Drop a defunct forward declaration of svm_complete_interrupts().

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210205005750.3841462-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add a helper function to handle kicking non-running vCPUs when sending
virtual IPIs.  A future patch will change SVM's interception functions
to take @vcpu instead of @svm, at which piont declaring and modifying
'vcpu' in a case statement is confusing, and potentially dangerous.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210205005750.3841462-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Restore the full 64-bit values of DR6 and DR7 when emulating RSM on
x86-64, as defined by both Intel's SDM and AMD's APM.

Note, bits 63:32 of DR6 and DR7 are reserved, so this is a glorified nop
unless the SMM handler is poking into SMRAM, which it most definitely
shouldn't be doing since both Intel and AMD list the DR6 and DR7 fields
as read-only.

Fixes: 660a5d51 ("KVM: x86: save/load state on SMM switch")
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210205012458.3872687-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Drop the DR6/7 volatile+fixed bits adjustments in RSM emulation, which
are redundant and misleading.  The necessary adjustments are made by
kvm_set_dr(), which properly sets the fixed bits that are conditional
on the vCPU model.

Note, KVM incorrectly reads only bits 31:0 of the DR6/7 fields when
emulating RSM on x86-64.  On the plus side for this change, that bug
makes removing "& DRx_VOLATILE" a nop.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210205012458.3872687-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Use hva_t, a.k.a. unsigned long, for the local variable that holds the
hypercall page address.  On 32-bit KVM, gcc complains about using a u64
due to the implicit cast from a 64-bit value to a 32-bit pointer.

  arch/x86/kvm/xen.c: In function ‘kvm_xen_write_hypercall_page’:
  arch/x86/kvm/xen.c:300:22: error: cast to pointer from integer of
                             different size [-Werror=int-to-pointer-cast]
  300 |   page = memdup_user((u8 __user *)blob_addr, PAGE_SIZE);

Cc: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Fixes: 23200b7a ("KVM: x86/xen: intercept xen hypercalls if enabled")
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210208201502.1239867-1-seanjc@google.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: NJoao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This accidentally ended up locking and then immediately unlocking kvm->lock
at the beginning of the function. Fix it.

Fixes: a76b9641 ("KVM: x86/xen: add KVM_XEN_HVM_SET_ATTR/KVM_XEN_HVM_GET_ATTR")
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <20210208232326.1830370-2-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Use kvm_pfn_t, a.k.a. u64, for the local 'pfn' variable when retrieving
a so called "remapped" hva/pfn pair.  In theory, the hva could resolve to
a pfn in high memory on a 32-bit kernel.

This bug was inadvertantly exposed by commit bd2fae8d ("KVM: do not
assume PTE is writable after follow_pfn"), which added an error PFN value
to the mix, causing gcc to comlain about overflowing the unsigned long.

  arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c: In function ‘hva_to_pfn_remapped’:
  include/linux/kvm_host.h:89:30: error: conversion from ‘long long unsigned int’
                                  to ‘long unsigned int’ changes value from
                                  ‘9218868437227405314’ to ‘2’ [-Werror=overflow]
   89 | #define KVM_PFN_ERR_RO_FAULT (KVM_PFN_ERR_MASK + 2)
      |                              ^
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1935:9: note: in expansion of macro ‘KVM_PFN_ERR_RO_FAULT’

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: add6a0cd ("KVM: MMU: try to fix up page faults before giving up")
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210208201940.1258328-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Currently, the follow_pfn function is exported for modules but
follow_pte is not.  However, follow_pfn is very easy to misuse,
because it does not provide protections (so most of its callers
assume the page is writable!) and because it returns after having
already unlocked the page table lock.

Provide instead a simplified version of follow_pte that does
not have the pmdpp and range arguments.  The older version
survives as follow_invalidate_pte() for use by fs/dax.c.
Reviewed-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The TDP MMU assumes that it can do atomic accesses to 64-bit PTEs.
Rather than just disabling it, compile it out completely so that it
is possible to use for example 64-bit xchg.

To limit the number of stubs, wrap all accesses to tdp_mmu_enabled
or tdp_mmu_page with a function.  Calls to all other functions in
tdp_mmu.c are eliminated and do not even reach the linker.
Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Tested-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Adjust the KVMGT page tracking callbacks.

Cc: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Zhi Wang <zhi.a.wang@intel.com>
Cc: intel-gvt-dev@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add a helper to generate the mask of reserved GPA bits _without_ any
adjustments for repurposed bits, and use it to replace a variety of
open coded variants in the MTRR and APIC_BASE flows.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-11-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add a helper to generate the mask of reserved PA bits in the host.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-10-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Use reserved_gpa_bits, which accounts for exceptions to the maxphyaddr
rule, e.g. SEV's C-bit, for the page {table,directory,etc...} entry (PxE)
reserved bits checks.  For SEV, the C-bit is ignored by hardware when
walking pages tables, e.g. the APM states:

  Note that while the guest may choose to set the C-bit explicitly on
  instruction pages and page table addresses, the value of this bit is a
  don't-care in such situations as hardware always performs these as
  private accesses.

