Patch series "ima: carry the measurement list across kexec", v8.

The TPM PCRs are only reset on a hard reboot.  In order to validate a
TPM's quote after a soft reboot (eg.  kexec -e), the IMA measurement
list of the running kernel must be saved and then restored on the
subsequent boot, possibly of a different architecture.

The existing securityfs binary_runtime_measurements file conveniently
provides a serialized format of the IMA measurement list.  This patch
set serializes the measurement list in this format and restores it.

Up to now, the binary_runtime_measurements was defined as architecture
native format.  The assumption being that userspace could and would
handle any architecture conversions.  With the ability of carrying the
measurement list across kexec, possibly from one architecture to a
different one, the per boot architecture information is lost and with it
the ability of recalculating the template digest hash.  To resolve this
problem, without breaking the existing ABI, this patch set introduces
the boot command line option "ima_canonical_fmt", which is arbitrarily
defined as little endian.

The need for this boot command line option will be limited to the
existing version 1 format of the binary_runtime_measurements.
Subsequent formats will be defined as canonical format (eg.  TPM 2.0
support for larger digests).

A simplified method of Thiago Bauermann's "kexec buffer handover" patch
series for carrying the IMA measurement list across kexec is included in
this patch set.  The simplified method requires all file measurements be
taken prior to executing the kexec load, as subsequent measurements will
not be carried across the kexec and restored.

This patch (of 10):

The IMA kexec buffer allows the currently running kernel to pass the
measurement list via a kexec segment to the kernel that will be kexec'd.
The second kernel can check whether the previous kernel sent the buffer
and retrieve it.

This is the architecture-specific part which enables IMA to receive the
measurement list passed by the previous kernel.  It will be used in the
next patch.

The change in machine_kexec_64.c is to factor out the logic of removing
an FDT memory reservation so that it can be used by remove_ima_buffer.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-2-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NThiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NEric Saint Etienne <eric.saint.etienne@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NAllen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Only s390 and powerpc have hardware facilities allowing to measure
cputimes scaled by frequency. On all other architectures
utimescaled/stimescaled are equal to utime/stime (however they are
accounted separately).

Remove {u,s}timescaled accounting on all architectures except
powerpc and s390, where those values are explicitly accounted
in the proper places.
Signed-off-by: NStanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161031162143.GB12646@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

In preparation for removing "depends on !COMPILE_TEST" from GCC_PLUGINS,
the GCC_PLUGIN_CYC_COMPLEXITY plugin needs to gain the restriction,
since it is mainly an example, and produces (intended) voluminous stderr
reporting, which is generally undesirable for allyesconfig-style build
tests. This additionally puts the plugin behind EXPERT and improves the
help text.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to
extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot time as
possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in CPU operation
(due to runtime data differences, hardware differences, SMP ordering,
thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc).

At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example for
how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals.

The need for very-early boot entropy tends to be very architecture or
system design specific, so this plugin is more suited for those sorts
of special cases. The existing kernel RNG already attempts to extract
entropy from reliable runtime variation, but this plugin takes the idea to
a logical extreme by permuting a global variable based on any variation
in code execution (e.g. a different value (and permutation function)
is used to permute the global based on loop count, case statement,
if/then/else branching, etc).

To do this, the plugin starts by inserting a local variable in every
marked function. The plugin then adds logic so that the value of this
variable is modified by randomly chosen operations (add, xor and rol) and
random values (gcc generates separate static values for each location at
compile time and also injects the stack pointer at runtime). The resulting
value depends on the control flow path (e.g., loops and branches taken).

Before the function returns, the plugin mixes this local variable into
the latent_entropy global variable. The value of this global variable
is added to the kernel entropy pool in do_one_initcall() and _do_fork(),
though it does not credit any bytes of entropy to the pool; the contents
of the global are just used to mix the pool.

Additionally, the plugin can pre-initialize arrays with build-time
random contents, so that two different kernel builds running on identical
hardware will not have the same starting values.
Signed-off-by: NEmese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
[kees: expanded commit message and code comments]
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Enabling -ffunction-sections modified the generic linker script to
pull .text.* sections into regular TEXT_TEXT section, conflicting
with some architectures. Revert that change and require archs that
enable the option to ensure they have no conflicting section names,
and do the appropriate merging.
Reported-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Tested-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Fixes: b67067f1 ("kbuild: allow archs to select link dead code/data elimination")
Signed-off-by: NNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>

Introduce LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION option for architectures to
select to build with -ffunction-sections, -fdata-sections, and link
with --gc-sections. It requires some work (documented) to ensure all
unreferenced entrypoints are live, and requires toolchain and build
verification, so it is made a per-arch option for now.

