This checks that it is not possible to bypass the total stack size check in
update_stack_depth() by calling a function that uses a large amount of
stack memory *before* using a large amount of stack memory in the caller.

Currently, the first added testcase causes a rejection as expected, but
the second testcase is (AFAICS incorrectly) accepted:

[...]
#483/p calls: stack overflow using two frames (post-call access) FAIL
Unexpected success to load!
0: (85) call pc+2
caller:
 R10=fp0,call_-1
callee:
 frame1: R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0,call_0
3: (72) *(u8 *)(r10 -300) = 0
4: (b7) r0 = 0
5: (95) exit
returning from callee:
 frame1: R0_w=inv0 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0,call_0
to caller at 1:
 R0_w=inv0 R10=fp0,call_-1

from 5 to 1: R0=inv0 R10=fp0,call_-1
1: (72) *(u8 *)(r10 -300) = 0
2: (95) exit
processed 6 insns, stack depth 300+300
[...]
Summary: 704 PASSED, 1 FAILED

AFAICS the JIT-generated code for the second testcase shows that this
really causes the stack pointer to be decremented by 300+300:

first function:
00000000  55                push rbp
00000001  4889E5            mov rbp,rsp
00000004  4881EC58010000    sub rsp,0x158
0000000B  4883ED28          sub rbp,byte +0x28
[...]
00000025  E89AB3AFE5        call 0xffffffffe5afb3c4
0000002A  C685D4FEFFFF00    mov byte [rbp-0x12c],0x0
[...]
00000041  4883C528          add rbp,byte +0x28
00000045  C9                leave
00000046  C3                ret

second function:
00000000  55                push rbp
00000001  4889E5            mov rbp,rsp
00000004  4881EC58010000    sub rsp,0x158
0000000B  4883ED28          sub rbp,byte +0x28
[...]
00000025  C685D4FEFFFF00    mov byte [rbp-0x12c],0x0
[...]
0000003E  4883C528          add rbp,byte +0x28
00000042  C9                leave
00000043  C3                ret
Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

Commit cc2b14d5 ("bpf: teach verifier to recognize zero initialized
stack") introduced a very relaxed check when comparing stacks of different
states, effectively returning a positive result in many cases where it
shouldn't.

This can create problems in cases such as this following C pseudocode:

long var;
long *x = bpf_map_lookup(...);
if (!x)
        return;

if (*x != 0xbeef)
        var = 0;
else
        var = 1;

/* This is the key part, calling a helper causes an explored state
 * to be saved with the information that "var" is on the stack as
 * STACK_ZERO, since the helper is first met by the verifier after
 * the "var = 0" assignment. This state will however be wrongly used
 * also for the "var = 1" case, so the verifier assumes "var" is always
 * 0 and will replace the NULL assignment with nops, because the
 * search pruning prevents it from exploring the faulty branch.
 */
bpf_ktime_get_ns();

if (var)
        *(long *)0 = 0xbeef;

Fix the issue by making sure that the stack is fully explored before
returning a positive comparison result.

Also attach a couple tests that highlight the bad behavior. In the first
test, without this fix instructions 16 and 17 are replaced with nops
instead of being rejected by the verifier.

The second test, instead, allows a program to make a potentially illegal
read from the stack.

Fixes: cc2b14d5 ("bpf: teach verifier to recognize zero initialized stack")
Signed-off-by: NGianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

Add some additional checks for few more corner cases.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

adjust two tests, since verifier got smarter
and add new one to test stack_zero logic
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

Add extensive set of tests for bpf_call verification logic:

calls: basic sanity
calls: using r0 returned by callee
calls: callee is using r1
calls: callee using args1
calls: callee using wrong args2
calls: callee using two args
calls: callee changing pkt pointers
calls: two calls with args
calls: two calls with bad jump
calls: recursive call. test1
calls: recursive call. test2
calls: unreachable code
calls: invalid call
calls: jumping across function bodies. test1
calls: jumping across function bodies. test2
calls: call without exit
calls: call into middle of ld_imm64
calls: call into middle of other call
calls: two calls with bad fallthrough
calls: two calls with stack read
calls: two calls with stack write
calls: spill into caller stack frame
calls: two calls with stack write and void return
calls: ambiguous return value
calls: two calls that return map_value
calls: two calls that return map_value with bool condition
calls: two calls that return map_value with incorrect bool check
calls: two calls that receive map_value via arg=ptr_stack_of_caller. test1
calls: two calls that receive map_value via arg=ptr_stack_of_caller. test2
calls: two jumps that receive map_value via arg=ptr_stack_of_jumper. test3
calls: two calls that receive map_value_ptr_or_null via arg. test1
calls: two calls that receive map_value_ptr_or_null via arg. test2
calls: pkt_ptr spill into caller stack
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