Such behavior is expected to hold true for other features that repurpose
GPA bits, e.g. KVM could theoretically emulate SME or MKTME, which both
allow non-zero repurposed bits in the page tables.  Conceptually, KVM
should apply reserved GPA checks universally, and any features that do
not adhere to the basic rule should be explicitly handled, i.e. if a GPA
bit is repurposed but not allowed in page tables for whatever reason.

Refactor __reset_rsvds_bits_mask() to take the pre-generated reserved
bits mask, and opportunistically clean up its code, e.g. to align lines
and comments.

Practically speaking, this is change is a likely a glorified nop given
the current KVM code base.  SEV's C-bit is the only repurposed GPA bit,
and KVM doesn't support shadowing encrypted page tables (which is
theoretically possible via SEV debug APIs).

Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-9-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Rename cr3_lm_rsvd_bits to reserved_gpa_bits, and use it for all GPA
legality checks.  AMD's APM states:

  If the C-bit is an address bit, this bit is masked from the guest
  physical address when it is translated through the nested page tables.

Thus, any access that can conceivably be run through NPT should ignore
the C-bit when checking for validity.

For features that KVM emulates in software, e.g. MTRRs, there is no
clear direction in the APM for how the C-bit should be handled.  For
such cases, follow the SME behavior inasmuch as possible, since SEV is
is essentially a VM-specific variant of SME.  For SME, the APM states:

  In this case the upper physical address bits are treated as reserved
  when the feature is enabled except where otherwise indicated.

Collecting the various relavant SME snippets in the APM and cross-
referencing the omissions with Linux kernel code, this leaves MTTRs and
APIC_BASE as the only flows that KVM emulates that should _not_ ignore
the C-bit.

Note, this means the reserved bit checks in the page tables are
technically broken.  This will be remedied in a future patch.

Although the page table checks are technically broken, in practice, it's
all but guaranteed to be irrelevant.  NPT is required for SEV, i.e.
shadowing page tables isn't needed in the common case.  Theoretically,
the checks could be in play for nested NPT, but it's extremely unlikely
that anyone is running nested VMs on SEV, as doing so would require L1
to expose sensitive data to L0, e.g. the entire VMCB.  And if anyone is
running nested VMs, L0 can't read the guest's encrypted memory, i.e. L1
would need to put its NPT in shared memory, in which case the C-bit will
never be set.  Or, L1 could use shadow paging, but again, if L0 needs to
read page tables, e.g. to load PDPTRs, the memory can't be encrypted if
L1 has any expectation of L0 doing the right thing.

Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Replace an open coded check for an invalid CR3 with its equivalent
helper.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Replace a variety of open coded GPA checks with the recently introduced
common helpers.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add a helper to genericize checking for a legal GPA that also must
conform to an arbitrary alignment, and use it in the existing
page_address_valid().  Future patches will replace open coded variants
in VMX and SVM.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add a helper to check for a legal GPA, and use it to consolidate code
in existing, related helpers.  Future patches will extend usage to
VMX and SVM code, properly handle exceptions to the maxphyaddr rule, and
add more helpers.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Don't clear the SME C-bit when reading a guest PDPTR, as the GPA (CR3) is
in the guest domain.

Barring a bizarre paravirtual use case, this is likely a benign bug.  SME
is not emulated by KVM, loading SEV guest PDPTRs is doomed as KVM can't
use the correct key to read guest memory, and setting guest MAXPHYADDR
higher than the host, i.e. overlapping the C-bit, would cause faults in
the guest.

Note, for SEV guests, stripping the C-bit is technically aligned with CPU
behavior, but for KVM it's the greater of two evils.  Because KVM doesn't
have access to the guest's encryption key, ignoring the C-bit would at
best result in KVM reading garbage.  By keeping the C-bit, KVM will
fail its read (unless userspace creates a memslot with the C-bit set).
The guest will still undoubtedly die, as KVM will use '0' for the PDPTR
value, but that's preferable to interpreting encrypted data as a PDPTR.

