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  1. 12 5月, 2021 2 次提交
  3. 11 5月, 2021 4 次提交
  5. 08 5月, 2021 1 次提交
  7. 07 5月, 2021 3 次提交
    • E
      netfilter: nftables: avoid potential overflows on 32bit arches · 6c8774a9
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      User space could ask for very large hash tables, we need to make sure
our size computations wont overflow.

nf_tables_newset() needs to double check the u64 size
will fit into size_t field.

Fixes: 0ed6389c ("netfilter: nf_tables: rename set implementations")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
      6c8774a9
    • E
      netfilter: nftables: avoid overflows in nft_hash_buckets() · a54754ec
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      Number of buckets being stored in 32bit variables, we have to
ensure that no overflows occur in nft_hash_buckets()

syzbot injected a size == 0x40000000 and reported:

UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13
shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
CPU: 1 PID: 29539 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:148
 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x181 lib/ubsan.c:327
 __roundup_pow_of_two include/linux/log2.h:57 [inline]
 nft_hash_buckets net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c:411 [inline]
 nft_hash_estimate.cold+0x19/0x1e net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c:652
 nft_select_set_ops net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:3586 [inline]
 nf_tables_newset+0xe62/0x3110 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:4322
 nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xa09/0x24b0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:488
 nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:612 [inline]
 nfnetlink_rcv+0x3af/0x420 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:630
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
 netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46

Fixes: 0ed6389c ("netfilter: nf_tables: rename set implementations")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
      a54754ec
    • A
      tcp: Specify cmsgbuf is user pointer for receive zerocopy. · a6f8ee58
      由 Arjun Roy 提交于 
      A prior change (1f466e1f) introduces separate handling for
->msg_control depending on whether the pointer is a kernel or user
pointer. However, while tcp receive zerocopy is using this field, it
is not properly annotating that the buffer in this case is a user
pointer. This can cause faults when the improper mechanism is used
within put_cmsg().

This patch simply annotates tcp receive zerocopy's use as explicitly
being a user pointer.

Fixes: 7eeba170 ("tcp: Add receive timestamp support for receive zerocopy.")
Signed-off-by: NArjun Roy <arjunroy@google.com>
Acked-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506223530.2266456-1-arjunroy.kdev@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
      a6f8ee58
  9. 06 5月, 2021 5 次提交
  11. 05 5月, 2021 3 次提交
    • E
      netfilter: nfnetlink: add a missing rcu_read_unlock() · 7072a355
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      Reported by syzbot :
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:201
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 26899, name: syz-executor.5
1 lock held by syz-executor.5/26899:
 #0: ffffffff8bf797a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: nfnetlink_get_subsys net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:148 [inline]
 #0: ffffffff8bf797a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1da/0x1300 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:226
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffffff8917799e>] preempt_schedule_irq+0x3e/0x90 kernel/sched/core.c:5533
CPU: 1 PID: 26899 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210504-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 ___might_sleep.cold+0x1f1/0x237 kernel/sched/core.c:8338
 might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:201 [inline]
 slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:500 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2845 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x33d/0x3e0 mm/slub.c:2960
 __alloc_skb+0x20b/0x340 net/core/skbuff.c:413
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1107 [inline]
 nlmsg_new include/net/netlink.h:953 [inline]
 netlink_ack+0x1ed/0xaa0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2437
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x33d/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508
 nfnetlink_rcv+0x1ac/0x420 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:650
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
 netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
 do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x4665f9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fa8a03ee188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056bf60 RCX: 00000000004665f9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000480 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00000000004bfce1 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000056bf60
R13: 00007fffe864480f R14: 00007fa8a03ee300 R15: 0000000000022000

