- 03 8月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Ilya Dryomov 提交于
The wire format dictates that payload_len fits into 4 bytes. Take u32 instead of size_t to reflect that. All callers pass a small integer, so no changes required. Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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- 25 7月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Willem de Bruijn 提交于
Syzbot reported a read beyond the end of the skb head when returning IPV6_ORIGDSTADDR: BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in put_cmsg+0x5ef/0x860 net/core/scm.c:242 CPU: 0 PID: 4501 Comm: syz-executor128 Not tainted 4.17.0+ #9 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x188/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1125 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x138/0x1f0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1219 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x7a/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1261 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline] put_cmsg+0x5ef/0x860 net/core/scm.c:242 ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl+0x1cf3/0x1eb0 net/ipv6/datagram.c:719 ip6_datagram_recv_ctl+0x41c/0x450 net/ipv6/datagram.c:733 rawv6_recvmsg+0x10fb/0x1460 net/ipv6/raw.c:521 [..] This logic and its ipv4 counterpart read the destination port from the packet at skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4. With MSG_MORE and a local SOCK_RAW sender, syzbot was able to cook a packet that stores headers exactly up to skb_transport_offset(skb) in the head and the remainder in a frag. Call pskb_may_pull before accessing the pointer to ensure that it lies in skb head. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAF=yD-LEJwZj5a1-bAAj2Oy_hKmGygV6rsJ_WOrAYnv-fnayiQ@mail.gmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+9adb4b567003cac781f0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 24 7月, 2018 10 次提交
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由 Amar Singhal 提交于
Currently user regulatory hint is ignored if all wiphys in the system are self managed. But the hint is not ignored if there is no wiphy in the system. This affects the global regulatory setting. Global regulatory setting needs to be maintained so that it can be applied to a new wiphy entering the system. Therefore, do not ignore user regulatory setting even if all wiphys in the system are self managed. Signed-off-by: NAmar Singhal <asinghal@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于
Current sg coalescing logic in sk_alloc_sg() (latter is used by tls and sockmap) is not quite correct in that we do fetch the previous sg entry, however the subsequent check whether the refilled page frag from the socket is still the same as from the last entry with prior offset and length matching the start of the current buffer is comparing always the first sg list entry instead of the prior one. Fixes: 3c4d7559 ("tls: kernel TLS support") Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: NDave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Florian Westphal 提交于
Shaochun Chen points out we leak dumper filter state allocations stored in dump_control->data in case there is an error before netlink sets cb_running (after which ->done will be called at some point). In order to fix this, add .start functions and do the allocations there. ->done is going to clean up, and in case error occurs before ->start invocation no cleanups need to be done anymore. Reported-by: Nshaochun chen <cscnull@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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由 Eric Dumazet 提交于
In case skb in out_or_order_queue is the result of multiple skbs coalescing, we would like to get a proper gso_segs counter tracking, so that future tcp_drop() can report an accurate number. I chose to not implement this tracking for skbs in receive queue, since they are not dropped, unless socket is disconnected. Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Acked-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Eric Dumazet 提交于
In order to be able to give better diagnostics and detect malicious traffic, we need to have better sk->sk_drops tracking. Fixes: 9f5afeae ("tcp: use an RB tree for ooo receive queue") Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Acked-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Eric Dumazet 提交于
In case an attacker feeds tiny packets completely out of order, tcp_collapse_ofo_queue() might scan the whole rb-tree, performing expensive copies, but not changing socket memory usage at all. 1) Do not attempt to collapse tiny skbs. 2) Add logic to exit early when too many tiny skbs are detected. We prefer not doing aggressive collapsing (which copies packets) for pathological flows, and revert to tcp_prune_ofo_queue() which will be less expensive. In the future, we might add the possibility of terminating flows that are proven to be malicious. Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Eric Dumazet 提交于
Right after a TCP flow is created, receiving tiny out of order packets allways hit the condition : if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) >= sk->sk_rcvbuf) tcp_clamp_window(sk); tcp_clamp_window() increases sk_rcvbuf to match sk_rmem_alloc (guarded by tcp_rmem[2]) Calling tcp_collapse_ofo_queue() in this case is not useful, and offers a O(N^2) surface attack to malicious peers. Better not attempt anything before full queue capacity is reached, forcing attacker to spend lots of resource and allow us to more easily detect the abuse. Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Acked-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Eric Dumazet 提交于
