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  1. 09 9月, 2017 1 次提交
  3. 07 9月, 2017 1 次提交
    • R
      x86,mpx: make mpx depend on x86-64 to free up VMA flag · df3735c5
      由 Rik van Riel 提交于 
      Patch series "mm,fork,security: introduce MADV_WIPEONFORK", v4.

If a child process accesses memory that was MADV_WIPEONFORK, it will get
zeroes.  The address ranges are still valid, they are just empty.

If a child process accesses memory that was MADV_DONTFORK, it will get a
segmentation fault, since those address ranges are no longer valid in
the child after fork.

Since MADV_DONTFORK also seems to be used to allow very large programs
to fork in systems with strict memory overcommit restrictions, changing
the semantics of MADV_DONTFORK might break existing programs.

The use case is libraries that store or cache information, and want to
know that they need to regenerate it in the child process after fork.

Examples of this would be:
 - systemd/pulseaudio API checks (fail after fork) (replacing a getpid
   check, which is too slow without a PID cache)
 - PKCS#11 API reinitialization check (mandated by specification)
 - glibc's upcoming PRNG (reseed after fork)
 - OpenSSL PRNG (reseed after fork)

The security benefits of a forking server having a re-inialized PRNG in
every child process are pretty obvious.  However, due to libraries
having all kinds of internal state, and programs getting compiled with
many different versions of each library, it is unreasonable to expect
calling programs to re-initialize everything manually after fork.

A further complication is the proliferation of clone flags, programs
bypassing glibc's functions to call clone directly, and programs calling
unshare, causing the glibc pthread_atfork hook to not get called.

It would be better to have the kernel take care of this automatically.

The patchset also adds MADV_KEEPONFORK, to undo the effects of a prior
MADV_WIPEONFORK.

This is similar to the OpenBSD minherit syscall with MAP_INHERIT_ZERO:

    https://man.openbsd.org/minherit.2

This patch (of 2):

MPX only seems to be available on 64 bit CPUs, starting with Skylake and
Goldmont.  Move VM_MPX into the 64 bit only portion of vma->vm_flags, in
order to free up a VMA flag.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170811212829.29186-2-riel@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Colm MacCártaigh <colm@allcosts.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      df3735c5
  5. 31 8月, 2017 1 次提交
    • V
      x86/mm: Enable RCU based page table freeing (CONFIG_HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE=y) · 9e52fc2b
      由 Vitaly Kuznetsov 提交于 
      There's a subtle bug in how some of the paravirt guest code handles
page table freeing on x86:

On x86 software page table walkers depend on the fact that remote TLB flush
does an IPI: walk is performed lockless but with interrupts disabled and in
case the page table is freed the freeing CPU will get blocked as remote TLB
flush is required. On other architectures which don't require an IPI to do
remote TLB flush we have an RCU-based mechanism (see
include/asm-generic/tlb.h for more details).

In virtualized environments we may want to override the ->flush_tlb_others
callback in pv_mmu_ops and use a hypercall asking the hypervisor to do a
remote TLB flush for us. This breaks the assumption about IPIs. Xen PV has
been doing this for years and the upcoming remote TLB flush for Hyper-V will
do it too.

This is not safe, as software page table walkers may step on an already
freed page.

Fix the bug by enabling the RCU-based page table freeing mechanism,
CONFIG_HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE=y.

Testing with kernbench and mmap/munmap microbenchmarks, and neither showed
any noticeable performance impact.
Suggested-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Jork Loeser <Jork.Loeser@microsoft.com>
Cc: KY Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170828082251.5562-1-vkuznets@redhat.com
[ Rewrote/fixed/clarified the changelog. ]
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      9e52fc2b
  7. 29 8月, 2017 1 次提交
    • I
      locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Disable CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT for the time being · 7b3d61cc
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      Mike Galbraith bisected a boot crash back to the following commit:

  7a46ec0e ("locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection")

The crash/hang pattern is:

 > Symptom is a few splats as below, with box finally hanging.  Network
 > comes up, but neither ssh nor console login is possible.
 >
 >  ------------[ cut here ]------------
 >  WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 0 at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:374 netlink_sock_destruct+0x82/0xa0
 >  ...
 >  __sk_destruct()
 >  rcu_process_callbacks()
 >  __do_softirq()
 >  irq_exit()
 >  smp_apic_timer_interrupt()
 >  apic_timer_interrupt()

We are at -rc7 already, and the code has grown some dependencies, so
instead of a plain revert disable the config temporarily, in the hope
of getting real fixes.
Reported-by: NMike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Tested-by: NMike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/tip-7a46ec0e2f4850407de5e1d19a44edee6efa58ec@git.kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      7b3d61cc
  9. 24 8月, 2017 1 次提交
  11. 19 8月, 2017 1 次提交
  13. 18 8月, 2017 1 次提交
    • T
      kernel/watchdog: Prevent false positives with turbo modes · 7edaeb68
      由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于 
      The hardlockup detector on x86 uses a performance counter based on unhalted
CPU cycles and a periodic hrtimer. The hrtimer period is about 2/5 of the
performance counter period, so the hrtimer should fire 2-3 times before the
performance counter NMI fires. The NMI code checks whether the hrtimer
fired since the last invocation. If not, it assumess a hard lockup.

The calculation of those periods is based on the nominal CPU
frequency. Turbo modes increase the CPU clock frequency and therefore
shorten the period of the perf/NMI watchdog. With extreme Turbo-modes (3x
nominal frequency) the perf/NMI period is shorter than the hrtimer period
which leads to false positives.

A simple fix would be to shorten the hrtimer period, but that comes with
the side effect of more frequent hrtimer and softlockup thread wakeups,
which is not desired.

Implement a low pass filter, which checks the perf/NMI period against
kernel time. If the perf/NMI fires before 4/5 of the watchdog period has
elapsed then the event is ignored and postponed to the next perf/NMI.

That solves the problem and avoids the overhead of shorter hrtimer periods
and more frequent softlockup thread wakeups.

Fixes: 58687acb ("lockup_detector: Combine nmi_watchdog and softlockup detector")
Reported-and-tested-by: NKan Liang <Kan.liang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: dzickus@redhat.com
Cc: prarit@redhat.com
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: babu.moger@oracle.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: eranian@google.com
Cc: acme@redhat.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: atomlin@redhat.com
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1708150931310.1886@nanos
      7edaeb68
  15. 17 8月, 2017 1 次提交
    • K
      locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection · 7a46ec0e
      由 Kees Cook 提交于 
      This implements refcount_t overflow protection on x86 without a noticeable
performance impact, though without the fuller checking of REFCOUNT_FULL.

This is done by duplicating the existing atomic_t refcount implementation
but with normally a single instruction added to detect if the refcount
has gone negative (e.g. wrapped past INT_MAX or below zero). When detected,
the handler saturates the refcount_t to INT_MIN / 2. With this overflow
protection, the erroneous reference release that would follow a wrap back
to zero is blocked from happening, avoiding the class of refcount-overflow
use-after-free vulnerabilities entirely.

Only the overflow case of refcounting can be perfectly protected, since
it can be detected and stopped before the reference is freed and left to
be abused by an attacker. There isn't a way to block early decrements,
and while REFCOUNT_FULL stops increment-from-zero cases (which would
be the state _after_ an early decrement and stops potential double-free
conditions), this fast implementation does not, since it would require
the more expensive cmpxchg loops. Since the overflow case is much more
common (e.g. missing a "put" during an error path), this protection
provides real-world protection. For example, the two public refcount
overflow use-after-free exploits published in 2016 would have been
rendered unexploitable:

  http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-kernel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/

  http://cyseclabs.com/page?n=02012016

This implementation does, however, notice an unchecked decrement to zero
(i.e. caller used refcount_dec() instead of refcount_dec_and_test() and it
resulted in a zero). Decrements under zero are noticed (since they will
have resulted in a negative value), though this only indicates that a
use-after-free may have already happened. Such notifications are likely
avoidable by an attacker that has already exploited a use-after-free
vulnerability, but it's better to have them reported than allow such
conditions to remain universally silent.