================================================
WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
5.12.0-next-20210504-syzkaller #0 Tainted: G        W
------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.5/26899 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
1 lock held by syz-executor.5/26899:
 #0: ffffffff8bf797a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: nfnetlink_get_subsys net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:148 [inline]
 #0: ffffffff8bf797a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1da/0x1300 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:226
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 26899 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:359 rcu_note_context_switch+0xfd/0x16e0 kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:359
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 26899 Comm: syz-executor.5 Tainted: G        W         5.12.0-next-20210504-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0xfd/0x16e0 kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:359
Code: 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 0f b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 2e 0d 00 00 8b bd cc 03 00 00 85 ff 7e 02 <0f> 0b 65 48 8b 2c 25 00 f0 01 00 48 8d bd cc 03 00 00 48 b8 00 00
RSP: 0000:ffffc90002fffdb0 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: ffff8880b9c36080 RCX: ffffffff8dc99bac
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88808b9d1c80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8dc96917
R10: fffffbfff1b92d22 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff88808b9d1c80 R14: ffff88808b9d1c80 R15: ffffc90002ff8000
FS:  00007fa8a03ee700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f09896ed000 CR3: 0000000032070000 CR4: 00000000001526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 __schedule+0x214/0x23e0 kernel/sched/core.c:5044
 schedule+0xcf/0x270 kernel/sched/core.c:5226
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:162 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x13e/0x280 kernel/entry/common.c:208
 irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x5/0x40 kernel/entry/common.c:314
 asm_sysvec_reschedule_ipi+0x12/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:637
RIP: 0033:0x4665f9

Fixes: 50f2db9e ("netfilter: nfnetlink: consolidate callback types")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
      7072a355
    • O
      net/nfc: fix use-after-free llcp_sock_bind/connect · c61760e6
      由 Or Cohen 提交于 
      Commits 8a4cd82d ("nfc: fix refcount leak in llcp_sock_connect()")
and c33b1cc6 ("nfc: fix refcount leak in llcp_sock_bind()")
fixed a refcount leak bug in bind/connect but introduced a
use-after-free if the same local is assigned to 2 different sockets.

This can be triggered by the following simple program:
    int sock1 = socket( AF_NFC, SOCK_STREAM, NFC_SOCKPROTO_LLCP );
    int sock2 = socket( AF_NFC, SOCK_STREAM, NFC_SOCKPROTO_LLCP );
    memset( &addr, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp) );
    addr.sa_family = AF_NFC;
    addr.nfc_protocol = NFC_PROTO_NFC_DEP;
    bind( sock1, (struct sockaddr*) &addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp) )
    bind( sock2, (struct sockaddr*) &addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp) )
    close(sock1);
    close(sock2);

Fix this by assigning NULL to llcp_sock->local after calling
nfc_llcp_local_put.

This addresses CVE-2021-23134.
Reported-by: NOr Cohen <orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com>
Reported-by: NNadav Markus <nmarkus@paloaltonetworks.com>
Fixes: c33b1cc6 ("nfc: fix refcount leak in llcp_sock_bind()")
Signed-off-by: NOr Cohen <orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c61760e6
    • J
      net: Only allow init netns to set default tcp cong to a restricted algo · 8d432592
      由 Jonathon Reinhart 提交于 
      tcp_set_default_congestion_control() is netns-safe in that it writes
to &net->ipv4.tcp_congestion_control, but it also sets
ca->flags |= TCP_CONG_NON_RESTRICTED which is not namespaced.
This has the unintended side-effect of changing the global
net.ipv4.tcp_allowed_congestion_control sysctl, despite the fact that it
is read-only: 97684f09 ("net: Make tcp_allowed_congestion_control
readonly in non-init netns")

Resolve this netns "leak" by only allowing the init netns to set the
default algorithm to one that is restricted. This restriction could be
removed if tcp_allowed_congestion_control were namespace-ified in the
future.

This bug was uncovered with
https://github.com/JonathonReinhart/linux-netns-sysctl-verify

Fixes: 6670e152 ("tcp: Namespace-ify sysctl_tcp_default_congestion_control")
Signed-off-by: NJonathon Reinhart <jonathon.reinhart@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      8d432592
  13. 04 5月, 2021 10 次提交
  15. 02 5月, 2021 2 次提交
    • C
      xprtrdma: Fix a NULL dereference in frwr_unmap_sync() · 9e895cd9
      由 Chuck Lever 提交于 
      The normal mechanism that invalidates and unmaps MRs is
frwr_unmap_async(). frwr_unmap_sync() is used only when an RPC
Reply bearing Write or Reply chunks has been lost (ie, almost
never).

Coverity found that after commit 9a301caf ("xprtrdma: Move
fr_linv_done field to struct rpcrdma_mr"), the while() loop in
frwr_unmap_sync() exits only once @mr is NULL, unconditionally
causing subsequent dereferences of @mr to Oops.