Fixes: d0ec49d4 ("kvm/x86/svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM")
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Set cr3_lm_rsvd_bits, which is effectively an invalid GPA mask, at vCPU
reset.  The reserved bits check needs to be done even if userspace never
configures the guest's CPUID model.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0107973a ("KVM: x86: Introduce cr3_lm_rsvd_bits in kvm_vcpu_arch")
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210204000117.3303214-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

Instead of adding a plethora of new KVM_CAP_XEN_FOO capabilities, just
add bits to the return value of KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

It turns out that we can't handle event channels *entirely* in userspace
by delivering them as ExtINT, because KVM is a bit picky about when it
accepts ExtINT interrupts from a legacy PIC. The in-kernel local APIC
has to have LVT0 configured in APIC_MODE_EXTINT and unmasked, which
isn't necessarily the case for Xen guests especially on secondary CPUs.

To cope with this, add kvm_xen_get_interrupt() which checks the
evtchn_pending_upcall field in the Xen vcpu_info, and delivers the Xen
upcall vector (configured by KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_UPCALL_VECTOR) if it's
set regardless of LAPIC LVT0 configuration. This gives us the minimum
support we need for completely userspace-based implementation of event
channels.

This does mean that vcpu_enter_guest() needs to check for the
evtchn_pending_upcall flag being set, because it can't rely on someone
having set KVM_REQ_EVENT unless we were to add some way for userspace to
do so manually.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

Allow the Xen emulated guest the ability to register secondary
vcpu time information. On Xen guests this is used in order to be
mapped to userspace and hence allow vdso gettimeofday to work.
Signed-off-by: NJoao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

Parameterise kvm_setup_pvclock_page() a little bit so that it can be
invoked for different gfn_to_hva_cache structures, and with different
offsets. Then we can invoke it for the normal KVM pvclock and also for
the Xen one in the vcpu_info.
Signed-off-by: NJoao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

The vcpu info supersedes the per vcpu area of the shared info page and
the guest vcpus will use this instead.
Signed-off-by: NJoao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnkur Arora <ankur.a.arora@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

This will be used for per-vCPU setup such as runstate and vcpu_info.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

Wallclock on Xen is written in the shared_info page.

To that purpose, export kvm_write_wall_clock() and pass on the GPA of
its location to populate the shared_info wall clock data.
Signed-off-by: NJoao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

Xen added this in 2015 (Xen 4.6). On x86_64 and Arm it fills what was
previously a 32-bit hole in the generic shared_info structure; on
i386 it had to go at the end of struct arch_shared_info.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

Add KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO to allow hypervisor to know where the
guest's shared info page is.
Signed-off-by: NJoao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

There aren't a lot of differences for the things that the kernel needs
to care about, but there are a few.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

This will be used to set up shared info pages etc.
Signed-off-by: NJoao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

The code paths for Xen support are all fairly lightweight but if we hide
them behind this, they're even *more* lightweight for any system which
isn't actually hosting Xen guests.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

This is already more complex than the simple memcpy it originally had.
Move it to xen.c with the rest of the Xen support.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

Disambiguate Xen vs. Hyper-V calls by adding 'orl $0x80000000, %eax'
at the start of the Hyper-V hypercall page when Xen hypercalls are
also enabled.

That bit is reserved in the Hyper-V ABI, and those hypercall numbers
will never be used by Xen (because it does precisely the same trick).

Switch to using kvm_vcpu_write_guest() while we're at it, instead of
open-coding it.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

Add a new exit reason for emulator to handle Xen hypercalls.

Since this means KVM owns the ABI, dispense with the facility for the
VMM to provide its own copy of the hypercall pages; just fill them in
directly using VMCALL/VMMCALL as we do for the Hyper-V hypercall page.

This behaviour is enabled by a new INTERCEPT_HCALL flag in the
KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl structure, and advertised by the same flag
being returned from the KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM check.

Rename xen_hvm_config() to kvm_xen_write_hypercall_page() and move it
to the nascent xen.c while we're at it, and add a test case.
Signed-off-by: NJoao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

The address we give to memdup_user() isn't correctly tagged as __user.
This is harmless enough as it's a one-off use and we're doing exactly
the right thing, but fix it anyway to shut the checker up. Otherwise
it'll whine when the (now legacy) code gets moved around in a later
patch.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

Xen usually places its MSR at 0x40000000 or 0x40000200 depending on
whether it is running in viridian mode or not. Note that this is not
ABI guaranteed, so it is possible for Xen to advertise the MSR some
place else.

Given the way xen_hvm_config() is handled, if the former address is
selected, this will conflict with Hyper-V's MSR
(HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID) which unconditionally uses the same address.

Given that the MSR location is arbitrary, move the xen_hvm_config()
handling to the top of kvm_set_msr_common() before falling through.
Signed-off-by: NJoao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

Make the last few changes necessary to enable the TDP MMU to handle page
faults in parallel while holding the mmu_lock in read mode.
Reviewed-by: NPeter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NBen Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210202185734.1680553-24-bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>