Juha-Matti Tilli reported that malicious peers could inject tiny packets in out_of_order_queue, forcing very expensive calls to tcp_collapse_ofo_queue() and tcp_prune_ofo_queue() for every incoming packet. out_of_order_queue rb-tree can contain thousands of nodes, iterating over all of them is not nice. Before linux-4.9, we would have pruned all packets in ofo_queue in one go, every XXXX packets. XXXX depends on sk_rcvbuf and skbs truesize, but is about 7000 packets with tcp_rmem[2] default of 6 MB. Since we plan to increase tcp_rmem[2] in the future to cope with modern BDP, can not revert to the old behavior, without great pain. Strategy taken in this patch is to purge ~12.5 % of the queue capacity. Fixes: 36a6503f ("tcp: refine tcp_prune_ofo_queue() to not drop all packets") Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: NJuha-Matti Tilli <juha-matti.tilli@iki.fi> Acked-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Paolo Abeni 提交于
The skb hash for locally generated ip[v6] fragments belonging to the same datagram can vary in several circumstances: * for connected UDP[v6] sockets, the first fragment get its hash via set_owner_w()/skb_set_hash_from_sk() * for unconnected IPv6 UDPv6 sockets, the first fragment can get its hash via ip6_make_flowlabel()/skb_get_hash_flowi6(), if auto_flowlabel is enabled For the following frags the hash is usually computed via skb_get_hash(). The above can cause OoO for unconnected IPv6 UDPv6 socket: in that scenario the egress tx queue can be selected on a per packet basis via the skb hash. It may also fool flow-oriented schedulers to place fragments belonging to the same datagram in different flows. Fix the issue by copying the skb hash from the head frag into the others at fragmentation time. Before this commit: perf probe -a "dev_queue_xmit skb skb->hash skb->l4_hash:b1@0/8 skb->sw_hash:b1@1/8" netperf -H $IPV4 -t UDP_STREAM -l 5 -- -m 2000 -n & perf record -e probe:dev_queue_xmit -e probe:skb_set_owner_w -a sleep 0.1 perf script probe:dev_queue_xmit: (ffffffff8c6b1b20) hash=3713014309 l4_hash=1 sw_hash=0 probe:dev_queue_xmit: (ffffffff8c6b1b20) hash=0 l4_hash=0 sw_hash=0 After this commit: probe:dev_queue_xmit: (ffffffff8c6b1b20) hash=2171763177 l4_hash=1 sw_hash=0 probe:dev_queue_xmit: (ffffffff8c6b1b20) hash=2171763177 l4_hash=1 sw_hash=0 Fixes: b73c3d0e ("net: Save TX flow hash in sock and set in skbuf on xmit") Fixes: 67800f9b ("ipv6: Call skb_get_hash_flowi6 to get skb->hash in ip6_make_flowlabel") Signed-off-by: NPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Wei Wang 提交于
In the code path where only rcu read lock is held, e.g. in the route lookup code path, it is not safe to directly call fib6_info_hold() because the fib6_info may already have been deleted but still exists in the rcu grace period. Holding reference to it could cause double free and crash the kernel. This patch adds a new function fib6_info_hold_safe() and replace fib6_info_hold() in all necessary places. Syzbot reported 3 crash traces because of this. One of them is: 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device team0 IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): team0: link becomes ready dst_release: dst:(____ptrval____) refcnt:-1 dst_release: dst:(____ptrval____) refcnt:-2 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 4845 at include/net/dst.h:239 dst_hold include/net/dst.h:239 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 4845 at include/net/dst.h:239 ip6_setup_cork+0xd66/0x1830 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1204 dst_release: dst:(____ptrval____) refcnt:-1 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 4845 Comm: syz-executor493 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3+ #10 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1c9/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113 panic+0x238/0x4e7 kernel/panic.c:184 dst_release: dst:(____ptrval____) refcnt:-2 dst_release: dst:(____ptrval____) refcnt:-3 __warn.cold.8+0x163/0x1ba kernel/panic.c:536 dst_release: dst:(____ptrval____) refcnt:-4 report_bug+0x252/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:186 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 [inline] do_error_trap+0x1fc/0x4d0 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:296 dst_release: dst:(____ptrval____) refcnt:-5 do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:316 invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:992 RIP: 0010:dst_hold include/net/dst.h:239 [inline] RIP: 0010:ip6_setup_cork+0xd66/0x1830 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1204 Code: c1 ed 03 89 9d 18 ff ff ff 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 41 c6 44 05 00 f8 e9 2d 01 00 00 4c 8b a5 c8 fe ff ff e8 1a f6 e6 fa <0f> 0b e9 6a fc ff ff e8 0e f6 e6 fa 48 8b 85 d0 fe ff ff 48 8d 78 RSP: 0018:ffff8801a8fcf178 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffff8801a8eba5c0 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff869511e6 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff869515b6 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: ffff8801a8fcf2c8 R08: ffff8801a8eba5c0 R09: ffffed0035ac8338 R10: ffffed0035ac8338 R11: ffff8801ad6419c3 R12: ffff8801a8fcf720 R13: ffff8801a8fcf6a0 R14: ffff8801ad6419c0 R15: ffff8801ad641980 ip6_make_skb+0x2c8/0x600 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1768 udpv6_sendmsg+0x2c90/0x35f0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1376 inet_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x690 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:641 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:651 ___sys_sendmsg+0x51d/0x930 net/socket.c:2125 __sys_sendmmsg+0x240/0x6f0 net/socket.c:2220 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2249 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2246 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9d/0x100 net/socket.c:2246 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x446ba9 Code: e8 cc bb 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 eb 08 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007fb39a469da8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dcc54 RCX: 0000000000446ba9 RDX: 00000000000000b8 RSI: 0000000020001b00 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006dcc50 R08: 00007fb39a46a700 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 45c828efc7a64843 R13: e6eeb815b9d8a477 R14: 5068caf6f713c6fc R15: 0000000000000001 Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Kernel Offset: disabled Rebooting in 86400 seconds.. Fixes: 93531c67 ("net/ipv6: separate handling of FIB entries from dst based routes") Reported-by: syzbot+902e2a1bcd4f7808cef5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+8ae62d67f647abeeceb9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+3f08feb14086930677d0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NWei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 23 7月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Roopa Prabhu 提交于
