We will use illegal instruction 0x0000 for handling 2 byte sw breakpoints
from user space. As it can be enabled dynamically via a capability,
let's move setting of ICTL_OPEREXC to the post creation step, so we avoid
any races when enabling that capability just while adding new cpus.
Acked-by: NJanosch Frank <frankja@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NCornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

Arch-specific code will use it.
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

In case we have to emuluate an instruction or part of it (instruction,
partial instruction, operation exception), we have to inject a PER
instruction-fetching event for that instruction, if hardware told us to do
so.

In case we retry an instruction, we must not inject the PER event.

Please note that we don't filter the events properly yet, so guest
debugging will be visible for the guest.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

Use the functions from context_tracking.h directly.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Let's be careful first and allow nested virtualization only if enabled
by the system administrator. In addition, user space still has to
explicitly enable it via SCLP features for it to work.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

We have certain SIE features that we cannot support for now.
Let's add these features, so user space can directly prepare to enable
them, so we don't have to update yet another component.

In addition, add a comment block, telling why it is for now not possible to
forward/enable these features.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

Guest 2 sets up the epoch of guest 3 from his point of view. Therefore,
we have to add the guest 2 epoch to the guest 3 epoch. We also have to take
care of guest 2 epoch changes on STP syncs. This will work just fine by
also updating the guest 3 epoch when a vsie_block has been set for a VCPU.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

Whenever a SIGP external call is injected via the SIGP external call
interpretation facility, the VCPU is not kicked. When a VCPU is currently
in the VSIE, the external call might not be processed immediately.

Therefore we have to provoke partial execution exceptions, which leads to a
kick of the VCPU and therefore also kick out of VSIE. This is done by
simulating the WAIT state. This bit has no other side effects.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

As we want to make use of CPUSTAT_WAIT also when a VCPU is not idle but
to force interception of external calls, let's check in the bitmap instead.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

Whenever we want to wake up a VCPU (e.g. when injecting an IRQ), we
have to kick it out of vsie, so the request will be handled faster.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

We can avoid one unneeded SIE entry after we reported a fault to g2.
Theoretically, g2 resolves the fault and we can create the shadow mapping
directly, instead of failing again when entering the SIE.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

We can easily enable ibs for guest 2, so he can use it for guest 3.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

We can easily enable cei for guest 2, so he can use it for guest 3.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

We can easily enable intervention bypass for guest 2, so it can use it
for guest 3.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

We can easily forward guest-storage-limit-suppression if available.

One thing to care about is keeping the prefix properly mapped when
gsls in toggled on/off or the mso changes in between. Therefore we better
remap the prefix on any mso changes just like we already do with the
prefix.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

We can easily forward the guest-PER-enhancement facility to guest 2 if
available.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

As we forward the whole SCA provided by guest 2, we can directly forward
SIIF if available.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

Let's provide the 64-bit-SCAO facility to guest 2, so he can set up a SCA
for guest 3 that has a 64 bit address. Please note that we already require
the 64 bit SCAO for our vsie implementation, in order to forward the SCA
directly (by pinning the page).
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

As soon as guest 2 is allowed to use run-time-instrumentation (indicated
via via STFLE), it can also enable it for guest 3.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

As soon as guest 2 is allowed to use the vector facility (indicated via
STFLE), it can also enable it for guest 3. We have to take care of the
sattellite block that might be used when not relying on lazy vector
copying (not the case for KVM).
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

As soon as guest 2 is allowed to use transactional execution (indicated via
STFLE), he can also enable it for guest 3.

Active transactional execution requires also the second prefix page to be
mapped. If that page cannot be mapped, a validity icpt has to be presented
to the guest.

We have to take care of tx being toggled on/off, otherwise we might get
wrong prefix validity icpt.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

As soon as message-security-assist extension 3 is enabled for guest 2,
we have to allow key wrapping for guest 3.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

Issuing STFLE is extremely rare. Instead of copying 2k on every
VSIE call, let's do this lazily, when a guest 3 tries to execute
STFLE. We can setup the block and retry.

Unfortunately, we can't directly forward that facility list, as
we only have a 31 bit address for the facility list designation.
So let's use a DMA allocation for our vsie_page instead for now.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

Introduced with ESOP, therefore available for the guest if it
is allowed to use ESOP.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

If guest 2 is allowed to use edat 1 / edat 2, it can also set it up for
guest 3, so let's properly check and forward the edat cpuflags.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

As soon as we forward an ibc to guest 2 (indicated via
kvm->arch.model.ibc), he can also use it for guest 3. Let's properly round
the ibc up/down, so we avoid any potential validity icpts from the
underlying SIE, if it doesn't simply round the values.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

In order to not always map the prefix, we have to take care of certain
aspects that implicitly unmap the prefix:
- Changes to the prefix address
- Changes to MSO, because the HVA of the prefix is changed
- Changes of the gmap shadow (e.g. unshadowed, asce or edat changes)

By properly handling these cases, we can stop remapping the prefix when
there is no reason to do so.

This also allows us now to not acquire any gmap shadow locks when
rerunning the vsie and still having a valid gmap shadow.