On a random powerpc64le build, this yelds a significant size saving,
it boots and runs fine, but there is a lot I haven't tested as yet, so
these savings may be reduced if there are bugs in the link.

    text      data        bss        dec   filename
11169741   1180744    1923176	14273661   vmlinux
10445269   1004127    1919707	13369103   vmlinux.dce

~700K text, ~170K data, 6% removed from kernel image size.
Signed-off-by: NNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>

ld -r is an incremental link used to create built-in.o files in build
subdirectories. It produces relocatable object files containing all
its input files, and these are are then pulled together and relocated
in the final link. Aside from the bloat, this constrains the final
link relocations, which has bitten large powerpc builds with
unresolvable relocations in the final link.

Alan Modra has recommended the kernel use thin archives for linking.
This is an alternative and means that the linker has more information
available to it when it links the kernel.

This patch enables a config option architectures can select, which
causes all built-in.o files to be built as thin archives. built-in.o
files in subdirectories do not get symbol table or index attached,
which improves speed and size. The final link pass creates a
built-in.o archive in the root output directory which includes the
symbol table and index. The linker then uses takes this file to link.

The --whole-archive linker option is required, because the linker now
has visibility to every individual object file, and it will otherwise
just completely avoid including those without external references
(consider a file with EXPORT_SYMBOL or initcall or hardware exceptions
as its only entry points). The traditional built works "by luck" as
built-in.o files are large enough that they're going to get external
references. However this optimisation is unpredictable for the kernel
(due to above external references), ineffective at culling unused, and
costly because the .o files have to be searched for references.
Superior alternatives for link-time culling should be used instead.

Build characteristics for inclink vs thinarc, on a small powerpc64le
pseries VM with a modest .config:

                                  inclink       thinarc
sizes
vmlinux                        15 618 680    15 625 028
sum of all built-in.o          56 091 808     1 054 334
sum excluding root built-in.o                   151 430

find -name built-in.o | xargs rm ; time make vmlinux
real                              22.772s       21.143s
user                              13.280s       13.430s
sys                                4.310s        2.750s

- Final kernel pulled in only about 6K more, which shows how
  ineffective the object file culling is.
- Build performance looks improved due to less pagecache activity.
  On IO constrained systems it could be a bigger win.
- Build size saving is significant.

Side note, the toochain understands archives, so there's some tricks,
$ ar t built-in.o          # list all files you linked with
$ size built-in.o          # and their sizes
$ objdump -d built-in.o    # disassembly (unrelocated) with filenames

Implementation by sfr, minor tweaks by npiggin.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>

Fixes: 8112c4f1 ("seccomp: remove 2-phase API")
Signed-off-by: NMickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y is selected, kernel stacks are allocated with
__vmalloc_node_range().

Grsecurity has had a similar feature (called GRKERNSEC_KSTACKOVERFLOW=y)
for a long time.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/14c07d4fd173a5b117f51e8b939f9f4323e39899.1470907718.git.luto@kernel.org
[ Minor edits. ]
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Fixes: 8112c4f1 ("seccomp: remove 2-phase API")
Signed-off-by: NMickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

Since adding the gcc plugin development headers is required for the
gcc plugin support, we should ease into this new kernel build dependency
more slowly. For now, disable the gcc plugins under COMPILE_TEST so that
all*config builds will skip it.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>

This creates per-architecture function arch_within_stack_frames() that
should validate if a given object is contained by a kernel stack frame.
Initial implementation is on x86.

This is based on code from PaX.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

We've had the thread info allocated together with the thread stack for
most architectures for a long time (since the thread_info was split off
from the task struct), but that is about to change.

But the patches that move the thread info to be off-stack (and a part of
the task struct instead) made it clear how confused the allocator and
freeing functions are.

Because the common case was that we share an allocation with the thread
stack and the thread_info, the two pointers were identical.  That
identity then meant that we would have things like

	ti = alloc_thread_info_node(tsk, node);
	...
	tsk->stack = ti;

which certainly _worked_ (since stack and thread_info have the same
value), but is rather confusing: why are we assigning a thread_info to
the stack? And if we move the thread_info away, the "confusing" code
just gets to be entirely bogus.

So remove all this confusion, and make it clear that we are doing the
stack allocation by renaming and clarifying the function names to be
about the stack.  The fact that the thread_info then shares the
allocation is an implementation detail, and not really about the
allocation itself.

This is a pure renaming and type fix: we pass in the same pointer, it's
just that we clarify what the pointer means.

The ia64 code that actually only has one single allocation (for all of
task_struct, thread_info and kernel thread stack) now looks a bit odd,
but since "tsk->stack" is actually not even used there, that oddity
doesn't matter.  It would be a separate thing to clean that up, I
intentionally left the ia64 changes as a pure brute-force renaming and
type change.
Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Several modern devices, such as PC/104 cards, are expected to run on
modern systems via an ISA bus interface. Since ISA is a legacy interface
for most modern architectures, ISA support should remain disabled in
general. Support for ISA-style drivers should be enabled on a per driver
basis.

