stable inclusion
from stable-5.11-rc1
commit ffde7034
bugzilla: 167382
CVE: N/A

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=ffde703470b03b1000017ed35c4f90a90caa22cf

-------------------------------------------------

To enable seccomp constant action bitmaps, we need to have a static
mapping to the audit architecture and system call table size. Add these
for arm64.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NGONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.11-rc1
commit 192cf322
bugzilla: 167382
CVE: N/A

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=192cf32243ce39af65bd095625aec374b38c03df

-------------------------------------------------

As part of the seccomp benchmarking, include the expectations with
regard to the timing behavior of the constant action bitmaps, and report
inconsistencies better.

Example output with constant action bitmaps on x86:

$ sudo ./seccomp_benchmark 100000000
Current BPF sysctl settings:
net.core.bpf_jit_enable = 1
net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 0
Benchmarking 200000000 syscalls...
129.359381409 - 0.008724424 = 129350656985 (129.4s)
getpid native: 646 ns
264.385890006 - 129.360453229 = 135025436777 (135.0s)
getpid RET_ALLOW 1 filter (bitmap): 675 ns
399.400511893 - 264.387045901 = 135013465992 (135.0s)
getpid RET_ALLOW 2 filters (bitmap): 675 ns
545.872866260 - 399.401718327 = 146471147933 (146.5s)
getpid RET_ALLOW 3 filters (full): 732 ns
696.337101319 - 545.874097681 = 150463003638 (150.5s)
getpid RET_ALLOW 4 filters (full): 752 ns
Estimated total seccomp overhead for 1 bitmapped filter: 29 ns
Estimated total seccomp overhead for 2 bitmapped filters: 29 ns
Estimated total seccomp overhead for 3 full filters: 86 ns
Estimated total seccomp overhead for 4 full filters: 106 ns
Estimated seccomp entry overhead: 29 ns
Estimated seccomp per-filter overhead (last 2 diff): 20 ns
Estimated seccomp per-filter overhead (filters / 4): 19 ns
Expectations:
	native ≤ 1 bitmap (646 ≤ 675): ✔️
	native ≤ 1 filter (646 ≤ 732): ✔️
	per-filter (last 2 diff) ≈ per-filter (filters / 4) (20 ≈ 19): ✔️
	1 bitmapped ≈ 2 bitmapped (29 ≈ 29): ✔️
	entry ≈ 1 bitmapped (29 ≈ 29): ✔️
	entry ≈ 2 bitmapped (29 ≈ 29): ✔️
	native + entry + (per filter * 4) ≈ 4 filters total (755 ≈ 752): ✔️

[YiFei: Changed commit message to show stats for this patch series]
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1b61df3db85c5f7f1b9202722c45e7b39df73ef2.1602431034.git.yifeifz2@illinois.eduSigned-off-by: NGONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.11-rc1
commit 25db9120
bugzilla: 167382
CVE: N/A

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=25db91209a910a0ccf8b093743088d0f4bf5659f

-------------------------------------------------

Provide seccomp internals with the details to calculate which syscall
table the running kernel is expecting to deal with. This allows for
efficient architecture pinning and paves the way for constant-action
bitmaps.
Co-developed-by: NYiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>
Signed-off-by: NYiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/da58c3733d95c4f2115dd94225dfbe2573ba4d87.1602431034.git.yifeifz2@illinois.eduSigned-off-by: NGONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.11-rc1
commit 8e01b51a
bugzilla: 167382
CVE: N/A

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=8e01b51a31a1e08e2c3e8fcc0ef6790441be2f61

-------------------------------------------------

SECCOMP_CACHE will only operate on syscalls that do not access
any syscall arguments or instruction pointer. To facilitate
this we need a static analyser to know whether a filter will
return allow regardless of syscall arguments for a given
architecture number / syscall number pair. This is implemented
here with a pseudo-emulator, and stored in a per-filter bitmap.

In order to build this bitmap at filter attach time, each filter is
emulated for every syscall (under each possible architecture), and
checked for any accesses of struct seccomp_data that are not the "arch"
nor "nr" (syscall) members. If only "arch" and "nr" are examined, and
the program returns allow, then we can be sure that the filter must
return allow independent from syscall arguments.

Nearly all seccomp filters are built from these cBPF instructions:

BPF_LD  | BPF_W    | BPF_ABS
BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ  | BPF_K
BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE  | BPF_K
BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT  | BPF_K
BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K
BPF_JMP | BPF_JA
BPF_RET | BPF_K
BPF_ALU | BPF_AND  | BPF_K

Each of these instructions are emulated. Any weirdness or loading
from a syscall argument will cause the emulator to bail.

The emulation is also halted if it reaches a return. In that case,
if it returns an SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, the syscall is marked as good.

Emulator structure and comments are from Kees [1] and Jann [2].

Emulation is done at attach time. If a filter depends on more
filters, and if the dependee does not guarantee to allow the
syscall, then we skip the emulation of this syscall.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200923232923.3142503-5-keescook@chromium.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1p=dR_2ikKq=xVxkoGg0fYpTBpkhJSv1w-6BG=76PAvw@mail.gmail.com/Suggested-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NYiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>
Reviewed-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Co-developed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/71c7be2db5ee08905f41c3be5c1ad6e2601ce88f.1602431034.git.yifeifz2@illinois.eduSigned-off-by: NGONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.11-rc1
commit f9d480b6
bugzilla: 167382
CVE: N/A

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=f9d480b6ffbeb336bf7f6ce44825c00f61b3abae

-------------------------------------------------

The overhead of running Seccomp filters has been part of some past
discussions [1][2][3]. Oftentimes, the filters have a large number
of instructions that check syscall numbers one by one and jump based
on that. Some users chain BPF filters which further enlarge the
overhead. A recent work [6] comprehensively measures the Seccomp
overhead and shows that the overhead is non-negligible and has a
non-trivial impact on application performance.

We observed some common filters, such as docker's [4] or
systemd's [5], will make most decisions based only on the syscall
numbers, and as past discussions considered, a bitmap where each bit
represents a syscall makes most sense for these filters.

