Move the driver source and Kconfig to the PCI host bridge drivers directory
and move the config option to a more appropriate sub-menu instead of
occupying the top-level location.

Update the Kconfig option with the X86_64 dependency that was implicitly
included from the previous location, and add information about the module
name when built as a loadable module.
Signed-off-by: NKeith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NBjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
CC: Jon Derrick <jonathan.derrick@intel.com>

We've unconditionally used the queued spinlock for many releases now.

Its time to remove the old ticket lock code.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Waiman Long <waiman.long@hpe.com>
Cc: Waiman.Long@hpe.com
Cc: david.vrabel@citrix.com
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160518184302.GO3193@twins.programming.kicks-ass.netSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Enable system support for the Mellanox Technologies platform, which
provides support for the next Mellanox basic systems: "msx6710",
"msx6720", "msb7700", "msn2700", "msx1410", "msn2410", "msb7800",
"msn2740", "msn2100" and also various number of derivative systems from
the above basic types.

The Kconfig controlling compilation of this code is: MLX_PLATFORM
Signed-off-by: NVadim Pasternak <vadimp@mellanox.com>
Cc: jiri@resnulli.us
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
Cc: geert@linux-m68k.org
Cc: linux@roeck-us.net
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: mchehab@kernel.org
Cc: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: kvalo@codeaurora.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474578822-33805-1-git-send-email-vadimp@mellanox.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Now that most of the thread_info users have been cleaned up,
this is straightforward.

Most of this code was written by Linus.

Originally-from: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a50eab40abeaec9cb9a9e3cbdeafd32190206654.1473801993.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

There are three usercopy warnings which are currently being silenced for
gcc 4.6 and newer:

1) "copy_from_user() buffer size is too small" compile warning/error

   This is a static warning which happens when object size and copy size
   are both const, and copy size > object size.  I didn't see any false
   positives for this one.  So the function warning attribute seems to
   be working fine here.

   Note this scenario is always a bug and so I think it should be
   changed to *always* be an error, regardless of
   CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS.

2) "copy_from_user() buffer size is not provably correct" compile warning

   This is another static warning which happens when I enable
   __compiletime_object_size() for new compilers (and
   CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS).  It happens when object size
   is const, but copy size is *not*.  In this case there's no way to
   compare the two at build time, so it gives the warning.  (Note the
   warning is a byproduct of the fact that gcc has no way of knowing
   whether the overflow function will be called, so the call isn't dead
   code and the warning attribute is activated.)

   So this warning seems to only indicate "this is an unusual pattern,
   maybe you should check it out" rather than "this is a bug".

   I get 102(!) of these warnings with allyesconfig and the
   __compiletime_object_size() gcc check removed.  I don't know if there
   are any real bugs hiding in there, but from looking at a small
   sample, I didn't see any.  According to Kees, it does sometimes find
   real bugs.  But the false positive rate seems high.

3) "Buffer overflow detected" runtime warning

   This is a runtime warning where object size is const, and copy size >
   object size.

All three warnings (both static and runtime) were completely disabled
for gcc 4.6 with the following commit:

  2fb0815c ("gcc4: disable __compiletime_object_size for GCC 4.6+")

That commit mistakenly assumed that the false positives were caused by a
gcc bug in __compiletime_object_size().  But in fact,
__compiletime_object_size() seems to be working fine.  The false
positives were instead triggered by #2 above.  (Though I don't have an
explanation for why the warnings supposedly only started showing up in
gcc 4.6.)

So remove warning #2 to get rid of all the false positives, and re-enable
warnings #1 and #3 by reverting the above commit.

Furthermore, since #1 is a real bug which is detected at compile time,
upgrade it to always be an error.

Having done all that, CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS is no longer
needed.
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Make HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_FP_TEST a normal define, independent from
kconfig.  This removes some config file pollution and simplifies the
checking for the fp test.
Suggested-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2c4e5f05054d6d367f702fd153af7a0109dd5c81.1471607358.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

This allows x86_64 kernels to enable vmapped stacks by setting
HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y - which enables the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y
high level Kconfig option.

There are a couple of interesting bits:

First, x86 lazily faults in top-level paging entries for the vmalloc
area.  This won't work if we get a page fault while trying to access
the stack: the CPU will promote it to a double-fault and we'll die.
To avoid this problem, probe the new stack when switching stacks and
forcibly populate the pgd entry for the stack when switching mms.

Second, once we have guard pages around the stack, we'll want to
detect and handle stack overflow.