To allow ISA-style drivers on modern systems, this patch introduces the
ISA_BUS_API and ISA_BUS Kconfig options. The ISA bus driver will now
build conditionally on the ISA_BUS_API Kconfig option, which defaults to
the legacy ISA Kconfig option. The ISA_BUS Kconfig option allows the
ISA_BUS_API Kconfig option to be selected on architectures which do not
enable ISA (e.g. X86_64).

The ISA_BUS Kconfig option is currently only implemented for X86
architectures. Other architectures may have their own ISA_BUS Kconfig
options added as required.
Reviewed-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NWilliam Breathitt Gray <vilhelm.gray@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The sancov gcc plugin inserts a __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() call
at the start of basic blocks.

This plugin is a helper plugin for the kcov feature. It supports
all gcc versions with plugin support (from gcc-4.5 on).
It is based on the gcc commit "Add fuzzing coverage support" by Dmitry Vyukov
(https://gcc.gnu.org/viewcvs/gcc?limit_changes=0&view=revision&revision=231296).
Signed-off-by: NEmese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>

Add a very simple plugin to demonstrate the GCC plugin infrastructure. This GCC
plugin computes the cyclomatic complexity of each function.

The complexity M of a function's control flow graph is defined as:
M = E - N + 2P
where
E = the number of edges
N = the number of nodes
P = the number of connected components (exit nodes).
Signed-off-by: NEmese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>

This patch allows to build the whole kernel with GCC plugins. It was ported from
grsecurity/PaX. The infrastructure supports building out-of-tree modules and
building in a separate directory. Cross-compilation is supported too.
Currently the x86, arm, arm64 and uml architectures enable plugins.

The directory of the gcc plugins is scripts/gcc-plugins. You can use a file or a directory
there. The plugins compile with these options:
 * -fno-rtti: gcc is compiled with this option so the plugins must use it too
 * -fno-exceptions: this is inherited from gcc too
 * -fasynchronous-unwind-tables: this is inherited from gcc too
 * -ggdb: it is useful for debugging a plugin (better backtrace on internal
    errors)
 * -Wno-narrowing: to suppress warnings from gcc headers (ipa-utils.h)
 * -Wno-unused-variable: to suppress warnings from gcc headers (gcc_version
    variable, plugin-version.h)

The infrastructure introduces a new Makefile target called gcc-plugins. It
supports all gcc versions from 4.5 to 6.0. The scripts/gcc-plugin.sh script
chooses the proper host compiler (gcc-4.7 can be built by either gcc or g++).
This script also checks the availability of the included headers in
scripts/gcc-plugins/gcc-common.h.

The gcc-common.h header contains frequently included headers for GCC plugins
and it has a compatibility layer for the supported gcc versions.

The gcc-generate-*-pass.h headers automatically generate the registration
structures for GIMPLE, SIMPLE_IPA, IPA and RTL passes.

Note that 'make clean' keeps the *.so files (only the distclean or mrproper
targets clean all) because they are needed for out-of-tree modules.

Based on work created by the PaX Team.
Signed-off-by: NEmese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>

This is just the infrastructure; there are no users yet.

This is modelled on CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM; a CONFIG_ symbol declares
the existence of <asm/hash.h>.

That file may define its own versions of various functions, and define
HAVE_* symbols (no CONFIG_ prefix!) to suppress the generic ones.

Included is a self-test (in lib/test_hash.c) that verifies the basics.
It is NOT in general required that the arch-specific functions compute
the same thing as the generic, but if a HAVE_* symbol is defined with
the value 1, then equality is tested.
Signed-off-by: NGeorge Spelvin <linux@sciencehorizons.net>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Philippe De Muyter <phdm@macq.eu>
Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org
Cc: Alistair Francis <alistai@xilinx.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: uclinux-h8-devel@lists.sourceforge.jp

The binary GCD algorithm is based on the following facts:
	1. If a and b are all evens, then gcd(a,b) = 2 * gcd(a/2, b/2)
	2. If a is even and b is odd, then gcd(a,b) = gcd(a/2, b)
	3. If a and b are all odds, then gcd(a,b) = gcd((a-b)/2, b) = gcd((a+b)/2, b)

Even on x86 machines with reasonable division hardware, the binary
algorithm runs about 25% faster (80% the execution time) than the
division-based Euclidian algorithm.

On platforms like Alpha and ARMv6 where division is a function call to
emulation code, it's even more significant.

There are two variants of the code here, depending on whether a fast
__ffs (find least significant set bit) instruction is available.  This
allows the unpredictable branches in the bit-at-a-time shifting loop to
be eliminated.

