“4e1617d05994bda1a9eb0e0b5b563249cc12f271”上不存在“paddle/phi/kernels/cpu/erf_kernel.cc”
  1. 05 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  2. 28 7月, 2014 2 次提交
    • A
      KVM: PPC: Remove 440 support · b2677b8d
      Alexander Graf 提交于
      The 440 target hasn't been properly functioning for a few releases and
      before I was the only one who fixes a very serious bug that indicates to
      me that nobody used it before either.
      
      Furthermore KVM on 440 is slow to the extent of unusable.
      
      We don't have to carry along completely unused code. Remove 440 and give
      us one less thing to worry about.
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
      b2677b8d
    • A
      KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add hack for split real mode · c01e3f66
      Alexander Graf 提交于
      Today we handle split real mode by mapping both instruction and data faults
      into a special virtual address space that only exists during the split mode
      phase.
      
      This is good enough to catch 32bit Linux guests that use split real mode for
      copy_from/to_user. In this case we're always prefixed with 0xc0000000 for our
      instruction pointer and can map the user space process freely below there.
      
      However, that approach fails when we're running KVM inside of KVM. Here the 1st
      level last_inst reader may well be in the same virtual page as a 2nd level
      interrupt handler.
      
      It also fails when running Mac OS X guests. Here we have a 4G/4G split, so a
      kernel copy_from/to_user implementation can easily overlap with user space
      addresses.
      
      The architecturally correct way to fix this would be to implement an instruction
      interpreter in KVM that kicks in whenever we go into split real mode. This
      interpreter however would not receive a great amount of testing and be a lot of
      bloat for a reasonably isolated corner case.
      
      So I went back to the drawing board and tried to come up with a way to make
      split real mode work with a single flat address space. And then I realized that
      we could get away with the same trick that makes it work for Linux:
      
      Whenever we see an instruction address during split real mode that may collide,
      we just move it higher up the virtual address space to a place that hopefully
      does not collide (keep your fingers crossed!).
      
      That approach does work surprisingly well. I am able to successfully run
      Mac OS X guests with KVM and QEMU (no split real mode hacks like MOL) when I
      apply a tiny timing probe hack to QEMU. I'd say this is a win over even more
      broken split real mode :).
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
      c01e3f66
  3. 30 5月, 2014 1 次提交
  4. 27 1月, 2014 3 次提交
    • P
      KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Cope with doorbell interrupts · 40688909
      Paul Mackerras 提交于
      When the PR host is running on a POWER8 machine in POWER8 mode, it
      will use doorbell interrupts for IPIs.  If one of them arrives while
      we are in the guest, we pop out of the guest with trap number 0xA00,
      which isn't handled by kvmppc_handle_exit_pr, leading to the following
      BUG_ON:
      