The fast (common) path for seccomp should be that the filter permits
the syscall to pass through, and failing seccomp is expected to be
an exceptional case; it is not expected for userspace to call a
denylisted syscall over and over.

When it can be concluded that an allow must occur for the given
architecture and syscall pair (this determination is introduced in
the next commit), seccomp will immediately allow the syscall,
bypassing further BPF execution.

Each architecture number has its own bitmap. The architecture
number in seccomp_data is checked against the defined architecture
number constant before proceeding to test the bit against the
bitmap with the syscall number as the index of the bit in the
bitmap, and if the bit is set, seccomp returns allow. The bitmaps
are all clear in this patch and will be initialized in the next
commit.

When only one architecture exists, the check against architecture
number is skipped, suggested by Kees Cook [7].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/c22a6c3cefc2412cad00ae14c1371711@huawei.com/T/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202005181120.971232B7B@keescook/T/
[3] https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/issues/116
[4] https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/ae0ef82b90356ac613f329a8ef5ee42ca923417d/profiles/seccomp/default.json
[5] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/6743a1caf4037f03dc51a1277855018e4ab61957/src/shared/seccomp-util.c#L270
[6] Draco: Architectural and Operating System Support for System Call Security
    https://tianyin.github.io/pub/draco.pdf, MICRO-53, Oct. 2020
[7] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/202010091614.8BB0EB64@keescook/Co-developed-by: NDimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu>
Signed-off-by: NDimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu>
Signed-off-by: NYiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>
Reviewed-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/10f91a367ec4fcdea7fc3f086de3f5f13a4a7436.1602431034.git.yifeifz2@illinois.eduSigned-off-by: NGONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 174c27583b3807ac96228c442735b02622d8d1c3
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 4bf584a0 upstream.

When do system reboot, it calls dwc3_shutdown and the whole debugfs
for dwc3 has removed first, when the gadget tries to do deinit, and
remove debugfs for its endpoints, it meets NULL pointer dereference
issue when call debugfs_lookup. Fix it by removing the whole dwc3
debugfs later than dwc3_drd_exit.

[ 2924.958838] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000002
....
[ 2925.030994] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
[ 2925.037005] pc : inode_permission+0x2c/0x198
[ 2925.041281] lr : lookup_one_len_common+0xb0/0xf8
[ 2925.045903] sp : ffff80001276ba70
[ 2925.049218] x29: ffff80001276ba70 x28: ffff0000c01f0000 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 2925.056364] x26: ffff800011791e70 x25: 0000000000000008 x24: dead000000000100
[ 2925.063510] x23: dead000000000122 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000001
[ 2925.070652] x20: ffff8000122c6188 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 2925.077797] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000004
[ 2925.084943] x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000030
[ 2925.092087] x11: 0101010101010101 x10: 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x9 : ffff8000102b2420
[ 2925.099232] x8 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x7 : feff73746e2f6f64 x6 : 0000000000008080
[ 2925.106378] x5 : 61c8864680b583eb x4 : 209e6ec2d263dbb7 x3 : 000074756f307065
[ 2925.113523] x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff8000122c6188
[ 2925.120671] Call trace:
[ 2925.123119]  inode_permission+0x2c/0x198
[ 2925.127042]  lookup_one_len_common+0xb0/0xf8
[ 2925.131315]  lookup_one_len_unlocked+0x34/0xb0
[ 2925.135764]  lookup_positive_unlocked+0x14/0x50
[ 2925.140296]  debugfs_lookup+0x68/0xa0
[ 2925.143964]  dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints+0x84/0xb0
[ 2925.148675]  dwc3_gadget_exit+0x28/0x78
[ 2925.152518]  dwc3_drd_exit+0x100/0x1f8
[ 2925.156267]  dwc3_remove+0x11c/0x120
[ 2925.159851]  dwc3_shutdown+0x14/0x20
[ 2925.163432]  platform_shutdown+0x28/0x38
[ 2925.167360]  device_shutdown+0x15c/0x378
[ 2925.171291]  kernel_restart_prepare+0x3c/0x48
[ 2925.175650]  kernel_restart+0x1c/0x68
[ 2925.179316]  __do_sys_reboot+0x218/0x240
[ 2925.183247]  __arm64_sys_reboot+0x28/0x30
[ 2925.187262]  invoke_syscall+0x48/0x100
[ 2925.191017]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xc8
[ 2925.195726]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 2925.199045]  el0_svc+0x20/0x30
[ 2925.202104]  el0_sync_handler+0xa8/0xb0
[ 2925.205942]  el0_sync+0x148/0x180
[ 2925.209270] Code: a9025bf5 2a0203f5 121f0056 370802b5 (79400660)
[ 2925.215372] ---[ end trace 124254d8e485a58b ]---
[ 2925.220012] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b
[ 2925.227676] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 2925.231164] CPU features: 0x00001001,20000846
[ 2925.235521] Memory Limit: none
[ 2925.238580] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b ]---

Fixes: 8d396bb0 ("usb: dwc3: debugfs: Add and remove endpoint dirs dynamically")
Cc: Jack Pham <jackp@codeaurora.org>
Tested-by: NJack Pham <jackp@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Chen <peter.chen@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210608105656.10795-1-peter.chen@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit 2a042767)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210615080847.GA10432@jackp-linux.qualcomm.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit e52d43c82f2f6556f0b7a790c19c072c1e99a95f
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 8d396bb0 upstream.

The DWC3 DebugFS directory and files are currently created once
during probe.  This includes creation of subdirectories for each
of the gadget's endpoints.  This works fine for peripheral-only
controllers, as dwc3_core_init_mode() calls dwc3_gadget_init()
just prior to calling dwc3_debugfs_init().

However, for dual-role controllers, dwc3_core_init_mode() will
instead call dwc3_drd_init() which is problematic in a few ways.
First, the initial state must be determined, then dwc3_set_mode()
will have to schedule drd_work and by then dwc3_debugfs_init()
could have already been invoked.  Even if the initial mode is
peripheral, dwc3_gadget_init() happens after the DebugFS files
are created, and worse so if the initial state is host and the
controller switches to peripheral much later.  And secondly,
even if the gadget endpoints' debug entries were successfully
created, if the controller exits peripheral mode, its dwc3_eps
are freed so the debug files would now hold stale references.