I didn't enable it on x86_32.  We'd need to rework the double-fault
code a bit and I'm concerned about running out of vmalloc virtual
addresses under some workloads.

This patch, by itself, will behave somewhat erratically when the
stack overflows while RSP is still more than a few tens of bytes
above the bottom of the stack.  Specifically, we'll get #PF and make
it to no_context and them oops without reliably triggering a
double-fault, and no_context doesn't know about stack overflows.
The next patch will improve that case.

Thank you to Nadav and Brian for helping me pay enough attention to
the SDM to hopefully get this right.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c88f3e2920b18e6cc621d772a04a62c06869037e.1470907718.git.luto@kernel.org
[ Minor edits. ]
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on x86. This is done both in
copy_*_user() and __copy_*_user() because copy_*_user() actually calls
down to _copy_*_user() and not __copy_*_user().

Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: NValdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>

This creates per-architecture function arch_within_stack_frames() that
should validate if a given object is contained by a kernel stack frame.
Initial implementation is on x86.

This is based on code from PaX.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Add a new option (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING) to define
the padding used for the physical memory mapping section when KASLR
memory is enabled. It ensures there is enough virtual address space when
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is used. The default value is 10 terabytes. If
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is not used, no space is reserved increasing the
entropy available.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-10-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory regions for
x86_64. This first patch adds the infrastructure and does not randomize
any region. The following patches will randomize the physical memory
mapping, vmalloc and vmemmap regions.

This security feature mitigates exploits relying on predictable kernel
addresses. These addresses can be used to disclose the kernel modules
base addresses or corrupt specific structures to elevate privileges
bypassing the current implementation of KASLR. This feature can be
enabled with the CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY option.

The order of each memory region is not changed. The feature looks at the
available space for the regions based on different configuration options
and randomizes the base and space between each. The size of the physical
memory mapping is the available physical memory. No performance impact
was detected while testing the feature.

Entropy is generated using the KASLR early boot functions now shared in
the lib directory (originally written by Kees Cook). Randomization is
done on PGD & PUD page table levels to increase possible addresses. The
physical memory mapping code was adapted to support PUD level virtual
addresses. This implementation on the best configuration provides 30,000
possible virtual addresses in average for each memory region.  An
additional low memory page is used to ensure each CPU can start with a
PGD aligned virtual address (for realmode).

x86/dump_pagetable was updated to correctly display each region.

Updated documentation on x86_64 memory layout accordingly.

Performance data, after all patches in the series:

Kernbench shows almost no difference (-+ less than 1%):

Before:

Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.63 (1.2695)
User Time 1034.89 (1.18115) System Time 87.056 (0.456416) Percent CPU 1092.9
(13.892) Context Switches 199805 (3455.33) Sleeps 97907.8 (900.636)

After:

Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.489 (1.10636)
User Time 1034.86 (1.36053) System Time 87.764 (0.49345) Percent CPU 1095
(12.7715) Context Switches 199036 (4298.1) Sleeps 97681.6 (1031.11)

Hackbench shows 0% difference on average (hackbench 90 repeated 10 times):

attemp,before,after 1,0.076,0.069 2,0.072,0.069 3,0.066,0.066 4,0.066,0.068
5,0.066,0.067 6,0.066,0.069 7,0.067,0.066 8,0.063,0.067 9,0.067,0.065
10,0.068,0.071 average,0.0677,0.0677
Signed-off-by: NThomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

We want the physical address to be randomized anywhere between
16MB and the top of physical memory (up to 64TB).

This patch exchanges the prior slots[] array for the new slot_areas[]
array, and lifts the limitation of KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE on the physical
address offset for 64-bit. As before, process_e820_entry() walks
memory and populates slot_areas[], splitting on any detected mem_avoid
collisions.

Finally, since the slots[] array and its associated functions are not
needed any more, so they are removed.

Based on earlier patches by Baoquan He.

Originally-from: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The mc146818_get_time/mc146818_set_time functions are rather large
inline functions in a global header file and are used in several
drivers and in x86 specific code.

Here we move them into a separate .c file that is compiled whenever
any of the users require it. This also lets us remove the linux/acpi.h
header inclusion from mc146818rtc.h, which in turn avoids some
warnings about duplicate definition of the TRUE/FALSE macros.
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: NAlexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com>

We want to use the table upgrade feature in ARM64.
Introduce a new configuration option that allows that.
Signed-off-by: NAleksey Makarov <aleksey.makarov@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

Several modern devices, such as PC/104 cards, are expected to run on
modern systems via an ISA bus interface. Since ISA is a legacy interface
for most modern architectures, ISA support should remain disabled in
general. Support for ISA-style drivers should be enabled on a per driver
basis.