rtnl_configure_link sets dev->rtnl_link_state to RTNL_LINK_INITIALIZED and unconditionally calls __dev_notify_flags to notify user-space of dev flags. current call sequence for rtnl_configure_link rtnetlink_newlink rtnl_link_ops->newlink rtnl_configure_link (unconditionally notifies userspace of default and new dev flags) If a newlink handler wants to call rtnl_configure_link early, we will end up with duplicate notifications to user-space. This patch fixes rtnl_configure_link to check rtnl_link_state and call __dev_notify_flags with gchanges = 0 if already RTNL_LINK_INITIALIZED. Later in the series, this patch will help the following sequence where a driver implementing newlink can call rtnl_configure_link to initialize the link early. makes the following call sequence work: rtnetlink_newlink rtnl_link_ops->newlink (vxlan) -> rtnl_configure_link (initializes link and notifies user-space of default dev flags) rtnl_configure_link (updates dev flags if requested by user ifm and notifies user-space of new dev flags) Signed-off-by: NRoopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 22 7月, 2018 4 次提交
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由 Hangbin Liu 提交于
There are two scenarios that we will restore deleted records. The first is when device down and up(or unmap/remap). In this scenario the new filter mode is same with previous one. Because we get it from in_dev->mc_list and we do not touch it during device down and up. The other scenario is when a new socket join a group which was just delete and not finish sending status reports. In this scenario, we should use the current filter mode instead of restore old one. Here are 4 cases in total. old_socket new_socket before_fix after_fix IN(A) IN(A) ALLOW(A) ALLOW(A) IN(A) EX( ) TO_IN( ) TO_EX( ) EX( ) IN(A) TO_EX( ) ALLOW(A) EX( ) EX( ) TO_EX( ) TO_EX( ) Fixes: 24803f38 (igmp: do not remove igmp souce list info when set link down) Fixes: 1666d49e (mld: do not remove mld souce list info when set link down) Signed-off-by: NHangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Eric Dumazet 提交于
syzbot caught a NULL deref [1], caused by skb_segment() skb_segment() has many "goto err;" that assume the @err variable contains -ENOMEM. A successful call to __skb_linearize() should not clear @err, otherwise a subsequent memory allocation error could return NULL. While we are at it, we might use -EINVAL instead of -ENOMEM when MAX_SKB_FRAGS limit is reached. [1] kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 13285 Comm: syz-executor3 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc4+ #146 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:tcp_gso_segment+0x3dc/0x1780 net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c:106 Code: f0 ff ff 0f 87 1c fd ff ff e8 00 88 0b fb 48 8b 75 d0 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d be 90 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <0f> b6 14 08 48 8d 86 94 00 00 00 48 89 c6 83 e0 07 48 c1 ee 03 0f RSP: 0018:ffff88019b7fd060 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000012 RBX: 0000000000000020 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000090 RBP: ffff88019b7fd0f0 R08: ffff88019510e0c0 R09: ffffed003b5c46d6 R10: ffffed003b5c46d6 R11: ffff8801dae236b3 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff8801d6c581f4 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8801d6c58128 FS: 00007fcae64d6700(0000) GS:ffff8801dae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004e8664 CR3: 00000001b669b000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: tcp4_gso_segment+0x1c3/0x440 net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c:54 inet_gso_segment+0x64e/0x12d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1342 inet_gso_segment+0x64e/0x12d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1342 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3b5/0x740 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3c3/0x880 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4099 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x640/0xf30 net/core/dev.c:3104 __dev_queue_xmit+0xc14/0x3910 net/core/dev.c:3561 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3602 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:473 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:481 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x1063/0x1860 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:229 ip_finish_output+0x841/0xfa0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:317 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:276 [inline] ip_output+0x223/0x880 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:405 dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] ip_local_out+0xc5/0x1b0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:124 iptunnel_xmit+0x567/0x850 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:91 ip_tunnel_xmit+0x1598/0x3af1 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:778 ipip_tunnel_xmit+0x264/0x2c0 net/ipv4/ipip.c:308 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4148 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4157 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3034 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x26c/0xc30 net/core/dev.c:3050 __dev_queue_xmit+0x29ef/0x3910 net/core/dev.c:3569 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3602 