1. 08 5月, 2018 2 次提交
  2. 07 5月, 2018 1 次提交
    • C
      PCI: remove PCI_DMA_BUS_IS_PHYS · 325ef185
      Christoph Hellwig 提交于
      This was used by the ide, scsi and networking code in the past to
      determine if they should bounce payloads.  Now that the dma mapping
      always have to support dma to all physical memory (thanks to swiotlb
      for non-iommu systems) there is no need to this crude hack any more.
      Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
      Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> (for riscv)
      Reviewed-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
      325ef185
  3. 23 4月, 2018 4 次提交
  4. 17 4月, 2018 1 次提交
    • M
      s390/signal: cleanup uapi struct sigaction · fae76491
      Martin Schwidefsky 提交于
      The struct sigaction for user space in arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/signal.h
      is ill defined. The kernel uses two structures 'struct sigaction' and
      'struct old_sigaction', the correlation in the kernel for both 31 and
      64 bit is as follows
      
          sys_sigaction -> struct old_sigaction
          sys_rt_sigaction -> struct sigaction
      
      The correlation of the (single) uapi definition for 'struct sigaction'
      under '#ifndef __KERNEL__':
      
          31-bit: sys_sigaction -> uapi struct sigaction
          31-bit: sys_rt_sigaction -> no structure available
      
          64-bit: sys_sigaction -> no structure available
          64-bit: sys_rt_sigaction -> uapi struct sigaction
      
      This is quite confusing. To make it a bit less confusing make the
      uapi definition of 'struct sigaction' usable for sys_rt_sigaction for
      both 31-bit and 64-bit.
      Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      fae76491
  5. 16 4月, 2018 16 次提交
  6. 14 4月, 2018 1 次提交
  7. 12 4月, 2018 1 次提交
    • K
      exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions · 8f2af155
      Kees Cook 提交于
      Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec".
      
      Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec
      continue to be frustrated[1][2].  In addition to the specific issues
      around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3]
      other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to
      be unchanging.  Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it
      can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only
      way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack
      limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the
      functions that need to know the stack limits.  This series implements
      the approach.
      
      [1] 04e35f44 ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()")
      [2] 779f4e1c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"")
      [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?"
      
      This patch (of 3):
      
      Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during
      exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process
      calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the
      per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the
      bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is
      finalized.
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
      Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
      Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
      Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
      Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      8f2af155
  8. 11 4月, 2018 2 次提交
    • M
      s390: correct nospec auto detection init order · 6a3d1e81
      Martin Schwidefsky 提交于
      With CONFIG_EXPOLINE_AUTO=y the call of spectre_v2_auto_early() via
      early_initcall is done *after* the early_param functions. This
      overwrites any settings done with the nobp/no_spectre_v2/spectre_v2
      parameters. The code patching for the kernel is done after the
      evaluation of the early parameters but before the early_initcall
      is done. The end result is a kernel image that is patched correctly
      but the kernel modules are not.
      
      Make sure that the nospec auto detection function is called before the
      early parameters are evaluated and before the code patching is done.
      
      Fixes: 6e179d64 ("s390: add automatic detection of the spectre defense")
      Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      6a3d1e81
    • H
      s390/zcrypt: Support up to 256 crypto adapters. · af4a7227
      Harald Freudenberger 提交于
      There was an artificial restriction on the card/adapter id
      to only 6 bits but all the AP commands do support adapter
      ids with 8 bit. This patch removes this restriction to 64
      adapters and now up to 256 adapter can get addressed.
      
      Some of the ioctl calls work on the max number of cards
      possible (which was 64). These ioctls are now deprecated
      but still supported. All the defines, structs and ioctl
      interface declarations have been kept for compabibility.
      There are now new ioctls (and defines for these) with an
      additional '2' appended which provide the extended versions
      with 256 cards supported.
      Signed-off-by: NHarald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      af4a7227
  9. 10 4月, 2018 12 次提交