- 30 5月, 2019 3 次提交
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
echainiv is the only algorithm or template in the crypto API that is enabled by default. But there doesn't seem to be a good reason for it. And it pulls in a lot of stuff as dependencies, like AEAD support and a "NIST SP800-90A DRBG" including HMAC-SHA256. The commit which made it default 'm', commit 3491244c ("crypto: echainiv - Set Kconfig default to m"), mentioned that it's needed for IPsec. However, later commit 32b6170c ("ipv4+ipv6: Make INET*_ESP select CRYPTO_ECHAINIV") made the IPsec kconfig options select it. So, remove the 'default m'. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
The "cryptomgr" module is required for templates to be used. Many templates select it, but others don't. Make all templates select it. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
The crypto self-tests are part of the "cryptomgr" module, which can technically be disabled (though it rarely is). If you do so, currently you can still enable CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS, which doesn't make sense since in that case testmgr.c isn't compiled at all. Fix it by making it CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS depend on CRYPTO_MANAGER2, like CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS already does. Fixes: 5b2706a4 ("crypto: testmgr - introduce CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS") Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 25 4月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Vitaly Chikunov 提交于
Fix undefined symbol issue in ecrdsa_generic module when ASN1 or OID_REGISTRY aren't enabled in the config by selecting these options for CRYPTO_ECRDSA. ERROR: "asn1_ber_decoder" [crypto/ecrdsa_generic.ko] undefined! ERROR: "look_up_OID" [crypto/ecrdsa_generic.ko] undefined! Reported-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: NVitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 18 4月, 2019 3 次提交
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由 Vitaly Chikunov 提交于
Add Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (GOST R 34.10-2012, RFC 7091, ISO/IEC 14888-3) is one of the Russian (and since 2018 the CIS countries) cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST algorithms). Only signature verification is supported, with intent to be used in the IMA. Summary of the changes: * crypto/Kconfig: - EC-RDSA is added into Public-key cryptography section. * crypto/Makefile: - ecrdsa objects are added. * crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c: - Recognize EC-RDSA and Streebog OIDs. * include/linux/oid_registry.h: - EC-RDSA OIDs are added to the enum. Also, a two currently not implemented curve OIDs are added for possible extension later (to not change numbering and grouping). * crypto/ecc.c: - Kenneth MacKay copyright date is updated to 2014, because vli_mmod_slow, ecc_point_add, ecc_point_mult_shamir are based on his code from micro-ecc. - Functions needed for ecrdsa are EXPORT_SYMBOL'ed. - New functions: vli_is_negative - helper to determine sign of vli; vli_from_be64 - unpack big-endian array into vli (used for a signature); vli_from_le64 - unpack little-endian array into vli (used for a public key); vli_uadd, vli_usub - add/sub u64 value to/from vli (used for increment/decrement); mul_64_64 - optimized to use __int128 where appropriate, this speeds up point multiplication (and as a consequence signature verification) by the factor of 1.5-2; vli_umult - multiply vli by a small value (speeds up point multiplication by another factor of 1.5-2, depending on vli sizes); vli_mmod_special - module reduction for some form of Pseudo-Mersenne primes (used for the curves A); vli_mmod_special2 - module reduction for another form of Pseudo-Mersenne primes (used for the curves B); vli_mmod_barrett - module reduction using pre-computed value (used for the curve C); vli_mmod_slow - more general module reduction which is much slower (used when the modulus is subgroup order); vli_mod_mult_slow - modular multiplication; ecc_point_add - add two points; ecc_point_mult_shamir - add two points multiplied by scalars in one combined multiplication (this gives speed up by another factor 2 in compare to two separate multiplications). ecc_is_pubkey_valid_partial - additional samity check is added. - Updated vli_mmod_fast with non-strict heuristic to call optimal module reduction function depending on the prime value; - All computations for the previously defined (two NIST) curves should not unaffected. * crypto/ecc.h: - Newly exported functions are documented. * crypto/ecrdsa_defs.h - Five curves are defined. * crypto/ecrdsa.c: - Signature verification is implemented. * crypto/ecrdsa_params.asn1, crypto/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1: - Templates for BER decoder for EC-RDSA parameters and public key. Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NVitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Vitaly Chikunov 提交于
ecc.c have algorithms that could be used togeter by ecdh and ecrdsa. Make it separate module. Add CRYPTO_ECC into Kconfig. EXPORT_SYMBOL and document to what seems appropriate. Move structs ecc_point and ecc_curve from ecc_curve_defs.h into ecc.h. No code changes. Signed-off-by: NVitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Vitaly Chikunov 提交于
Group RSA, DH, and ECDH into Public-key cryptography config section. Signed-off-by: NVitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 28 3月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Geert Uytterhoeven 提交于
Fixes: ccb778e1 ("crypto: api - Add fips_enable flag") Signed-off-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Reviewed-by: NMukesh Ojha <mojha@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 22 3月, 2019 6 次提交
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由 Ondrej Mosnacek 提交于
