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  1. 23 10月, 2019 27 次提交
  3. 07 10月, 2019 1 次提交
    • L
      elf: don't use MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE for elf executable mappings · b212921b
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      In commit 4ed28639 ("fs, elf: drop MAP_FIXED usage from elf_map") we
changed elf to use MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE instead of MAP_FIXED for the
executable mappings.

Then, people reported that it broke some binaries that had overlapping
segments from the same file, and commit ad55eac7 ("elf: enforce
MAP_FIXED on overlaying elf segments") re-instated MAP_FIXED for some
overlaying elf segment cases.  But only some - despite the summary line
of that commit, it only did it when it also does a temporary brk vma for
one obvious overlapping case.

Now Russell King reports another overlapping case with old 32-bit x86
binaries, which doesn't trigger that limited case.  End result: we had
better just drop MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE entirely, and go back to MAP_FIXED.

Yes, it's a sign of old binaries generated with old tool-chains, but we
do pride ourselves on not breaking existing setups.

This still leaves MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE in place for the load_elf_interp()
and the old load_elf_library() use-cases, because nobody has reported
breakage for those. Yet.

Note that in all the cases seen so far, the overlapping elf sections
seem to be just re-mapping of the same executable with different section
attributes.  We could possibly introduce a new MAP_FIXED_NOFILECHANGE
flag or similar, which acts like NOREPLACE, but allows just remapping
the same executable file using different protection flags.

It's not clear that would make a huge difference to anything, but if
people really hate that "elf remaps over previous maps" behavior, maybe
at least a more limited form of remapping would alleviate some concerns.

Alternatively, we should take a look at our elf_map() logic to see if we
end up not mapping things properly the first time.

In the meantime, this is the minimal "don't do that then" patch while
people hopefully think about it more.
Reported-by: NRussell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Fixes: 4ed28639 ("fs, elf: drop MAP_FIXED usage from elf_map")
Fixes: ad55eac7 ("elf: enforce  MAP_FIXED on overlaying elf segments")
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b212921b
  5. 06 10月, 2019 2 次提交
    • L
      Make filldir[64]() verify the directory entry filename is valid · 8a23eb80
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      This has been discussed several times, and now filesystem people are
talking about doing it individually at the filesystem layer, so head
that off at the pass and just do it in getdents{64}().

This is partially based on a patch by Jann Horn, but checks for NUL
bytes as well, and somewhat simplified.

There's also commentary about how it might be better if invalid names
due to filesystem corruption don't cause an immediate failure, but only
an error at the end of the readdir(), so that people can still see the
filenames that are ok.

There's also been discussion about just how much POSIX strictly speaking
requires this since it's about filesystem corruption.  It's really more
"protect user space from bad behavior" as pointed out by Jann.  But
since Eric Biederman looked up the POSIX wording, here it is for context:

 "From readdir:

   The readdir() function shall return a pointer to a structure
   representing the directory entry at the current position in the
   directory stream specified by the argument dirp, and position the
   directory stream at the next entry. It shall return a null pointer
   upon reaching the end of the directory stream. The structure dirent
   defined in the <dirent.h> header describes a directory entry.

  From definitions:

   3.129 Directory Entry (or Link)

   An object that associates a filename with a file. Several directory
   entries can associate names with the same file.

  ...

   3.169 Filename

   A name consisting of 1 to {NAME_MAX} bytes used to name a file. The
   characters composing the name may be selected from the set of all
   character values excluding the slash character and the null byte. The
   filenames dot and dot-dot have special meaning. A filename is
   sometimes referred to as a 'pathname component'."

Note that I didn't bother adding the checks to any legacy interfaces
that nobody uses.

Also note that if this ends up being noticeable as a performance
regression, we can fix that to do a much more optimized model that
checks for both NUL and '/' at the same time one word at a time.