If fast __ffs is not available, the "even/odd" GCD variant is used.

I use the following code to benchmark:

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <stdint.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <time.h>
	#include <unistd.h>

	#define swap(a, b) \
		do { \
			a ^= b; \
			b ^= a; \
			a ^= b; \
		} while (0)

	unsigned long gcd0(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
	{
		unsigned long r;

		if (a < b) {
			swap(a, b);
		}

		if (b == 0)
			return a;

		while ((r = a % b) != 0) {
			a = b;
			b = r;
		}

		return b;
	}

	unsigned long gcd1(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
	{
		unsigned long r = a | b;

		if (!a || !b)
			return r;

		b >>= __builtin_ctzl(b);

		for (;;) {
			a >>= __builtin_ctzl(a);
			if (a == b)
				return a << __builtin_ctzl(r);

			if (a < b)
				swap(a, b);
			a -= b;
		}
	}

	unsigned long gcd2(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
	{
		unsigned long r = a | b;

		if (!a || !b)
			return r;

		r &= -r;

		while (!(b & r))
			b >>= 1;

		for (;;) {
			while (!(a & r))
				a >>= 1;
			if (a == b)
				return a;

			if (a < b)
				swap(a, b);
			a -= b;
			a >>= 1;
			if (a & r)
				a += b;
			a >>= 1;
		}
	}

	unsigned long gcd3(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
	{
		unsigned long r = a | b;

		if (!a || !b)
			return r;

		b >>= __builtin_ctzl(b);
		if (b == 1)
			return r & -r;

		for (;;) {
			a >>= __builtin_ctzl(a);
			if (a == 1)
				return r & -r;
			if (a == b)
				return a << __builtin_ctzl(r);

			if (a < b)
				swap(a, b);
			a -= b;
		}
	}

	unsigned long gcd4(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
	{
		unsigned long r = a | b;

		if (!a || !b)
			return r;

		r &= -r;

		while (!(b & r))
			b >>= 1;
		if (b == r)
			return r;

		for (;;) {
			while (!(a & r))
				a >>= 1;
			if (a == r)
				return r;
			if (a == b)
				return a;

			if (a < b)
				swap(a, b);
			a -= b;
			a >>= 1;
			if (a & r)
				a += b;
			a >>= 1;
		}
	}

	static unsigned long (*gcd_func[])(unsigned long a, unsigned long b) = {
		gcd0, gcd1, gcd2, gcd3, gcd4,
	};

	#define TEST_ENTRIES (sizeof(gcd_func) / sizeof(gcd_func[0]))

	#if defined(__x86_64__)

	#define rdtscll(val) do { \
		unsigned long __a,__d; \
		__asm__ __volatile__("rdtsc" : "=a" (__a), "=d" (__d)); \
		(val) = ((unsigned long long)__a) | (((unsigned long long)__d)<<32); \
	} while(0)

	static unsigned long long benchmark_gcd_func(unsigned long (*gcd)(unsigned long, unsigned long),
								unsigned long a, unsigned long b, unsigned long *res)
	{
		unsigned long long start, end;
		unsigned long long ret;
		unsigned long gcd_res;

		rdtscll(start);
		gcd_res = gcd(a, b);
		rdtscll(end);

		if (end >= start)
			ret = end - start;
		else
			ret = ~0ULL - start + 1 + end;

		*res = gcd_res;
		return ret;
	}

	#else

	static inline struct timespec read_time(void)
	{
		struct timespec time;
		clock_gettime(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, &time);
		return time;
	}

	static inline unsigned long long diff_time(struct timespec start, struct timespec end)
	{
		struct timespec temp;

		if ((end.tv_nsec - start.tv_nsec) < 0) {
			temp.tv_sec = end.tv_sec - start.tv_sec - 1;
			temp.tv_nsec = 1000000000ULL + end.tv_nsec - start.tv_nsec;
		} else {
			temp.tv_sec = end.tv_sec - start.tv_sec;
			temp.tv_nsec = end.tv_nsec - start.tv_nsec;
		}

		return temp.tv_sec * 1000000000ULL + temp.tv_nsec;
	}

	static unsigned long long benchmark_gcd_func(unsigned long (*gcd)(unsigned long, unsigned long),
								unsigned long a, unsigned long b, unsigned long *res)
	{
		struct timespec start, end;
		unsigned long gcd_res;

		start = read_time();
		gcd_res = gcd(a, b);
		end = read_time();

