1. 28 1月, 2008 1 次提交
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  16. 05 12月, 2007 2 次提交
    • E
      VM/Security: add security hook to do_brk · 5a211a5d
      Eric Paris 提交于
      Given a specifically crafted binary do_brk() can be used to get low
      pages available in userspace virtually memory and can thus be used to
      circumvent the mmap_min_addr low memory protection.  Add security checks
      in do_brk().
      Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NAlan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      5a211a5d
    • E
      Security: round mmap hint address above mmap_min_addr · 7cd94146
      Eric Paris 提交于
      If mmap_min_addr is set and a process attempts to mmap (not fixed) with a
      non-null hint address less than mmap_min_addr the mapping will fail the
      security checks.  Since this is just a hint address this patch will round
      such a hint address above mmap_min_addr.
      
      gcj was found to try to be very frugal with vm usage and give hint addresses
      in the 8k-32k range.  Without this patch all such programs failed and with
      the patch they happily get a higher address.
      
      This patch is wrappad in CONFIG_SECURITY since mmap_min_addr doesn't exist
      without it and there would be no security check possible no matter what.  So
      we should not bother compiling in this rounding if it is just a waste of
      time.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      7cd94146
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