On first overflow detection, the refcount value is reset to INT_MIN / 2
(which serves as a saturation value) and a report and stack trace are
produced. When operations detect only negative value results (such as
changing an already saturated value), saturation still happens but no
notification is performed (since the value was already saturated).

On the matter of races, since the entire range beyond INT_MAX but before
0 is negative, every operation at INT_MIN / 2 will trap, leaving no
overflow-only race condition.

As for performance, this implementation adds a single "js" instruction
to the regular execution flow of a copy of the standard atomic_t refcount
operations. (The non-"and_test" refcount_dec() function, which is uncommon
in regular refcount design patterns, has an additional "jz" instruction
to detect reaching exactly zero.) Since this is a forward jump, it is by
default the non-predicted path, which will be reinforced by dynamic branch
prediction. The result is this protection having virtually no measurable
change in performance over standard atomic_t operations. The error path,
located in .text.unlikely, saves the refcount location and then uses UD0
to fire a refcount exception handler, which resets the refcount, handles
reporting, and returns to regular execution. This keeps the changes to
.text size minimal, avoiding return jumps and open-coded calls to the
error reporting routine.

Example assembly comparison:

refcount_inc() before:

  .text:
  ffffffff81546149:       f0 ff 45 f4             lock incl -0xc(%rbp)

refcount_inc() after:

  .text:
  ffffffff81546149:       f0 ff 45 f4             lock incl -0xc(%rbp)
  ffffffff8154614d:       0f 88 80 d5 17 00       js     ffffffff816c36d3
  ...
  .text.unlikely:
  ffffffff816c36d3:       48 8d 4d f4             lea    -0xc(%rbp),%rcx
  ffffffff816c36d7:       0f ff                   (bad)

These are the cycle counts comparing a loop of refcount_inc() from 1
to INT_MAX and back down to 0 (via refcount_dec_and_test()), between
unprotected refcount_t (atomic_t), fully protected REFCOUNT_FULL
(refcount_t-full), and this overflow-protected refcount (refcount_t-fast):

  2147483646 refcount_inc()s and 2147483647 refcount_dec_and_test()s:
		    cycles		protections
  atomic_t           82249267387	none
  refcount_t-fast    82211446892	overflow, untested dec-to-zero
  refcount_t-full   144814735193	overflow, untested dec-to-zero, inc-from-zero

This code is a modified version of the x86 PAX_REFCOUNT atomic_t
overflow defense from the last public patch of PaX/grsecurity, based
on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original
code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Thanks
to PaX Team for various suggestions for improvement for repurposing this
code to be a refcount-only protection.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arozansk@redhat.com
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170815161924.GA133115@beastSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      7a46ec0e
  17. 02 8月, 2017 1 次提交
  19. 26 7月, 2017 2 次提交
    • J
      x86/kconfig: Consolidate unwinders into multiple choice selection · 81d38719
      由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于 
      There are three mutually exclusive unwinders.  Make that more obvious by
combining them into a multiple-choice selection:

  CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER_UNWINDER
  CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER
  CONFIG_GUESS_UNWINDER (if CONFIG_EXPERT=y)

Frame pointers are still the default (for now).

The old CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER option is still used in some
arch-independent places, so keep it around, but make it
invisible to the user on x86 - it's now selected by
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER_UNWINDER=y.
Suggested-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170725135424.zukjmgpz3plf5pmt@trebleSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      81d38719
    • J
      x86/unwind: Add the ORC unwinder · ee9f8fce
      由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于 
      Add the new ORC unwinder which is enabled by CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER=y.
It plugs into the existing x86 unwinder framework.

It relies on objtool to generate the needed .orc_unwind and
.orc_unwind_ip sections.

For more details on why ORC is used instead of DWARF, see
Documentation/x86/orc-unwinder.txt - but the short version is
that it's a simplified, fundamentally more robust debugninfo
data structure, which also allows up to two orders of magnitude
faster lookups than the DWARF unwinder - which matters to
profiling workloads like perf.