We haven't really tended to optimize 'memchr()', and it only checks for
one pattern at a time anyway, and we really _should_ check for NUL too
(but see the comment about "soft errors" in the code about why it
currently only checks for '/')

See the CONFIG_DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS case of hash_name() for how the name
lookup code looks for pathname terminating characters in parallel.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190118161440.220134-2-jannh@google.com/
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      8a23eb80
    • L
      Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user() · 9f79b78e
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      We really should avoid the "__{get,put}_user()" functions entirely,
because they can easily be mis-used and the original intent of being
used for simple direct user accesses no longer holds in a post-SMAP/PAN
world.

Manually optimizing away the user access range check makes no sense any
more, when the range check is generally much cheaper than the "enable
user accesses" code that the __{get,put}_user() functions still need.

So instead of __put_user(), use the unsafe_put_user() interface with
user_access_{begin,end}() that really does generate better code these
days, and which is generally a nicer interface.  Under some loads, the
multiple user writes that filldir() does are actually quite noticeable.

This also makes the dirent name copy use unsafe_put_user() with a couple
of macros.  We do not want to make function calls with SMAP/PAN
disabled, and the code this generates is quite good when the
architecture uses "asm goto" for unsafe_put_user() like x86 does.

Note that this doesn't bother with the legacy cases.  Nobody should use
them anyway, so performance doesn't really matter there.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      9f79b78e
  7. 04 10月, 2019 1 次提交
    • E
      vfs: Fix EOVERFLOW testing in put_compat_statfs64 · cc3a7bfe
      由 Eric Sandeen 提交于 
      Today, put_compat_statfs64() disallows nearly any field value over
2^32 if f_bsize is only 32 bits, but that makes no sense.
compat_statfs64 is there for the explicit purpose of providing 64-bit
fields for f_files, f_ffree, etc.  And f_bsize is always only 32 bits.

As a result, 32-bit userspace gets -EOVERFLOW for i.e.  large file
counts even with -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 set.

In reality, only f_bsize and f_frsize can legitimately overflow
(fields like f_type and f_namelen should never be large), so test
only those fields.

This bug was discussed at length some time ago, and this is the proposal
Al suggested at https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/8/6/640.  It seemed to get
dropped amid the discussion of other related changes, but this
part seems obviously correct on its own, so I've picked it up and
sent it, for expediency.

Fixes: 64d2ab32 ("vfs: fix put_compat_statfs64() does not handle errors")
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      cc3a7bfe
  9. 01 10月, 2019 4 次提交
  11. 30 9月, 2019 1 次提交
    • L
      Revert "Revert "ext4: make __ext4_get_inode_loc plug"" · 02f03c42
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      This reverts commit 72dbcf72.

Instead of waiting forever for entropy that may just not happen, we now
try to actively generate entropy when required, and are thus hopefully
avoiding the problem that caused the nice ext4 IO pattern fix to be
reverted.

So revert the revert.

Cc: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Alexander E. Patrakov <patrakov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      02f03c42
  13. 27 9月, 2019 4 次提交
    • Q
      btrfs: qgroup: Fix reserved data space leak if we have multiple reserve calls · d4e20494
      由 Qu Wenruo 提交于 
      [BUG]
The following script can cause btrfs qgroup data space leak:

  mkfs.btrfs -f $dev
  mount $dev -o nospace_cache $mnt

  btrfs subv create $mnt/subv
  btrfs quota en $mnt
  btrfs quota rescan -w $mnt
  btrfs qgroup limit 128m $mnt/subv

  for (( i = 0; i < 3; i++)); do
          # Create 3 64M holes for latter fallocate to fail
          truncate -s 192m $mnt/subv/file
          xfs_io -c "pwrite 64m 4k" $mnt/subv/file > /dev/null
          xfs_io -c "pwrite 128m 4k" $mnt/subv/file > /dev/null
          sync

          # it's supposed to fail, and each failure will leak at least 64M
          # data space
          xfs_io -f -c "falloc 0 192m" $mnt/subv/file &> /dev/null
          rm $mnt/subv/file
          sync
  done

  # Shouldn't fail after we removed the file
  xfs_io -f -c "falloc 0 64m" $mnt/subv/file

[CAUSE]
Btrfs qgroup data reserve code allow multiple reservations to happen on
a single extent_changeset:
E.g:
	btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data(inode, &data_reserved, 0, SZ_1M);
	btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data(inode, &data_reserved, SZ_1M, SZ_2M);
	btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data(inode, &data_reserved, 0, SZ_4M);

Btrfs qgroup code has its internal tracking to make sure we don't
double-reserve in above example.