		*res = gcd_res;
		return diff_time(start, end);
	}

	#endif

	static inline unsigned long get_rand()
	{
		if (sizeof(long) == 8)
			return (unsigned long)rand() << 32 | rand();
		else
			return rand();
	}

	int main(int argc, char **argv)
	{
		unsigned int seed = time(0);
		int loops = 100;
		int repeats = 1000;
		unsigned long (*res)[TEST_ENTRIES];
		unsigned long long elapsed[TEST_ENTRIES];
		int i, j, k;

		for (;;) {
			int opt = getopt(argc, argv, "n:r:s:");
			/* End condition always first */
			if (opt == -1)
				break;

			switch (opt) {
			case 'n':
				loops = atoi(optarg);
				break;
			case 'r':
				repeats = atoi(optarg);
				break;
			case 's':
				seed = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
				break;
			default:
				/* You won't actually get here. */
				break;
			}
		}

		res = malloc(sizeof(unsigned long) * TEST_ENTRIES * loops);
		memset(elapsed, 0, sizeof(elapsed));

		srand(seed);
		for (j = 0; j < loops; j++) {
			unsigned long a = get_rand();
			/* Do we have args? */
			unsigned long b = argc > optind ? strtoul(argv[optind], NULL, 10) : get_rand();
			unsigned long long min_elapsed[TEST_ENTRIES];
			for (k = 0; k < repeats; k++) {
				for (i = 0; i < TEST_ENTRIES; i++) {
					unsigned long long tmp = benchmark_gcd_func(gcd_func[i], a, b, &res[j][i]);
					if (k == 0 || min_elapsed[i] > tmp)
						min_elapsed[i] = tmp;
				}
			}
			for (i = 0; i < TEST_ENTRIES; i++)
				elapsed[i] += min_elapsed[i];
		}

		for (i = 0; i < TEST_ENTRIES; i++)
			printf("gcd%d: elapsed %llu\n", i, elapsed[i]);

		k = 0;
		srand(seed);
		for (j = 0; j < loops; j++) {
			unsigned long a = get_rand();
			unsigned long b = argc > optind ? strtoul(argv[optind], NULL, 10) : get_rand();
			for (i = 1; i < TEST_ENTRIES; i++) {
				if (res[j][i] != res[j][0])
					break;
			}
			if (i < TEST_ENTRIES) {
				if (k == 0) {
					k = 1;
					fprintf(stderr, "Error:\n");
				}
				fprintf(stderr, "gcd(%lu, %lu): ", a, b);
				for (i = 0; i < TEST_ENTRIES; i++)
					fprintf(stderr, "%ld%s", res[j][i], i < TEST_ENTRIES - 1 ? ", " : "\n");
			}
		}

		if (k == 0)
			fprintf(stderr, "PASS\n");

		free(res);

		return 0;
	}

Compiled with "-O2", on "VirtualBox 4.4.0-22-generic #38-Ubuntu x86_64" got:

  zhaoxiuzeng@zhaoxiuzeng-VirtualBox:~/develop$ ./gcd -r 500000 -n 10
  gcd0: elapsed 10174
  gcd1: elapsed 2120
  gcd2: elapsed 2902
  gcd3: elapsed 2039
  gcd4: elapsed 2812
  PASS
  zhaoxiuzeng@zhaoxiuzeng-VirtualBox:~/develop$ ./gcd -r 500000 -n 10
  gcd0: elapsed 9309
  gcd1: elapsed 2280
  gcd2: elapsed 2822
  gcd3: elapsed 2217
  gcd4: elapsed 2710
  PASS
  zhaoxiuzeng@zhaoxiuzeng-VirtualBox:~/develop$ ./gcd -r 500000 -n 10
  gcd0: elapsed 9589
  gcd1: elapsed 2098
  gcd2: elapsed 2815
  gcd3: elapsed 2030
  gcd4: elapsed 2718
  PASS
  zhaoxiuzeng@zhaoxiuzeng-VirtualBox:~/develop$ ./gcd -r 500000 -n 10
  gcd0: elapsed 9914
  gcd1: elapsed 2309
  gcd2: elapsed 2779
  gcd3: elapsed 2228
  gcd4: elapsed 2709
  PASS

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: avoid #defining a CONFIG_ variable]
Signed-off-by: NZhaoxiu Zeng <zhaoxiu.zeng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NGeorge Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

printk() takes some locks and could not be used a safe way in NMI
context.

The chance of a deadlock is real especially when printing stacks from
all CPUs.  This particular problem has been addressed on x86 by the
commit a9edc880 ("x86/nmi: Perform a safe NMI stack trace on all
CPUs").

The patchset brings two big advantages.  First, it makes the NMI
backtraces safe on all architectures for free.  Second, it makes all NMI
messages almost safe on all architectures (the temporary buffer is
limited.  We still should keep the number of messages in NMI context at
minimum).

Note that there already are several messages printed in NMI context:
WARN_ON(in_nmi()), BUG_ON(in_nmi()), anything being printed out from MCE
handlers.  These are not easy to avoid.

This patch reuses most of the code and makes it generic.  It is useful
for all messages and architectures that support NMI.

