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  1. 22 6月, 2021 1 次提交
  3. 27 5月, 2021 1 次提交
  5. 22 4月, 2021 6 次提交
    • B
      KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command · 15fb7de1
      由 Brijesh Singh 提交于 
      The command is used for copying the incoming buffer into the
SEV guest memory space.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NSteve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NAshish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c5d0e3e719db7bb37ea85d79ed4db52e9da06257.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      15fb7de1
    • B
      KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command · af43cbbf
      由 Brijesh Singh 提交于 
      The command is used to create the encryption context for an incoming
SEV guest. The encryption context can be later used by the hypervisor
to import the incoming data into the SEV guest memory space.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NSteve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NAshish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c7400111ed7458eee01007c4d8d57cdf2cbb0fc2.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      af43cbbf
    • S
      KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL command · 5569e2e7
      由 Steve Rutherford 提交于 
      After completion of SEND_START, but before SEND_FINISH, the source VMM can
issue the SEND_CANCEL command to stop a migration. This is necessary so
that a cancelled migration can restart with a new target later.
Reviewed-by: NNathan Tempelman <natet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210412194408.2458827-1-srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      5569e2e7
    • B
      KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command · d3d1af85
      由 Brijesh Singh 提交于 
      The command is used for encrypting the guest memory region using the encryption
context created with KVM_SEV_SEND_START.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by : Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NAshish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-Id: <d6a6ea740b0c668b30905ae31eac5ad7da048bb3.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      d3d1af85
    • B
      KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command · 4cfdd47d
      由 Brijesh Singh 提交于 
      The command is used to create an outgoing SEV guest encryption context.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NSteve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NVenu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NAshish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-Id: <2f1686d0164e0f1b3d6a41d620408393e0a48376.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      4cfdd47d
    • N
      KVM: x86: Support KVM VMs sharing SEV context · 54526d1f
      由 Nathan Tempelman 提交于 
      Add a capability for userspace to mirror SEV encryption context from
one vm to another. On our side, this is intended to support a
Migration Helper vCPU, but it can also be used generically to support
other in-guest workloads scheduled by the host. The intention is for
the primary guest and the mirror to have nearly identical memslots.

The primary benefits of this are that:
1) The VMs do not share KVM contexts (think APIC/MSRs/etc), so they
can't accidentally clobber each other.
2) The VMs can have different memory-views, which is necessary for post-copy
migration (the migration vCPUs on the target need to read and write to
pages, when the primary guest would VMEXIT).

This does not change the threat model for AMD SEV. Any memory involved
is still owned by the primary guest and its initial state is still
attested to through the normal SEV_LAUNCH_* flows. If userspace wanted
to circumvent SEV, they could achieve the same effect by simply attaching
a vCPU to the primary VM.
This patch deliberately leaves userspace in charge of the memslots for the
mirror, as it already has the power to mess with them in the primary guest.

This patch does not support SEV-ES (much less SNP), as it does not
handle handing off attested VMSAs to the mirror.

For additional context, we need a Migration Helper because SEV PSP
migration is far too slow for our live migration on its own. Using
an in-guest migrator lets us speed this up significantly.
Signed-off-by: NNathan Tempelman <natet@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210408223214.2582277-1-natet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      54526d1f
  7. 20 4月, 2021 1 次提交
    • S
      KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX attribute · fe7e9488
      由 Sean Christopherson 提交于 
      Add a capability, KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE, that can be used by userspace
to grant a VM access to a priveleged attribute, with args[0] holding a
file handle to a valid SGX attribute file.

The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to
provide additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. to prevent
malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to ensure its nodes are running
inside a geniune SGX enclave and/or to obtain a stable fingerprint.

To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions by running an
enclave in a VM, KVM restricts guest access to privileged attributes by
default.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NKai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <0b099d65e933e068e3ea934b0523bab070cb8cea.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      fe7e9488
  9. 17 4月, 2021 1 次提交
  11. 07 4月, 2021 1 次提交
  13. 03 3月, 2021 1 次提交
    • D
      KVM: x86/xen: Add support for vCPU runstate information · 30b5c851
      由 David Woodhouse 提交于 
      This is how Xen guests do steal time accounting. The hypervisor records
the amount of time spent in each of running/runnable/blocked/offline
states.

In the Xen accounting, a vCPU is still in state RUNSTATE_running while
in Xen for a hypercall or I/O trap, etc. Only if Xen explicitly schedules
does the state become RUNSTATE_blocked. In KVM this means that even when
the vCPU exits the kvm_run loop, the state remains RUNSTATE_running.

The VMM can explicitly set the vCPU to RUNSTATE_blocked by using the
KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_CURRENT attribute, and can also use
KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_ADJUST to retrospectively add a given
amount of time to the blocked state and subtract it from the running
state.