neigh_direct_output+0x15/0x20 net/core/neighbour.c:1403 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:483 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xa67/0x1860 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:229 ip_finish_output+0x841/0xfa0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:317 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:276 [inline] ip_output+0x223/0x880 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:405 dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline] ip_local_out+0xc5/0x1b0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:124 ip_queue_xmit+0x9df/0x1f80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:504 tcp_transmit_skb+0x1bf9/0x3f10 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1168 tcp_write_xmit+0x1641/0x5c20 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2363 __tcp_push_pending_frames+0xb2/0x290 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2536 tcp_push+0x638/0x8c0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:735 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2ec5/0x3f00 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1410 tcp_sendmsg+0x2f/0x50 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1447 inet_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x690 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:641 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:651 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1797 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1809 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1805 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1805 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x455ab9 Code: 1d ba fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 eb b9 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007fcae64d5c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fcae64d66d4 RCX: 0000000000455ab9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000200 RDI: 0000000000000013 RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000014 R13: 00000000004c1145 R14: 00000000004d1818 R15: 0000000000000006 Modules linked in: Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Fixes: ddff00d4 ("net: Move skb_has_shared_frag check out of GRE code and into segmentation") Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: NAlexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 David Ahern 提交于
Example setup: host: ip -6 addr add dev eth1 2001:db8:104::4 where eth1 is enslaved to a VRF switch: ip -6 ro add 2001:db8:104::4/128 dev br1 where br1 only has an LLA ping6 2001:db8:104::4 ssh 2001:db8:104::4 (NOTE: UDP works fine if the PKTINFO has the address set to the global address and ifindex is set to the index of eth1 with a destination an LLA). For ICMP, icmp6_iif needs to be updated to check if skb->dev is an L3 master. If it is then return the ifindex from rt6i_idev similar to what is done for loopback. For TCP, restore the original tcp_v6_iif definition which is needed in most places and add a new tcp_v6_iif_l3_slave that considers the l3_slave variability. This latter check is only needed for socket lookups. Fixes: 9ff74384 ("net: vrf: Handle ipv6 multicast and link-local addresses") Signed-off-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 YueHaibing 提交于
Add a missing rcu_read_unlock in the error path Fixes: c95567c8 ("caif: added check for potential null return") Signed-off-by: NYueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 21 7月, 2018 4 次提交
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由 Doron Roberts-Kedes 提交于
The current code does not check sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN. tls_sw_recvmsg may return a positive value in the case where bytes have already been copied when the socket is shutdown. sk->sk_err has been cleared, causing the tls_wait_data to hang forever on a subsequent invocation. Checking sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN, as in tcp_recvmsg, fixes this problem. Fixes: c46234eb ("tls: RX path for ktls") Acked-by: NDave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Signed-off-by: NDoron Roberts-Kedes <doronrk@fb.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Yuchung Cheng 提交于
Per DCTCP RFC8257 (Section 3.2) the ACK reflecting the CE status change has to be sent immediately so the sender can respond quickly: """ When receiving packets, the CE codepoint MUST be processed as follows: 1. If the CE codepoint is set and DCTCP.CE is false, set DCTCP.CE to true and send an immediate ACK. 2. If the CE codepoint is not set and DCTCP.CE is true, set DCTCP.CE to false and send an immediate ACK. """ Previously DCTCP implementation may continue to delay the ACK. This patch fixes that to implement the RFC by forcing an immediate ACK. Tested with this packetdrill script provided by Larry Brakmo 0.000 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3 0.000 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0 0.000 setsockopt(3, SOL_TCP, TCP_CONGESTION, "dctcp", 5) = 0 0.000 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0 0.000 listen(3, 1) = 0 0.100 < [ect0] SEW 0:0(0) win 32792 <mss 1000,sackOK,nop,nop,nop,wscale 7> 0.100 > SE. 0:0(0) ack 1 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 8> 0.110 < [ect0] . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257 0.200 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4 +0 setsockopt(4, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG, [1], 4) = 0 0.200 < [ect0] . 1:1001(1000) ack 1 win 257 0.200 > [ect01] . 1:1(0) ack 1001 0.200 write(4, ..., 1) = 1 0.200 > [ect01] P. 1:2(1) ack 1001 0.200 < [ect0] . 1001:2001(1000) ack 2 win 257 +0.005 < [ce] . 2001:3001(1000) ack 2 win 257 +0.000 > [ect01] . 2:2(0) ack 2001 // Previously the ACK below would be delayed by 40ms +0.000 > [ect01] E. 2:2(0) ack 3001 +0.500 < F. 9501:9501(0) ack 4 win 257 Signed-off-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Yuchung Cheng 提交于