      [  331.436215] exit_nr=0xa00 | pc=0x1d2c | msr=0x800000000000d032
      [  331.437522] ------------[ cut here ]------------
      [  331.438296] kernel BUG at arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c:982!
      [  331.439063] Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#2]
      [  331.439819] SMP NR_CPUS=1024 NUMA pSeries
      [  331.440552] Modules linked in: tun nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ipt_MASQUERADE ip6t_REJECT xt_conntrack ebtable_nat ebtable_broute bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_nat nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_nat_ipv6 ip6table_mangle ip6table_security ip6table_raw ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_mangle iptable_security iptable_raw virtio_net kvm binfmt_misc ibmvscsi scsi_transport_srp scsi_tgt virtio_blk
      [  331.447614] CPU: 11 PID: 1296 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Tainted: G      D      3.11.7-200.2.fc19.ppc64p7 #1
      [  331.448920] task: c0000003bdc8c000 ti: c0000003bd32c000 task.ti: c0000003bd32c000
      [  331.450088] NIP: d0000000025d6b9c LR: d0000000025d6b98 CTR: c0000000004cfdd0
      [  331.451042] REGS: c0000003bd32f420 TRAP: 0700   Tainted: G      D       (3.11.7-200.2.fc19.ppc64p7)
      [  331.452331] MSR: 800000000282b032 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI>  CR: 28004824  XER: 20000000
      [  331.454616] SOFTE: 1
      [  331.455106] CFAR: c000000000848bb8
      [  331.455726]
      GPR00: d0000000025d6b98 c0000003bd32f6a0 d0000000026017b8 0000000000000032
      GPR04: c0000000018627f8 c000000001873208 320d0a3030303030 3030303030643033
      GPR08: c000000000c490a8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000002
      GPR12: 0000000028004822 c00000000fdc6300 0000000000000000 00000100076ec310
      GPR16: 000000002ae343b8 00003ffffd397398 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
      GPR20: 00000100076f16f4 00000100076ebe60 0000000000000008 ffffffffffffffff
      GPR24: 0000000000000000 0000008001041e60 0000000000000000 0000008001040ce8
      GPR28: c0000003a2d80000 0000000000000a00 0000000000000001 c0000003a2681810
      [  331.466504] NIP [d0000000025d6b9c] .kvmppc_handle_exit_pr+0x75c/0xa80 [kvm]
      [  331.466999] LR [d0000000025d6b98] .kvmppc_handle_exit_pr+0x758/0xa80 [kvm]
      [  331.467517] Call Trace:
      [  331.467909] [c0000003bd32f6a0] [d0000000025d6b98] .kvmppc_handle_exit_pr+0x758/0xa80 [kvm] (unreliable)
      [  331.468553] [c0000003bd32f750] [d0000000025d98f0] kvm_start_lightweight+0xb4/0xc4 [kvm]
      [  331.469189] [c0000003bd32f920] [d0000000025d7648] .kvmppc_vcpu_run_pr+0xd8/0x270 [kvm]
      [  331.469838] [c0000003bd32f9c0] [d0000000025cf748] .kvmppc_vcpu_run+0xc8/0xf0 [kvm]
      [  331.470790] [c0000003bd32fa50] [d0000000025cc19c] .kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x5c/0x1b0 [kvm]
      [  331.471401] [c0000003bd32fae0] [d0000000025c4888] .kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x478/0x730 [kvm]
      [  331.472026] [c0000003bd32fc90] [c00000000026192c] .do_vfs_ioctl+0x4dc/0x7a0
      [  331.472561] [c0000003bd32fd80] [c000000000261cc4] .SyS_ioctl+0xd4/0xf0
      [  331.473095] [c0000003bd32fe30] [c000000000009ed8] syscall_exit+0x0/0x98
      [  331.473633] Instruction dump:
      [  331.473766] 4bfff9b4 2b9d0800 419efc18 60000000 60420000 3d220000 e8bf11a0 e8df12a8
      [  331.474733] 7fa4eb78 e8698660 48015165 e8410028 <0fe00000> 813f00e4 3ba00000 39290001
      [  331.475386] ---[ end trace 49fc47d994c1f8f2 ]---
      [  331.479817]
      
      This fixes the problem by making kvmppc_handle_exit_pr() recognize the
      interrupt.  We also need to jump to the doorbell interrupt handler in
      book3s_segment.S to handle the interrupt on the way out of the guest.
      Having done that, there's nothing further to be done in
      kvmppc_handle_exit_pr().
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
      40688909
    • P
      KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Prepare for host using hypervisor doorbells · 5d00f66b
      Paul Mackerras 提交于
      POWER8 has support for hypervisor doorbell interrupts.  Though the
      kernel doesn't use them for IPIs on the powernv platform yet, it
      probably will in future, so this makes KVM cope gracefully if a
      hypervisor doorbell interrupt arrives while in a guest.
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
      5d00f66b
    • M
      KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add handler for HV facility unavailable · bd3048b8
      Michael Ellerman 提交于
      At present this should never happen, since the host kernel sets
      HFSCR to allow access to all facilities.  It's better to be prepared
      to handle it cleanly if it does ever happen, though.
      Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
      bd3048b8
  5. 08 1月, 2014 1 次提交
  6. 17 10月, 2013 2 次提交
    • P
      KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Better handling of exceptions that happen in real mode · 44a3add8
      Paul Mackerras 提交于
      When an interrupt or exception happens in the guest that comes to the
      host, the CPU goes to hypervisor real mode (MMU off) to handle the
      exception but doesn't change the MMU context.  After saving a few
      registers, we then clear the "in guest" flag.  If, for any reason,
      we get an exception in the real-mode code, that then gets handled
      by the normal kernel exception handlers, which turn the MMU on.  This
      is disastrous if the MMU is still set to the guest context, since we
      end up executing instructions from random places in the guest kernel
      with hypervisor privilege.
      
      In order to catch this situation, we define a new value for the "in guest"
      flag, KVM_GUEST_MODE_HOST_HV, to indicate that we are in hypervisor real
      mode with guest MMU context.  If the "in guest" flag is set to this value,
      we branch off to an emergency handler.  For the moment, this just does
      a branch to self to stop the CPU from doing anything further.
      
