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  1. 15 4月, 2021 4 次提交
  3. 10 10月, 2020 1 次提交
  5. 22 9月, 2020 1 次提交
  7. 05 3月, 2020 1 次提交
  9. 27 12月, 2019 5 次提交
  11. 19 10月, 2018 1 次提交
    • W
      net: socket: fix a missing-check bug · b6168562
      由 Wenwen Wang 提交于 
      In ethtool_ioctl(), the ioctl command 'ethcmd' is checked through a switch
statement to see whether it is necessary to pre-process the ethtool
structure, because, as mentioned in the comment, the structure
ethtool_rxnfc is defined with padding. If yes, a user-space buffer 'rxnfc'
is allocated through compat_alloc_user_space(). One thing to note here is
that, if 'ethcmd' is ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL, the size of the buffer 'rxnfc' is
partially determined by 'rule_cnt', which is actually acquired from the
user-space buffer 'compat_rxnfc', i.e., 'compat_rxnfc->rule_cnt', through
get_user(). After 'rxnfc' is allocated, the data in the original user-space
buffer 'compat_rxnfc' is then copied to 'rxnfc' through copy_in_user(),
including the 'rule_cnt' field. However, after this copy, no check is
re-enforced on 'rxnfc->rule_cnt'. So it is possible that a malicious user
race to change the value in the 'compat_rxnfc->rule_cnt' between these two
copies. Through this way, the attacker can bypass the previous check on
'rule_cnt' and inject malicious data. This can cause undefined behavior of
the kernel and introduce potential security risk.

This patch avoids the above issue via copying the value acquired by
get_user() to 'rxnfc->rule_cn', if 'ethcmd' is ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL.
Signed-off-by: NWenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b6168562
  13. 14 9月, 2018 1 次提交
  15. 15 8月, 2018 1 次提交
  17. 01 8月, 2018 1 次提交
  19. 31 7月, 2018 2 次提交
  21. 29 7月, 2018 2 次提交
  23. 12 7月, 2018 2 次提交
  25. 29 6月, 2018 2 次提交
    • C
      net: handle NULL ->poll gracefully · e88958e6
      由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于 
      The big aio poll revert broke various network protocols that don't
implement ->poll as a patch in the aio poll serie removed sock_no_poll
and made the common code handle this case.

Reported-by: syzbot+57727883dbad76db2ef0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+cdb0d3176b53d35ad454@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+2c7e8f74f8b2571c87e8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Fixes: a11e1d43 ("Revert changes to convert to ->poll_mask() and aio IOCB_CMD_POLL")
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      e88958e6
    • L
      Revert changes to convert to ->poll_mask() and aio IOCB_CMD_POLL · a11e1d43
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      The poll() changes were not well thought out, and completely
unexplained.  They also caused a huge performance regression, because
"->poll()" was no longer a trivial file operation that just called down
to the underlying file operations, but instead did at least two indirect
calls.

Indirect calls are sadly slow now with the Spectre mitigation, but the
performance problem could at least be largely mitigated by changing the
"->get_poll_head()" operation to just have a per-file-descriptor pointer
to the poll head instead.  That gets rid of one of the new indirections.

But that doesn't fix the new complexity that is completely unwarranted
for the regular case.  The (undocumented) reason for the poll() changes
was some alleged AIO poll race fixing, but we don't make the common case
slower and more complex for some uncommon special case, so this all
really needs way more explanations and most likely a fundamental
redesign.

[ This revert is a revert of about 30 different commits, not reverted
  individually because that would just be unnecessarily messy  - Linus ]

Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      a11e1d43
  27. 11 6月, 2018 1 次提交
    • C
      socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr() · 6d8c50dc
      由 Cong Wang 提交于 
      fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().

As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().

sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.

Fixes: 86741ec2 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: Nshankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      6d8c50dc
  29. 26 5月, 2018 2 次提交
  31. 05 5月, 2018 1 次提交
  33. 03 4月, 2018 12 次提交