Thanks to Andy Lutomirski for the performance improvement ideas:
splitting the ORC unwind table into two parallel arrays and creating a
fast lookup table to search a subset of the unwind table.
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0a6cbfb40f8da99b7a45a1a8302dc6aef16ec812.1500938583.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
[ Extended the changelog. ]
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      ee9f8fce
  21. 21 7月, 2017 1 次提交
  23. 18 7月, 2017 2 次提交
    • T
      x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs · f88a68fa
      由 Tom Lendacky 提交于 
      Add early_memremap() support to be able to specify encrypted and
decrypted mappings with and without write-protection. The use of
write-protection is necessary when encrypting data "in place". The
write-protect attribute is considered cacheable for loads, but not
stores. This implies that the hardware will never give the core a
dirty line with this memtype.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/479b5832c30fae3efa7932e48f81794e86397229.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      f88a68fa
    • T
      x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support · 7744ccdb
      由 Tom Lendacky 提交于 
      Add support for Secure Memory Encryption (SME). This initial support
provides a Kconfig entry to build the SME support into the kernel and
defines the memory encryption mask that will be used in subsequent
patches to mark pages as encrypted.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a6c34d16caaed3bc3e2d6f0987554275bd291554.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      7744ccdb
  25. 13 7月, 2017 2 次提交
    • D
      include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions · 6974f0c4
      由 Daniel Micay 提交于 
      This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc
_FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer
overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the
size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time.  Unlike glibc,
it covers buffer reads in addition to writes.

GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a
much more complex implementation.  They aren't designed to detect read
overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based
on inline checks.  Inline checks don't add up to much code size and
allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need
for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper
overhead.

This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and
some non-x86 core kernel code.  There will likely be issues caught in
regular use at runtime too.

Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity,
as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally:

* Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet
  place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of
  the source buffer.

* Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat.

* It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for
  some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like
  glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative
  approach to avoid likely compatibility issues.

* The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config
  option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough
  time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed.

Kees said:
 "This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have
  blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size
  argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for
  out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already"

[arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de
[keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast
[keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NDaniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      6974f0c4
    • N
      kernel/watchdog: split up config options · 05a4a952
      由 Nicholas Piggin 提交于 
      Split SOFTLOCKUP_DETECTOR from LOCKUP_DETECTOR, and split
HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF from HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR.

LOCKUP_DETECTOR implies the general boot, sysctl, and programming
interfaces for the lockup detectors.

An architecture that wants to use a hard lockup detector must define
HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF or HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH.

Alternatively an arch can define HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG, which provides the
minimum arch_touch_nmi_watchdog, and it otherwise does its own thing and
does not implement the LOCKUP_DETECTOR interfaces.

sparc is unusual in that it has started to implement some of the
interfaces, but not fully yet.  It should probably be converted to a full
HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH.

[npiggin@gmail.com: fix]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170617223522.66c0ad88@roar.ozlabs.ibm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170616065715.18390-4-npiggin@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NDon Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NBabu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com>	[sparc]
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      05a4a952
  27. 07 7月, 2017 2 次提交
    • A
      mm/hugetlb: clean up ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE · e1073d1e
      由 Aneesh Kumar K.V 提交于 
      This moves the #ifdef in C code to a Kconfig dependency.  Also we move
the gigantic_page_supported() function to be arch specific.

This allows architectures to conditionally enable runtime allocation of
gigantic huge page.  Architectures like ppc64 supports different
gigantic huge page size (16G and 1G) based on the translation mode
selected.  This provides an opportunity for ppc64 to enable runtime
allocation only w.r.t 1G hugepage.

No functional change in this patch.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1494995292-4443-1-git-send-email-aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NAneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      e1073d1e
    • H
      mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP during swap out · 38d8b4e6
      由 Huang Ying 提交于 
      Patch series "THP swap: Delay splitting THP during swapping out", v11.

This patchset is to optimize the performance of Transparent Huge Page
(THP) swap.

Recently, the performance of the storage devices improved so fast that
we cannot saturate the disk bandwidth with single logical CPU when do
page swap out even on a high-end server machine.  Because the
performance of the storage device improved faster than that of single
logical CPU.  And it seems that the trend will not change in the near
future.  On the other hand, the THP becomes more and more popular
because of increased memory size.  So it becomes necessary to optimize
THP swap performance.