So it is best if the DebugFS endpoint entries are created and
removed dynamically at the same time the underlying dwc3_eps are.
Do this by calling dwc3_debugfs_create_endpoint_dir() as each
endpoint is created, and conversely remove the DebugFS entry when
the endpoint is freed.

Fixes: 41ce1456 ("usb: dwc3: core: make dwc3_set_mode() work properly")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NPeter Chen <peter.chen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJack Pham <jackp@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210529192932.22912-1-jackp@codeaurora.orgSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 1b5fbb66182f5cab525be163327ce1a1fdbb9f15
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit ef83f9ef upstream.

To pick the changes in:

  ea6932d7 ("net: make get_net_ns return error if NET_NS is disabled")

That don't result in any changes in the tables generated from that
header.

This silences this perf build warning:

  Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/perf/trace/beauty/include/linux/socket.h' differs from latest version at 'include/linux/socket.h'
  diff -u tools/perf/trace/beauty/include/linux/socket.h include/linux/socket.h

Cc: Changbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 69371e0482ea3a39484642e8d29c3d51fb26a915
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 1792a59e upstream.

To pick the changes in:

  32182747 ("icmp: don't send out ICMP messages with a source address of 0.0.0.0")

That don't result in any change in tooling, as INADDR_ are not used to
generate id->string tables used by 'perf trace'.

This addresses this build warning:

  Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/uapi/linux/in.h' differs from latest version at 'include/uapi/linux/in.h'
  diff -u tools/include/uapi/linux/in.h include/uapi/linux/in.h

Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 4f6e7098f19b8554470f6ad28030d1550c0bd983
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit cb3cefe3 upstream.

Add clock rate zero check to fix coverity issue of "divide by 0".

Fixes: commit 85bd1798 ("net: fec: fix spin_lock dead lock")
Signed-off-by: NFugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJoakim Zhang <qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 1af3a8e91f1accd45f69bd430f92c3a5698cdb56
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 8f269102 upstream.

Platform drivers may call stmmac_probe_config_dt() to parse dt, could
call stmmac_remove_config_dt() in error handing after dt parsed, so need
disable clocks in stmmac_remove_config_dt().

Go through all platforms drivers which use stmmac_probe_config_dt(),
none of them disable clocks manually, so it's safe to disable them in
stmmac_remove_config_dt().

Fixes: commit d2ed0a77 ("net: ethernet: stmmac: fix of-node and fixed-link-phydev leaks")
Signed-off-by: NJoakim Zhang <qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit f71ca814c2860861750668044a18e6d7d74cc2d5
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 1b3865d0 upstream.

Fixes build with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y.

Hopefully.  But it's the right thing to do anwyay.

Fixes: 1ad53d9f ("slub: improve bit diffusion for freelist ptr obfuscation")
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=213417
Reported-by: <vannguye@cisco.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit f6ed2357541612a13a5841b3af4dc32ed984a25f
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit e41a49fa upstream.

It turns out that SLUB redzoning ("slub_debug=Z") checks from
s->object_size rather than from s->inuse (which is normally bumped to
make room for the freelist pointer), so a cache created with an object
size less than 24 would have the freelist pointer written beyond
s->object_size, causing the redzone to be corrupted by the freelist
pointer.  This was very visible with "slub_debug=ZF":

  BUG test (Tainted: G    B            ): Right Redzone overwritten
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

  INFO: 0xffff957ead1c05de-0xffff957ead1c05df @offset=1502. First byte 0x1a instead of 0xbb
  INFO: Slab 0xffffef3950b47000 objects=170 used=170 fp=0x0000000000000000 flags=0x8000000000000200
  INFO: Object 0xffff957ead1c05d8 @offset=1496 fp=0xffff957ead1c0620

  Redzone  (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb               ........
  Object   (____ptrval____): 00 00 00 00 00 f6 f4 a5               ........
  Redzone  (____ptrval____): 40 1d e8 1a aa                        @....
  Padding  (____ptrval____): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00               ........

Adjust the offset to stay within s->object_size.

(Note that no caches of in this size range are known to exist in the
kernel currently.)

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608183955.280836-4-keescook@chromium.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200807160627.GA1420741@elver.google.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0f7dd7b2-7496-5e2d-9488-2ec9f8e90441@suse.cz/Fixes: 89b83f28 (slub: avoid redzone when choosing freepointer location)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CANpmjNOwZ5VpKQn+SYWovTkFB4VsT-RPwyENBmaK0dLcpqStkA@mail.gmail.comSigned-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reported-by: N"Lin, Zhenpeng" <zplin@psu.edu>
Tested-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 4314c8c63bfdd56ac34d10955023dc10886eafd3
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 74c1d3e0 upstream.

The redzone area for SLUB exists between s->object_size and s->inuse
(which is at least the word-aligned object_size).  If a cache were
created with an object_size smaller than sizeof(void *), the in-object
stored freelist pointer would overwrite the redzone (e.g.  with boot
param "slub_debug=ZF"):

  BUG test (Tainted: G    B            ): Right Redzone overwritten
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

  INFO: 0xffff957ead1c05de-0xffff957ead1c05df @offset=1502. First byte 0x1a instead of 0xbb
  INFO: Slab 0xffffef3950b47000 objects=170 used=170 fp=0x0000000000000000 flags=0x8000000000000200
  INFO: Object 0xffff957ead1c05d8 @offset=1496 fp=0xffff957ead1c0620

  Redzone  (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb    ........
  Object   (____ptrval____): f6 f4 a5 40 1d e8          ...@..
  Redzone  (____ptrval____): 1a aa                      ..
  Padding  (____ptrval____): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00    ........

Store the freelist pointer out of line when object_size is smaller than
sizeof(void *) and redzoning is enabled.