      While we're here, we define another new flag value to indicate that we
      are in a HV guest, as distinct from a PR guest.  This will be useful
      when we have a kernel that can support both PR and HV guests concurrently.
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
      44a3add8
    • P
      KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Allow guest to use 64k pages · a4a0f252
      Paul Mackerras 提交于
      This adds the code to interpret 64k HPTEs in the guest hashed page
      table (HPT), 64k SLB entries, and to tell the guest about 64k pages
      in kvm_vm_ioctl_get_smmu_info().  Guest 64k pages are still shadowed
      by 4k pages.
      
      This also adds another hash table to the four we have already in
      book3s_mmu_hpte.c to allow us to find all the PTEs that we have
      instantiated that match a given 64k guest page.
      
      The tlbie instruction changed starting with POWER6 to use a bit in
      the RB operand to indicate large page invalidations, and to use other
      RB bits to indicate the base and actual page sizes and the segment
      size.  64k pages came in slightly earlier, with POWER5++.
      We use one bit in vcpu->arch.hflags to indicate that the emulated
      cpu supports 64k pages, and another to indicate that it has the new
      tlbie definition.
      
      The KVM_PPC_GET_SMMU_INFO ioctl presents a bit of a problem, because
      the MMU capabilities depend on which CPU model we're emulating, but it
      is a VM ioctl not a VCPU ioctl and therefore doesn't get passed a VCPU
      fd.  In addition, commonly-used userspace (QEMU) calls it before
      setting the PVR for any VCPU.  Therefore, as a best effort we look at
      the first vcpu in the VM and return 64k pages or not depending on its
      capabilities.  We also make the PVR default to the host PVR on recent
      CPUs that support 1TB segments (and therefore multiple page sizes as
      well) so that KVM_PPC_GET_SMMU_INFO will include 64k page and 1TB
      segment support on those CPUs.
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
      a4a0f252
  7. 11 6月, 2013 1 次提交
  8. 13 3月, 2013 1 次提交
  9. 30 10月, 2012 1 次提交
    • P
      KVM: PPC: Book3s HV: Don't access runnable threads list without vcore lock · 913d3ff9
      Paul Mackerras 提交于
      There were a few places where we were traversing the list of runnable
      threads in a virtual core, i.e. vc->runnable_threads, without holding
      the vcore spinlock.  This extends the places where we hold the vcore
      spinlock to cover everywhere that we traverse that list.
      
      Since we possibly need to sleep inside kvmppc_book3s_hv_page_fault,
      this moves the call of it from kvmppc_handle_exit out to
      kvmppc_vcpu_run, where we don't hold the vcore lock.
      
      In kvmppc_vcore_blocked, we don't actually need to check whether
      all vcpus are ceded and don't have any pending exceptions, since the
      caller has already done that.  The caller (kvmppc_run_vcpu) wasn't
      actually checking for pending exceptions, so we add that.
      
      The change of if to while in kvmppc_run_vcpu is to make sure that we
      never call kvmppc_remove_runnable() when the vcore state is RUNNING or
      EXITING.
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
      913d3ff9
  10. 06 5月, 2012 2 次提交
  11. 08 4月, 2012 1 次提交
    • S
      KVM: PPC: booke: category E.HV (GS-mode) support · d30f6e48
      Scott Wood 提交于
      Chips such as e500mc that implement category E.HV in Power ISA 2.06
      provide hardware virtualization features, including a new MSR mode for
      guest state.  The guest OS can perform many operations without trapping
      into the hypervisor, including transitions to and from guest userspace.
      
      Since we can use SRR1[GS] to reliably tell whether an exception came from
      guest state, instead of messing around with IVPR, we use DO_KVM similarly
      to book3s.
      
      Current issues include:
       - Machine checks from guest state are not routed to the host handler.
       - The guest can cause a host oops by executing an emulated instruction
         in a page that lacks read permission.  Existing e500/4xx support has
         the same problem.
      
      Includes work by Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@freescale.com>,
      Varun Sethi <Varun.Sethi@freescale.com>, and
      Liu Yu <yu.liu@freescale.com>.
      Signed-off-by: NScott Wood <scottwood@freescale.com>
      [agraf: remove pt_regs usage]
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
      d30f6e48
  12. 12 7月, 2011 1 次提交
    • P
      KVM: PPC: Add support for Book3S processors in hypervisor mode · de56a948
      Paul Mackerras 提交于
      This adds support for KVM running on 64-bit Book 3S processors,
      specifically POWER7, in hypervisor mode.  Using hypervisor mode means
      that the guest can use the processor's supervisor mode.  That means
      that the guest can execute privileged instructions and access privileged
      registers itself without trapping to the host.  This gives excellent
      performance, but does mean that KVM cannot emulate a processor
      architecture other than the one that the hardware implements.
      