The alternative printk_func is set when entering and is reseted when
leaving NMI context.  It queues IRQ work to copy the messages into the
main ring buffer in a safe context.

__printk_nmi_flush() copies all available messages and reset the buffer.
Then we could use a simple cmpxchg operations to get synchronized with
writers.  There is also used a spinlock to get synchronized with other
flushers.

We do not longer use seq_buf because it depends on external lock.  It
would be hard to make all supported operations safe for a lockless use.
It would be confusing and error prone to make only some operations safe.

The code is put into separate printk/nmi.c as suggested by Steven
Rostedt.  It needs a per-CPU buffer and is compiled only on
architectures that call nmi_enter().  This is achieved by the new
HAVE_NMI Kconfig flag.

The are MN10300 and Xtensa architectures.  We need to clean up NMI
handling there first.  Let's do it separately.

The patch is heavily based on the draft from Peter Zijlstra, see

  https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/6/10/327

[arnd@arndb.de: printk-nmi: use %zu format string for size_t]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: min_t->min - all types are size_t here]
Signed-off-by: NPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Suggested-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Suggested-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>	[arm part]
Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Define HAVE_EXIT_THREAD for archs which want to do something in
exit_thread. For others, let's define exit_thread as an empty inline.

This is a cleanup before we change the prototype of exit_thread to
accept a task parameter.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mips]
Signed-off-by: NJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <a-jacquiot@ti.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Chen Liqin <liqin.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com>
Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>
Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com>
Cc: Lennox Wu <lennox.wu@gmail.com>
Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add a CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION option which will run "objtool check" for
each .o file to ensure the validity of its stack metadata.
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/92baab69a6bf9bc7043af0bfca9fb964a1d45546.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Move the generic implementation to <linux/dma-mapping.h> now that all
architectures support it and remove the HAVE_DMA_ATTR Kconfig symbol now
that everyone supports them.

[valentinrothberg@gmail.com: remove leftovers in Kconfig]
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <a-jacquiot@ti.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com>
Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com>
Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com>
Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Sebastian Ott <sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NValentin Rothberg <valentinrothberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This series converts all remaining architectures to use dma_map_ops and
the generic implementation of the DMA API.  This not only simplifies the
code a lot, but also prepares for possible future changes like more
generic non-iommu dma_ops implementations or generic per-device
dma_map_ops.

This patch (of 16):

We have a couple architectures that do not want to support this code, so
add another Kconfig symbol that disables the code similar to what we do
for the nommu case.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com>
Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no>
Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com>
Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <a-jacquiot@ti.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Sebastian Ott <sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to
exploitation of user-space processes in the presence of security
vulnerabilities by making it more difficult to find desired code/data
which could help an attack.  This is done by adding a random offset to
the location of regions in the process address space, with a greater
range of potential offset values corresponding to better protection/a
larger search-space for brute force, but also to greater potential for
fragmentation.

The offset added to the mmap_base address, which provides the basis for
the majority of the mappings for a process, is set once on process exec
in arch_pick_mmap_layout() and is done via hard-coded per-arch values,
which reflect, hopefully, the best compromise for all systems.  The
trade-off between increased entropy in the offset value generation and
the corresponding increased variability in address space fragmentation
is not absolute, however, and some platforms may tolerate higher amounts
of entropy.  This patch introduces both new Kconfig values and a sysctl
interface which may be used to change the amount of entropy used for
offset generation on a system.

The direct motivation for this change was in response to the
libstagefright vulnerabilities that affected Android, specifically to
information provided by Google's project zero at:

  http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/09/stagefrightened.html

The attack presented therein, by Google's project zero, specifically
targeted the limited randomness used to generate the offset added to the
mmap_base address in order to craft a brute-force-based attack.
Concretely, the attack was against the mediaserver process, which was
limited to respawning every 5 seconds, on an arm device.  The hard-coded
8 bits used resulted in an average expected success rate of defeating
the mmap ASLR after just over 10 minutes (128 tries at 5 seconds a
piece).  With this patch, and an accompanying increase in the entropy
value to 16 bits, the same attack would take an average expected time of
over 45 hours (32768 tries), which makes it both less feasible and more
likely to be noticed.

The introduced Kconfig and sysctl options are limited by per-arch
minimum and maximum values, the minimum of which was chosen to match the
current hard-coded value and the maximum of which was chosen so as to
give the greatest flexibility without generating an invalid mmap_base
address, generally a 3-4 bits less than the number of bits in the
user-space accessible virtual address space.

When decided whether or not to change the default value, a system
developer should consider that mmap_base address could be placed
anywhere up to 2^(value) bits away from the non-randomized location,
which would introduce variable-sized areas above and below the mmap_base
address such that the maximum vm_area_struct size may be reduced,
preventing very large allocations.

