Add test vector params for NIST P384, add test vector for
NIST P384 on vector of tests.

Vector param from:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5903#section-3.1Signed-off-by: NHui Tang <tanghui20@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add a comment that p192 will fail to register in FIPS mode.

Fix ecdh-nist-p192's entry in testmgr by removing the ifdefs
and not setting fips_allowed.
Signed-off-by: NHui Tang <tanghui20@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Register NIST P384 as an akcipher and extend the testmgr with
NIST P384-specific test vectors.

Summary of changes:

* crypto/ecdsa.c
  - add ecdsa_nist_p384_init_tfm
  - register and unregister P384 tfm

* crypto/testmgr.c
  - add test vector for P384 on vector of tests

* crypto/testmgr.h
  - add test vector params for P384(sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384
    and sha512)
Signed-off-by: NSaulo Alessandre <saulo.alessandre@tse.jus.br>
Tested-by: NStefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add support for parsing the parameters of a NIST P256 or NIST P192 key.
Enable signature verification using these keys. The new module is
enabled with CONFIG_ECDSA:
  Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (NIST P192, P256 etc.)
  is A NIST cryptographic standard algorithm. Only signature verification
  is implemented.

Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NStefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

1. crypto and crypto/atmel-ecc:
   Move curve id of ECDH from the key into the algorithm name instead
   in crypto and atmel-ecc, so ECDH algorithm name change form 'ecdh'
   to 'ecdh-nist-pxxx', and we cannot use 'curve_id' in 'struct ecdh';
2. crypto/testmgr and net/bluetooth:
   Modify 'testmgr.c', 'testmgr.h' and 'net/bluetooth' to adapt
   the modification.
Signed-off-by: NMeng Yu <yumeng18@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NZaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Nkernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Delete sg_data function, because sg_data function definition same as
sg_virt(), so need to delete it and use sg_virt() replace to sg_data().
Signed-off-by: NKai Ye <yekai13@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

It is not trivial to trace back why exactly the tnepres variant of
serpent was added ~17 years ago - Google searches come up mostly empty,
but it seems to be related with the 'kerneli' version, which was based
on an incorrect interpretation of the serpent spec.

In other words, nobody is likely to care anymore today, so let's get rid
of it.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Salsa20 is not used anywhere in the kernel, is not suitable for disk
encryption, and widely considered to have been superseded by ChaCha20.
So let's remove it.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NMike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Tiger is never referenced anywhere in the kernel, and unlikely
to be depended upon by userspace via AF_ALG. So let's remove it.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

RIPE-MD 320 is never referenced anywhere in the kernel, and unlikely
to be depended upon by userspace via AF_ALG. So let's remove it
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

RIPE-MD 256 is never referenced anywhere in the kernel, and unlikely
to be depended upon by userspace via AF_ALG. So let's remove it
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

RIPE-MD 128 is never referenced anywhere in the kernel, and unlikely
to be depended upon by userspace via AF_ALG. So let's remove it.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The cipher routines in the crypto API are mostly intended for templates
implementing skcipher modes generically in software, and shouldn't be
used outside of the crypto subsystem. So move the prototypes and all
related definitions to a new header file under include/crypto/internal.
Also, let's use the new module namespace feature to move the symbol
exports into a new namespace CRYPTO_INTERNAL.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Currently, by default crypto self-test failures only result in a
pr_warn() message and an "unknown" status in /proc/crypto.  Both of
these are easy to miss.  There is also an option to panic the kernel
when a test fails, but that can't be the default behavior.

A crypto self-test failure always indicates a kernel bug, however, and
there's already a standard way to report (recoverable) kernel bugs --
the WARN() family of macros.  WARNs are noisier and harder to miss, and
existing test systems already know to look for them in dmesg or via
/proc/sys/kernel/tainted.

Therefore, call WARN() when an algorithm fails its self-tests.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

When alg_test() is called from tcrypt.ko rather than from the algorithm
registration code, "driver" is actually the algorithm name, not the
driver name.  So it shouldn't be used in places where a driver name is
wanted, e.g. when reporting a test failure or when checking whether the
driver is the generic driver or not.

Fix this for the skcipher algorithm tests by getting the driver name
from the crypto_skcipher that actually got allocated.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

When alg_test() is called from tcrypt.ko rather than from the algorithm
registration code, "driver" is actually the algorithm name, not the
driver name.  So it shouldn't be used in places where a driver name is
wanted, e.g. when reporting a test failure or when checking whether the
driver is the generic driver or not.

Fix this for the AEAD algorithm tests by getting the driver name from
the crypto_aead that actually got allocated.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

When alg_test() is called from tcrypt.ko rather than from the algorithm
registration code, "driver" is actually the algorithm name, not the
driver name.  So it shouldn't be used in places where a driver name is
wanted, e.g. when reporting a test failure or when checking whether the
driver is the generic driver or not.