To allow ISA-style drivers on modern systems, this patch introduces the
ISA_BUS_API and ISA_BUS Kconfig options. The ISA bus driver will now
build conditionally on the ISA_BUS_API Kconfig option, which defaults to
the legacy ISA Kconfig option. The ISA_BUS Kconfig option allows the
ISA_BUS_API Kconfig option to be selected on architectures which do not
enable ISA (e.g. X86_64).

The ISA_BUS Kconfig option is currently only implemented for X86
architectures. Other architectures may have their own ISA_BUS Kconfig
options added as required.
Reviewed-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NWilliam Breathitt Gray <vilhelm.gray@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

This replaces:

- "select ARCH_REQUIRE_GPIOLIB" with "select GPIOLIB" as this can
  now be selected directly.

- "select ARCH_WANT_OPTIONAL_GPIOLIB" with no dependency: GPIOLIB
  is now selectable by everyone, so we need not declare our
  intent to select it.

When ordering the symbols the following rationale was used:
if the selects were in alphabetical order, I moved select GPIOLIB
to be in alphabetical order, but if the selects were not
maintained in alphabetical order, I just replaced
"select ARCH_REQUIRE_GPIOLIB" with "select GPIOLIB".
Signed-off-by: NLinus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Cc: Michael Büsch <m@bues.ch>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464870018-8281-1-git-send-email-linus.walleij@linaro.orgSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

People complained about ARCH_HWEIGHT_CFLAGS and how it throws a wrench
into kcov, lto, etc, experimentations.

Add asm versions for __sw_hweight{32,64}() and do explicit saving and
restoring of clobbered registers. This gets rid of the special calling
convention. We get to call those functions on !X86_FEATURE_POPCNT CPUs.

We still need to hardcode POPCNT and register operands as some old gas
versions which we support, do not know about POPCNT.

Btw, remove redundant REX prefix from 32-bit POPCNT because alternatives
can do padding now.
Suggested-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464605787-20603-1-git-send-email-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

This patch allows to build the whole kernel with GCC plugins. It was ported from
grsecurity/PaX. The infrastructure supports building out-of-tree modules and
building in a separate directory. Cross-compilation is supported too.
Currently the x86, arm, arm64 and uml architectures enable plugins.

The directory of the gcc plugins is scripts/gcc-plugins. You can use a file or a directory
there. The plugins compile with these options:
 * -fno-rtti: gcc is compiled with this option so the plugins must use it too
 * -fno-exceptions: this is inherited from gcc too
 * -fasynchronous-unwind-tables: this is inherited from gcc too
 * -ggdb: it is useful for debugging a plugin (better backtrace on internal
    errors)
 * -Wno-narrowing: to suppress warnings from gcc headers (ipa-utils.h)
 * -Wno-unused-variable: to suppress warnings from gcc headers (gcc_version
    variable, plugin-version.h)

The infrastructure introduces a new Makefile target called gcc-plugins. It
supports all gcc versions from 4.5 to 6.0. The scripts/gcc-plugin.sh script
chooses the proper host compiler (gcc-4.7 can be built by either gcc or g++).
This script also checks the availability of the included headers in
scripts/gcc-plugins/gcc-common.h.

The gcc-common.h header contains frequently included headers for GCC plugins
and it has a compatibility layer for the supported gcc versions.

The gcc-generate-*-pass.h headers automatically generate the registration
structures for GIMPLE, SIMPLE_IPA, IPA and RTL passes.

Note that 'make clean' keeps the *.so files (only the distclean or mrproper
targets clean all) because they are needed for out-of-tree modules.

Based on work created by the PaX Team.
Signed-off-by: NEmese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>

Commit b3c1be1b ("base: isa: Remove X86_32 dependency") made ISA
support available on x86-64 too.  That's not right - while there are
some LPC-style devices that might be useful still and be based on
ISA-like IP blocks, that is *not* an excuse to try to enable any random
legacy drivers.

Such drivers should be individually enabled and made to perhaps depend
on ISA_DMA_API instead (which we have continued to support on x86-64).
Or we could add another "ISA_XYZ_API" that we support that doesn't
enable random old drivers that aren't even 64-bit clean nor do we have
any test coverage for.