This patch (of 4):

ASLR only uses as few as 8 bits to generate the random offset for the
mmap base address on 32 bit architectures.  This value was chosen to
prevent a poorly chosen value from dividing the address space in such a
way as to prevent large allocations.  This may not be an issue on all
platforms.  Allow the specification of a minimum number of bits so that
platforms desiring greater ASLR protection may determine where to place
the trade-off.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

There are two kexec load syscalls, kexec_load another and kexec_file_load.
 kexec_file_load has been splited as kernel/kexec_file.c.  In this patch I
split kexec_load syscall code to kernel/kexec.c.

And add a new kconfig option KEXEC_CORE, so we can disable kexec_load and
use kexec_file_load only, or vice verse.

The original requirement is from Ted Ts'o, he want kexec kernel signature
being checked with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled.  But kexec-tools use
kexec_load syscall can bypass the checking.

Vivek Goyal proposed to create a common kconfig option so user can compile
in only one syscall for loading kexec kernel.  KEXEC/KEXEC_FILE selects
KEXEC_CORE so that old config files still work.

Because there's general code need CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE, so I updated all the
architecture Kconfig with a new option KEXEC_CORE, and let KEXEC selects
KEXEC_CORE in arch Kconfig.  Also updated general kernel code with to
kexec_load syscall.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Remove CONFIG_PERCPU_RWSEM, the next patch adds the unconditional
user of percpu_rw_semaphore.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>

Add a little selftest that validates all combinations.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Don't burden architectures without dynamic task_struct sizing
with the overhead of dynamic sizing.

Also optimize the x86 code a bit by caching task_struct_size.
Acked-and-Tested-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1437128892-9831-3-git-send-email-mingo@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

clone has some of the quirkiest syscall handling in the kernel, with a
pile of special cases, historical curiosities, and architecture-specific
calling conventions.  In particular, clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts a
parameter "tls" that the C entry point completely ignores and some
assembly entry points overwrite; instead, the low-level arch-specific
code pulls the tls parameter out of the arch-specific register captured
as part of pt_regs on entry to the kernel.  That's a massive hack, and
it makes the arch-specific code only work when called via the specific
existing syscall entry points; because of this hack, any new clone-like
system call would have to accept an identical tls argument in exactly
the same arch-specific position, rather than providing a unified system
call entry point across architectures.

The first patch allows architectures to handle the tls argument via
normal C parameter passing, if they opt in by selecting
HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS.  The second patch makes 32-bit and 64-bit x86 opt
into this.

These two patches came out of the clone4 series, which isn't ready for
this merge window, but these first two cleanup patches were entirely
uncontroversial and have acks.  I'd like to go ahead and submit these
two so that other architectures can begin building on top of this and
opting into HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS.  However, I'm also happy to wait and
send these through the next merge window (along with v3 of clone4) if
anyone would prefer that.

This patch (of 2):

clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts an argument to set the thread-local
storage area for the new thread.  sys_clone declares an int argument
tls_val in the appropriate point in the argument list (based on the
various CLONE_BACKWARDS variants), but doesn't actually use or pass along
that argument.  Instead, sys_clone calls do_fork, which calls
copy_process, which calls the arch-specific copy_thread, and copy_thread
pulls the corresponding syscall argument out of the pt_regs captured at
kernel entry (knowing what argument of clone that architecture passes tls
in).

Apart from being awful and inscrutable, that also only works because only
one code path into copy_thread can pass the CLONE_SETTLS flag, and that
code path comes from sys_clone with its architecture-specific
argument-passing order.  This prevents introducing a new version of the
clone system call without propagating the same architecture-specific
position of the tls argument.

However, there's no reason to pull the argument out of pt_regs when
sys_clone could just pass it down via C function call arguments.

Introduce a new CONFIG_HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS for architectures to opt into,
and a new copy_thread_tls that accepts the tls parameter as an additional
unsigned long (syscall-argument-sized) argument.  Change sys_clone's tls
argument to an unsigned long (which does not change the ABI), and pass
that down to copy_thread_tls.

Architectures that don't opt into copy_thread_tls will continue to ignore
the C argument to sys_clone in favor of the pt_regs captured at kernel
entry, and thus will be unable to introduce new versions of the clone
syscall.