Fix this for the hash algorithm tests by getting the driver name from
the crypto_ahash or crypto_shash that actually got allocated.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add testmgr test vectors for SM2 algorithm. These vectors come
from `openssl pkeyutl -sign` and libgcrypt.
Signed-off-by: NTianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: NXufeng Zhang <yunbo.xufeng@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

When the 'key' allocation fails, the 'req' will not be released,
which will cause memory leakage on this path. This patch adds a
'free_req' tag used to solve this problem, and two new err values
are added to reflect the real reason of the error.
Signed-off-by: NTianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Some asymmetric algorithms will get different ciphertext after
each encryption, such as SM2, and let testmgr support the testing
of such algorithms.

In struct akcipher_testvec, set c and c_size to be empty, skip
the comparison of the ciphertext, and compare the decrypted
plaintext with m to achieve the test purpose.
Signed-off-by: NTianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: NXufeng Zhang <yunbo.xufeng@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The header file algapi.h includes skbuff.h unnecessarily since
all we need is a forward declaration for struct sk_buff.  This
patch removes that inclusion.

Unfortunately skbuff.h pulls in a lot of things and drivers over
the years have come to rely on it so this patch adds a lot of
missing inclusions that result from this.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

As said by Linus:

  A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
  Otherwise it's actively misleading.

  In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
  caller wants.

  In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
  future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
  something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.

The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.

Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.

The renaming is done by using the command sequence:

  git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
  xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'

followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]
Suggested-by: NJoe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: NWaiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Do test_aead_vs_generic_impl() before test_aead_inauthentic_inputs() so
that any differences with the generic driver are detected before getting
to the inauthentic input tests, which intentionally use only the driver
being tested (so that they run even if a generic driver is unavailable).
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

rfc4543 was missing from the list of algorithms that may treat the end
of the AAD buffer specially.

Also, with rfc4106, rfc4309, rfc4543, and rfc7539esp, the end of the AAD
buffer is actually supposed to contain a second copy of the IV, and
we've concluded that if the IV copies don't match the behavior is
implementation-defined.  So, the fuzz tests can't easily test that case.

So, make the fuzz tests only use inputs where the two IV copies match.
Reported-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Fixes: 40153b10 ("crypto: testmgr - fuzz AEADs against their generic implementation")
Cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Originally-from: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This patch enables the selftests for the s390 specific protected key
AES (PAES) cipher implementations:
  * cbc-paes-s390
  * ctr-paes-s390
  * ecb-paes-s390
  * xts-paes-s390
PAES is an AES cipher but with encrypted ('protected') key
material. However, the paes ciphers are able to derive an protected
key from clear key material with the help of the pkey kernel module.

So this patch now enables the generic AES tests for the paes
ciphers. Under the hood the setkey() functions rearrange the clear key
values as clear key token and so the pkey kernel module is able to
provide protected key blobs from the given clear key values. The
derived protected key blobs are then used within the paes cipers and
should produce the very same results as the generic AES implementation
with the clear key values.

The s390-paes cipher testlist entries are surrounded
by #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390) because they don't
make any sense on non s390 platforms or without the PAES
cipher implementation.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200213083946.zicarnnt3wizl5ty@gondor.apana.org.auAcked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NHarald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NVasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>

The whole point of using an AEAD over length-preserving encryption is
that the data is authenticated.  However currently the fuzz tests don't
test any inauthentic inputs to verify that the data is actually being
authenticated.  And only two algorithms ("rfc4543(gcm(aes))" and
"ccm(aes)") even have any inauthentic test vectors at all.

Therefore, update the AEAD fuzz tests to sometimes generate inauthentic
test vectors, either by generating a (ciphertext, AAD) pair without
using the key, or by mutating an authentic pair that was generated.

To avoid flakiness, only assume this works reliably if the auth tag is
at least 8 bytes.  Also account for the rfc4106, rfc4309, and rfc7539esp
algorithms intentionally ignoring the last 8 AAD bytes, and for some
algorithms doing extra checks that result in EINVAL rather than EBADMSG.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In preparation for adding inauthentic input fuzz tests, which don't
require that a generic implementation of the algorithm be available,
refactor test_aead_vs_generic_impl() so that instead there's a
higher-level function test_aead_extra() which initializes a struct
aead_extra_tests_ctx and then calls test_aead_vs_generic_impl() with a
pointer to that struct.

As a bonus, this reduces stack usage.

Also switch from crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->maxauthsize to
crypto_aead_maxauthsize(), now that the latter is available in
<crypto/aead.h>.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The alignment bug in ghash_setkey() fixed by commit 5c6bc4df
("crypto: ghash - fix unaligned memory access in ghash_setkey()")
wasn't reliably detected by the crypto self-tests on ARM because the
tests only set the keys directly from the test vectors.

