process_buffer_measurement() does not have log messages for failure
conditions.

This change adds a log statement in the above function.
Suggested-by: NJoe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: NTushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NLakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

The kbuild Makefile specifies object files for vmlinux in the $(obj-y)
lists. These lists depend on the kernel configuration[1].

The kbuild Makefile for IMA combines the object files for IMA into a
single object file namely ima.o. All the object files for IMA should be
combined into ima.o. But certain object files are being added to their
own $(obj-y). This results in the log messages from those modules getting
prefixed with their respective base file name, instead of "ima". This is
inconsistent with the log messages from the IMA modules that are combined
into ima.o.

This change fixes the above issue.

[1] Documentation\kbuild\makefiles.rst
Signed-off-by: NTushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NLakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

sm3 has been supported by the ima hash algorithm, but it is not
yet in the Kconfig configuration list. After adding, both ima and tpm2
can support sm3 well.
Signed-off-by: NTianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

If CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, the kernel attempts to load the certs
from the db, dbx and MokListRT EFI variables into the appropriate keyrings.

But it just assumes that the variables will be present and prints an error
if the certs can't be loaded, even when is possible that the variables may
not exist. For example the MokListRT variable will only be present if shim
is used.

So only print an error message about failing to get the certs list from an
EFI variable if this is found. Otherwise these printed errors just pollute
the kernel log ring buffer with confusing messages like the following:

[    5.427251] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
[    5.427261] MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
[    5.428012] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
[    5.428023] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT
Reported-by: NHans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJavier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NHans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

The former contains nothing but a pointer to an array of the latter...
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Unused now.
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Avoiding taking a lock in an IRQ context is not enough to prevent
deadlocks, as discovered by syzbot:

===
WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
5.5.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
-----------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.0/8927 [HC0[0]:SC0[2]:HE1:SE0] is trying to acquire:
ffff888027c94098 (&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline]
ffff888027c94098 (&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: sidtab_sid2str_put.part.0+0x36/0x880 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c:533

and this task is already holding:
ffffffff898639b0 (&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline]
ffffffff898639b0 (&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.}, at: nf_conntrack_lock+0x17/0x70 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:91
which would create a new lock dependency:
 (&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.} -> (&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock){+.+.}

but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock:
 (&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.}

[...]

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock);
                               local_irq_disable();
                               lock(&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock);
                               lock(&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***
[...]
===

Fix this by simply locking with irqsave/irqrestore and stop giving up on
!in_task(). It makes the locking a bit slower, but it shouldn't make a
big difference in real workloads. Under the scenario from [1] (only
cache hits) it only increased the runtime overhead from the
security_secid_to_secctx() function from ~2% to ~3% (it was ~5-65%
before introducing the cache).

[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1733259

Fixes: d97bd23c ("selinux: cache the SID -> context string translation")
Reported-by: syzbot+61cba5033e2072d61806@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Correct the filesystem name to "binder" to enable genfscon per-file
labelling for binderfs.

Fixes: 7a4b5194 ("selinux: allow per-file labelling for binderfs")
Signed-off-by: NHridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: slight style changes to the subj/description]
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

I am seeing ping failures to IPv6 linklocal addresses with Debian
buster. Easiest example to reproduce is:

$ ping -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1
connect: Invalid argument

$ ping -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1
PING ff02::01%eth1(ff02::1%eth1) 56 data bytes
64 bytes from fe80::e0:f9ff:fe0c:37%eth1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.059 ms

git bisect traced the failure to
commit b9ef5513 ("smack: Check address length before reading address family")

Arguably ping is being stupid since the buster version is not setting
the address family properly (ping on stretch for example does):

$ strace -e connect ping6 -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1
connect(5, {sa_family=AF_UNSPEC,
sa_data="\4\1\0\0\0\0\377\2\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\1\3\0\0\0"}, 28)
= -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)

but the command works fine on kernels prior to this commit, so this is
breakage which goes against the Linux paradigm of "don't break userspace"

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

This macro is never used from it was introduced in commit e6b1db98
("security: Support early LSMs"), better to remove it.
Signed-off-by: NAlex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Keys queued for measurement should be freed if a custom IMA policy
was not loaded.  Otherwise, the keys will remain queued forever
consuming kernel memory.

This patch defines a delayed workqueue to handle the above scenario.
The workqueue handler is setup to execute 5 minutes after IMA
initialization is completed.