With the current ARG_PTR_TO_MEM/ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM semantics, an helper
argument can be NULL when the next argument type is ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO
and the verifier can prove the value of this next argument is 0. However,
most helpers are just interested in handling <!NULL, 0>, so forcing them to
deal with <NULL, 0> makes the implementation of those helpers more
complicated for no apparent benefits, requiring them to explicitly handle
those corner cases with checks that bpf programs could start relying upon,
preventing the possibility of removing them later.

Solve this by making ARG_PTR_TO_MEM/ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM never accept NULL
even when ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO is set, and introduce a new argument type
ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL to explicitly deal with the NULL case.

Currently, the only helper that needs this is bpf_csum_diff_proto(), so
change arg1 and arg3 to this new type as well.

Also add a new battery of tests that explicitly test the
!ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL combination: all the current ones testing the
various <NULL, 0> variations are focused on bpf_csum_diff, so cover also
other helpers.
Signed-off-by: NGianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

There are four tests in test_verifier using bpf_probe_write_user
helper. These four tests will emit the following kernel messages
  [   12.974753] test_verifier[220] is installing a program with bpf_probe_write_user
                                    helper that may corrupt user memory!
  [   12.979285] test_verifier[220] is installing a program with bpf_probe_write_user
                                    helper that may corrupt user memory!
  ......

This may confuse certain users. This patch replaces bpf_probe_write_user
with bpf_trace_printk. The test_verifier already uses bpf_trace_printk
earlier in the test and a trace_printk warning message has been printed.
So this patch does not emit any more kernel messages.

Fixes: b6ff6391 ("bpf: fix and add test cases for ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO semantics change")
Signed-off-by: NYonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

Fix a few test cases to allow non-NULL map/packet/stack pointer
with size = 0. Change a few tests using bpf_probe_read to use
bpf_probe_write_user so ARG_CONST_SIZE arg can still be properly
tested. One existing test case already covers size = 0 with non-NULL
packet pointer, so add additional tests so all cases of
size = 0 and 0 <= size <= legal_upper_bound with non-NULL
map/packet/stack pointer are covered.
Signed-off-by: NYonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Lets also add test cases to cover all possible data_meta access tests
for good/bad access cases so we keep tracking them.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Two minor cleanups after Dave's recent merge in f8ddadc4
("Merge git://git.kernel.org...") of net into net-next in
order to get the code in line with what was done originally
in the net tree: i) use max() instead of max_t() since both
ranges are u16, ii) don't split the direct access test cases
in the middle with bpf_exit test cases from 390ee7e2
("bpf: enforce return code for cgroup-bpf programs").
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Lets add test cases to cover really all possible direct packet
access tests for good/bad access cases so we keep tracking them.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The skb->mark field is a union with reserved_tailroom which is used
in the TCP code paths from stream memory allocation. Allowing SK_SKB
programs to set this field creates a conflict with future code
optimizations, such as "gifting" the skb to the egress path instead
of creating a new skb and doing a memcpy.

Because we do not have a released version of SK_SKB yet lets just
remove it for now. A more appropriate scratch pad to use at the
socket layer is dev_scratch, but lets add that in future kernels
when needed.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Commit f1174f77 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
removed the crafty selection of which pointer types are
allowed to be modified.  This is OK for most pointer types
since adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() will catch operations on
immutable pointers.  One exception is PTR_TO_CTX which is
now allowed to be offseted freely.

The intent of aforementioned commit was to allow context
access via modified registers.  The offset passed to
->is_valid_access() verifier callback has been adjusted
by the value of the variable offset.