Currently when a DCTCP receiver delays an ACK and receive a data packet with a different CE mark from the previous one's, it sends two immediate ACKs acking previous and latest sequences respectly (for ECN accounting). Previously sending the first ACK may mark off the delayed ACK timer (tcp_event_ack_sent). This may subsequently prevent sending the second ACK to acknowledge the latest sequence (tcp_ack_snd_check). The culprit is that tcp_send_ack() assumes it always acknowleges the latest sequence, which is not true for the first special ACK. The fix is to not make the assumption in tcp_send_ack and check the actual ack sequence before cancelling the delayed ACK. Further it's safer to pass the ack sequence number as a local variable into tcp_send_ack routine, instead of intercepting tp->rcv_nxt to avoid future bugs like this. Reported-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Yuchung Cheng 提交于
Refactor and create helpers to send the special ACK in DCTCP. Signed-off-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 20 7月, 2018 6 次提交
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由 Florian Westphal 提交于
When first DCCP packet is SYNC or SYNCACK, we insert a new conntrack that has an un-initialized timeout value, i.e. such entry could be reaped at any time. Mark them as INVALID and only ignore SYNC/SYNCACK when connection had an old state. Reported-by: syzbot+6f18401420df260e37ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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由 Florian Westphal 提交于
Its possible to rename two chains to the same name in one transaction: nft add chain t c1 nft add chain t c2 nft 'rename chain t c1 c3;rename chain t c2 c3' This creates two chains named 'c3'. Appears to be harmless, both chains can still be deleted both by name or handle, but, nevertheless, its a bug. Walk transaction log and also compare vs. the pending renames. Both chains can still be deleted, but nevertheless it is a bug as we don't allow to create chains with identical names, so we should prevent this from happening-by-rename too. Signed-off-by: NFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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由 Florian Westphal 提交于
The new name is stored in the transaction metadata, on commit, the pointers to the old and new names are swapped. Therefore in abort and commit case we have to free the pointer in the chain_trans container. In commit case, the pointer can be used by another cpu that is currently dumping the renamed chain, thus kfree needs to happen after waiting for rcu readers to complete. Fixes: b7263e07 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Allow chain name of up to 255 chars") Signed-off-by: NFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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由 Florian Westphal 提交于
Fixes: 3b49e2e9 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add flow table netlink frontend") Signed-off-by: NFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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由 Florian Westphal 提交于
no need to store the name in separate area. Furthermore, it uses kmalloc but not kfree and most accesses seem to treat it as char[IFNAMSIZ] not char *. Remove this and use dev->name instead. In case event zeroed dev, just omit the name in the dump. Fixes: d92191aa ("netfilter: nf_tables: cache device name in flowtable object") Signed-off-by: NFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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由 Tariq Toukan 提交于
Fix the warning below by calling the ptr_ring_consume_bh, which uses spin_[un]lock_bh. [ 179.064300] ================================ [ 179.069073] WARNING: inconsistent lock state [ 179.073846] 4.18.0-rc2+ #18 Not tainted [ 179.078133] -------------------------------- [ 179.082907] inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage. [ 179.089637] swapper/21/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes: [ 179.095478] 00000000963d1995 (&(&r->consumer_lock)->rlock){+.?.}, at: __page_pool_empty_ring+0x61/0x100 [ 179.105988] {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: [ 179.111443] _raw_spin_lock+0x35/0x50 [ 179.115634] __page_pool_empty_ring+0x61/0x100 [ 179.120699] page_pool_destroy+0x32/0x50 [ 179.125204] mlx5e_free_rq+0x38/0xc0 [mlx5_core] [ 179.130471] mlx5e_close_channel+0x20/0x120 [mlx5_core] [ 179.136418] mlx5e_close_channels+0x26/0x40 [mlx5_core] [ 179.142364] mlx5e_close_locked+0x44/0x50 [mlx5_core] [ 179.148509] mlx5e_close+0x42/0x60 [mlx5_core] [ 179.153936] __dev_close_many+0xb1/0x120 [ 179.158749] dev_close_many+0xa2/0x170 [ 179.163364] rollback_registered_many+0x148/0x460 [ 179.169047] rollback_registered+0x56/0x90 [ 179.174043] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x7e/0x100 [ 179.179816] unregister_netdev+0x18/0x20 [ 179.184623] mlx5e_remove+0x2a/0x50 [mlx5_core] [ 179.190107] mlx5_remove_device+0xe5/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 179.196274] mlx5_unregister_interface+0x39/0x90 [mlx5_core] [ 179.203028] cleanup+0x5/0xbfc [mlx5_core] [ 179.208031] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x16b/0x240 [ 179.213640] do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x210 [ 179.218151] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 179.224218] irq event stamp: 334398 [ 179.228438] hardirqs last enabled at (334398): [<ffffffffa511d8b7>] rcu_process_callbacks+0x1c7/0x790 [ 179.239178] hardirqs last disabled at (334397): [<ffffffffa511d872>] rcu_process_callbacks+0x182/0x790 [ 179.249931] softirqs last enabled at (334386): [<ffffffffa509732e>] irq_enter+0x5e/0x70 [ 179.259306] softirqs last disabled at (334387): [<ffffffffa509741c>] irq_exit+0xdc/0xf0 [ 179.268584] [ 179.268584] other info that might help us debug this: [ 179.276572] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 179.276572] [ 179.283877] CPU0 [ 179.286954] ---- [ 179.290033] lock(&(&r->consumer_lock)->rlock); [ 179.295546] <Interrupt> [ 179.298830] lock(&(&r->consumer_lock)->rlock); [ 179.304550] [ 179.304550] *** DEADLOCK *** Fixes: ff7d6b27 ("page_pool: refurbish version of page_pool code") Signed-off-by: NTariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 19 7月, 2018 8 次提交
