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  1. 26 7月, 2021 2 次提交
  3. 01 7月, 2021 4 次提交
  5. 30 6月, 2021 1 次提交
  7. 22 6月, 2021 3 次提交
    • P
      clocksource: Provide kernel module to test clocksource watchdog · 1253b9b8
      由 Paul E. McKenney 提交于 
      When the clocksource watchdog marks a clock as unstable, this might
be due to that clock being unstable or it might be due to delays that
happen to occur between the reads of the two clocks.  It would be good
to have a way of testing the clocksource watchdog's ability to
distinguish between these two causes of clock skew and instability.

Therefore, provide a new clocksource-wdtest module selected by a new
TEST_CLOCKSOURCE_WATCHDOG Kconfig option.  This module has a single module
parameter named "holdoff" that provides the number of seconds of delay
before testing should start, which defaults to zero when built as a module
and to 10 seconds when built directly into the kernel.  Very large systems
that boot slowly may need to increase the value of this module parameter.

This module uses hand-crafted clocksource structures to do its testing,
thus avoiding messing up timing for the rest of the kernel and for user
applications.  This module first verifies that the ->uncertainty_margin
field of the clocksource structures are set sanely.  It then tests the
delay-detection capability of the clocksource watchdog, increasing the
number of consecutive delays injected, first provoking console messages
complaining about the delays and finally forcing a clock-skew event.
Unexpected test results cause at least one WARN_ON_ONCE() console splat.
If there are no splats, the test has passed.  Finally, it fuzzes the
value returned from a clocksource to test the clocksource watchdog's
ability to detect time skew.

This module checks the state of its clocksource after each test, and
uses WARN_ON_ONCE() to emit a console splat if there are any failures.
This should enable all types of test frameworks to detect any such
failures.

This facility is intended for diagnostic use only, and should be avoided
on production systems.
Reported-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Suggested-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: NFeng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210527190124.440372-5-paulmck@kernel.org
      1253b9b8
    • P
      clocksource: Limit number of CPUs checked for clock synchronization · fa218f1c
      由 Paul E. McKenney 提交于 
      Currently, if skew is detected on a clock marked CLOCK_SOURCE_VERIFY_PERCPU,
that clock is checked on all CPUs.  This is thorough, but might not be
what you want on a system with a few tens of CPUs, let alone a few hundred
of them.

Therefore, by default check only up to eight randomly chosen CPUs.  Also
provide a new clocksource.verify_n_cpus kernel boot parameter.  A value of
-1 says to check all of the CPUs, and a non-negative value says to randomly
select that number of CPUs, without concern about selecting the same CPU
multiple times.  However, make use of a cpumask so that a given CPU will be
checked at most once.

Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> # For verify_n_cpus=1.
Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: NFeng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210527190124.440372-3-paulmck@kernel.org
      fa218f1c
    • P
      clocksource: Retry clock read if long delays detected · db3a34e1
      由 Paul E. McKenney 提交于 
      When the clocksource watchdog marks a clock as unstable, this might be due
to that clock being unstable or it might be due to delays that happen to
occur between the reads of the two clocks.  Yes, interrupts are disabled
across those two reads, but there are no shortage of things that can delay
interrupts-disabled regions of code ranging from SMI handlers to vCPU
preemption.  It would be good to have some indication as to why the clock
was marked unstable.

Therefore, re-read the watchdog clock on either side of the read from the
clock under test.  If the watchdog clock shows an excessive time delta
between its pair of reads, the reads are retried.

The maximum number of retries is specified by a new kernel boot parameter
clocksource.max_cswd_read_retries, which defaults to three, that is, up to
four reads, one initial and up to three retries.  If more than one retry
was required, a message is printed on the console (the occasional single
retry is expected behavior, especially in guest OSes).  If the maximum
number of retries is exceeded, the clock under test will be marked
unstable.  However, the probability of this happening due to various sorts
of delays is quite small.  In addition, the reason (clock-read delays) for
the unstable marking will be apparent.
Reported-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: NFeng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210527190124.440372-1-paulmck@kernel.org
      db3a34e1
  9. 17 6月, 2021 3 次提交
  11. 09 6月, 2021 1 次提交
  13. 07 6月, 2021 1 次提交
  15. 04 6月, 2021 1 次提交
  17. 28 5月, 2021 1 次提交
  19. 20 5月, 2021 1 次提交
  21. 18 5月, 2021 1 次提交
  23. 12 5月, 2021 1 次提交
  25. 11 5月, 2021 1 次提交
  27. 07 5月, 2021 1 次提交
    • R
      init/initramfs.c: do unpacking asynchronously · e7cb072e
      由 Rasmus Villemoes 提交于 
      Patch series "background initramfs unpacking, and CONFIG_MODPROBE_PATH", v3.