What is missing, however, is taking the variable offset
into account when the context register is used.  Or in terms
of the code adding the offset to the value passed to the
->convert_ctx_access() callback.  This leads to the following
eBPF user code:

     r1 += 68
     r0 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 8)
     exit

being translated to this in kernel space:

   0: (07) r1 += 68
   1: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r1 +180)
   2: (95) exit

Offset 8 is corresponding to 180 in the kernel, but offset
76 is valid too.  Verifier will "accept" access to offset
68+8=76 but then "convert" access to offset 8 as 180.
Effective access to offset 248 is beyond the kernel context.
(This is a __sk_buff example on a debug-heavy kernel -
packet mark is 8 -> 180, 76 would be data.)

Dereferencing the modified context pointer is not as easy
as dereferencing other types, because we have to translate
the access to reading a field in kernel structures which is
usually at a different offset and often of a different size.
To allow modifying the pointer we would have to make sure
that given eBPF instruction will always access the same
field or the fields accessed are "compatible" in terms of
offset and size...

Disallow dereferencing modified context pointers and add
to selftests the test case described here.

Fixes: f1174f77 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: NJakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NEdward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

with addition of tnum logic the verifier got smart enough and
we can enforce return codes at program load time.
For now do so for cgroup-bpf program types.
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch extends the libbpf to provide API support to
allow specifying BPF object name.

In tools/lib/bpf/libbpf, the C symbol of the function
and the map is used.  Regarding section name, all maps are
under the same section named "maps".  Hence, section name
is not a good choice for map's name.  To be consistent with
map, bpf_prog also follows and uses its function symbol as
the prog's name.

This patch adds logic to collect function's symbols in libbpf.
There is existing codes to collect the map's symbols and no change
is needed.

The bpf_load_program_name() and bpf_map_create_name() are
added to take the name argument.  For the other bpf_map_create_xxx()
variants, a name argument is directly added to them.

In samples/bpf, bpf_load.c in particular, the symbol is also
used as the map's name and the map symbols has already been
collected in the existing code.  For bpf_prog, bpf_load.c does
not collect the function symbol name.  We can consider to collect
them later if there is a need to continue supporting the bpf_load.c.
Signed-off-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add various test_verifier selftests, and a simple xdp/tc functional
test that is being attached to veths. Also let new versions of clang
use the recently added -mcpu=probe support [1] for the BPF target,
so that it can probe the underlying kernel for BPF insn set extensions.
We could also just set this options always, where older versions just
ignore it and give a note to the user that the -mcpu value is not
supported, but given emitting the note cannot be turned off from clang
side lets not confuse users running selftests with it, thus fallback
to the default generic one when we see that clang doesn't support it.
Also allow CPU option to be overridden in the Makefile from command
line.

  [1] https://github.com/llvm-mirror/llvm/commit/d7276a40d87b89aed89978dec6457a5b8b3a0db5Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Neither ___bpf_prog_run nor the JITs accept it.
Also adds a new test case.

Fixes: 17a52670 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: NEdward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Tests packet read/writes and additional skb fields.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The test makes a read through a map value pointer, then considers pruning
 a branch where the register holds an adjusted map value pointer.  It
 should not prune, but currently it does.
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>
[ecree@solarflare.com: added test-name and patch description]
Signed-off-by: NEdward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Writes in straight-line code should not prevent reads from propagating
 along jumps.  With current verifier code, the jump from 3 to 5 does not
 add a read mark on 3:R0 (because 5:R0 has a write mark), meaning that
 the jump from 1 to 3 gets pruned as safe even though R0 is NOT_INIT.