If a custom IMA policy is loaded before the workqueue handler is
scheduled to execute, the workqueue task is cancelled and any queued keys
are processed for measurement.  But if a custom policy was not loaded then
the queued keys are just freed when the delayed workqueue handler is run.
Signed-off-by: NLakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com> # sleeping
function called from invalid context
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> # redefinition of
ima_init_key_queue() function.
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

Measuring keys requires a custom IMA policy to be loaded.  Keys should
be queued for measurement if a custom IMA policy is not yet loaded.
Keys queued for measurement, if any, should be processed when a custom
policy is loaded.

This patch updates the IMA hook function ima_post_key_create_or_update()
to queue the key if a custom IMA policy has not yet been loaded.  And,
ima_update_policy() function, which is called when a custom IMA policy
is loaded, is updated to process queued keys.
Signed-off-by: NLakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

Measuring keys requires a custom IMA policy to be loaded.  Keys created
or updated before a custom IMA policy is loaded should be queued and
will be processed after a custom policy is loaded.

This patch defines a workqueue for queuing keys when a custom IMA policy
has not yet been loaded.  An intermediate Kconfig boolean option namely
IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS is used to declare the workqueue functions.

A flag namely ima_process_keys is used to check if the key should be
queued or should be processed immediately.
Signed-off-by: NLakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

ima_match_keyring() is called while holding rcu read lock. Since this
function executes in atomic context, it should not call any function
that can sleep (such as kstrdup()).

This patch pre-allocates a buffer to hold the keyrings string read from
the IMA policy and uses that to match the given keyring.
Signed-off-by: NLakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: e9085e0a ("IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys")
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

Keep the ima policy rules around from the beginning even if they appear
invalid at the time of loading, as they may become active after an lsm
policy load.  However, loading a custom IMA policy with unknown LSM
labels is only safe after we have transitioned from the "built-in"
policy rules to a custom IMA policy.

Patch also fixes the rule re-use during the lsm policy reload and makes
some prints a bit more human readable.

Changelog:
v4:
- Do not allow the initial policy load refer to non-existing lsm rules.
v3:
- Fix too wide policy rule matching for non-initialized LSMs
v2:
- Fix log prints

Fixes: b1694245 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJanne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonsta Karsisto <konsta.karsisto@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

This allows other parts of the kernel (perhaps a stacked LSM allowing
system monitoring, eg. the proposed KRSI LSM [1]) to retrieve the hash
of a given file from IMA if it's present in the iint cache.

It's true that the existence of the hash means that it's also in the
audit logs or in /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements,
but it can be difficult to pull that information out for every
subsequent exec. This is especially true if a given host has been up
for a long time and the file was first measured a long time ago.

It should be kept in mind that this function gives access to cached
entries which can be removed, for instance on security_inode_free().

This is based on Peter Moody's patch:
 https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/mailman/message/33036180/

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/9/10/393Signed-off-by: NFlorent Revest <revest@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NKP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

When reading ima_policy from securityfs, there is a missing
space between output string of LSM rules and the remaining
rules.
Signed-off-by: NClay Chang <clayc@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

commit 2db154b3 ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around")
introduced a new move_mount(2) system call and a corresponding new LSM
security_move_mount hook but did not implement this hook for any existing
LSM.  This creates a regression for SELinux with respect to consistent
checking of mounts; the existing selinux_mount hook checks mounton
permission to the mount point path.  Provide a SELinux hook
implementation for move_mount that applies this same check for
consistency.  In the future we may wish to add a new move_mount
filesystem permission and check as well, but this addresses
the immediate regression.

Fixes: 2db154b3 ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around")
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

In security_load_policy(), we can defer allocating the newpolicydb
ancillary array to after checking state->initialized, thereby avoiding
the pointless allocation when loading policy the first time.
Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: merged portions by hand]
Reviewed-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

This patch removes the inode, file, and superblock security blob
allocation functions and moves the associated code into the
respective LSM hooks.  This patch also removes the inode_doinit()
function as it was a trivial wrapper around
inode_doinit_with_dentry() and called from one location in the code.
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

selinux_nlmsg_perm is used for only by selinux_netlink_send. Remove
the redundant function to simplify the code.

Fix a typo by suggestion from Stephen.
Signed-off-by: NHuaisheng Ye <yehs1@lenovo.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Two places used u32 where there should have been __le32.