The state_entry_time corresponds to get_kvmclock_ns() at the time the
vCPU entered the current state, and the total times of all four states
should always add up to state_entry_time.
Co-developed-by: NJoao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJoao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <20210301125309.874953-2-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      30b5c851
  15. 10 2月, 2021 1 次提交
  17. 04 2月, 2021 11 次提交
  19. 08 1月, 2021 1 次提交
    • T
      KVM: SVM: Add support for booting APs in an SEV-ES guest · 647daca2
      由 Tom Lendacky 提交于 
      Typically under KVM, an AP is booted using the INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence,
where the guest vCPU register state is updated and then the vCPU is VMRUN
to begin execution of the AP. For an SEV-ES guest, this won't work because
the guest register state is encrypted.

Following the GHCB specification, the hypervisor must not alter the guest
register state, so KVM must track an AP/vCPU boot. Should the guest want
to park the AP, it must use the AP Reset Hold exit event in place of, for
example, a HLT loop.

First AP boot (first INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence):
  Execute the AP (vCPU) as it was initialized and measured by the SEV-ES
  support. It is up to the guest to transfer control of the AP to the
  proper location.

Subsequent AP boot:
  KVM will expect to receive an AP Reset Hold exit event indicating that
  the vCPU is being parked and will require an INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence to
  awaken it. When the AP Reset Hold exit event is received, KVM will place
  the vCPU into a simulated HLT mode. Upon receiving the INIT-SIPI-SIPI
  sequence, KVM will make the vCPU runnable. It is again up to the guest
  to then transfer control of the AP to the proper location.

  To differentiate between an actual HLT and an AP Reset Hold, a new MP
  state is introduced, KVM_MP_STATE_AP_RESET_HOLD, which the vCPU is
  placed in upon receiving the AP Reset Hold exit event. Additionally, to
  communicate the AP Reset Hold exit event up to userspace (if needed), a
  new exit reason is introduced, KVM_EXIT_AP_RESET_HOLD.

A new x86 ops function is introduced, vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector, in order
to accomplish AP booting. For VMX, vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector is set to the
original SIPI delivery function, kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(). SVM adds
a new function that, for non SEV-ES guests, invokes the original SIPI
delivery function, kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(), but for SEV-ES guests,
implements the logic above.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <e8fbebe8eb161ceaabdad7c01a5859a78b424d5e.1609791600.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      647daca2
  21. 15 11月, 2020 2 次提交
    • P
      KVM: X86: Implement ring-based dirty memory tracking · fb04a1ed
      由 Peter Xu 提交于 
      This patch is heavily based on previous work from Lei Cao
<lei.cao@stratus.com> and Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>. [1]

KVM currently uses large bitmaps to track dirty memory.  These bitmaps
are copied to userspace when userspace queries KVM for its dirty page
information.  The use of bitmaps is mostly sufficient for live
migration, as large parts of memory are be dirtied from one log-dirty
pass to another.  However, in a checkpointing system, the number of
dirty pages is small and in fact it is often bounded---the VM is
paused when it has dirtied a pre-defined number of pages. Traversing a
large, sparsely populated bitmap to find set bits is time-consuming,
as is copying the bitmap to user-space.

A similar issue will be there for live migration when the guest memory
is huge while the page dirty procedure is trivial.  In that case for
each dirty sync we need to pull the whole dirty bitmap to userspace
and analyse every bit even if it's mostly zeros.

The preferred data structure for above scenarios is a dense list of
guest frame numbers (GFN).  This patch series stores the dirty list in
kernel memory that can be memory mapped into userspace to allow speedy
harvesting.

This patch enables dirty ring for X86 only.  However it should be
easily extended to other archs as well.

[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10471409/Signed-off-by: NLei Cao <lei.cao@stratus.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201001012222.5767-1-peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      fb04a1ed
    • V
      KVM: x86: hyper-v: allow KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_HV_CPUID as a system ioctl · c21d54f0
      由 Vitaly Kuznetsov 提交于 
      KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_HV_CPUID is a vCPU ioctl but its output is now
independent from vCPU and in some cases VMMs may want to use it as a system
ioctl instead. In particular, QEMU doesn CPU feature expansion before any
vCPU gets created so KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_HV_CPUID can't be used.

Convert KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_HV_CPUID to 'dual' system/vCPU ioctl with the
same meaning.
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200929150944.1235688-2-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      c21d54f0
  23. 22 10月, 2020 1 次提交
  25. 28 9月, 2020 2 次提交
    • A
      KVM: x86: Introduce MSR filtering · 1a155254
      由 Alexander Graf 提交于 
      It's not desireable to have all MSRs always handled by KVM kernel space. Some
MSRs would be useful to handle in user space to either emulate behavior (like
uCode updates) or differentiate whether they are valid based on the CPU model.