      This code assumes that the guest is running paravirtualized using the
      PAPR (Power Architecture Platform Requirements) interface, which is the
      interface that IBM's PowerVM hypervisor uses.  That means that existing
      Linux distributions that run on IBM pSeries machines will also run
      under KVM without modification.  In order to communicate the PAPR
      hypercalls to qemu, this adds a new KVM_EXIT_PAPR_HCALL exit code
      to include/linux/kvm.h.
      
      Currently the choice between book3s_hv support and book3s_pr support
      (i.e. the existing code, which runs the guest in user mode) has to be
      made at kernel configuration time, so a given kernel binary can only
      do one or the other.
      
      This new book3s_hv code doesn't support MMIO emulation at present.
      Since we are running paravirtualized guests, this isn't a serious
      restriction.
      
      With the guest running in supervisor mode, most exceptions go straight
      to the guest.  We will never get data or instruction storage or segment
      interrupts, alignment interrupts, decrementer interrupts, program
      interrupts, single-step interrupts, etc., coming to the hypervisor from
      the guest.  Therefore this introduces a new KVMTEST_NONHV macro for the
      exception entry path so that we don't have to do the KVM test on entry
      to those exception handlers.
      
      We do however get hypervisor decrementer, hypervisor data storage,
      hypervisor instruction storage, and hypervisor emulation assist
      interrupts, so we have to handle those.
      
      In hypervisor mode, real-mode accesses can access all of RAM, not just
      a limited amount.  Therefore we put all the guest state in the vcpu.arch
      and use the shadow_vcpu in the PACA only for temporary scratch space.
      We allocate the vcpu with kzalloc rather than vzalloc, and we don't use
      anything in the kvmppc_vcpu_book3s struct, so we don't allocate it.
      We don't have a shared page with the guest, but we still need a
      kvm_vcpu_arch_shared struct to store the values of various registers,
      so we include one in the vcpu_arch struct.
      
      The POWER7 processor has a restriction that all threads in a core have
      to be in the same partition.  MMU-on kernel code counts as a partition
      (partition 0), so we have to do a partition switch on every entry to and
      exit from the guest.  At present we require the host and guest to run
      in single-thread mode because of this hardware restriction.
      
      This code allocates a hashed page table for the guest and initializes
      it with HPTEs for the guest's Virtual Real Memory Area (VRMA).  We
      require that the guest memory is allocated using 16MB huge pages, in
      order to simplify the low-level memory management.  This also means that
      we can get away without tracking paging activity in the host for now,
      since huge pages can't be paged or swapped.
      
      This also adds a few new exports needed by the book3s_hv code.
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
      de56a948
  13. 20 4月, 2011 1 次提交
  14. 24 10月, 2010 1 次提交
    • A
      KVM: PPC: Implement Level interrupts on Book3S · 17bd1580
      Alexander Graf 提交于
      The current interrupt logic is just completely broken. We get a notification
      from user space, telling us that an interrupt is there. But then user space
      expects us that we just acknowledge an interrupt once we deliver it to the
      guest.
      
      This is not how real hardware works though. On real hardware, the interrupt
      controller pulls the external interrupt line until it gets notified that the
      interrupt was received.
      
      So in reality we have two events: pulling and letting go of the interrupt line.
      
      To maintain backwards compatibility, I added a new request for the pulling
      part. The letting go part was implemented earlier already.
      
      With this in place, we can now finally start guests that do not randomly stall
      and stop to work at random times.
      
      This patch implements above logic for Book3S.
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
      17bd1580
  15. 17 5月, 2010 1 次提交
  16. 25 4月, 2010 1 次提交
  17. 01 3月, 2010 1 次提交
    • A
      KVM: PPC: Implement 'skip instruction' mode · b4433a7c
      Alexander Graf 提交于
      To fetch the last instruction we were interrupted on, we enable DR in early
      exit code, where we are still in a very transitional phase between guest
      and host state.
      
      Most of the time this seemed to work, but another CPU can easily flush our
      TLB and HTAB which makes us go in the Linux page fault handler which totally
      breaks because we still use the guest's SLB entries.
      
      To work around that, let's introduce a second KVM guest mode that defines
      that whenever we get a trap, we don't call the Linux handler or go into
      the KVM exit code, but just jump over the faulting instruction.
      
      That way a potentially bad lwz doesn't trigger any faults and we can later
      on interpret the invalid instruction we fetched as "fetch didn't work".
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
      b4433a7c
  18. 08 12月, 2009 1 次提交
  19. 05 11月, 2009 1 次提交
  20. 24 3月, 2009 1 次提交
  21. 04 8月, 2008 1 次提交
  22. 27 4月, 2008 1 次提交