The advantages of the THP swap support include:

 - Batch the swap operations for the THP to reduce lock
   acquiring/releasing, including allocating/freeing the swap space,
   adding/deleting to/from the swap cache, and writing/reading the swap
   space, etc. This will help improve the performance of the THP swap.

 - The THP swap space read/write will be 2M sequential IO. It is
   particularly helpful for the swap read, which are usually 4k random
   IO. This will improve the performance of the THP swap too.

 - It will help the memory fragmentation, especially when the THP is
   heavily used by the applications. The 2M continuous pages will be
   free up after THP swapping out.

 - It will improve the THP utilization on the system with the swap
   turned on. Because the speed for khugepaged to collapse the normal
   pages into the THP is quite slow. After the THP is split during the
   swapping out, it will take quite long time for the normal pages to
   collapse back into the THP after being swapped in. The high THP
   utilization helps the efficiency of the page based memory management
   too.

There are some concerns regarding THP swap in, mainly because possible
enlarged read/write IO size (for swap in/out) may put more overhead on
the storage device.  To deal with that, the THP swap in should be turned
on only when necessary.  For example, it can be selected via
"always/never/madvise" logic, to be turned on globally, turned off
globally, or turned on only for VMA with MADV_HUGEPAGE, etc.

This patchset is the first step for the THP swap support.  The plan is
to delay splitting THP step by step, finally avoid splitting THP during
the THP swapping out and swap out/in the THP as a whole.

As the first step, in this patchset, the splitting huge page is delayed
from almost the first step of swapping out to after allocating the swap
space for the THP and adding the THP into the swap cache.  This will
reduce lock acquiring/releasing for the locks used for the swap cache
management.

With the patchset, the swap out throughput improves 15.5% (from about
3.73GB/s to about 4.31GB/s) in the vm-scalability swap-w-seq test case
with 8 processes.  The test is done on a Xeon E5 v3 system.  The swap
device used is a RAM simulated PMEM (persistent memory) device.  To test
the sequential swapping out, the test case creates 8 processes, which
sequentially allocate and write to the anonymous pages until the RAM and
part of the swap device is used up.

This patch (of 5):

In this patch, splitting huge page is delayed from almost the first step
of swapping out to after allocating the swap space for the THP
(Transparent Huge Page) and adding the THP into the swap cache.  This
will batch the corresponding operation, thus improve THP swap out
throughput.

This is the first step for the THP swap optimization.  The plan is to
delay splitting the THP step by step and avoid splitting the THP
finally.

In this patch, one swap cluster is used to hold the contents of each THP
swapped out.  So, the size of the swap cluster is changed to that of the
THP (Transparent Huge Page) on x86_64 architecture (512).  For other
architectures which want such THP swap optimization,
ARCH_USES_THP_SWAP_CLUSTER needs to be selected in the Kconfig file for
the architecture.  In effect, this will enlarge swap cluster size by 2
times on x86_64.  Which may make it harder to find a free cluster when
the swap space becomes fragmented.  So that, this may reduce the
continuous swap space allocation and sequential write in theory.  The
performance test in 0day shows no regressions caused by this.

In the future of THP swap optimization, some information of the swapped
out THP (such as compound map count) will be recorded in the
swap_cluster_info data structure.

The mem cgroup swap accounting functions are enhanced to support charge
or uncharge a swap cluster backing a THP as a whole.

The swap cluster allocate/free functions are added to allocate/free a
swap cluster for a THP.  A fair simple algorithm is used for swap
cluster allocation, that is, only the first swap device in priority list
will be tried to allocate the swap cluster.  The function will fail if
the trying is not successful, and the caller will fallback to allocate a
single swap slot instead.  This works good enough for normal cases.  If
the difference of the number of the free swap clusters among multiple
swap devices is significant, it is possible that some THPs are split
earlier than necessary.  For example, this could be caused by big size
difference among multiple swap devices.

The swap cache functions is enhanced to support add/delete THP to/from
the swap cache as a set of (HPAGE_PMD_NR) sub-pages.  This may be
enhanced in the future with multi-order radix tree.  But because we will
split the THP soon during swapping out, that optimization doesn't make
much sense for this first step.