I've tested this fix by creating a client that skips invoking
frwr_unmap_async() when RPC Replies complete. That forces all
invalidation tasks to fall upon frwr_unmap_sync(). Simple workloads
with this fix applied to the adulterated client work as designed.
Reported-by: Ncoverity-bot <keescook+coverity-bot@chromium.org>
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1504556 ("Null pointer dereferences")
Fixes: 9a301caf ("xprtrdma: Move fr_linv_done field to struct rpcrdma_mr")
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
      9e895cd9
    • B
      sunrpc: Fix misplaced barrier in call_decode · f8f7e0fb
      由 Baptiste Lepers 提交于 
      Fix a misplaced barrier in call_decode. The struct rpc_rqst is modified
as follows by xprt_complete_rqst:

req->rq_private_buf.len = copied;
/* Ensure all writes are done before we update */
/* req->rq_reply_bytes_recvd */
smp_wmb();
req->rq_reply_bytes_recvd = copied;

And currently read as follows by call_decode:

smp_rmb(); // misplaced
if (!req->rq_reply_bytes_recvd)
   goto out;
req->rq_rcv_buf.len = req->rq_private_buf.len;

This patch places the smp_rmb after the if to ensure that
rq_reply_bytes_recvd and rq_private_buf.len are read in order.

Fixes: 9ba82886 ("SUNRPC: Don't try to parse incomplete RPC messages")
Signed-off-by: NBaptiste Lepers <baptiste.lepers@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
      f8f7e0fb
  17. 01 5月, 2021 8 次提交
  19. 30 4月, 2021 2 次提交
    • Y
      net: Remove redundant assignment to err · 1a70f659
      由 Yang Li 提交于 
      Variable 'err' is set to -ENOMEM but this value is never read as it is
overwritten with a new value later on, hence the 'If statements' and
assignments are redundantand and can be removed.

Cleans up the following clang-analyzer warning:

net/ipv6/seg6.c:126:4: warning: Value stored to 'err' is never read
[clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores]
Reported-by: NAbaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      1a70f659
    • Z
      bridge: Fix possible races between assigning rx_handler_data and setting IFF_BRIDGE_PORT bit · 59259ff7
      由 Zhang Zhengming 提交于 
      There is a crash in the function br_get_link_af_size_filtered,
as the port_exists(dev) is true and the rx_handler_data of dev is NULL.
But the rx_handler_data of dev is correct saved in vmcore.

The oops looks something like:
 ...
 pc : br_get_link_af_size_filtered+0x28/0x1c8 [bridge]
 ...
 Call trace:
  br_get_link_af_size_filtered+0x28/0x1c8 [bridge]
  if_nlmsg_size+0x180/0x1b0
  rtnl_calcit.isra.12+0xf8/0x148
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x334/0x370
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x64/0x130
  rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x38
  netlink_unicast+0x1f0/0x250
  netlink_sendmsg+0x310/0x378
  sock_sendmsg+0x4c/0x70
  __sys_sendto+0x120/0x150
  __arm64_sys_sendto+0x30/0x40
  el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130
  el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
  el0_svc+0x8/0xc

In br_add_if(), we found there is no guarantee that
assigning rx_handler_data to dev->rx_handler_data
will before setting the IFF_BRIDGE_PORT bit of priv_flags.
So there is a possible data competition:

CPU 0:                                                        CPU 1:
(RCU read lock)                                               (RTNL lock)
rtnl_calcit()                                                 br_add_slave()
  if_nlmsg_size()                                               br_add_if()
    br_get_link_af_size_filtered()                              -> netdev_rx_handler_register
                                                                    ...
                                                                    // The order is not guaranteed
      ...                                                           -> dev->priv_flags |= IFF_BRIDGE_PORT;
      // The IFF_BRIDGE_PORT bit of priv_flags has been set
      -> if (br_port_exists(dev)) {
        // The dev->rx_handler_data has NOT been assigned
        -> p = br_port_get_rcu(dev);
        ....
                                                                    -> rcu_assign_pointer(dev->rx_handler_data, rx_handler_data);
                                                                     ...

Fix it in br_get_link_af_size_filtered, using br_port_get_check_rcu() and checking the return value.
Signed-off-by: NZhang Zhengming <zhangzhengming@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NZhao Lei <zhaolei69@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWang Xiaogang <wangxiaogang3@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      59259ff7