Turning off ISA will now also turn off some drivers that have been
marked as depending on it as part of this series, and that used to work
on modern platforms.

See for example commits ad7afc38..cc736607, which may also need
to be reverted.

This commit means that the warnings that came in due to enabling ISA
widely are now gone again.
Acked-by: NWilliam Breathitt Gray <vilhelm.gray@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

printk() takes some locks and could not be used a safe way in NMI
context.

The chance of a deadlock is real especially when printing stacks from
all CPUs.  This particular problem has been addressed on x86 by the
commit a9edc880 ("x86/nmi: Perform a safe NMI stack trace on all
CPUs").

The patchset brings two big advantages.  First, it makes the NMI
backtraces safe on all architectures for free.  Second, it makes all NMI
messages almost safe on all architectures (the temporary buffer is
limited.  We still should keep the number of messages in NMI context at
minimum).

Note that there already are several messages printed in NMI context:
WARN_ON(in_nmi()), BUG_ON(in_nmi()), anything being printed out from MCE
handlers.  These are not easy to avoid.

This patch reuses most of the code and makes it generic.  It is useful
for all messages and architectures that support NMI.

The alternative printk_func is set when entering and is reseted when
leaving NMI context.  It queues IRQ work to copy the messages into the
main ring buffer in a safe context.

__printk_nmi_flush() copies all available messages and reset the buffer.
Then we could use a simple cmpxchg operations to get synchronized with
writers.  There is also used a spinlock to get synchronized with other
flushers.

We do not longer use seq_buf because it depends on external lock.  It
would be hard to make all supported operations safe for a lockless use.
It would be confusing and error prone to make only some operations safe.

The code is put into separate printk/nmi.c as suggested by Steven
Rostedt.  It needs a per-CPU buffer and is compiled only on
architectures that call nmi_enter().  This is achieved by the new
HAVE_NMI Kconfig flag.

The are MN10300 and Xtensa architectures.  We need to clean up NMI
handling there first.  Let's do it separately.

The patch is heavily based on the draft from Peter Zijlstra, see

  https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/6/10/327

[arnd@arndb.de: printk-nmi: use %zu format string for size_t]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: min_t->min - all types are size_t here]
Signed-off-by: NPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Suggested-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Suggested-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>	[arm part]
Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Define HAVE_EXIT_THREAD for archs which want to do something in
exit_thread. For others, let's define exit_thread as an empty inline.

This is a cleanup before we change the prototype of exit_thread to
accept a task parameter.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mips]
Signed-off-by: NJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <a-jacquiot@ti.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Chen Liqin <liqin.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com>
Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>
Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com>
Cc: Lennox Wu <lennox.wu@gmail.com>
Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Split the HAVE_BPF_JIT into two for distinguishing cBPF and eBPF JITs.

Current cBPF ones:

  # git grep -n HAVE_CBPF_JIT arch/
  arch/arm/Kconfig:44:    select HAVE_CBPF_JIT
  arch/mips/Kconfig:18:   select HAVE_CBPF_JIT if !CPU_MICROMIPS
  arch/powerpc/Kconfig:129:       select HAVE_CBPF_JIT
  arch/sparc/Kconfig:35:  select HAVE_CBPF_JIT

Current eBPF ones:

  # git grep -n HAVE_EBPF_JIT arch/
  arch/arm64/Kconfig:61:  select HAVE_EBPF_JIT
  arch/s390/Kconfig:126:  select HAVE_EBPF_JIT if PACK_STACK && HAVE_MARCH_Z196_FEATURES
  arch/x86/Kconfig:94:    select HAVE_EBPF_JIT                    if X86_64

Later code also needs this facility to check for eBPF JITs.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The introduction of the ISA_BUS option blocks the compilation of ISA
drivers on non-x86 platforms. The ISA_BUS configuration option should
not be necessary if the X86_32 dependency can be decoupled from the ISA
configuration option. This patch both removes the ISA_BUS configuration
option entirely and removes the X86_32 dependency from the ISA
configuration option.
Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NWilliam Breathitt Gray <vilhelm.gray@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Currently CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET is used to limit the maximum
offset for kernel randomization. This limit doesn't need to be a CONFIG
since it is tied completely to KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE, and will make no sense
once physical and virtual offsets are randomized separately. This patch
removes CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET and consolidates the Kconfig
help text.