These two patches are independent, but better-together.

The second is a rather trivial patch that simply allows the developer to
change "/sbin/modprobe" to something else - e.g.  the empty string, so
that all request_module() during early boot return -ENOENT early, without
even spawning a usermode helper, needlessly synchronizing with the
initramfs unpacking.

The first patch delegates decompressing the initramfs to a worker thread,
allowing do_initcalls() in main.c to proceed to the device_ and late_
initcalls without waiting for that decompression (and populating of
rootfs) to finish.  Obviously, some of those later calls may rely on the
initramfs being available, so I've added synchronization points in the
firmware loader and usermodehelper paths - there might be other places
that would need this, but so far no one has been able to think of any
places I have missed.

There's not much to win if most of the functionality needed during boot is
only available as modules.  But systems with a custom-made .config and
initramfs can boot faster, partly due to utilizing more than one cpu
earlier, partly by avoiding known-futile modprobe calls (which would still
trigger synchronization with the initramfs unpacking, thus eliminating
most of the first benefit).

This patch (of 2):

Most of the boot process doesn't actually need anything from the
initramfs, until of course PID1 is to be executed.  So instead of doing
the decompressing and populating of the initramfs synchronously in
populate_rootfs() itself, push that off to a worker thread.

This is primarily motivated by an embedded ppc target, where unpacking
even the rather modest sized initramfs takes 0.6 seconds, which is long
enough that the external watchdog becomes unhappy that it doesn't get
attention soon enough.  By doing the initramfs decompression in a worker
thread, we get to do the device_initcalls and hence start petting the
watchdog much sooner.

Normal desktops might benefit as well.  On my mostly stock Ubuntu kernel,
my initramfs is a 26M xz-compressed blob, decompressing to around 126M.
That takes almost two seconds:

[    0.201454] Trying to unpack rootfs image as initramfs...
[    1.976633] Freeing initrd memory: 29416K

Before this patch, these lines occur consecutively in dmesg.  With this
patch, the timestamps on these two lines is roughly the same as above, but
with 172 lines inbetween - so more than one cpu has been kept busy doing
work that would otherwise only happen after the populate_rootfs()
finished.

Should one of the initcalls done after rootfs_initcall time (i.e., device_
and late_ initcalls) need something from the initramfs (say, a kernel
module or a firmware blob), it will simply wait for the initramfs
unpacking to be done before proceeding, which should in theory make this
completely safe.

But if some driver pokes around in the filesystem directly and not via one
of the official kernel interfaces (i.e.  request_firmware*(),
call_usermodehelper*) that theory may not hold - also, I certainly might
have missed a spot when sprinkling wait_for_initramfs().  So there is an
escape hatch in the form of an initramfs_async= command line parameter.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210313212528.2956377-1-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210313212528.2956377-2-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dkSigned-off-by: NRasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Reviewed-by: NLuis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      e7cb072e
  29. 06 5月, 2021 1 次提交
  31. 05 5月, 2021 2 次提交
  33. 04 5月, 2021 1 次提交
  35. 01 5月, 2021 1 次提交
  37. 17 4月, 2021 1 次提交
  39. 14 4月, 2021 1 次提交
    • S
      KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework · 5d0682be
      由 Sumit Garg 提交于 
      Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as
an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations
like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusted keys
support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.

Add a generic trusted keys framework where underlying implementations
can be easily plugged in. Create struct trusted_key_ops to achieve this,
which contains necessary functions of a backend.

Also, define a module parameter in order to select a particular trust
source in case a platform support multiple trust sources. In case its
not specified then implementation itetrates through trust sources list
starting with TPM and assign the first trust source as a backend which
has initiazed successfully during iteration.

Note that current implementation only supports a single trust source at
runtime which is either selectable at compile time or during boot via
aforementioned module parameter.
Suggested-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
      5d0682be
  41. 09 4月, 2021 1 次提交
  43. 08 4月, 2021 1 次提交
    • K
      stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall · 39218ff4
      由 Kees Cook 提交于 
      This provides the ability for architectures to enable kernel stack base
address offset randomization. This feature is controlled by the boot
param "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", with its default value set by
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT.

This feature is based on the original idea from the last public release
of PaX's RANDKSTACK feature: https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/randkstack.txt
All the credit for the original idea goes to the PaX team. Note that
the design and implementation of this upstream randomize_kstack_offset
feature differs greatly from the RANDKSTACK feature (see below).