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由 Randy Dunlap 提交于
Attempt to make cryptic TCP seq number error messages clearer by (1) identifying the source of the message as "TCP", (2) identifying the errors as "seq # bug", and (3) grouping the field identifiers and values by separating them with commas. E.g., the following message is changed from: recvmsg bug 2: copied 73BCB6CD seq 70F17CBE rcvnxt 73BCB9AA fl 0 WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1501 at /linux/net/ipv4/tcp.c:1881 tcp_recvmsg+0x649/0xb90 to: TCP recvmsg seq # bug 2: copied 73BCB6CD, seq 70F17CBE, rcvnxt 73BCB9AA, fl 0 WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1501 at /linux/net/ipv4/tcp.c:2011 tcp_recvmsg+0x694/0xba0 Suggested-by: N積丹尼 Dan Jacobson <jidanni@jidanni.org> Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Colin Ian King 提交于
The rol32 call is currently rotating hash but the rol'd value is being discarded. I believe the current code is incorrect and hash should be assigned the rotated value returned from rol32. Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1468411 ("Useless call") Fixes: b5facfdb ("ipv6: sr: Compute flowlabel for outer IPv6 header of seg6 encap mode") Signed-off-by: NColin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Acked-by: dlebrun@google.com Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 YueHaibing 提交于
Fixes the following sparse warnings: net/sched/cls_api.c:1101:43: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer net/sched/cls_api.c:1492:75: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer Signed-off-by: NYueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Karsten Graul 提交于
During clc handshake the receive timeout is set to CLC_WAIT_TIME. Remember and reset the original timeout value after the receive calls, and remove a duplicate assignment of CLC_WAIT_TIME. Signed-off-by: NKarsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NUrsula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Ursula Braun 提交于
For security reasons the return code of get_user() should always be checked. Fixes: 01d2f7e2 ("net/smc: sockopts TCP_NODELAY and TCP_CORK") Reported-by: NHeiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NUrsula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Ursula Braun 提交于
The SMC protocol requires to send a separate consumer cursor update, if it cannot be piggybacked to updates of the producer cursor. Currently the decision to send a separate consumer cursor update just considers the amount of data already received by the socket program. It does not consider the amount of data already arrived, but not yet consumed by the receiver. Basing the decision on the difference between already confirmed and already arrived data (instead of difference between already confirmed and already consumed data), may lead to a somewhat earlier consumer cursor update send in fast unidirectional traffic scenarios, and thus to better throughput. Signed-off-by: NUrsula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com> Suggested-by: NThomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
syzbot is reporting stalls at nfc_llcp_send_ui_frame() [1]. This is because nfc_llcp_send_ui_frame() is retrying the loop without any delay when nonblocking nfc_alloc_send_skb() returned NULL. Since there is no need to use MSG_DONTWAIT if we retry until sock_alloc_send_pskb() succeeds, let's use blocking call. Also, in case an unexpected error occurred, let's break the loop if blocking nfc_alloc_send_skb() failed. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=4a131cc571c3733e0eff6bc673f4e36ae48f19c6Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzbot+d29d18215e477cfbfbdd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Arnd Bergmann 提交于
My randconfig builds came across an old missing dependency for ILA: ERROR: "dst_cache_set_ip6" [net/ipv6/ila/ila.ko] undefined! ERROR: "dst_cache_get" [net/ipv6/ila/ila.ko] undefined! ERROR: "dst_cache_init" [net/ipv6/ila/ila.ko] undefined! ERROR: "dst_cache_destroy" [net/ipv6/ila/ila.ko] undefined! We almost never run into this by accident because randconfig builds end up selecting DST_CACHE from some other tunnel protocol, and this one appears to be the only one missing the explicit 'select'. >From all I can tell, this problem first appeared in linux-4.9 when dst_cache support got added to ILA. Fixes: 79ff2fc3 ("ila: Cache a route to translated address") Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 18 7月, 2018 3 次提交
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由 Taehee Yoo 提交于
This patch fixes below. 1. check null pointer of rb_next. rb_next can return null. so null check routine should be added. 2. add rcu_barrier in destroy routine. GC uses call_rcu to remove elements. but all elements should be removed before destroying set and chains. so that rcu_barrier is added. test script: %cat test.nft table inet aa { map map1 { type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags interval, timeout; elements = { 0-1 : jump a0, 3-4 : jump a0, 6-7 : jump a0, 9-10 : jump a0, 12-13 : jump a0, 15-16 : jump a0, 18-19 : jump a0, 21-22 : jump a0, 24-25 : jump a0, 27-28 : jump a0, } timeout 1s; } chain a0 { } } flush ruleset table inet aa { map map1 { type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags interval, timeout; elements = { 0-1 : jump a0, 3-4 : jump a0, 6-7 : jump a0, 9-10 : jump a0, 12-13 : jump a0, 15-16 : jump a0, 18-19 : jump a0, 21-22 : jump a0, 24-25 : jump a0, 27-28 : jump a0, } timeout 1s; } chain a0 { } } flush ruleset splat looks like: [ 2402.419838] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access [ 2402.428433] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI [ 2402.429343] CPU: 1 PID: 1350 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc2+ #1 [ 2402.429343] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 03/23/2017 [ 2402.429343] Workqueue: events_power_efficient