-tools).  This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.

On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket
(at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must
also match the security association being used.

The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.
The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as
before.

Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is
minimal.  The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the
combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec
processing proceeds as in the original case.

Testing:

The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools.  ipsec-tools have
been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version
0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security
associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation
using the security contexts via racoon.

The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set
security contexts.  These programs are also available from me, and
contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing
this interface.  Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel
behavior.
Signed-off-by: NTrent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      df71837d
  31. 22 12月, 2005 1 次提交
    • D
      [IPSEC]: Fix policy updates missed by sockets · 9b78a82c
      由 David S. Miller 提交于 
      The problem is that when new policies are inserted, sockets do not see
the update (but all new route lookups do).

This bug is related to the SA insertion stale route issue solved
recently, and this policy visibility problem can be fixed in a similar
way.

The fix is to flush out the bundles of all policies deeper than the
policy being inserted.  Consider beginning state of "outgoing"
direction policy list:

	policy A --> policy B --> policy C --> policy D

First, realize that inserting a policy into a list only potentially
changes IPSEC routes for that direction.  Therefore we need not bother
considering the policies for other directions.  We need only consider
the existing policies in the list we are doing the inserting.

Consider new policy "B'", inserted after B.

	policy A --> policy B --> policy B' --> policy C --> policy D

Two rules:

1) If policy A or policy B matched before the insertion, they
   appear before B' and thus would still match after inserting
   B'

2) Policy C and D, now "shadowed" and after policy B', potentially
   contain stale routes because policy B' might be selected
   instead of them.

Therefore we only need flush routes assosciated with policies
appearing after a newly inserted policy, if any.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      9b78a82c
  33. 20 12月, 2005 1 次提交
  35. 10 11月, 2005 2 次提交
  37. 09 11月, 2005 1 次提交
  39. 26 10月, 2005 1 次提交
  41. 09 10月, 2005 1 次提交
  43. 06 10月, 2005 1 次提交
  45. 05 10月, 2005 1 次提交