Additionally remove the "smaller than sizeof(void *)" check under
CONFIG_DEBUG_VM in kmem_cache_sanity_check() as it is now redundant:
SLAB and SLOB both handle small sizes.

(Note that no caches within this size range are known to exist in the
kernel currently.)

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608183955.280836-3-keescook@chromium.org
Fixes: 81819f0f ("SLUB core")
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: "Lin, Zhenpeng" <zplin@psu.edu>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 4a36fda16b1bb52acfd419574832dded8cbdef57
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 8669dbab upstream.

Patch series "Actually fix freelist pointer vs redzoning", v4.

This fixes redzoning vs the freelist pointer (both for middle-position
and very small caches).  Both are "theoretical" fixes, in that I see no
evidence of such small-sized caches actually be used in the kernel, but
that's no reason to let the bugs continue to exist, especially since
people doing local development keep tripping over it.  :)

This patch (of 3):

Instead of repeating "Redzone" and "Poison", clarify which sides of
those zones got tripped.  Additionally fix column alignment in the
trailer.

Before:

  BUG test (Tainted: G    B            ): Redzone overwritten
  ...
  Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb      ........
  Object (____ptrval____): f6 f4 a5 40 1d e8            ...@..
  Redzone (____ptrval____): 1a aa                        ..
  Padding (____ptrval____): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00      ........

After:

  BUG test (Tainted: G    B            ): Right Redzone overwritten
  ...
  Redzone  (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb      ........
  Object   (____ptrval____): f6 f4 a5 40 1d e8            ...@..
  Redzone  (____ptrval____): 1a aa                        ..
  Padding  (____ptrval____): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00      ........

The earlier commits that slowly resulted in the "Before" reporting were:

  d86bd1be ("mm/slub: support left redzone")
  ffc79d28 ("slub: use print_hex_dump")
  24922684 ("SLUB: change error reporting format to follow lockdep loosely")

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608183955.280836-1-keescook@chromium.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608183955.280836-2-keescook@chromium.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cfdb11d7-fb8e-e578-c939-f7f5fb69a6bd@suse.cz/Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: "Lin, Zhenpeng" <zplin@psu.edu>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 12eb3c2c1a4f6e7c30de2aa0a09cb1b9e19fa9c0
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 099dd687 upstream.

I found it by pure code review, that pte_same_as_swp() of unuse_vma()
didn't take uffd-wp bit into account when comparing ptes.
pte_same_as_swp() returning false negative could cause failure to
swapoff swap ptes that was wr-protected by userfaultfd.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210603180546.9083-1-peterx@redhat.com
Fixes: f45ec5ff ("userfaultfd: wp: support swap and page migration")
Signed-off-by: NPeter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[5.7+]
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit fc7fdd8c5c2ad2fe3e297698be9d4dbe4a4e0579
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit cfc579f9 upstream.

The egress tunnel code uses dst_clone() and directly sets the result
which is wrong because the entry might have 0 refcnt or be already deleted,
causing number of problems. It also triggers the WARN_ON() in dst_hold()[1]
when a refcnt couldn't be taken. Fix it by using dst_hold_safe() and
checking if a reference was actually taken before setting the dst.

[1] dmesg WARN_ON log and following refcnt errors
 WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 38 at include/net/dst.h:230 br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel+0x10b/0x134 [bridge]
 Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp bridge stp llc bonding ipv6 virtio_net
 CPU: 5 PID: 38 Comm: ksoftirqd/5 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G        W         5.13.0-rc3+ #360
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel+0x10b/0x134 [bridge]
 Code: e8 85 bc 01 e1 45 84 f6 74 90 45 31 f6 85 db 48 c7 c7 a0 02 19 a0 41 0f 94 c6 31 c9 31 d2 44 89 f6 e8 64 bc 01 e1 85 db 75 02 <0f> 0b 31 c9 31 d2 44 89 f6 48 c7 c7 70 02 19 a0 e8 4b bc 01 e1 49
 RSP: 0018:ffff8881003d39e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffa01902a0
 RBP: ffff8881040c6700 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
 R10: 2ce93d0054fe0d00 R11: 54fe0d00000e0000 R12: ffff888109515000
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000401
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88822bf40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007f42ba70f030 CR3: 0000000109926000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
 Call Trace:
  br_handle_vlan+0xbc/0xca [bridge]
  __br_forward+0x23/0x164 [bridge]
  deliver_clone+0x41/0x48 [bridge]
  br_handle_frame_finish+0x36f/0x3aa [bridge]
  ? skb_dst+0x2e/0x38 [bridge]
  ? br_handle_ingress_vlan_tunnel+0x3e/0x1c8 [bridge]
  ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x3aa/0x3aa [bridge]
  br_handle_frame+0x2c3/0x377 [bridge]
  ? __skb_pull+0x33/0x51
  ? vlan_do_receive+0x4f/0x36a
  ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x3aa/0x3aa [bridge]
  __netif_receive_skb_core+0x539/0x7c6
  ? __list_del_entry_valid+0x16e/0x1c2
  __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x6d/0xd6
  netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1d9/0x1fa
  gro_normal_list+0x22/0x3e
  dev_gro_receive+0x55b/0x600
  ? detach_buf_split+0x58/0x140
  napi_gro_receive+0x94/0x12e
  virtnet_poll+0x15d/0x315 [virtio_net]
  __napi_poll+0x2c/0x1c9
  net_rx_action+0xe6/0x1fb
  __do_softirq+0x115/0x2d8
  run_ksoftirqd+0x18/0x20
  smpboot_thread_fn+0x183/0x19c
  ? smpboot_unregister_percpu_thread+0x66/0x66
  kthread+0x10a/0x10f
  ? kthread_mod_delayed_work+0xb6/0xb6
  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
 ---[ end trace 49f61b07f775fd2b ]---
 dst_release: dst:00000000c02d677a refcnt:-1
 dst_release underflow

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 11538d03 ("bridge: vlan dst_metadata hooks in ingress and egress paths")
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit fe0448a3fad365a747283a00a1d1ad5e8d6675b7
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 58e20717 upstream.