Fixes sparse warnings:
  CHECK   [...]/security/selinux/ss/services.c
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2669:16: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2669:16:    expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2669:16:    got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2674:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2674:24:    expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2674:24:    got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2675:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2675:24:    expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2675:24:    got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2676:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2676:24:    expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2676:24:    got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2681:32: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2681:32:    expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2681:32:    got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2701:16: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2701:16:    expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2701:16:    got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2706:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2706:24:    expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2706:24:    got restricted __le32 [usertype]
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2707:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2707:24:    expected unsigned int
[...]/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2707:24:    got restricted __le32 [usertype]
Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

This patch adds vlan rtm definitions:
 - NEWVLAN: to be used for creating vlans, setting options and
   notifications
 - DELVLAN: to be used for deleting vlans
 - GETVLAN: used for dumping vlan information

Dumping vlans which can span multiple messages is added now with basic
information (vid and flags). We use nlmsg_parse() to validate the header
length in order to be able to extend the message with filtering
attributes later.
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

kunit tests that do not support module build should depend
on KUNIT=y rather than just KUNIT in Kconfig, otherwise
they will trigger compilation errors for "make allmodconfig"
builds.

Fixes: 9fe124bf ("kunit: allow kunit to be loaded as a module")
Reported-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NAlan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NShuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>

Commit b1d9e6b0 ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks") switched the LSM
infrastructure to use per-hook lists, which meant that removing the
hooks for a given module was no longer atomic. Even though the commit
clearly documents that modules implementing runtime revmoval of hooks
(only SELinux attempts this madness) need to take special precautions to
avoid race conditions, SELinux has never addressed this.

By inserting an artificial delay between the loop iterations of
security_delete_hooks() (I used 100 ms), booting to a state where
SELinux is enabled, but policy is not yet loaded, and running these
commands:

    while true; do ping -c 1 <some IP>; done &
    echo -n 1 >/sys/fs/selinux/disable
    kill %1
    wait

...I was able to trigger NULL pointer dereferences in various places. I
also have a report of someone getting panics on a stock RHEL-8 kernel
after setting SELINUX=disabled in /etc/selinux/config and rebooting
(without adding "selinux=0" to kernel command-line).

Reordering the SELinux hooks such that those that allocate structures
are removed last seems to prevent these panics. It is very much possible
that this doesn't make the runtime disable completely race-free, but at
least it makes the operation much less fragile.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b1d9e6b0 ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks")
Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

The disabled/enforcing/initialized flags are all accessed concurrently
by threads so use the appropriate accessors that ensure atomicity and
document that it is expected.

Use smp_load/acquire...() helpers (with memory barriers) for the
initialized flag, since it gates access to the rest of the state
structures.

Note that the disabled flag is currently not used for anything other
than avoiding double disable, but it will be used for bailing out of
hooks once security_delete_hooks() is removed.
Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

SELinux checks whether VM_EXEC is set in the VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
during initialization and saves the result in default_noexec for use
in its mmap and mprotect hook function implementations to decide
whether to apply EXECMEM, EXECHEAP, EXECSTACK, and EXECMOD checks.
Mark default_noexec as ro_after_init to prevent later clearing it
and thereby disabling these checks.  It is only set legitimately from
init code.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Move cache based  pkey sid  retrieval code which was added
with commit "409dcf31" under CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND.
As its  going to alloc a new cache which impacts
low RAM devices which was enabled by default.
Suggested-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: NRavi Kumar Siddojigari <rsiddoji@codeaurora.org>
[PM: checkpatch.pl cleanups, fixed capitalization in the description]
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security only calls msg_msg_alloc_security but
do nothing else. And also msg_msg_alloc_security is just used by the
former.

Remove the redundant function to simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: NHuaisheng Ye <yehs1@lenovo.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Add KUnit tests to test AppArmor unpacking of userspace policies.
AppArmor uses a serialized binary format for loading policies. To find
policy format documentation see
Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/apparmor.rst.

In order to write the tests against the policy unpacking code, some
static functions needed to be exposed for testing purposes. One of the
goals of this patch is to establish a pattern for which testing these
kinds of functions should be done in the future.
Signed-off-by: NBrendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NMike Salvatore <mike.salvatore@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NShuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>