[kees: rewrote changelog, dropped KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE_DEFAULT, rewrote help]
Signed-off-by: NBaoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1461185746-8017-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Ingo says:

 "If we do a separate file we should have it in arch/x86/events/Kconfig
  (not in arch/x86/Kconfig.perf), and also move some of the other bits,
  such as PERF_EVENTS_AMD_POWER?"
Suggested-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

By default, the uncore driver will be built into the kernel. If it is
configured as a module, the supported CPU model can be auto loaded.

This patch also cleans up the code of uncore_cpu_init() and
uncore_pci_init().
Based-on-a-patch-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1458462817-2475-1-git-send-email-kan.liang@intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Many motherboards utilize a LPC to ISA bridge in order to decode
ISA-style port-mapped I/O addresses. This is particularly true for
embedded motherboards supporting the PC/104 bus (a bus specification
derived from ISA).

These motherboards are now commonly running 64-bit x86 processors. The
X86_32 dependency should be removed from the ISA bus configuration
option in order to support these newer motherboards.

A new config option, CONFIG_ISA_BUS, is introduced to allow for the
compilation of the ISA bus driver independent of the CONFIG_ISA option.
Devices which communicate via ISA-compatible buses can now be supported
independent of the dependencies of the CONFIG_ISA option.
Signed-off-by: NWilliam Breathitt Gray <vilhelm.gray@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing).  Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system.  A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/).  However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.

kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible.  It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g.  scheduler, locking).

Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes.  Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch).  I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.

This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side.  The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.

We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:

  https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs

We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation".  For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.

Why not gcov.  Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat.  A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g.  an invalid
input).  In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M).  Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges.  On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.

kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure.  But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.

Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Introduce an AMD accumlated power reporting mechanism for the Family
15h, Model 60h processor that can be used to calculate the average
power consumed by a processor during a measurement interval. The
feature support is indicated by CPUID Fn8000_0007_EDX[12].

This feature will be implemented both in hwmon and perf. The current
design provides one event to report per package/processor power
consumption by counting each compute unit power value.

Here the gory details of how the computation is done:

* Tsample: compute unit power accumulator sample period
* Tref: the PTSC counter period (PTSC: performance timestamp counter)
* N: the ratio of compute unit power accumulator sample period to the
  PTSC period

* Jmax: max compute unit accumulated power which is indicated by
  MSR_C001007b[MaxCpuSwPwrAcc]

* Jx/Jy: compute unit accumulated power which is indicated by
  MSR_C001007a[CpuSwPwrAcc]

* Tx/Ty: the value of performance timestamp counter which is indicated
  by CU_PTSC MSR_C0010280[PTSC]
* PwrCPUave: CPU average power

i. Determine the ratio of Tsample to Tref by executing CPUID Fn8000_0007.
	N = value of CPUID Fn8000_0007_ECX[CpuPwrSampleTimeRatio[15:0]].

ii. Read the full range of the cumulative energy value from the new
    MSR MaxCpuSwPwrAcc.
	Jmax = value returned.

iii. At time x, software reads CpuSwPwrAcc and samples the PTSC.
	Jx = value read from CpuSwPwrAcc and Tx = value read from PTSC.

iv. At time y, software reads CpuSwPwrAcc and samples the PTSC.
	Jy = value read from CpuSwPwrAcc and Ty = value read from PTSC.

v. Calculate the average power consumption for a compute unit over
time period (y-x). Unit of result is uWatt:

	if (Jy < Jx) // Rollover has occurred
		Jdelta = (Jy + Jmax) - Jx
	else
		Jdelta = Jy - Jx
	PwrCPUave = N * Jdelta * 1000 / (Ty - Tx)

Simple example:

  root@hr-zp:/home/ray/tip# ./tools/perf/perf stat -a -e 'power/power-pkg/' make -j4
    CHK     include/config/kernel.release
    CHK     include/generated/uapi/linux/version.h
    CHK     include/generated/utsrelease.h
    CHK     include/generated/timeconst.h
    CHK     include/generated/bounds.h
    CHK     include/generated/asm-offsets.h
    CALL    scripts/checksyscalls.sh
    CHK     include/generated/compile.h
    SKIPPED include/generated/compile.h
    Building modules, stage 2.
  Kernel: arch/x86/boot/bzImage is ready  (#40)
    MODPOST 4225 modules

   Performance counter stats for 'system wide':

              183.44 mWatts power/power-pkg/

       341.837270111 seconds time elapsed

  root@hr-zp:/home/ray/tip# ./tools/perf/perf stat -a -e 'power/power-pkg/' sleep 10

   Performance counter stats for 'system wide':

                0.18 mWatts power/power-pkg/

        10.012551815 seconds time elapsed
Suggested-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Suggested-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NHuang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: jacob.w.shin@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1457502306-2559-1-git-send-email-ray.huang@amd.com
[ Fixed the modular build. ]
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Include pci/hotplug/Kconfig directly from pci/Kconfig, so arches don't
have to source both pci/Kconfig and pci/hotplug/Kconfig.