Please note, to detect changing gmap shadows, we have to keep the reference
of the gmap shadow. The address of a gmap shadow does otherwise not
reliably indicate if the gmap shadow has changed (the memory chunk
could get reused).
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

This patch adds basic support for nested virtualization on s390x, called
VSIE (virtual SIE) and allows it to be used by the guest if the necessary
facilities are supported by the hardware and enabled for the guest.

In order to make this work, we have to shadow the sie control block
provided by guest 2. In order to gain some performance, we have to
reuse the same shadow blocks as good as possible. For now, we allow
as many shadow blocks as we have VCPUs (that way, every VCPU can run the
VSIE concurrently).

We have to watch out for the prefix getting unmapped out of our shadow
gmap and properly get the VCPU out of VSIE in that case, to fault the
prefix pages back in. We use the PROG_REQUEST bit for that purpose.

This patch is based on an initial prototype by Tobias Elpelt.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

Acked-by: NHeiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

Nested virtualization will have to enable own gmaps. Current code
would enable the wrong gmap whenever scheduled out and back in,
therefore resulting in the wrong gmap being enabled.

This patch reenables the last enabled gmap, therefore avoiding having to
touch vcpu->arch.gmap when enabling a different gmap.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

The default kvm gmap notifier doesn't have to handle shadow gmaps.
So let's just directly exit in case we get notified about one.
Acked-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

Let's not fault in everything in read-write but limit it to read-only
where possible.

When restricting access rights, we already have the required protection
level in our hands. When reading from guest 2 storage (gmap_read_table),
it is obviously PROT_READ. When shadowing a pte, the required protection
level is given via the guest 2 provided pte.

Based on an initial patch by Martin Schwidefsky.
Acked-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

It will be very helpful to have a mechanism to check without any locks
if a given gmap shadow is still valid and matches the given properties.
Acked-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

For nested virtualization, we want to know if we are handling a protection
exception, because these can directly be forwarded to the guest without
additional checks.
Acked-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

We have no known user of real-space designation and only support it to
be architecture compliant.

Gmap shadows with real-space designation are never unshadowed
automatically, as there is nothing to protect for the top level table.

So let's simply limit the number of such shadows to one by removing
existing ones on creation of another one.
Acked-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

We can easily support real-space designation just like EDAT1 and EDAT2.
So guest2 can provide for guest3 an asce with the real-space control being
set.

We simply have to allocate the biggest page table possible and fake all
levels.

There is no protection to consider. If we exceed guest memory, vsie code
will inject an addressing exception (via program intercept). In the future,
we could limit the fake table level to the gmap page table.

As the top level page table can never go away, such gmap shadows will never
get unshadowed, we'll have to come up with another way to limit the number
of kept gmap shadows.
Acked-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

Just like we already do with ste protection, let's take rte protection
into account. This way, the host pte doesn't have to be mapped writable.
Acked-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

If the guest is enabled for EDAT2, we can easily create shadows for
guest2 -> guest3 provided tables that make use of EDAT2.

If guest2 references a 2GB page, this memory looks consecutive for guest2,
but it does not have to be so for us. Therefore we have to create fake
segment and page tables.

This works just like EDAT1 support, so page tables are removed when the
parent table (r3t table entry) is changed.

We don't hve to care about:
- ACCF-Validity Control in RTTE
- Access-Control Bits in RTTE
- Fetch-Protection Bit in RTTE
- Common-Region Bit in RTTE

Just like for EDAT1, all bits might be dropped and there is no guaranteed
that they are active.
Acked-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

If the guest is enabled for EDAT1, we can easily create shadows for
guest2 -> guest3 provided tables that make use of EDAT1.

If guest2 references a 1MB page, this memory looks consecutive for guest2,
but it might not be so for us. Therefore we have to create fake page tables.

We can easily add that to our existing infrastructure. The invalidation
mechanism will make sure that fake page tables are removed when the parent
table (sgt table entry) is changed.

As EDAT1 also introduced protection on all page table levels, we have to
also shadow these correctly.

We don't have to care about:
- ACCF-Validity Control in STE
- Access-Control Bits in STE
- Fetch-Protection Bit in STE
- Common-Segment Bit in STE

As all bits might be dropped and there is no guaranteed that they are
active ("unpredictable whether the CPU uses these bits", "may be used").
Without using EDAT1 in the shadow ourselfes (STE-format control == 0),
simply shadowing these bits would not be enough. They would be ignored.

Please note that we are using the "fake" flag to make this look consistent
with further changes (EDAT2, real-space designation support) and don't let
the shadow functions handle fc=1 stes.

In the future, with huge pages in the host, gmap_shadow_pgt() could simply
try to map a huge host page if "fake" is set to one and indicate via return
value that no lower fake tables / shadow ptes are required.
Acked-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

In preparation for EDAT1/EDAT2 support for gmap shadows, we have to store
the requested edat level in the gmap shadow.

The edat level used during shadow translation is a property of the gmap
shadow. Depending on that level, the gmap shadow will look differently for
the same guest tables. We have to store it internally in order to support
it later.
Acked-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>