This patch fixes a tunnel_dst null pointer dereference due to lockless
access in the tunnel egress path. When deleting a vlan tunnel the
tunnel_dst pointer is set to NULL without waiting a grace period (i.e.
while it's still usable) and packets egressing are dereferencing it
without checking. Use READ/WRITE_ONCE to annotate the lockless use of
tunnel_id, use RCU for accessing tunnel_dst and make sure it is read
only once and checked in the egress path. The dst is already properly RCU
protected so we don't need to do anything fancy than to make sure
tunnel_id and tunnel_dst are read only once and checked in the egress path.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 11538d03 ("bridge: vlan dst_metadata hooks in ingress and egress paths")
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit cfe403f209b11fad123a882100f0822a52a7630f
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit c364df24 upstream.

Just as the initial check, we need to ensure num_frag+1 buffers available,
as that is the number of buffers we are going to use.

This fixes a buffer overflow, which might be seen during heavy network
load. Complete lockup of TEMAC was reproducible within about 10 minutes of
a particular load.

Fixes: 84823ff8 ("net: ll_temac: Fix race condition causing TX hang")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+
Signed-off-by: NEsben Haabendal <esben@geanix.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 019ab7d044d0ebf97e1236bb8935b7809be92358
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 6aa32217 upstream.

With the skb pointer piggy-backed on the TX BD, we have a simple and
efficient way to free the skb buffer when the frame has been transmitted.
But in order to avoid freeing the skb while there are still fragments from
the skb in use, we need to piggy-back on the TX BD of the skb, not the
first.

Without this, we are doing use-after-free on the DMA side, when the first
BD of a multi TX BD packet is seen as completed in xmit_done, and the
remaining BDs are still being processed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+
Signed-off-by: NEsben Haabendal <esben@geanix.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 41984d4fbe21d7e0638212c42fdeaead76f5513d
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 4cbbe348 upstream.

If GC has entered CGPG, ringing doorbell > first page doesn't wakeup GC.
Enlarge CP_MEC_DOORBELL_RANGE_UPPER to workaround this issue.
Signed-off-by: NYifan Zhang <yifan1.zhang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NFelix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit bc58ec307ce93a0bcb14f4cdcd8e18ac7b4ebf10
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 1c0b0efd upstream.

If GC has entered CGPG, ringing doorbell > first page doesn't wakeup GC.
Enlarge CP_MEC_DOORBELL_RANGE_UPPER to workaround this issue.
Signed-off-by: NYifan Zhang <yifan1.zhang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NFelix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 96b4126f8c371b64b39a2faab8cb4d39dd777411
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 0288e5e1 upstream.

If cfg80211_pmsr_process_abort() moves all the PMSR requests that
need to be freed into a local list before aborting and freeing them.
As a result, it is possible that cfg80211_pmsr_complete() will run in
parallel and free the same PMSR request.

Fix it by freeing the request in cfg80211_pmsr_complete() only if it
is still in the original pmsr list.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9bb7e0f2 ("cfg80211: add peer measurement with FTM initiator API")
Signed-off-by: NAvraham Stern <avraham.stern@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NLuca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20210618133832.1fbef57e269a.I00294bebdb0680b892f8d1d5c871fd9dbe785a5e@changeidSigned-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 5493b0c2a784ffa4c80c6a6e2c933824bfaba9b1
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit b5642479 upstream.

If all net/wireless/certs/*.hex files are deleted, the build
will hang at this point since the 'cat' command will have no
arguments. Do "echo | cat - ..." so that even if the "..."
part is empty, the whole thing won't hang.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NLuca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20210618133832.c989056c3664.Ic3b77531d00b30b26dcd69c64e55ae2f60c3f31e@changeidSigned-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit f74df6e086083dc435f7500bdbc86b05277d17af
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit bddc0c41 upstream.

The commit cb17ed29 ("mac80211: parse radiotap header when selecting Tx
queue") moved the code to validate the radiotap header from
ieee80211_monitor_start_xmit to ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap. This made is
possible to share more code with the new Tx queue selection code for
injected frames. But at the same time, it now required the call of
ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap at the beginning of functions which wanted to
handle the radiotap header. And this broke the rate parser for radiotap
header parser.

The radiotap parser for rates is operating most of the time only on the
data in the actual radiotap header. But for the 802.11a/b/g rates, it must
also know the selected band from the chandef information. But this
information is only written to the ieee80211_tx_info at the end of the
ieee80211_monitor_start_xmit - long after ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap was
already called. The info->band information was therefore always 0
(NL80211_BAND_2GHZ) when the parser code tried to access it.

For a 5GHz only device, injecting a frame with 802.11a rates would cause a
NULL pointer dereference because local->hw.wiphy->bands[NL80211_BAND_2GHZ]
would most likely have been NULL when the radiotap parser searched for the
correct rate index of the driver.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NBen Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Fixes: cb17ed29 ("mac80211: parse radiotap header when selecting Tx queue")
Signed-off-by: NMathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
[sven@narfation.org: added commit message]
Signed-off-by: NSven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210530133226.40587-1-sven@narfation.orgSigned-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit df203c1fdaaf6db8781fcf41237b8c2ea16b69a8
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 4ad5dd2d upstream.

flags varible which is the input parameter of pl330_prep_dma_cyclic()
should not be used by spinlock_irq[save/restore] function.
Signed-off-by: NJongho Park <jongho7.park@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NBumyong Lee <bumyong.lee@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NChanho Park <chanho61.park@samsung.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210507063647.111209-1-chanho61.park@samsung.com
Fixes: f6f2421c ("dmaengine: pl330: Merge dma_pl330_dmac and pl330_dmac structs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NVinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit b842b568a584645cf9fcaf5b62fd875d1ef5d275
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 4f5aecdf upstream.

As mentioned in kernel commit 1d50e5d0 ("crash_core, vmcoreinfo:
Append 'MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS' to vmcoreinfo"), SECTION_SIZE_BITS in the
formula:

    #define SECTIONS_SHIFT    (MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS - SECTION_SIZE_BITS)

Besides SECTIONS_SHIFT, SECTION_SIZE_BITS is also used to calculate
PAGES_PER_SECTION in makedumpfile just like kernel.