The only pattern utilizing this feature is in the main while loop of
btrfs_fallocate() function.

However btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data()'s error handling has a bug in that
on error it clears all ranges in the io_tree with EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED
flag but doesn't free previously reserved bytes.

This bug has a two fold effect:
- Clearing EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED ranges
  This is the correct behavior, but it prevents
  btrfs_qgroup_check_reserved_leak() to catch the leakage as the
  detector is purely EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED flag based.

- Leak the previously reserved data bytes.

The bug manifests when N calls to btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data are made and
the last one fails, leaking space reserved in the previous ones.

[FIX]
Also free previously reserved data bytes when btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data
fails.

Fixes: 52472553 ("btrfs: qgroup: Introduce btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data function")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      d4e20494
    • Q
      btrfs: qgroup: Fix the wrong target io_tree when freeing reserved data space · bab32fc0
      由 Qu Wenruo 提交于 
      [BUG]
Under the following case with qgroup enabled, if some error happened
after we have reserved delalloc space, then in error handling path, we
could cause qgroup data space leakage:

From btrfs_truncate_block() in inode.c:

	ret = btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space(inode, &data_reserved,
					   block_start, blocksize);
	if (ret)
		goto out;

 again:
	page = find_or_create_page(mapping, index, mask);
	if (!page) {
		btrfs_delalloc_release_space(inode, data_reserved,
					     block_start, blocksize, true);
		btrfs_delalloc_release_extents(BTRFS_I(inode), blocksize, true);
		ret = -ENOMEM;
		goto out;
	}

[CAUSE]
In the above case, btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space() will call
btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data() and mark the io_tree range with
EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED flag.

In the error handling path, we have the following call stack:
btrfs_delalloc_release_space()
|- btrfs_free_reserved_data_space()
   |- btrsf_qgroup_free_data()
      |- __btrfs_qgroup_release_data(reserved=@reserved, free=1)
         |- qgroup_free_reserved_data(reserved=@reserved)
            |- clear_record_extent_bits();
            |- freed += changeset.bytes_changed;

However due to a completion bug, qgroup_free_reserved_data() will clear
EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED flag in BTRFS_I(inode)->io_failure_tree, other
than the correct BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree.
Since io_failure_tree is never marked with that flag,
btrfs_qgroup_free_data() will not free any data reserved space at all,
causing a leakage.

This type of error handling can only be triggered by errors outside of
qgroup code. So EDQUOT error from qgroup can't trigger it.

[FIX]
Fix the wrong target io_tree.
Reported-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Fixes: bc42bda2 ("btrfs: qgroup: Fix qgroup reserved space underflow by only freeing reserved ranges")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: NNikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      bab32fc0
    • P
      CIFS: Fix oplock handling for SMB 2.1+ protocols · a016e279
      由 Pavel Shilovsky 提交于 
      There may be situations when a server negotiates SMB 2.1
protocol version or higher but responds to a CREATE request
with an oplock rather than a lease.

Currently the client doesn't handle such a case correctly:
when another CREATE comes in the server sends an oplock
break to the initial CREATE and the client doesn't send
an ack back due to a wrong caching level being set (READ
instead of RWH). Missing an oplock break ack makes the
server wait until the break times out which dramatically
increases the latency of the second CREATE.

Fix this by properly detecting oplocks when using SMB 2.1
protocol version and higher.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
      a016e279
    • S
      smb3: missing ACL related flags · ff3ee62a
      由 Steve French 提交于 
      Various SMB3 ACL related flags (for security descriptor and
ACEs for example) were missing and some fields are different
in SMB3 and CIFS. Update cifsacl.h definitions based on
current MS-DTYP specification.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NAurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
      ff3ee62a