Verifier output:
0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +0)
1: (35) if r2 >= 0x0 goto pc+1
 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2=inv(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R10=fp0
2: (b7) r0 = 0
3: (35) if r2 >= 0x0 goto pc+1
 R0=inv0 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2=inv(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R10=fp0
4: (b7) r0 = 0
5: (95) exit

from 3 to 5: safe

from 1 to 3: safe
processed 8 insns, stack depth 0
Signed-off-by: NEdward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This adds tests to access new __sk_buff members from sk skb program
type.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add test cases to the verifier selftest suite in order to verify that
i) direct packet access, and ii) dynamic map value access is working
with the changes related to the new instructions.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Variable ctx accesses and stack accesses aren't allowed, because we can't
 determine what type of value will be read.
Signed-off-by: NEdward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

A number of selftests fell foul of the changed MAX_PACKET_OFF handling.
For instance, "direct packet access: test2" was potentially reading four
 bytes from pkt + 0xffff, which could take it past the verifier's limit,
 causing the program to be rejected (checks against pkt_end didn't give
 us any reg->range).
Increase the shifts by one so that R2 is now mask 0x7fff instead of
 mask 0xffff.
Signed-off-by: NEdward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Some of the verifier's error messages have changed, and some constructs
 that previously couldn't be verified are now accepted.
Signed-off-by: NEdward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

We really must check with #if __BYTE_ORDER == XYZ instead of
just presence of #ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN. I noticed that when
actually running this on big endian machine, the latter test
resolves to true for user space, same for #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN.

E.g., looking at endian.h from libc, both are also defined
there, so we really must test this against __BYTE_ORDER instead
for proper insns selection. For the kernel, such checks are
fine though e.g. see 13da9e20 ("Revert "endian: #define
__BYTE_ORDER"") and 415586c9 ("UAPI: fix endianness conditionals
in M32R's asm/stat.h") for some more context, but not for
user space. Lets also make sure to properly include endian.h.
After that, suite passes for me:

./test_verifier: ELF 64-bit MSB executable, [...]

Linux foo 4.13.0-rc3+ #4 SMP Fri Aug 4 06:59:30 EDT 2017 s390x s390x s390x GNU/Linux

Before fix: Summary: 505 PASSED, 11 FAILED
After  fix: Summary: 516 PASSED,  0 FAILED

Fixes: 18f3d6be ("selftests/bpf: Add test cases to test narrower ctx field loads")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NYonghong <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

There is a bug in the verifier's handling of BPF_SUB: [a,b] - [c,d] yields
 was [a-c, b-d] rather than the correct [a-d, b-c].  So here is a test
 which, with the bogus handling, will produce ranges of [0,0] and thus
 allowed accesses; whereas the correct handling will give a range of
 [-255, 255] (and hence the right-shift will give a range of [0, 255]) and
 the accesses will be rejected.
Signed-off-by: NEdward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add a couple of more test cases to BPF selftests that are related
to mixed signed and unsigned checks.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

These failed due to a bug in verifier bounds handling.
Signed-off-by: NEdward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Fix the few existing test cases that used mixed signed/unsigned
bounds and switch them only to one flavor. Reason why we need this
is that proper boundaries cannot be derived from mixed tests.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

For the test_verifier case, it's quite hard to parse log level 2 to
figure out what's causing an issue when used to log level 1. We do
want to use bpf_verify_program() in order to simulate some of the
tests with strict alignment. So just add an argument to pass the level
and put it to 1 for test_verifier.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add couple of verifier test cases for x|imm += pkt_ptr, including the
imm += x extension.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Leaking kernel addresses on unpriviledged is generally disallowed,
for example, verifier rejects the following:

  0: (b7) r0 = 0
  1: (18) r2 = 0xffff897e82304400
  3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +48) = r2
  R2 leaks addr into ctx

Doing pointer arithmetic on them is also forbidden, so that they
don't turn into unknown value and then get leaked out. However,
there's xadd as a special case, where we don't check the src reg
for being a pointer register, e.g. the following will pass:

  0: (b7) r0 = 0
  1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +48) = r0
  2: (18) r2 = 0xffff897e82304400 ; map
  4: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r1 +48) += r2
  5: (95) exit

We could store the pointer into skb->cb, loose the type context,
and then read it out from there again to leak it eventually out
of a map value. Or more easily in a different variant, too:

   0: (bf) r6 = r1
   1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
   2: (bf) r2 = r10
   3: (07) r2 += -8
   4: (18) r1 = 0x0
   6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
   7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+3
   R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R6=ctx R10=fp
   8: (b7) r3 = 0
   9: (7b) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = r3
  10: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r0 +0) += r6
  11: (b7) r0 = 0
  12: (95) exit

  from 7 to 11: R0=inv,min_value=0,max_value=0 R6=ctx R10=fp
  11: (b7) r0 = 0
  12: (95) exit

Prevent this by checking xadd src reg for pointer types. Also
add a couple of test cases related to this.