Unfortunately, this arch-dependent macro SECTION_SIZE_BITS changes, e.g.
recently in kernel commit f0b13ee2 ("arm64/sparsemem: reduce
SECTION_SIZE_BITS").  But user space wants a stable interface to get
this info.  Such info is impossible to be deduced from a crashdump
vmcore.  Hence append SECTION_SIZE_BITS to vmcoreinfo.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608103359.84907-1-kernelfans@gmail.com
Link: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/kexec/2021-June/022676.htmlSigned-off-by: NPingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NBaoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Bhupesh Sharma <bhupesh.sharma@linaro.org>
Cc: Kazuhito Hagio <k-hagio@ab.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Boris Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 63ba83563e71d5785f642e7ed2dc503acf48a092
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit efa16550 upstream.

If access_ok() or fpregs_soft_set() fails in __fpu__restore_sig() then the
function just returns but does not clear the FPU state as it does for all
other fatal failures.

Clear the FPU state for these failures as well.

Fixes: 72a671ce ("x86, fpu: Unify signal handling code paths for x86 and x86_64 kernels")
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87mtryyhhz.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit a7748e021b9fb7739e3cb88449296539de0b6817
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit d8778e39 upstream.

Both Intel and AMD consider it to be architecturally valid for XRSTOR to
fail with #PF but nonetheless change the register state.  The actual
conditions under which this might occur are unclear [1], but it seems
plausible that this might be triggered if one sibling thread unmaps a page
and invalidates the shared TLB while another sibling thread is executing
XRSTOR on the page in question.

__fpu__restore_sig() can execute XRSTOR while the hardware registers
are preserved on behalf of a different victim task (using the
fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx mechanism), and, in theory, XRSTOR could fail but
modify the registers.

If this happens, then there is a window in which __fpu__restore_sig()
could schedule out and the victim task could schedule back in without
reloading its own FPU registers. This would result in part of the FPU
state that __fpu__restore_sig() was attempting to load leaking into the
victim task's user-visible state.

Invalidate preserved FPU registers on XRSTOR failure to prevent this
situation from corrupting any state.

[1] Frequent readers of the errata lists might imagine "complex
    microarchitectural conditions".

Fixes: 1d731e73 ("x86/fpu: Add a fastpath to __fpu__restore_sig()")
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: NRik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608144345.758116583@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 076f732b16a5bf842686e1b43ab6021a2d98233e
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 484cea4f upstream.

The non-compacted slowpath uses __copy_from_user() and copies the entire
user buffer into the kernel buffer, verbatim.  This means that the kernel
buffer may now contain entirely invalid state on which XRSTOR will #GP.
validate_user_xstate_header() can detect some of that corruption, but that
leaves the onus on callers to clear the buffer.

Prior to XSAVES support, it was possible just to reinitialize the buffer,
completely, but with supervisor states that is not longer possible as the
buffer clearing code split got it backwards. Fixing that is possible but
not corrupting the state in the first place is more robust.

Avoid corruption of the kernel XSAVE buffer by using copy_user_to_xstate()
which validates the XSAVE header contents before copying the actual states
to the kernel. copy_user_to_xstate() was previously only called for
compacted-format kernel buffers, but it works for both compacted and
non-compacted forms.

Using it for the non-compacted form is slower because of multiple
__copy_from_user() operations, but that cost is less important than robust
code in an already slow path.

[ Changelog polished by Dave Hansen ]

Fixes: b860eb8d ("x86/fpu/xstate: Define new functions for clearing fpregs and xstates")
Reported-by: syzbot+2067e764dbcd10721e2e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: NRik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608144345.611833074@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit abc790bdbbc5c538e9be62cde9b5ae4e4c562833
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 510b80a6 upstream.

When user space brings PKRU into init state, then the kernel handling is
broken:

  T1 user space
     xsave(state)
     state.header.xfeatures &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU;
     xrstor(state)

  T1 -> kernel
     schedule()
       XSAVE(S) -> T1->xsave.header.xfeatures[PKRU] == 0
       T1->flags |= TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD;

       wrpkru();

     schedule()
       ...
       pk = get_xsave_addr(&T1->fpu->state.xsave, XFEATURE_PKRU);
       if (pk)
	 wrpkru(pk->pkru);
       else
	 wrpkru(DEFAULT_PKRU);

Because the xfeatures bit is 0 and therefore the value in the xsave
storage is not valid, get_xsave_addr() returns NULL and switch_to()
writes the default PKRU. -> FAIL #1!

So that wrecks any copy_to/from_user() on the way back to user space
which hits memory which is protected by the default PKRU value.

Assumed that this does not fail (pure luck) then T1 goes back to user
space and because TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD is set it ends up in

  switch_fpu_return()
      __fpregs_load_activate()
        if (!fpregs_state_valid()) {
  	 load_XSTATE_from_task();
        }

But if nothing touched the FPU between T1 scheduling out and back in,
then the fpregs_state is still valid which means switch_fpu_return()
does nothing and just clears TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD. Back to user space with
DEFAULT_PKRU loaded. -> FAIL #2!

The fix is simple: if get_xsave_addr() returns NULL then set the
PKRU value to 0 instead of the restrictive default PKRU value in
init_pkru_value.

 [ bp: Massage in minor nitpicks from folks. ]

Fixes: 0cecca9d ("x86/fpu: Eager switch PKRU state")
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: NRik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Tested-by: NBabu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608144346.045616965@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 208bb686e7fa7fff16e8fa78ff0db34aa9acdbd7
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 8d651ee9 upstream.

Some drivers require memory that is marked as EFI boot services
data. In order for this memory to not be re-used by the kernel
after ExitBootServices(), efi_mem_reserve() is used to preserve it
by inserting a new EFI memory descriptor and marking it with the
EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute.