To improve test coverage, update the tests to sometimes pass misaligned
keys to setkey().  This applies to shash, ahash, skcipher, and aead.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

When checking two implementations of the same skcipher algorithm for
consistency, require that the minimum key size be the same, not just the
maximum key size.  There's no good reason to allow different minimum key
sizes.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Currently if the comparison fuzz tests encounter an encryption error
when generating an skcipher or AEAD test vector, they will still test
the decryption side (passing it the uninitialized ciphertext buffer)
and expect it to fail with the same error.

This is sort of broken because it's not well-defined usage of the API to
pass an uninitialized buffer, and furthermore in the AEAD case it's
acceptable for the decryption error to be EBADMSG (meaning "inauthentic
input") even if the encryption error was something else like EINVAL.

Fix this for skcipher by explicitly initializing the ciphertext buffer
on error, and for AEAD by skipping the decryption test on error.
Reported-by: NPascal Van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Fixes: d435e10e ("crypto: testmgr - fuzz skciphers against their generic implementation")
Fixes: 40153b10 ("crypto: testmgr - fuzz AEADs against their generic implementation")
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Due to the removal of the blkcipher and ablkcipher algorithm types,
crypto_skcipher::keysize is now redundant since it always equals
crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->max_keysize.

Remove it and update crypto_skcipher_default_keysize() accordingly.

Also rename crypto_skcipher_default_keysize() to
crypto_skcipher_max_keysize() to clarify that it specifically returns
the maximum key size, not some unspecified "default".
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In preparation of introducing KPP implementations of Curve25519, import
the set of test cases proposed by the Zinc patch set, but converted to
the KPP format.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

As suggested by Eric for the Blake2b implementation contributed by
David, introduce a set of test vectors for Blake2s covering different
digest and key sizes.

          blake2s-128  blake2s-160  blake2s-224  blake2s-256
         ---------------------------------------------------
len=0   | klen=0       klen=1       klen=16      klen=32
len=1   | klen=16      klen=32      klen=0       klen=1
len=7   | klen=32      klen=0       klen=1       klen=16
len=15  | klen=1       klen=16      klen=32      klen=0
len=64  | klen=0       klen=1       klen=16      klen=32
len=247 | klen=16      klen=32      klen=0       klen=1
len=256 | klen=32      klen=0       klen=1       klen=16

Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Test vectors for blake2b with various digest sizes. As the algorithm is
the same up to the digest calculation, the key and input data length is
distributed in a way that tests all combinanions of the two over the
digest sizes.

Based on the suggestion from Eric, the following input sizes are tested
[0, 1, 7, 15, 64, 247, 256], where blake2b blocksize is 128, so the
padded and the non-padded input buffers are tested.

          blake2b-160  blake2b-256  blake2b-384  blake2b-512
         ---------------------------------------------------
len=0   | klen=0       klen=1       klen=32      klen=64
len=1   | klen=32      klen=64      klen=0       klen=1
len=7   | klen=64      klen=0       klen=1       klen=32
len=15  | klen=1       klen=32      klen=64      klen=0
len=64  | klen=0       klen=1       klen=32      klen=64
len=247 | klen=32      klen=64      klen=0       klen=1
len=256 | klen=64      klen=0       klen=1       klen=32

Where key:

- klen=0: empty key
- klen=1: 1 byte value 0x42, 'B'
- klen=32: first 32 bytes of the default key, sequence 00..1f
- klen=64: default key, sequence 00..3f

The unkeyed vectors are ordered before keyed, as this is required by
testmgr.

CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Added testvectors for the rfc3686(ctr(sm4)) skcipher algorithm

changes since v1:
- nothing
Signed-off-by: NPascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Added testvectors for the ofb(sm4) and cfb(sm4) skcipher algorithms

changes since v1:
- nothing
Signed-off-by: NPascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Added testvectors for the hmac(sm3) ahash authentication algorithm

changes since v1 & v2:
-nothing
Signed-off-by: NPascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add a test vector for the ESSIV mode that is the most widely used,
i.e., using cbc(aes) and sha256, in both skcipher and AEAD modes
(the latter is used by tcrypt to encapsulate the authenc template
or h/w instantiations of the same)
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Three variants of AEGIS were proposed for the CAESAR competition, and
only one was selected for the final portfolio: AEGIS128.

The other variants, AEGIS128L and AEGIS256, are not likely to ever turn
up in networking protocols or other places where interoperability
between Linux and other systems is a concern, nor are they likely to
be subjected to further cryptanalysis. However, uninformed users may
think that AEGIS128L (which is faster) is equally fit for use.

So let's remove them now, before anyone starts using them and we are
forced to support them forever.

Note that there are no known flaws in the algorithms or in any of these
implementations, but they have simply outlived their usefulness.
Reviewed-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

MORUS was not selected as a winner in the CAESAR competition, which
is not surprising since it is considered to be cryptographically
broken [0]. (Note that this is not an implementation defect, but a
flaw in the underlying algorithm). Since it is unlikely to be in use
currently, let's remove it before we're stuck with it.

[0] https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/172.pdfReviewed-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>