Spotted while reviewind patches from Eric Biggers. Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Convert the x86 implementations of MORUS-1280 to use the AEAD SIMD helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided aead_request is modified. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Convert the x86 implementation of MORUS-640 to use the AEAD SIMD helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided aead_request is modified. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Convert the x86 implementation of AEGIS-256 to use the AEAD SIMD helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided aead_request is modified. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Convert the x86 implementation of AEGIS-128L to use the AEAD SIMD helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided aead_request is modified. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Convert the x86 implementation of AEGIS-128 to use the AEAD SIMD helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided aead_request is modified. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 08 2月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
To achieve more comprehensive crypto test coverage, I'd like to add fuzz tests that use random data layouts and request flags. To be most effective these tests should be part of testmgr, so they automatically run on every algorithm registered with the crypto API. However, they will take much longer to run than the current tests and therefore will only really be intended to be run by developers, whereas the current tests have a wider audience. Therefore, add a new kconfig option CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS that can be set by developers to enable these extra, expensive tests. Similar to the regular tests, also add a module parameter cryptomgr.noextratests to support disabling the tests. Finally, another module parameter cryptomgr.fuzz_iterations is added to control how many iterations the fuzz tests do. Note: for now setting this to 0 will be equivalent to cryptomgr.noextratests=1. But I opted for separate parameters to provide more flexibility to add other types of tests under the "extra tests" category in the future. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 11 1月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 haco 提交于
Fix typo "plcmul" to "pclmul" Signed-off-by: NHuaxuan Mao <minhaco@msn.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 21 12月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Masahiro Yamada 提交于
The Kconfig lexer supports special characters such as '.' and '/' in the parameter context. In my understanding, the reason is just to support bare file paths in the source statement. I do not see a good reason to complicate Kconfig for the room of ambiguity. The majority of code already surrounds file paths with double quotes, and it makes sense since file paths are constant string literals. Make it treewide consistent now. Signed-off-by: NMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: NWolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Acked-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 13 12月, 2018 4 次提交
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Now that the x86_64 SIMD implementations of ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 have been refactored to support varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12. This is identical to XChaCha20 except for the number of rounds, which is 12 instead of 20. This can be used by Adiantum. Reviewed-by: NMartin Willi <martin@strongswan.org> Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Add an XChaCha20 implementation that is hooked up to the x86_64 SIMD implementations of ChaCha20. This can be used by Adiantum. An SSSE3 implementation of single-block HChaCha20 is also added so that XChaCha20 can use it rather than the generic implementation. This required refactoring the ChaCha permutation into its own function. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Add a 64-bit AVX2 implementation of NHPoly1305, an ε-almost-∆-universal hash function used in the Adiantum encryption mode. For now, only the NH portion is actually AVX2-accelerated; the Poly1305 part is less performance-critical so is just implemented in C. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Add a 64-bit SSE2 implementation of NHPoly1305, an ε-almost-∆-universal hash function used in the Adiantum encryption mode. For now, only the NH portion is actually SSE2-accelerated; the Poly1305 part is less performance-critical so is just implemented in C. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 07 12月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Corentin Labbe 提交于
CRYPTO_STATS is using CRYPTO_USER stuff, so it should depends on it. Signed-off-by: NCorentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Herbert Xu 提交于
Since this user-space API is still undergoing significant changes, this patch disables it for the current merge window. Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 20 11月, 2018 4 次提交
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Adiantum was designed by Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper: Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12 stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single 16-byte block. On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption, and decryption about 5 times faster. Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction. Our earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only. Adiantum's εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's; consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC. This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure. Like HPolyC, Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction to ChaCha12. Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only trust ChaCha12 and AES-256. Note that the εA∆U hash function is only used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken". Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice versa. No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes. Adiantum also supports arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16 bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing". For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices. Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's. 12-round Salsa20 is also the eSTREAM recommendation. For the block cipher, Adiantum uses AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis making it the obvious first choice. Nevertheless, for flexibility this patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher. We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt, where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes such as AES-XTS. A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries, as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7. Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too slow to be viable on these devices. We did find that some "lightweight" block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial. The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each time it is overwritten. Even restricting the threat model to offline attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling. Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a "tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest possible security model for length-preserving encryption. Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the ideal solution. But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance. Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Add a generic implementation of NHPoly1305, an ε-almost-∆-universal hash function used in the Adiantum encryption mode. CONFIG_NHPOLY1305 is not selectable by itself since there won't be any real reason to enable it without also enabling Adiantum support. Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Now that the generic implementation of ChaCha20 has been refactored to allow varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12, which is the XSalsa construction applied to ChaCha12. ChaCha12 is one of the three ciphers specified by the original ChaCha paper (https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf: "ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20"), alongside ChaCha8 and ChaCha20. ChaCha12 is faster than ChaCha20 but has a lower, but still large, security margin. We need XChaCha12 support so that it can be used in the Adiantum encryption mode, which enables disk/file encryption on low-end mobile devices where AES-XTS is too slow as the CPUs lack AES instructions. We'd prefer XChaCha20 (the more popular variant), but it's too slow on some of our target devices, so at least in some cases we do need the XChaCha12-based version. In more detail, the problem is that Adiantum is still much slower than we're happy with, and encryption still has a quite noticeable effect on the feel of low-end devices. Users and vendors push back hard against encryption that degrades the user experience, which always risks encryption being disabled entirely. So we need to choose the fastest option that gives us a solid margin of security, and here that's XChaCha12. The best known attack on ChaCha breaks only 7 rounds and has 2^235 time complexity, so ChaCha12's security margin is still better than AES-256's. Much has been learned about cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers since Salsa20 was originally designed in 2005, and it now seems we can be comfortable with a smaller number of rounds. The eSTREAM project also suggests the 12-round version of Salsa20 as providing the best balance among the different variants: combining very good performance with a "comfortable margin of security". Note that it would be trivial to add vanilla ChaCha12 in addition to XChaCha12. However, it's unneeded for now and therefore is omitted. As discussed in the patch that introduced XChaCha20 support, I considered splitting the code into separate chacha-common, chacha20, xchacha20, and xchacha12 modules, so that these algorithms could be enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit to the added complexity. Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Acked-by: NMartin Willi <martin@strongswan.org> Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
Add support for the XChaCha20 stream cipher. XChaCha20 is the application of the XSalsa20 construction (https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf) to ChaCha20 rather than to Salsa20. XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce length from 64 bits (or 96 bits, depending on convention) to 192 bits, while provably retaining ChaCha20's security. XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 permutation to map the key and first 128 nonce bits to a 256-bit subkey. Then, it does the ChaCha20 stream cipher with the subkey and remaining 64 bits of nonce. We need XChaCha support in order to add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Note that to meet our performance requirements, we actually plan to primarily use the variant XChaCha12. But we believe it's wise to first add XChaCha20 as a baseline with a higher security margin, in case there are any situations where it can be used. Supporting both variants is straightforward. Since XChaCha20's subkey differs for each request, XChaCha20 can't be a template that wraps ChaCha20; that would require re-keying the underlying ChaCha20 for every request, which wouldn't be thread-safe. Instead, we make XChaCha20 its own top-level algorithm which calls the ChaCha20 streaming implementation internally. Similar to the existing ChaCha20 implementation, we define the IV to be the nonce and stream position concatenated together. This allows users to seek to any position in the stream. I considered splitting the code into separate chacha20-common, chacha20, and xchacha20 modules, so that chacha20 and xchacha20 could be enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit to the added complexity of separate modules. Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Acked-by: NMartin Willi <martin@strongswan.org> Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 16 11月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Vitaly Chikunov 提交于
Add GOST/IETF Streebog hash function (GOST R 34.11-2012, RFC 6986) generic hash transformation. Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NVitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Gilad Ben-Yossef 提交于
cts(cbc(aes)) as used in the kernel has been added to NIST standard as CBC-CS3. Document it as such. Signed-off-by: NGilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Suggested-by: NStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 09 11月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
In the "aes-fixed-time" AES implementation, disable interrupts while accessing the S-box, in order to make cache-timing attacks more difficult. Previously it was possible for the CPU to be interrupted while the S-box was loaded into L1 cache, potentially evicting the cachelines and causing later table lookups to be time-variant. In tests I did on x86 and ARM, this doesn't affect performance significantly. Responsiveness is potentially a concern, but interrupts are only disabled for a single AES block. Note that even after this change, the implementation still isn't necessarily guaranteed to be constant-time; see https://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf for a discussion of the many difficulties involved in writing truly constant-time AES software. But it's valuable to make such attacks more difficult. Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 05 10月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于