Under SEV, memory marked with the EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute needs to
be mapped encrypted by Linux, otherwise the kernel might crash at boot
like below:

  EFI Variables Facility v0.08 2004-May-17
  general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x3597688770a868b2: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 13 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.12.4-2-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:efi_mokvar_entry_next
  [...]
  Call Trace:
   efi_mokvar_sysfs_init
   ? efi_mokvar_table_init
   do_one_initcall
   ? __kmalloc
   kernel_init_freeable
   ? rest_init
   kernel_init
   ret_from_fork

Expand the __ioremap_check_other() function to additionally check for
this other type of boot data reserved at runtime and indicate that it
should be mapped encrypted for an SEV guest.

 [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Fixes: 58c90902 ("efi: Support for MOK variable config table")
Reported-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10+
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608095439.12668-2-joro@8bytes.orgSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 75a55bc2e5e64cfdcf839e06b37cbb0cb8b69459
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 12f7764a upstream.

switch_fpu_finish() checks current->mm as indicator for kernel threads.
That's wrong because kernel threads can temporarily use a mm of a user
process via kthread_use_mm().

Check the task flags for PF_KTHREAD instead.

Fixes: 0cecca9d ("x86/fpu: Eager switch PKRU state")
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: NRik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608144345.912645927@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit ddaaf38e1923760de1bc6f5e4e02e42db327ab6e
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 28e5e44a upstream.

tl;dr:

Several SGX users reported seeing the following message on NUMA systems:

  sgx: [Firmware Bug]: Unable to map EPC section to online node. Fallback to the NUMA node 0.

This turned out to be the memblock code mistakenly throwing away SGX
memory.
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>

=== Full Changelog ===

The 'max_pfn' variable represents the highest known RAM address.  It can
be used, for instance, to quickly determine for which physical addresses
there is mem_map[] space allocated.  The numa_meminfo code makes an
effort to throw out ("trim") all memory blocks which are above 'max_pfn'.

SGX memory is not considered RAM (it is marked as "Reserved" in the
e820) and is not taken into account by max_pfn. Despite this, SGX memory
areas have NUMA affinity and are enumerated in the ACPI SRAT table. The
existing SGX code uses the numa_meminfo mechanism to look up the NUMA
affinity for its memory areas.

In cases where SGX memory was above max_pfn (usually just the one EPC
section in the last highest NUMA node), the numa_memblock is truncated
at 'max_pfn', which is below the SGX memory.  When the SGX code tries to
look up the affinity of this memory, it fails and produces an error message:

  sgx: [Firmware Bug]: Unable to map EPC section to online node. Fallback to the NUMA node 0.

and assigns the memory to NUMA node 0.

Instead of silently truncating the memory block at 'max_pfn' and
dropping the SGX memory, add the truncated portion to
'numa_reserved_meminfo'.  This allows the SGX code to later determine
the NUMA affinity of its 'Reserved' area.

Before, numa_meminfo looked like this (from 'crash'):

  blk = { start =          0x0, end = 0x2080000000, nid = 0x0 }
        { start = 0x2080000000, end = 0x4000000000, nid = 0x1 }

numa_reserved_meminfo is empty.

With this, numa_meminfo looks like this:

  blk = { start =          0x0, end = 0x2080000000, nid = 0x0 }
        { start = 0x2080000000, end = 0x4000000000, nid = 0x1 }

and numa_reserved_meminfo has an entry for node 1's SGX memory:

  blk =  { start = 0x4000000000, end = 0x4080000000, nid = 0x1 }

 [ daveh: completely rewrote/reworked changelog ]

Fixes: 5d30f92e ("x86/NUMA: Provide a range-to-target_node lookup facility")
Reported-by: NReinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NFan Du <fan.du@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210617194657.0A99CB22@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit f6bcb1a6281d4ea03b98e26501b88439baa007c6
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 96f1b001 upstream.

ARCv2 has some configuration dependent registers (r30, r58, r59) which
could be targetted by the compiler. To keep the ABI stable, these were
unconditionally part of the glibc ABI
(sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/arc/sys/ucontext.h:mcontext_t) however we
missed populating them (by saving/restoring them across signal
handling).

This patch fixes the issue by
 - adding arcv2 ABI regs to kernel struct sigcontext
 - populating them during signal handling

Change to struct sigcontext might seem like a glibc ABI change (although
it primarily uses ucontext_t:mcontext_t) but the fact is
 - it has only been extended (existing fields are not touched)
 - the old sigcontext was ABI incomplete to begin with anyways

Fixes: https://github.com/foss-for-synopsys-dwc-arc-processors/linux/issues/53
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nkernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: NVladimir Isaev <isaev@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: NVineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit b516daed991359ba0433dff31862ae4df30b4150
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit e73a99f3 upstream.

When a AP queue is switched to soft offline, all pending
requests are purged out of the pending requests list and
'received' by the upper layer like zcrypt device drivers.
This is also done for requests which are already enqueued
into the firmware queue. A request in a firmware queue
may eventually produce an response message, but there is
no waiting process any more. However, the response was
counted with the queue_counter and as this counter was
reset to 0 with the offline switch, the pending response
caused the queue_counter to get negative. The next request
increased this counter to 0 (instead of 1) which caused
the ap code to assume there is nothing to receive and so
the response for this valid request was never tried to
fetch from the firmware queue.

This all caused a queue to not work properly after a
switch offline/online and in the end processes to hang
forever when trying to send a crypto request after an
queue offline/online switch cicle.

Fixed by a) making sure the counter does not drop below 0
and b) on a successful enqueue of a message has at least
a value of 1.

Additionally a warning is emitted, when a reply can't get
assigned to a waiting process. This may be normal operation
(process had timeout or has been killed) but may give a
hint that something unexpected happened (like this odd
behavior described above).
Signed-off-by: NHarald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NVasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 7c003dab436db33aac674ad66eed49add83b595b
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 5bcbe328 upstream.

The size of SIE critical section is calculated wrongly
as result of a missed subtraction in commit 0b0ed657
("s390: remove critical section cleanup from entry.S")

Fixes: 0b0ed657 ("s390: remove critical section cleanup from entry.S")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NHeiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NVasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 3a9934d6b8dd8a91d61ed2d0d538fa27cb9192a3
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit dfdc0a71 upstream.