As a result of the asymmetric public keys subtype Kconfig option being
defined as tristate, with the existing IMA Makefile, ima_asymmetric_keys.c
could be built as a kernel module.  To prevent this from happening, this
patch defines and uses an intermediate Kconfig boolean option named
IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS.
Signed-off-by: NLakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: NJames.Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> # ima_asymmetric_keys.c
is built as a kernel module.
Fixes: 88e70da1 ("IMA: Define an IMA hook to measure keys")
Fixes: cb1aa382 ("KEYS: Call the IMA hook to measure keys")
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated patch description]
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

selinuxfs was originally mounted on /selinux, and various docs and
kconfig help texts referred to nodes under it.  In Linux 3.0,
/sys/fs/selinux was introduced as the preferred mount point for selinuxfs.
Fix all the old references to /selinux/ to /sys/fs/selinux/.
While we are there, update the description of the selinux boot parameter
to reflect the fact that the default value is always 1 since
commit be6ec88f ("selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE")
and drop discussion of runtime disable since it is deprecated.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Deprecate the CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE functionality.  The
code was originally developed to make it easier for Linux
distributions to support architectures where adding parameters to the
kernel command line was difficult.  Unfortunately, supporting runtime
disable meant we had to make some security trade-offs when it came to
the LSM hooks, as documented in the Kconfig help text:

  NOTE: selecting this option will disable the '__ro_after_init'
  kernel hardening feature for security hooks.   Please consider
  using the selinux=0 boot parameter instead of enabling this
  option.

Fortunately it looks as if that the original motivation for the
runtime disable functionality is gone, and Fedora/RHEL appears to be
the only major distribution enabling this capability at build time
so we are now taking steps to remove it entirely from the kernel.
The first step is to mark the functionality as deprecated and print
an error when it is used (what this patch is doing).  As Fedora/RHEL
makes progress in transitioning the distribution away from runtime
disable, we will introduce follow-up patches over several kernel
releases which will block for increasing periods of time when the
runtime disable is used.  Finally we will remove the option entirely
once we believe all users have moved to the kernel cmdline approach.
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for binderfs.
This is required to have separate permissions to allow
access to binder, hwbinder and vndbinder devices which are
relocating to binderfs.
Acked-by: NJeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: NMark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Signed-off-by: NHridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

The return value of snprintf maybe over the size of TMPBUFLEN, use
scnprintf instead in sel_read_class and sel_read_perm.
Signed-off-by: Nliuyang34 <liuyang34@xiaomi.com>
[PM: cleaned up the description]
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

aa_xattrs_match() is unfortunately calling vfs_getxattr_alloc() from a
context protected by an rcu_read_lock. This can not be done as
vfs_getxattr_alloc() may sleep regardles of the gfp_t value being
passed to it.

Fix this by breaking the rcu_read_lock on the policy search when the
xattr match feature is requested and restarting the search if a policy
changes occur.

Fixes: 8e51f908 ("apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and value")
Reported-by: NJia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Reported-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

The common fast path check can be done under rcu_read_lock() and
doesn't need a reference count on the label. Only take a reference
count if entering the slow path.

Fixes reported hackbench regression
  - sha1 79e178a5 ("Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2019-12-03' of
    git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor")

  hackbench -l (256000/#grp) -g #grp
   128 groups     19.679 ±0.90%

  - previous sha1 01d1dff6 ("Merge tag 's390-5.5-2' of
    git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux")

  hackbench -l (256000/#grp) -g #grp
   128 groups     3.1689 ±3.04%
Reported-by: NVincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Tested-by: NVincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Tested-by: NSebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Fixes: bce4e7e9 ("apparmor: reduce rcu_read_lock scope for aa_file_perm mediation")
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

With commit df323337 ("apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU
caches, 2019-05-03"), AppArmor code was converted to use memory pools. In
that conversion, a bug snuck into the code that polices bind mounts that
causes all bind mounts to fail with -ENOMEM, as we erroneously error out
if `aa_get_buffer` returns a pointer instead of erroring out when it
does _not_ return a valid pointer.

Fix the issue by correctly checking for valid pointers returned by
`aa_get_buffer` to fix bind mounts with AppArmor.

Fixes: df323337 ("apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches")
Signed-off-by: NPatrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

syzbot is reporting that there is a race at tomoyo_stat_update() [1].
Although it is acceptable to fail to track exact number of times policy
was updated, convert to atomic_t because this is not a hot path.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a4d7b973972eeed410596e6604580e0133b0fc04Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzbot+efea72d4a0a1d03596cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function security_port_sid:
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2346:17: warning: variable sidtab set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function security_ib_endport_sid:
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2435:17: warning: variable sidtab set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function security_netif_sid:
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2480:17: warning: variable sidtab set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function security_fs_use:
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2831:17: warning: variable sidtab set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]

Since commit 66f8e2f0 ("selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash table")
'sidtab' is not used any more, so remove it.
Reported-by: NHulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>