The THP splitting functions are enhanced to support to split THP in swap
cache during swapping out.  The page lock will be held during allocating
the swap cluster, adding the THP into the swap cache and splitting the
THP.  So in the code path other than swapping out, if the THP need to be
split, the PageSwapCache(THP) will be always false.

The swap cluster is only available for SSD, so the THP swap optimization
in this patchset has no effect for HDD.

[ying.huang@intel.com: fix two issues in THP optimize patch]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87k25ed8zo.fsf@yhuang-dev.intel.com
[hannes@cmpxchg.org: extensive cleanups and simplifications, reduce code size]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170515112522.32457-2-ying.huang@intel.comSigned-off-by: N"Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Suggested-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> [for config option]
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> [for changes in huge_memory.c and huge_mm.h]
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Ebru Akagunduz <ebru.akagunduz@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      38d8b4e6
  29. 02 7月, 2017 1 次提交
  31. 29 6月, 2017 1 次提交
  33. 23 6月, 2017 2 次提交
  35. 14 6月, 2017 1 次提交
  37. 13 6月, 2017 1 次提交
  39. 10 6月, 2017 1 次提交
    • D
      x86, uaccess: introduce copy_from_iter_flushcache for pmem / cache-bypass operations · 0aed55af
      由 Dan Williams 提交于 
      The pmem driver has a need to transfer data with a persistent memory
destination and be able to rely on the fact that the destination writes are not
cached. It is sufficient for the writes to be flushed to a cpu-store-buffer
(non-temporal / "movnt" in x86 terms), as we expect userspace to call fsync()
to ensure data-writes have reached a power-fail-safe zone in the platform. The
fsync() triggers a REQ_FUA or REQ_FLUSH to the pmem driver which will turn
around and fence previous writes with an "sfence".

Implement a __copy_from_user_inatomic_flushcache, memcpy_page_flushcache, and
memcpy_flushcache, that guarantee that the destination buffer is not dirty in
the cpu cache on completion. The new copy_from_iter_flushcache and sub-routines
will be used to replace the "pmem api" (include/linux/pmem.h +
arch/x86/include/asm/pmem.h). The availability of copy_from_iter_flushcache()
and memcpy_flushcache() are gated by the CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE
config symbol, and fallback to copy_from_iter_nocache() and plain memcpy()
otherwise.

This is meant to satisfy the concern from Linus that if a driver wants to do
something beyond the normal nocache semantics it should be something private to
that driver [1], and Al's concern that anything uaccess related belongs with
the rest of the uaccess code [2].

The first consumer of this interface is a new 'copy_from_iter' dax operation so
that pmem can inject cache maintenance operations without imposing this
overhead on other dax-capable drivers.

[1]: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/linux-nvdimm/2017-January/008364.html
[2]: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/linux-nvdimm/2017-April/009942.html

Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
      0aed55af
  41. 09 6月, 2017 1 次提交
  43. 05 6月, 2017 1 次提交
    • A
      x86/mm: Remove the UP asm/tlbflush.h code, always use the (formerly) SMP code · ce4a4e56
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      The UP asm/tlbflush.h generates somewhat nicer code than the SMP version.
Aside from that, it's fallen quite a bit behind the SMP code:

 - flush_tlb_mm_range() didn't flush individual pages if the range
   was small.

 - The lazy TLB code was much weaker.  This usually wouldn't matter,
   but, if a kernel thread flushed its lazy "active_mm" more than
   once (due to reclaim or similar), it wouldn't be unlazied and
   would instead pointlessly flush repeatedly.

 - Tracepoints were missing.

Aside from that, simply having the UP code around was a maintanence
burden, since it means that any change to the TLB flush code had to
make sure not to break it.

Simplify everything by deleting the UP code.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      ce4a4e56
  45. 24 5月, 2017 1 次提交
  47. 27 4月, 2017 2 次提交
  49. 23 4月, 2017 1 次提交
    • I
      Revert "x86/mm/gup: Switch GUP to the generic get_user_page_fast() implementation" · 6dd29b3d
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      This reverts commit 2947ba05.