Fixes: 1be7f75d ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: 17a52670 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: NEdward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add test cases in test_verifier and test_progs.
Negative tests are added in test_verifier as well.
The test in test_progs will compare the value of narrower ctx field
load result vs. the masked value of normal full-field load result,
and will fail if they are not the same.
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NYonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an
narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example,
        __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or
        __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol
        __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period
which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field.

This patch solves the issue by:
  . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the
    field size of narrower load from prog type
    specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier.
  . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates
    (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses
         supporting non-whole-field access
    (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access.
  . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is
    less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it
    to a full field load followed by proper masking.
  . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period
    are supporting narrowing loads.
  . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores
    are just normal stores.

Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and
these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound
__sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two
redundant "skb cb oob" tests.
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NYonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The selftests depend on using the shell exit code as a mean of
detecting the success or failure of test-binary executed.  The
appropiate output "[PASS]" or "[FAIL]" in generated by
tools/testing/selftests/lib.mk.

Notice that the exit code is masked with 255. Thus, be careful if
using the number of errors as the exit code, as 256 errors would be
seen as a success.

There are two standard defined exit(3) codes:
 /usr/include/stdlib.h
 #define EXIT_FAILURE    1       /* Failing exit status.  */
 #define EXIT_SUCCESS    0       /* Successful exit status.  */

Fix test_verifier.c to not use the negative value of variable
"results", but instead return EXIT_FAILURE.

Fix test_align.c and test_progs.c to actually use exit codes, before
they were always indicating success regardless of results.
Signed-off-by: NJesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: NFengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch adds various verifier test cases:

1) A test case for the pruning issue when tracking alignment
   is used.
2) Various PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL tests to make sure pointer
   arithmetic turns such register into UNKNOWN_VALUE type.
3) Test cases for the special treatment of LD_ABS/LD_IND to
   make sure verifier doesn't break calling convention here.
   Latter is needed, since f.e. arm64 JIT uses r1 - r5 for
   storing temporary data, so they really must be marked as
   NOT_INIT.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

llvm 4.0 and above generates the code like below:
....
440: (b7) r1 = 15
441: (05) goto pc+73
515: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r10 -152)
516: (bf) r7 = r10
517: (07) r7 += -112
518: (bf) r2 = r7
519: (0f) r2 += r1
520: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r8 +0)
521: (73) *(u8 *)(r2 +45) = r1
....
and the verifier complains "R2 invalid mem access 'inv'" for insn #521.
This is because verifier marks register r2 as unknown value after #519
where r2 is a stack pointer and r1 holds a constant value.

Teach verifier to recognize "stack_ptr + imm" and
"stack_ptr + reg with const val" as valid stack_ptr with new offset.
Signed-off-by: NYonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add several test cases around ldimm64, fp arithmetic and direct
packet access.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add napi_id access to __sk_buff for socket filter program types, tc
program types and other bpf_convert_ctx_access() users. Having access
to skb->napi_id is useful for per RX queue listener siloing, f.e.
in combination with SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_EBPF and when busy polling is
used, meaning SO_REUSEPORT enabled listeners can then select the
corresponding socket at SYN time already [1]. The skb is marked via
skb_mark_napi_id() early in the receive path (e.g., napi_gro_receive()).

Currently, sockets can only use SO_INCOMING_NAPI_ID from 6d433902
("net: Introduce SO_INCOMING_NAPI_ID") as a socket option to look up
the NAPI ID associated with the queue for steering, which requires a
prior sk_mark_napi_id() after the socket was looked up.

Semantics for the __sk_buff napi_id access are similar, meaning if
skb->napi_id is < MIN_NAPI_ID (e.g. outgoing packets using sender_cpu),
then an invalid napi_id of 0 is returned to the program, otherwise a
valid non-zero napi_id.

  [1] http://netdevconf.org/2.1/slides/apr6/dumazet-BUSY-POLLING-Netdev-2.1.pdfSuggested-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>