Skip to content

K
Kernel

openeuler / Kernel
大约 1 年 前同步成功

通知 5
Star 0
Fork 0
K
Kernel

体验新版 GitCode，发现更多精彩内容 >>

切换分支/标签
  1. 09 5月, 2017 1 次提交
  3. 25 12月, 2016 1 次提交
  5. 17 11月, 2016 1 次提交
    • A
      xattr: Fix setting security xattrs on sockfs · 4a590153
      由 Andreas Gruenbacher 提交于 
      The IOP_XATTR flag is set on sockfs because sockfs supports getting the
"system.sockprotoname" xattr.  Since commit 6c6ef9f2, this flag is checked for
setxattr support as well.  This is wrong on sockfs because security xattr
support there is supposed to be provided by security_inode_setsecurity.  The
smack security module relies on socket labels (xattrs).

Fix this by adding a security xattr handler on sockfs that returns
-EAGAIN, and by checking for -EAGAIN in setxattr.

We cannot simply check for -EOPNOTSUPP in setxattr because there are
filesystems that neither have direct security xattr support nor support
via security_inode_setsecurity.  A more proper fix might be to move the
call to security_inode_setsecurity into sockfs, but it's not clear to me
if that is safe: we would end up calling security_inode_post_setxattr after
that as well.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      4a590153
  7. 08 10月, 2016 7 次提交
  9. 07 10月, 2016 1 次提交
  11. 06 7月, 2016 1 次提交
    • E
      vfs: Don't modify inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs · 0bd23d09
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      When a filesystem outside of init_user_ns is mounted it could have
uids and gids stored in it that do not map to init_user_ns.

The plan is to allow those filesystems to set i_uid to INVALID_UID and
i_gid to INVALID_GID for unmapped uids and gids and then to handle
that strange case in the vfs to ensure there is consistent robust
handling of the weirdness.

Upon a careful review of the vfs and filesystems about the only case
where there is any possibility of confusion or trouble is when the
inode is written back to disk.  In that case filesystems typically
read the inode->i_uid and inode->i_gid and write them to disk even
when just an inode timestamp is being updated.

Which leads to a rule that is very simple to implement and understand
inodes whose i_uid or i_gid is not valid may not be written.

In dealing with access times this means treat those inodes as if the
inode flag S_NOATIME was set.  Reads of the inodes appear safe and
useful, but any write or modification is disallowed.  The only inode
write that is allowed is a chown that sets the uid and gid on the
inode to valid values.  After such a chown the inode is normal and may
be treated as such.

Denying all writes to inodes with uids or gids unknown to the vfs also
prevents several oddball cases where corruption would have occurred
because the vfs does not have complete information.

One problem case that is prevented is attempting to use the gid of a
directory for new inodes where the directories sgid bit is set but the
directories gid is not mapped.

Another problem case avoided is attempting to update the evm hash
after setxattr, removexattr, and setattr.  As the evm hash includeds
the inode->i_uid or inode->i_gid not knowning the uid or gid prevents
a correct evm hash from being computed.  evm hash verification also
fails when i_uid or i_gid is unknown but that is essentially harmless
as it does not cause filesystem corruption.
Acked-by: NSeth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      0bd23d09
  13. 28 5月, 2016 2 次提交
  15. 26 5月, 2016 2 次提交
  17. 11 4月, 2016 2 次提交
  19. 20 2月, 2016 1 次提交
  21. 23 1月, 2016 1 次提交
    • A
      wrappers for ->i_mutex access · 5955102c
      由 Al Viro 提交于 
      parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested},
inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex).

Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle
->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held
only shared.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      5955102c
  23. 09 1月, 2016 1 次提交
  25. 14 12月, 2015 2 次提交
  27. 07 12月, 2015 4 次提交
  29. 14 11月, 2015 2 次提交
    • A
      9p: xattr simplifications · e409de99
      由 Andreas Gruenbacher 提交于 
      Now that the xattr handler is passed to the xattr handler operations, we
can use the same get and set operations for the user, trusted, and security
xattr namespaces.  In those namespaces, we can access the full attribute
name by "reattaching" the name prefix the vfs has skipped for us.  Add a
xattr_full_name helper to make this obvious in the code.

For the "system.posix_acl_access" and "system.posix_acl_default"
attributes, handler->prefix is the full attribute name; the suffix is the
empty string.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Cc: Ron Minnich <rminnich@sandia.gov>
Cc: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net>
Cc: v9fs-developer@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      e409de99
    • A
      xattr handlers: Pass handler to operations instead of flags · d9a82a04
      由 Andreas Gruenbacher 提交于 
      The xattr_handler operations are currently all passed a file system
specific flags value which the operations can use to disambiguate between
different handlers; some file systems use that to distinguish the xattr
namespace, for example.  In some oprations, it would be useful to also have
access to the handler prefix.  To allow that, pass a pointer to the handler
to operations instead of the flags value alone.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      d9a82a04
  31. 22 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  33. 20 11月, 2014 1 次提交
    • A
      new helper: audit_file() · 9f45f5bf
      由 Al Viro 提交于 
      ... for situations when we don't have any candidate in pathnames - basically,
in descriptor-based syscalls.

[Folded the build fix for !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL configs from Chen Gang]
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      9f45f5bf
  35. 13 10月, 2014 1 次提交
    • E
      vfs: Deduplicate code shared by xattr system calls operating on paths · 8cc43116
      由 Eric Biggers 提交于 
      The following pairs of system calls dealing with extended attributes only
differ in their behavior on whether the symbolic link is followed (when
the named file is a symbolic link):

- setxattr() and lsetxattr()
- getxattr() and lgetxattr()
- listxattr() and llistxattr()
- removexattr() and lremovexattr()

Despite this, the implementations all had duplicated code, so this commit
redirects each of the above pairs of system calls to a corresponding
function to which different lookup flags (LOOKUP_FOLLOW or 0) are passed.

For me this reduced the stripped size of xattr.o from 8824 to 8248 bytes.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      8cc43116
  37. 24 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  39. 21 12月, 2012 7 次提交