nft_rbtree_gc [nft_set_rbtree] [ 2402.429343] RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x1e/0x130 [ 2402.429343] Code: e9 de f2 ff ff 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 41 55 48 89 fa 41 54 55 53 48 c1 ea 03 48 b8 00 00 00 0 [ 2402.429343] RSP: 0018:ffff880105f77678 EFLAGS: 00010296 [ 2402.429343] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8801143e3428 RCX: 1ffff1002287c69c [ 2402.429343] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 2402.429343] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffed0016aabc24 R09: ffffed0016aabc24 [ 2402.429343] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0016aabc23 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 2402.429343] R13: ffff8800b6933388 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8801143e3440 [ 2402.534486] kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled [ 2402.534212] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011b600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2402.534212] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2402.534212] CR2: 0000000000863008 CR3: 00000000a3c16000 CR4: 00000000001006e0 [ 2402.534212] Call Trace: [ 2402.534212] nft_rbtree_gc+0x2b5/0x5f0 [nft_set_rbtree] [ 2402.534212] process_one_work+0xc1b/0x1ee0 [ 2402.540329] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access [ 2402.534212] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40 [ 2402.534212] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x3e0/0x3e0 [ 2402.534212] ? set_load_weight+0x270/0x270 [ 2402.534212] ? __schedule+0x6ea/0x1fb0 [ 2402.534212] ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8 [ 2402.534212] ? save_trace+0x320/0x320 [ 2402.534212] ? sched_clock_local+0xe2/0x150 [ 2402.534212] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0 [ 2402.534212] ? worker_thread+0x35f/0x1150 [ 2402.534212] ? lock_contended+0xe90/0xe90 [ 2402.534212] ? __lock_acquire+0x4520/0x4520 [ 2402.534212] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xb1/0x350 [ 2402.534212] ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x111/0x1b0 [ 2402.534212] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x1f0/0x1f0 [ 2402.534212] worker_thread+0x169/0x1150 Fixes: 8d8540c4("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: add timeout support") Signed-off-by: NTaehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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由 Taehee Yoo 提交于
GC of set uses call_rcu() to destroy elements. So that elements would be destroyed after destroying sets and chains. But, elements should be destroyed before destroying sets and chains. In order to wait calling call_rcu(), a rcu_barrier() is added. In order to test correctly, below patch should be applied. https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/940883/ test scripts: %cat test.nft table ip aa { map map1 { type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags timeout; elements = { 0 : jump a0, 1 : jump a0, 2 : jump a0, 3 : jump a0, 4 : jump a0, 5 : jump a0, 6 : jump a0, 7 : jump a0, 8 : jump a0, 9 : jump a0, } timeout 1s; } chain a0 { } } flush ruleset [ ... ] table ip aa { map map1 { type ipv4_addr : verdict; flags timeout; elements = { 0 : jump a0, 1 : jump a0, 2 : jump a0, 3 : jump a0, 4 : jump a0, 5 : jump a0, 6 : jump a0, 7 : jump a0, 8 : jump a0, 9 : jump a0, } timeout 1s; } chain a0 { } } flush ruleset Splat looks like: [ 200.795603] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1363! [ 200.806944] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI [ 200.812253] CPU: 1 PID: 1582 Comm: nft Not tainted 4.17.0+ #24 [ 200.820297] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 07/08/2015 [ 200.830309] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy.isra.34+0x62/0x240 [nf_tables] [ 200.838317] Code: 43 50 85 c0 74 26 48 8b 45 00 48 8b 4d 08 ba 54 05 00 00 48 c7 c6 60 6d 29 c0 48 c7 c7 c0 65 29 c0 4c 8b 40 08 e8 58 e5 fd f8 <0f> 0b 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff [ 200.860366] RSP: 0000:ffff880118dbf4d0 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 200.866354] RAX: 0000000000000061 RBX: ffff88010cdeaf08 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 200.874355] RDX: 0000000000000061 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffed00231b7e90 [ 200.882361] RBP: ffff880118dbf4e8 R08: ffffed002373bcfb R09: ffffed002373bcfa [ 200.890354] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffed002373bcfb R12: dead000000000200 [ 200.898356] R13: dead000000000100 R14: ffffffffbb62af38 R15: dffffc0000000000 [ 200.906354] FS: 00007fefc31fd700(0000) GS:ffff88011b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 200.915533] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 200.922355] CR2: 0000557f1c8e9128 CR3: 0000000106880000 CR4: 00000000001006e0 [ 200.930353] Call Trace: [ 200.932351] ? nf_tables_commit+0x26f6/0x2c60 [nf_tables] [ 200.939525] ? nf_tables_setelem_notify.constprop.49+0x1a0/0x1a0 [nf_tables] [ 200.947525] ? nf_tables_delchain+0x6e0/0x6e0 [nf_tables] [ 200.952383] ? nft_add_set_elem+0x1700/0x1700 [nf_tables] [ 200.959532] ? nla_parse+0xab/0x230 [ 200.963529] ? nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xd06/0x10d0 [nfnetlink] [ 200.968384] ? nfnetlink_net_init+0x130/0x130 [nfnetlink] [ 200.975525] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290 [ 200.980363] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290 [ 200.986356] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x132/0x170 [ 200.990352] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1b0 [ 200.994355] ? sched_clock_local+0x10d/0x130 [ 200.999531] ? memset+0x1f/0x40 Fixes: 9d098292 ("netfilter: nft_hash: add support for timeouts") Signed-off-by: NTaehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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由 Taehee Yoo 提交于