Note that this effectively adds pci/hotplug/Kconfig to the following
arches, because they already sourced drivers/pci/Kconfig but they
previously did not source drivers/pci/hotplug/Kconfig:

  alpha
  arm
  avr32
  frv
  m68k
  microblaze
  mn10300
  sparc
  unicore32

Inspired-by-patch-from: Bogicevic Sasa <brutallesale@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NBjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>

Include pci/pcie/Kconfig directly from pci/Kconfig, so arches don't
have to source both pci/Kconfig and pci/pcie/Kconfig.

Note that this effectively adds pci/pcie/Kconfig to the following
arches, because they already sourced drivers/pci/Kconfig but they
previously did not source drivers/pci/pcie/Kconfig:

  alpha
  avr32
  blackfin
  frv
  m32r
  m68k
  microblaze
  mn10300
  parisc
  sparc
  unicore32
  xtensa

[bhelgaas: changelog, source pci/pcie/Kconfig at top of pci/Kconfig, whitespace]
Signed-off-by: NSasa Bogicevic <brutallesale@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NBjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>

Set HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION to enable stack metadata validation for
x86_64.
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cdaeb6914d00a070c0f455cd06989bf3f787a2f6.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

This removes the CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA option and makes it always enabled.

This simplifies the code and also makes it clearer that read-only mapped
memory is just as fundamental a security feature in kernel-space as it is
in user-space.
Suggested-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Brown <david.brown@linaro.org>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455748879-21872-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The syscall-level code is passed a protection key and need to
return an appropriate error code if the protection key is bogus.
We will be using this in subsequent patches.

Note that this also begins a series of arch-specific calls that
we need to expose in otherwise arch-independent code.  We create
a linux/pkeys.h header where we will put *all* the stubs for
these functions.
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210232.774EEAAB@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

I don't have a strong opinion on whether we need this or not.
Protection Keys has relatively little code associated with it,
and it is not a heavyweight feature to keep enabled.  However,
I can imagine that folks would still appreciate being able to
disable it.

Here's the option if folks want it.
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210228.7E79386C@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

vma->vm_flags is an 'unsigned long', so has space for 32 flags
on 32-bit architectures.  The high 32 bits are unused on 64-bit
platforms.  We've steered away from using the unused high VMA
bits for things because we would have difficulty supporting it
on 32-bit.

Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode, so there is
no concern about supporting this feature in 32-bit mode or on
32-bit CPUs.

This patch carves out 4 bits from the high half of
vma->vm_flags and allows architectures to set config option
to make them available.

Sparse complains about these constants unless we explicitly
call them "UL".
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Valentin Rothberg <valentinrothberg@gmail.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210208.81AF00D5@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Looks like the HPET spec at intel.com got moved.
It isn't hard to find so drop the link, just mention
the revision assumed.
Suggested-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455145462-3877-1-git-send-email-mst@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

I don't have a strong opinion on whether we need a Kconfig prompt
or not.  Protection Keys has relatively little code associated
with it, and it is not a heavyweight feature to keep enabled.
However, I can imagine that folks would still appreciate being
able to disable it.

Note that, with disabled-features.h, the checks in the code
for protection keys are always the same:

	cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PKU)

With the config option disabled, this essentially turns into an

We will hide the prompt for now.
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210200.DB7055E8@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

arch/x86/built-in.o: In function `uv_bios_call':
(.text+0xeba00): undefined reference to `efi_call'
Reported-by: Nkbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Suggested-by: N"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Acked-by: NAlex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Thomas Voegtle reported that doing oldconfig with a .config which has
CONFIG_MICROCODE enabled but BLK_DEV_INITRD disabled prevents the
microcode loading mechanism from being built.

So untangle it from the BLK_DEV_INITRD dependency so that oldconfig
doesn't turn it off and add an explanatory text to its Kconfig help what
the supported methods for supplying microcode are.
Reported-by: NThomas Voegtle <tv@lio96.de>
Tested-by: NThomas Voegtle <tv@lio96.de>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.4
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1454499225-21544-2-git-send-email-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>