Reasoning for the feature:

This feature aims to make harder the various stack-based attacks that
rely on deterministic stack structure. We have had many such attacks in
past (just to name few):

https://jon.oberheide.org/files/infiltrate12-thestackisback.pdf
https://jon.oberheide.org/files/stackjacking-infiltrate11.pdf
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/06/exploiting-recursion-in-linux-kernel_20.html

As Linux kernel stack protections have been constantly improving
(vmap-based stack allocation with guard pages, removal of thread_info,
STACKLEAK), attackers have had to find new ways for their exploits
to work. They have done so, continuing to rely on the kernel's stack
determinism, in situations where VMAP_STACK and THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK_STRUCT
were not relevant. For example, the following recent attacks would have
been hampered if the stack offset was non-deterministic between syscalls:

https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf
(page 70: targeting the pt_regs copy with linear stack overflow)

https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html
(leaked stack address from one syscall as a target during next syscall)

The main idea is that since the stack offset is randomized on each system
call, it is harder for an attack to reliably land in any particular place
on the thread stack, even with address exposures, as the stack base will
change on the next syscall. Also, since randomization is performed after
placing pt_regs, the ptrace-based approach[1] to discover the randomized
offset during a long-running syscall should not be possible.

Design description:

During most of the kernel's execution, it runs on the "thread stack",
which is pretty deterministic in its structure: it is fixed in size,
and on every entry from userspace to kernel on a syscall the thread
stack starts construction from an address fetched from the per-cpu
cpu_current_top_of_stack variable. The first element to be pushed to the
thread stack is the pt_regs struct that stores all required CPU registers
and syscall parameters. Finally the specific syscall function is called,
with the stack being used as the kernel executes the resulting request.

The goal of randomize_kstack_offset feature is to add a random offset
after the pt_regs has been pushed to the stack and before the rest of the
thread stack is used during the syscall processing, and to change it every
time a process issues a syscall. The source of randomness is currently
architecture-defined (but x86 is using the low byte of rdtsc()). Future
improvements for different entropy sources is possible, but out of scope
for this patch. Further more, to add more unpredictability, new offsets
are chosen at the end of syscalls (the timing of which should be less
easy to measure from userspace than at syscall entry time), and stored
in a per-CPU variable, so that the life of the value does not stay
explicitly tied to a single task.

As suggested by Andy Lutomirski, the offset is added using alloca()
and an empty asm() statement with an output constraint, since it avoids
changes to assembly syscall entry code, to the unwinder, and provides
correct stack alignment as defined by the compiler.

In order to make this available by default with zero performance impact
for those that don't want it, it is boot-time selectable with static
branches. This way, if the overhead is not wanted, it can just be
left turned off with no performance impact.

The generated assembly for x86_64 with GCC looks like this:

...
ffffffff81003977: 65 8b 05 02 ea 00 7f  mov %gs:0x7f00ea02(%rip),%eax
					    # 12380 <kstack_offset>
ffffffff8100397e: 25 ff 03 00 00        and $0x3ff,%eax
ffffffff81003983: 48 83 c0 0f           add $0xf,%rax
ffffffff81003987: 25 f8 07 00 00        and $0x7f8,%eax
ffffffff8100398c: 48 29 c4              sub %rax,%rsp
ffffffff8100398f: 48 8d 44 24 0f        lea 0xf(%rsp),%rax
ffffffff81003994: 48 83 e0 f0           and $0xfffffffffffffff0,%rax
...

As a result of the above stack alignment, this patch introduces about
5 bits of randomness after pt_regs is spilled to the thread stack on
x86_64, and 6 bits on x86_32 (since its has 1 fewer bit required for
stack alignment). The amount of entropy could be adjusted based on how
much of the stack space we wish to trade for security.

My measure of syscall performance overhead (on x86_64):

lmbench: /usr/lib/lmbench/bin/x86_64-linux-gnu/lat_syscall -N 10000 null
    randomize_kstack_offset=y	Simple syscall: 0.7082 microseconds
    randomize_kstack_offset=n	Simple syscall: 0.7016 microseconds

So, roughly 0.9% overhead growth for a no-op syscall, which is very
manageable. And for people that don't want this, it's off by default.

There are two gotchas with using the alloca() trick. First,
compilers that have Stack Clash protection (-fstack-clash-protection)
enabled by default (e.g. Ubuntu[3]) add pagesize stack probes to
any dynamic stack allocations. While the randomization offset is
always less than a page, the resulting assembly would still contain
(unreachable!) probing routines, bloating the resulting assembly. To
avoid this, -fno-stack-clash-protection is unconditionally added to
the kernel Makefile since this is the only dynamic stack allocation in
the kernel (now that VLAs have been removed) and it is provably safe
from Stack Clash style attacks.