The level of struct nft_ctx is updated by nf_tables_check_loops(). That is used to validate jumpstack depth. But jumpstack validation routine doesn't update and validate recursively. So, in some cases, chain depth can be bigger than the NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE. After this patch, The jumpstack validation routine is located in the nft_chain_validate(). When new rules or new set elements are added, the nft_table_validate() is called by the nf_tables_newrule and the nf_tables_newsetelem. The nft_table_validate() calls the nft_chain_validate() that visit all their children chains recursively. So it can update depth of chain certainly. Reproducer: %cat ./test.sh #!/bin/bash nft add table ip filter nft add chain ip filter input { type filter hook input priority 0\; } for ((i=0;i<20;i++)); do nft add chain ip filter a$i done nft add rule ip filter input jump a1 for ((i=0;i<10;i++)); do nft add rule ip filter a$i jump a$((i+1)) done for ((i=11;i<19;i++)); do nft add rule ip filter a$i jump a$((i+1)) done nft add rule ip filter a10 jump a11 Result: [ 253.931782] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:186 nft_do_chain+0xacc/0xdf0 [nf_tables] [ 253.931915] Modules linked in: nf_tables nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables [ 253.932153] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3+ #48 [ 253.932153] RIP: 0010:nft_do_chain+0xacc/0xdf0 [nf_tables] [ 253.932153] Code: 83 f8 fb 0f 84 c7 00 00 00 e9 d0 00 00 00 83 f8 fd 74 0e 83 f8 ff 0f 84 b4 00 00 00 e9 bd 00 00 00 83 bd 64 fd ff ff 0f 76 09 <0f> 0b 31 c0 e9 bc 02 00 00 44 8b ad 64 fd [ 253.933807] RSP: 0018:ffff88011b807570 EFLAGS: 00010212 [ 253.933807] RAX: 00000000fffffffd RBX: ffff88011b807660 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 253.933807] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffff880112b39d78 RDI: ffff88011b807670 [ 253.933807] RBP: ffff88011b807850 R08: ffffed0023700ece R09: ffffed0023700ecd [ 253.933807] R10: ffff88011b80766f R11: ffffed0023700ece R12: ffff88011b807898 [ 253.933807] R13: ffff880112b39d80 R14: ffff880112b39d60 R15: dffffc0000000000 [ 253.933807] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 253.933807] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 253.933807] CR2: 00000000014f1008 CR3: 000000006b216000 CR4: 00000000001006e0 [ 253.933807] Call Trace: [ 253.933807] <IRQ> [ 253.933807] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x132/0x170 [ 253.933807] ? __nft_trace_packet+0x180/0x180 [nf_tables] [ 253.933807] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x132/0x170 [ 253.933807] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290 [ 253.933807] ? __lock_acquire+0x4835/0x4af0 [ 253.933807] ? inet_ehash_locks_alloc+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 253.933807] ? unwind_next_frame+0x159e/0x1840 [ 253.933807] ? __read_once_size_nocheck.constprop.4+0x5/0x10 [ 253.933807] ? nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x197/0x1e0 [nf_tables] [ 253.933807] ? nft_do_chain+0x5/0xdf0 [nf_tables] [ 253.933807] nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x197/0x1e0 [nf_tables] [ 253.933807] ? nft_do_chain_arp+0xb0/0xb0 [nf_tables] [ 253.933807] ? __lock_is_held+0x9d/0x130 [ 253.933807] nf_hook_slow+0xc4/0x150 [ 253.933807] ip_local_deliver+0x28b/0x380 [ 253.933807] ? ip_call_ra_chain+0x3e0/0x3e0 [ 253.933807] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x1610/0x1610 [ 253.933807] ip_rcv+0xbcc/0xcc0 [ 253.933807] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x290/0x290 [ 253.933807] ? ip_local_deliver+0x380/0x380 [ 253.933807] ? __lock_is_held+0x9d/0x130 [ 253.933807] ? ip_local_deliver+0x380/0x380 [ 253.933807] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1c9c/0x2240 Signed-off-by: NTaehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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- 17 7月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Ursula Braun 提交于
SMC ioctl processing requires the sock lock to work properly in all thinkable scenarios. Problem has been found with RaceFuzzer and fixes: KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in smc_ioctl Reported-by: NByoungyoung Lee <lifeasageek@gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot+35b2c5aa76fd398b9fd4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: NUrsula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NStefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 David Ahern 提交于
Eric reported that reverting the patch that fixed and simplified IPv6 multipath routes means reverting back to invalid userspace notifications. eg., $ ip -6 route add 2001:db8:1::/64 nexthop dev eth0 nexthop dev eth1 only generates a single notification: 2001:db8:1::/64 dev eth0 metric 1024 pref medium While working on a fix for this problem I found another case that is just broken completely - a multipath route with a gateway followed by device followed by gateway: $ ip -6 ro add 2001:db8:103::/64 nexthop via 2001:db8:1::64 nexthop dev dummy2 nexthop via 2001:db8:3::64 In this case the device only route is dropped completely - no notification to userpsace but no addition to the FIB either: $ ip -6 ro ls 2001:db8:1::/64 dev dummy1 proto kernel metric 256 pref medium 2001:db8:2::/64 dev dummy2 proto kernel metric 256 pref medium 2001:db8:3::/64 dev dummy3 proto kernel metric 256 pref medium 2001:db8:103::/64 metric 1024 nexthop via 2001:db8:1::64 dev dummy1 weight 1 nexthop via 2001:db8:3::64 dev dummy3 weight 1 pref medium fe80::/64 dev dummy1 proto kernel metric 256 pref medium fe80::/64 dev dummy2 proto kernel metric 256 pref medium fe80::/64 dev dummy3 proto kernel metric 256 pref medium Really, IPv6 multipath is just FUBAR'ed beyond repair when it comes to device only routes, so do not allow it all. This change will break any scripts relying on the mpath api for insert, but I don't see any other way to handle the permutations. Besides, since the routes are added to the FIB as standalone (non-multipath) routes the kernel is not doing what the user requested, so it might as well tell the user that. Reported-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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