Commit c9b8b07c (KVM: x86: Dynamically allocate per-vCPU emulation context)
tries to allocate per-vCPU emulation context dynamically, however, the
x86_emulator slab cache is still exiting after the kvm module is unload
as below after destroying the VM and unloading the kvm module.

grep x86_emulator /proc/slabinfo
x86_emulator          36     36   2672   12    8 : tunables    0    0    0 : slabdata      3      3      0

This patch fixes this slab cache leak by destroying the x86_emulator slab cache
when the kvm module is unloaded.

Fixes: c9b8b07c (KVM: x86: Dynamically allocate per-vCPU emulation context)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <1623387573-5969-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 18eca69f88f2e3f1421d57f1dc4219a68de5891d
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 654430ef upstream.

Calculate and check the full mmu_role when initializing the MMU context
for the nested MMU, where "full" means the bits and pieces of the role
that aren't handled by kvm_calc_mmu_role_common().  While the nested MMU
isn't used for shadow paging, things like the number of levels in the
guest's page tables are surprisingly important when walking the guest
page tables.  Failure to reinitialize the nested MMU context if L2's
paging mode changes can result in unexpected and/or missed page faults,
and likely other explosions.

E.g. if an L1 vCPU is running both a 32-bit PAE L2 and a 64-bit L2, the
"common" role calculation will yield the same role for both L2s.  If the
64-bit L2 is run after the 32-bit PAE L2, L0 will fail to reinitialize
the nested MMU context, ultimately resulting in a bad walk of L2's page
tables as the MMU will still have a guest root_level of PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL.

  WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 167334 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:3075 ept_save_pdptrs+0x15/0xe0 [kvm_intel]
  Modules linked in: kvm_intel]
  CPU: 4 PID: 167334 Comm: CPU 3/KVM Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1-d849817d5673-reqs #185
  Hardware name: ASUS Q87M-E/Q87M-E, BIOS 1102 03/03/2014
  RIP: 0010:ept_save_pdptrs+0x15/0xe0 [kvm_intel]
  Code: <0f> 0b c3 f6 87 d8 02 00f
  RSP: 0018:ffffbba702dbba00 EFLAGS: 00010202
  RAX: 0000000000000011 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffffffff810a2c08
  RDX: ffff91d7bc30acc0 RSI: 0000000000000011 RDI: ffff91d7bc30a600
  RBP: ffff91d7bc30a600 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000007
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff91d7bc30a600
  R13: ffff91d7bc30acc0 R14: ffff91d67c123460 R15: 0000000115d7e005
  FS:  00007fe8e9ffb700(0000) GS:ffff91d90fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000029f15a001 CR4: 00000000001726e0
  Call Trace:
   kvm_pdptr_read+0x3a/0x40 [kvm]
   paging64_walk_addr_generic+0x327/0x6a0 [kvm]
   paging64_gva_to_gpa_nested+0x3f/0xb0 [kvm]
   kvm_fetch_guest_virt+0x4c/0xb0 [kvm]
   __do_insn_fetch_bytes+0x11a/0x1f0 [kvm]
   x86_decode_insn+0x787/0x1490 [kvm]
   x86_decode_emulated_instruction+0x58/0x1e0 [kvm]
   x86_emulate_instruction+0x122/0x4f0 [kvm]
   vmx_handle_exit+0x120/0x660 [kvm_intel]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xe25/0x1cb0 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x211/0x5a0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
   do_syscall_64+0x40/0xb0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bf627a92 ("x86/kvm/mmu: check if MMU reconfiguration is needed in init_kvm_nested_mmu()")
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210610220026.1364486-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-5.10.46
commit 669a8866e468fd020d34eb00e08cb41d3774b71b
bugzilla: 168323
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 78fcb2c9 upstream.

Immediately reset the MMU context when the vCPU's SMM flag is cleared so
that the SMM flag in the MMU role is always synchronized with the vCPU's
flag.  If RSM fails (which isn't correctly emulated), KVM will bail
without calling post_leave_smm() and leave the MMU in a bad state.

The bad MMU role can lead to a NULL pointer dereference when grabbing a
shadow page's rmap for a page fault as the initial lookups for the gfn
will happen with the vCPU's SMM flag (=0), whereas the rmap lookup will
use the shadow page's SMM flag, which comes from the MMU (=1).  SMM has
an entirely different set of memslots, and so the initial lookup can find
a memslot (SMM=0) and then explode on the rmap memslot lookup (SMM=1).

  general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
  CPU: 1 PID: 8410 Comm: syz-executor382 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
  RIP: 0010:__gfn_to_rmap arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:935 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:gfn_to_rmap+0x2b0/0x4d0 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:947
  Code: <42> 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 ff e8 f1 79 a9 00 4c 89 fb 4d 8b 37 44
  RSP: 0018:ffffc90000ffef98 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888015b9f414 RCX: ffff888019669c40
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001
  RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffff811d9cdb R09: ffffed10065a6002
  R10: ffffed10065a6002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000
  R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  000000000124b300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000028e31000 CR4: 00000000001526e0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Call Trace:
   rmap_add arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:965 [inline]
   mmu_set_spte+0x862/0xe60 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:2604
   __direct_map arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:2862 [inline]
   direct_page_fault+0x1f74/0x2b70 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:3769
   kvm_mmu_do_page_fault arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h:124 [inline]
   kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x199/0x1440 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:5065
   vmx_handle_exit+0x26/0x160 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6122
   vcpu_enter_guest+0x3bdd/0x9630 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9428
   vcpu_run+0x416/0xc20 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9494
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x4e8/0xa40 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9722
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x70f/0xbb0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3460
   vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
   __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:1069 [inline]
   __se_sys_ioctl+0xfb/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:1055
   do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
  RIP: 0033:0x440ce9

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+fb0b6a7e8713aeb0319c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 9ec19493 ("KVM: x86: clear SMM flags before loading state while leaving SMM")
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210609185619.992058-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jun <chenjun102@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>