Dan Williams reported dax-pmem kernel warnings with the following signature:

   WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 245 at lib/percpu-refcount.c:155 percpu_ref_switch_to_atomic_rcu+0x1f5/0x200
   percpu ref (dax_pmem_percpu_release [dax_pmem]) <= 0 (0) after switching to atomic

... and bisected it to this commit, which suggests possible memory corruption
caused by the x86 fast-GUP conversion.

He also pointed out:

 "
  This is similar to the backtrace when we were not properly handling
  pud faults and was fixed with this commit: 220ced16 "mm: fix
  get_user_pages() vs device-dax pud mappings"

  I've found some missing _devmap checks in the generic
  get_user_pages_fast() path, but this does not fix the regression
  [...]
 "

So given that there are known bugs, and a pretty robust looking bisection
points to this commit suggesting that are unknown bugs in the conversion
as well, revert it for the time being - we'll re-try in v4.13.
Reported-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: dann.frazier@canonical.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: steve.capper@linaro.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      6dd29b3d
  51. 18 4月, 2017 1 次提交
    • I
      x86: Enable KASLR by default · 6807c846
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      KASLR is mature (and important) enough to be enabled by default on x86.

Also enable it by default in the defconfigs.
Acked-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: dave.jiang@intel.com
Cc: dyoung@redhat.com
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      6807c846
  53. 04 4月, 2017 1 次提交
  55. 30 3月, 2017 1 次提交
  57. 28 3月, 2017 1 次提交
  59. 24 3月, 2017 1 次提交
  61. 18 3月, 2017 1 次提交
  63. 13 3月, 2017 1 次提交
    • D
      x86/mm: Introduce mmap_compat_base() for 32-bit mmap() · 1b028f78
      由 Dmitry Safonov 提交于 
      mmap() uses a base address, from which it starts to look for a free space
for allocation.

The base address is stored in mm->mmap_base, which is calculated during
exec(). The address depends on task's size, set rlimit for stack, ASLR
randomization. The base depends on the task size and the number of random
bits which are different for 64-bit and 32bit applications.

Due to the fact, that the base address is fixed, its mmap() from a compat
(32bit) syscall issued by a 64bit task will return a address which is based
on the 64bit base address and does not fit into the 32bit address space
(4GB). The returned pointer is truncated to 32bit, which results in an
invalid address.

To solve store a seperate compat address base plus a compat legacy address
base in mm_struct. These bases are calculated at exec() time and can be
used later to address the 32bit compat mmap() issued by 64 bit
applications.

As a consequence of this change 32-bit applications issuing a 64-bit
syscall (after doing a long jump) will get a 64-bit mapping now. Before
this change 32-bit applications always got a 32bit mapping.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog and added a comment ]
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: 0x7f454c46@gmail.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306141721.9188-4-dsafonov@virtuozzo.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      1b028f78
  65. 08 3月, 2017 1 次提交
    • J
      stacktrace/x86: add function for detecting reliable stack traces · af085d90
      由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于 
      For live patching and possibly other use cases, a stack trace is only
useful if it can be assured that it's completely reliable.  Add a new
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() function to achieve that.

Note that if the target task isn't the current task, and the target task
is allowed to run, then it could be writing the stack while the unwinder
is reading it, resulting in possible corruption.  So the caller of
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() must ensure that the task is either
'current' or inactive.

save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() relies on the x86 unwinder's detection
of pt_regs on the stack.  If the pt_regs are not user-mode registers
from a syscall, then they indicate an in-kernel interrupt or exception
(e.g. preemption or a page fault), in which case the stack is considered
unreliable due to the nature of frame pointers.

It also relies on the x86 unwinder's detection of other issues, such as:

- corrupted stack data
- stack grows the wrong way
- stack walk doesn't reach the bottom
- user didn't provide a large enough entries array

Such issues are reported by checking unwind_error() and !unwind_done().

Also add CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE so arch-independent code can
determine at build time whether the function is implemented.
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMiroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>	# for the x86 changes
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      af085d90
  67. 25 2月, 2017 1 次提交