For historical reasons, the AES-NI based implementation of the PCBC chaining mode uses a special FPU chaining mode wrapper template to amortize the FPU start/stop overhead over multiple blocks. When this FPU wrapper was introduced, it supported widely used chaining modes such as XTS and CTR (as well as LRW), but currently, PCBC is the only remaining user. Since there are no known users of pcbc(aes) in the kernel, let's remove this special driver, and rely on the generic pcbc driver to encapsulate the AES-NI core cipher. Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 28 9月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Gilad Ben-Yossef 提交于
Add a generic version of output feedback mode. We already have support of several hardware based transformations of this mode and the needed test vectors but we somehow missed adding a generic software one. Fix this now. Signed-off-by: NGilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Corentin Labbe 提交于
This patch implement a generic way to get statistics about all crypto usages. Signed-off-by: NCorentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 04 9月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于
As it turns out, the AVX2 multibuffer SHA routines are currently broken [0], in a way that would have likely been noticed if this code were in wide use. Since the code is too complicated to be maintained by anyone except the original authors, and since the performance benefits for real-world use cases are debatable to begin with, it is better to drop it entirely for the moment. [0] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=153476243825350&w=2Suggested-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Megha Dey <megha.dey@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Jason A. Donenfeld 提交于
These are unused, undesired, and have never actually been used by anybody. The original authors of this code have changed their mind about its inclusion. While originally proposed for disk encryption on low-end devices, the idea was discarded [1] in favor of something else before that could really get going. Therefore, this patch removes Speck. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=153359499015659Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Acked-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 31 5月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Eric Biggers 提交于
The x86 assembly implementations of Salsa20 use the frame base pointer register (%ebp or %rbp), which breaks frame pointer convention and breaks stack traces when unwinding from an interrupt in the crypto code. Recent (v4.10+) kernels will warn about this, e.g. WARNING: kernel stack regs at 00000000a8291e69 in syzkaller047086:4677 has bad 'bp' value 000000001077994c [...] But after looking into it, I believe there's very little reason to still retain the x86 Salsa20 code. First, these are *not* vectorized (SSE2/SSSE3/AVX2) implementations, which would be needed to get anywhere close to the best Salsa20 performance on any remotely modern x86 processor; they're just regular x86 assembly. Second, it's still unclear that anyone is actually using the kernel's Salsa20 at all, especially given that now ChaCha20 is supported too, and with much more efficient SSSE3 and AVX2 implementations. Finally, in benchmarks I did on both Intel and AMD processors with both gcc 8.1.0 and gcc 4.9.4, the x86_64 salsa20-asm is actually slightly *slower* than salsa20-generic (~3% slower on Skylake, ~10% slower on Zen), while the i686 salsa20-asm is only slightly faster than salsa20-generic (~15% faster on Skylake, ~20% faster on Zen). The gcc version made little difference. So, the x86_64 salsa20-asm is pretty clearly useless. That leaves just the i686 salsa20-asm, which based on my tests provides a 15-20% speed boost. But that's without updating the code to not use %ebp. And given the maintenance cost, the small speed difference vs. salsa20-generic, the fact that few people still use i686 kernels, the doubt that anyone is even using the kernel's Salsa20 at all, and the fact that a SSE2 implementation would almost certainly be much faster on any remotely modern x86 processor yet no one has cared enough to add one yet, I don't think it's worthwhile to keep. Thus, just remove both the x86_64 and i686 salsa20-asm implementations. Reported-by: syzbot+ffa3a158337bbc01ff09@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Ondrej Mosnacek 提交于
Commit 56e8e57f ("crypto: morus - Add common SIMD glue code for MORUS") accidetally consiedered the glue code to be usable by different architectures, but it seems to be only usable on x86. This patch moves it under arch/x86/crypto and adds 'depends on X86' to the Kconfig options and also removes the prompt to hide these internal options from the user. Reported-by: Nkbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 19 5月, 2018 3 次提交
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由 Ondrej Mosnacek 提交于
This patch adds optimized implementations of MORUS-640 and MORUS-1280, utilizing the SSE2 and AVX2 x86 extensions. For MORUS-1280 (which operates on 256-bit blocks) we provide both AVX2 and SSE2 implementation. Although SSE2 MORUS-1280 is slower than AVX2 MORUS-1280, it is comparable in speed to the SSE2 MORUS-640. Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Ondrej Mosnacek 提交于
This patch adds a common glue code for optimized implementations of MORUS AEAD algorithms. Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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由 Ondrej Mosnacek 提交于
This patch adds the generic implementation of the MORUS family of AEAD algorithms (MORUS-640 and MORUS-1280). The original authors of MORUS are Hongjun Wu and Tao Huang. At the time of writing, MORUS is one of the finalists in CAESAR, an open competition intended to select a portfolio of alternatives to the problematic AES-GCM: https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html https://competitions.cr.yp.to/round3/morusv2.pdfSigned-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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