The second gotcha with alloca() is a negative interaction with
-fstack-protector*, in that it sees the alloca() as an array allocation,
which triggers the unconditional addition of the stack canary function
pre/post-amble which slows down syscalls regardless of the static
branch. In order to avoid adding this unneeded check and its associated
performance impact, architectures need to carefully remove uses of
-fstack-protector-strong (or -fstack-protector) in the compilation units
that use the add_random_kstack() macro and to audit the resulting stack
mitigation coverage (to make sure no desired coverage disappears). No
change is visible for this on x86 because the stack protector is already
unconditionally disabled for the compilation unit, but the change is
required on arm64. There is, unfortunately, no attribute that can be
used to disable stack protector for specific functions.

Comparison to PaX RANDKSTACK feature:

The RANDKSTACK feature randomizes the location of the stack start
(cpu_current_top_of_stack), i.e. including the location of pt_regs
structure itself on the stack. Initially this patch followed the same
approach, but during the recent discussions[2], it has been determined
to be of a little value since, if ptrace functionality is available for
an attacker, they can use PTRACE_PEEKUSR/PTRACE_POKEUSR to read/write
different offsets in the pt_regs struct, observe the cache behavior of
the pt_regs accesses, and figure out the random stack offset. Another
difference is that the random offset is stored in a per-cpu variable,
rather than having it be per-thread. As a result, these implementations
differ a fair bit in their implementation details and results, though
obviously the intent is similar.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4BC57C1@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/
[3] https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-devel/2019-June/040741.htmlCo-developed-by: NElena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NElena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-4-keescook@chromium.org
      39218ff4
  45. 06 4月, 2021 3 次提交
    • M
      pata_legacy: Add `probe_mask' parameter like with ide-generic · 7d33004d
      由 Maciej W. Rozycki 提交于 
      Carry the `probe_mask' parameter over from ide-generic to pata_legacy so
that there is a way to prevent random poking at ISA port I/O locations
in attempt to discover adapter option cards with libata like with the
old IDE driver.  By default all enabled locations are tried, however it
may interfere with a different kind of hardware responding there.

For example with a plain (E)ISA system the driver tries all the six
possible locations:

scsi host0: pata_legacy
ata1: PATA max PIO4 cmd 0x1f0 ctl 0x3f6 irq 14
ata1.00: ATA-4: ST310211A, 3.54, max UDMA/100
ata1.00: 19541088 sectors, multi 16: LBA
ata1.00: configured for PIO
scsi 0:0:0:0: Direct-Access     ATA      ST310211A        3.54 PQ: 0 ANSI: 5
scsi 0:0:0:0: Attached scsi generic sg0 type 0
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] 19541088 512-byte logical blocks: (10.0 GB/9.32 GiB)
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Write Protect is off
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Mode Sense: 00 3a 00 00
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Write cache: enabled, read cache: enabled, doesn't support DPO or FUA
 sda: sda1 sda2 sda3
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Attached SCSI disk
scsi host1: pata_legacy
ata2: PATA max PIO4 cmd 0x170 ctl 0x376 irq 15
scsi host1: pata_legacy
ata3: PATA max PIO4 cmd 0x1e8 ctl 0x3ee irq 11
scsi host1: pata_legacy
ata4: PATA max PIO4 cmd 0x168 ctl 0x36e irq 10
scsi host1: pata_legacy
ata5: PATA max PIO4 cmd 0x1e0 ctl 0x3e6 irq 8
scsi host1: pata_legacy
ata6: PATA max PIO4 cmd 0x160 ctl 0x366 irq 12

however giving the kernel "pata_legacy.probe_mask=21" makes it try every
other location only:

scsi host0: pata_legacy
ata1: PATA max PIO4 cmd 0x1f0 ctl 0x3f6 irq 14
ata1.00: ATA-4: ST310211A, 3.54, max UDMA/100
ata1.00: 19541088 sectors, multi 16: LBA
ata1.00: configured for PIO
scsi 0:0:0:0: Direct-Access     ATA      ST310211A        3.54 PQ: 0 ANSI: 5
scsi 0:0:0:0: Attached scsi generic sg0 type 0
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] 19541088 512-byte logical blocks: (10.0 GB/9.32 GiB)
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Write Protect is off
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Mode Sense: 00 3a 00 00
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Write cache: enabled, read cache: enabled, doesn't support DPO or FUA
 sda: sda1 sda2 sda3
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Attached SCSI disk
scsi host1: pata_legacy
ata2: PATA max PIO4 cmd 0x1e8 ctl 0x3ee irq 11
scsi host1: pata_legacy
ata3: PATA max PIO4 cmd 0x1e0 ctl 0x3e6 irq 8
Signed-off-by: NMaciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.2103211800110.21463@angie.orcam.me.ukSigned-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
      7d33004d
    • M
      pata_platform: Document `pio_mask' module parameter · 6ddcec95
      由 Maciej W. Rozycki 提交于 
      Add MODULE_PARM_DESC documentation and a kernel-parameters.txt entry.
Signed-off-by: NMaciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.2103212023190.21463@angie.orcam.me.ukSigned-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
      6ddcec95
    • M
      pata_legacy: Properly document module parameters · 426e2c6a
      由 Maciej W. Rozycki 提交于 
      Most pata_legacy module parameters lack MODULE_PARM_DESC documentation
and none is described in kernel-parameters.txt.  Also several comments
are inaccurate or wrong.

Add the missing documentation pieces then and reorder parameters into a
consistent block.  Remove inaccuracies as follows:

- `all' affects primary and secondary port ranges only rather than all,

- `probe_all' affects tertiary and further port ranges rather than all,

- `ht6560b' is for HT 6560B rather than HT 6560A.
Signed-off-by: NMaciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.2103211909560.21463@angie.orcam.me.ukSigned-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
      426e2c6a
  47. 29 3月, 2021 1 次提交
  49. 18 3月, 2021 1 次提交
  51. 10 3月, 2021 1 次提交
  53. 09 3月, 2021 3 次提交
    • B
      Documentation/admin-guide: kernel-parameters: correct the architectures for numa_balancing · 00b072c0
      由 Barry Song 提交于 
      X86 isn't the only architecture supporting NUMA_BALANCING. ARM64, PPC,
S390 and RISCV also support it:

arch$ git grep NUMA_BALANCING
arm64/Kconfig:  select ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING
arm64/configs/defconfig:CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING=y
arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h:#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING
powerpc/configs/powernv_defconfig:CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING=y
powerpc/configs/ppc64_defconfig:CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING=y
powerpc/configs/pseries_defconfig:CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING=y
powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h:#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING
powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h:#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING
powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h:#endif /* CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING */
powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h:#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING
powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h:#endif /* CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING */
powerpc/include/asm/nohash/pgtable.h:#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING
powerpc/include/asm/nohash/pgtable.h:#endif /* CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING */
powerpc/platforms/Kconfig.cputype:      select ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING
riscv/Kconfig:  select ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING
riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h:#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING
s390/Kconfig:   select ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING
s390/configs/debug_defconfig:CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING=y
s390/configs/defconfig:CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING=y
s390/include/asm/pgtable.h:#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING
x86/Kconfig:    select ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING     if X86_64
x86/include/asm/pgtable.h:#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING
x86/include/asm/pgtable.h:#endif /* CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING */

On the other hand, setup_numabalancing() is implemented in mm/mempolicy.c
which doesn't depend on architectures.
Signed-off-by: NBarry Song <song.bao.hua@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: NPalmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Acked-by: NPalmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302084159.33688-1-song.bao.hua@hisilicon.comSigned-off-by: NJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      00b072c0
    • U
      rcuscale: Add kfree_rcu() single-argument scale test · 686fe1bf
      由 Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) 提交于 
      The single-argument variant of kfree_rcu() is currently not
tested by any member of the rcutoture test suite.  This
commit therefore adds rcuscale code to test it.  This
testing is controlled by two new boolean module parameters,
kfree_rcu_test_single and kfree_rcu_test_double.  If one
is set and the other not, only the corresponding variant
is tested, otherwise both are tested, with the variant to
be tested determined randomly on each invocation.

Both of these module parameters are initialized to false,
so setting either to true will test only that variant.
Suggested-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NUladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
      686fe1bf
    • P
      rcu: deprecate "all" option to rcu_nocbs= · 3e70df91
      由 Paul Gortmaker 提交于 
      With the core bitmap support now accepting "N" as a placeholder for
the end of the bitmap, "all" can be represented as "0-N" and has the
advantage of not being specific to RCU (or any other subsystem).

So deprecate the use of "all" by removing documentation references
to it.  The support itself needs to remain for now, since we don't
know how many people out there are using it currently, but since it
is in an __init area anyway, it isn't worth losing sleep over.

Cc: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Acked-by: NYury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
      3e70df91