To allow user space to specify which MSRs it wants to see handled by KVM,
this patch introduces a new ioctl to push filter rules with bitmaps into
KVM. Based on these bitmaps, KVM can then decide whether to reject MSR access.
With the addition of KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR it can also deflect the
denied MSR events to user space to operate on.

If no filter is populated, MSR handling stays identical to before.
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>

Message-Id: <20200925143422.21718-8-graf@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      1a155254
    • A
      KVM: x86: Allow deflecting unknown MSR accesses to user space · 1ae09954
      由 Alexander Graf 提交于 
      MSRs are weird. Some of them are normal control registers, such as EFER.
Some however are registers that really are model specific, not very
interesting to virtualization workloads, and not performance critical.
Others again are really just windows into package configuration.

Out of these MSRs, only the first category is necessary to implement in
kernel space. Rarely accessed MSRs, MSRs that should be fine tunes against
certain CPU models and MSRs that contain information on the package level
are much better suited for user space to process. However, over time we have
accumulated a lot of MSRs that are not the first category, but still handled
by in-kernel KVM code.

This patch adds a generic interface to handle WRMSR and RDMSR from user
space. With this, any future MSR that is part of the latter categories can
be handled in user space.

Furthermore, it allows us to replace the existing "ignore_msrs" logic with
something that applies per-VM rather than on the full system. That way you
can run productive VMs in parallel to experimental ones where you don't care
about proper MSR handling.
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>

Message-Id: <20200925143422.21718-3-graf@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      1ae09954
  27. 12 9月, 2020 1 次提交
    • H
      KVM: MIPS: Change the definition of kvm type · 15e9e35c
      由 Huacai Chen 提交于 
      MIPS defines two kvm types:

 #define KVM_VM_MIPS_TE          0
 #define KVM_VM_MIPS_VZ          1

In Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst it is said that "You probably want to
use 0 as machine type", which implies that type 0 be the "automatic" or
"default" type. And, in user-space libvirt use the null-machine (with
type 0) to detect the kvm capability, which returns "KVM not supported"
on a VZ platform.

I try to fix it in QEMU but it is ugly:
https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2020-08/msg05629.html

And Thomas Huth suggests me to change the definition of kvm type:
https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2020-09/msg03281.html

So I define like this:

 #define KVM_VM_MIPS_AUTO        0
 #define KVM_VM_MIPS_VZ          1
 #define KVM_VM_MIPS_TE          2

Since VZ and TE cannot co-exists, using type 0 on a TE platform will
still return success (so old user-space tools have no problems on new
kernels); the advantage is that using type 0 on a VZ platform will not
return failure. So, the only problem is "new user-space tools use type
2 on old kernels", but if we treat this as a kernel bug, we can backport
this patch to old stable kernels.
Signed-off-by: NHuacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
Message-Id: <1599734031-28746-1-git-send-email-chenhc@lemote.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      15e9e35c
  29. 21 8月, 2020 1 次提交
  31. 11 7月, 2020 1 次提交
    • M
      KVM: x86: Add a capability for GUEST_MAXPHYADDR < HOST_MAXPHYADDR support · 3edd6839
      由 Mohammed Gamal 提交于 
      This patch adds a new capability KVM_CAP_SMALLER_MAXPHYADDR which
allows userspace to query if the underlying architecture would
support GUEST_MAXPHYADDR < HOST_MAXPHYADDR and hence act accordingly
(e.g. qemu can decide if it should warn for -cpu ..,phys-bits=X)

The complications in this patch are due to unexpected (but documented)
behaviour we see with NPF vmexit handling in AMD processor.  If
SVM is modified to add guest physical address checks in the NPF
and guest #PF paths, we see the followning error multiple times in
the 'access' test in kvm-unit-tests:

            test pte.p pte.36 pde.p: FAIL: pte 2000021 expected 2000001
            Dump mapping: address: 0x123400000000
            ------L4: 24c3027
            ------L3: 24c4027
            ------L2: 24c5021
            ------L1: 1002000021

This is because the PTE's accessed bit is set by the CPU hardware before
the NPF vmexit. This is handled completely by hardware and cannot be fixed
in software.

Therefore, availability of the new capability depends on a boolean variable
allow_smaller_maxphyaddr which is set individually by VMX and SVM init
routines. On VMX it's always set to true, on SVM it's only set to true
when NPT is not enabled.

CC: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
CC: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NMohammed Gamal <mgamal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200710154811.418214-10-mgamal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      3edd6839
  33. 09 7月, 2020 1 次提交
  35. 23 6月, 2020 1 次提交
  37. 01 6月, 2020 3 次提交
  39. 25 4月, 2020 1 次提交
  41. 21 4月, 2020 1 次提交