Patch co-authored by Josh Triplett and Thiago Macieira.
Signed-off-by: NJosh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thiago Macieira <thiago.macieira@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The arch_randomize_brk() function is used on several architectures,
even those that don't support ET_DYN ASLR. To avoid bulky extern/#define
tricks, consolidate the support under CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE for
the architectures that support it, while still handling CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com>
Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

When an architecture fully supports randomizing the ELF load location,
a per-arch mmap_rnd() function is used to find a randomized mmap base.
In preparation for randomizing the location of ET_DYN binaries
separately from mmap, this renames and exports these functions as
arch_mmap_rnd(). Additionally introduces CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
for describing this feature on architectures that support it
(which is a superset of ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, since s390
already supports a separated ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR without the
ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE logic).
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com>
Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add ioremap_pud_enabled() and ioremap_pmd_enabled(), which return 1 when
I/O mappings with pud/pmd are enabled on the kernel.

ioremap_huge_init() calls arch_ioremap_pud_supported() and
arch_ioremap_pmd_supported() to initialize the capabilities at boot-time.

A new kernel option "nohugeiomap" is also added, so that user can disable
the huge I/O map capabilities when necessary.
Signed-off-by: NToshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Robert Elliott <Elliott@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

By this time all architectures which support more than two page table
levels should be covered.  This patch add default definiton of
PGTABLE_LEVELS equal 2.

We also add assert to detect inconsistence between CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS
and __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED/__PAGETABLE_PUD_FOLDED.
Signed-off-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

We want to enable the hard lockup detector on ppc64, but right now
that enables the oprofile NMI timer too.

We'd prefer not to enable the oprofile NMI timer, it adds another
element to our PMU testing and it requires us to increase our
exported symbols (eg cpu_khz).

Modify the config entry for OPROFILE_NMI_TIMER to disable it on PPC64.
Signed-off-by: NAnton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Acked-by: NRobert Richter <rric@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

The description of how archs should implement seccomp filters was
still strictly correct, but it failed to describe the newly
available optimizations.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

This adds the new "seccomp" syscall with both an "operation" and "flags"
parameter for future expansion. The third argument is a pointer value,
used with the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation. Currently, flags must
be 0. This is functionally equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...).

In addition to the TSYNC flag later in this patch series, there is a
non-zero chance that this syscall could be used for configuring a fixed
argument area for seccomp-tracer-aware processes to pass syscall arguments
in the future. Hence, the use of "seccomp" not simply "seccomp_add_filter"
for this syscall. Additionally, this syscall uses operation, flags,
and user pointer for arguments because strictly passing arguments via
a user pointer would mean seccomp itself would be unable to trivially
filter the seccomp syscall itself.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>

Suggested change from Oleg Nesterov. Fixes incomplete dependencies
for uprobes feature.
Signed-off-by: NDavid A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
Acked-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>

This changes the stack protector config option into a choice of
"None", "Regular", and "Strong":

   CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE
   CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR
   CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG

"Regular" means the old CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y option.

"Strong" is a new mode introduced by this patch. With "Strong" the
kernel is built with -fstack-protector-strong (available in
gcc 4.9 and later). This option increases the coverage of the stack
protector without the heavy performance hit of -fstack-protector-all.

For reference, the stack protector options available in gcc are:

-fstack-protector-all:
  Adds the stack-canary saving prefix and stack-canary checking
  suffix to _all_ function entry and exit. Results in substantial
  use of stack space for saving the canary for deep stack users
  (e.g. historically xfs), and measurable (though shockingly still
  low) performance hit due to all the saving/checking. Really not
  suitable for sane systems, and was entirely removed as an option
  from the kernel many years ago.

-fstack-protector:
  Adds the canary save/check to functions that define an 8
  (--param=ssp-buffer-size=N, N=8 by default) or more byte local
  char array. Traditionally, stack overflows happened with
  string-based manipulations, so this was a way to find those
  functions. Very few total functions actually get the canary; no
  measurable performance or size overhead.

-fstack-protector-strong
  Adds the canary for a wider set of functions, since it's not
  just those with strings that have ultimately been vulnerable to
  stack-busting. With this superset, more functions end up with a
  canary, but it still remains small compared to all functions
  with only a small change in performance. Based on the original
  design document, a function gets the canary when it contains any
  of:

    - local variable's address used as part of the right hand side
      of an assignment or function argument
    - local variable is an array (or union containing an array),
      regardless of array type or length
    - uses register local variables

  https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/1xXBH6rRZue4f296vGt9YQcuLVQHeE516stHwt8M9xyU

Find below a comparison of "size" and "objdump" output when built with
gcc-4.9 in three configurations:

  - defconfig
	11430641 kernel text size
	36110 function bodies

  - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR
	11468490 kernel text size (+0.33%)
	1015 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (2.81%)

  - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG via this patch
	11692790 kernel text size (+2.24%)
	7401 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (20.5%)

With -strong, ARM's compressed boot code now triggers stack
protection, so a static guard was added. Since this is only used
during decompression and was never used before, the exposure
here is very small. Once it switches to the full kernel, the
stack guard is back to normal.

Chrome OS has been using -fstack-protector-strong for its kernel
builds for the last 8 months with no problems.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
[ Improved the changelog and descriptions some more. ]
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>