it's used only as a flag to distinguish normal pipes/FIFOs from the
internal per-task one used by file-to-file splice.  And pipe->files
would work just as well for that purpose...
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

fs/pipe.c file_operations methods *know* that pipe is not an internal one;
no need to check pipe->inode for those callers.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

simplify get_pipe_info(), while we are at it
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

now it can be done - put mutex into pipe_inode_info, use it instead
of ->i_mutex
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

* new field - pipe->files; number of struct file over that pipe (all
  sharing the same inode, of course); protected by inode->i_lock.
* pipe_release() decrements pipe->files, clears inode->i_pipe when
  if the counter has reached 0 (all under ->i_lock) and, in that case,
  frees pipe after having done pipe_unlock()
* fifo_open() starts with grabbing ->i_lock, and either bumps pipe->files
  if ->i_pipe was non-NULL or allocates a new pipe (dropping and regaining
  ->i_lock) and rechecks ->i_pipe; if it's still NULL, inserts new pipe
  there, otherwise bumps ->i_pipe->files and frees the one we'd allocated.
  At that point we know that ->i_pipe is non-NULL and won't go away, so
  we can do pipe_lock() on it and proceed as we used to.  If we end up
  failing, decrement pipe->files and if it reaches 0 clear ->i_pipe and
  free the sucker after pipe_unlock().
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

* use the fact that file_inode(file)->i_pipe doesn't change
  while the file is opened - no locks needed to access that.
* switch to pipe_lock/pipe_unlock where it's easy to do
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... and take to fs/read_write.c
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... so that writev(2) doesn't miss it.  Get rid of hpfs_file_write().
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

look for file_capable() in there...
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... and provide namespace_lock() as a trivial wrapper;
switch to those two consistently.

Result is patterned after rtnl_lock/rtnl_unlock pair.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

which allows to kill the last argument of umount_tree() and make release_mounts()
static.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... it's always &unmounted.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

global list of release_mounts() fodder, protected by namespace_sem;
eventually, all umount_tree() callers will use it as kill list.
Helper picking the contents of that list, releasing namespace_sem
and doing release_mounts() on what it got.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

do_loopback calls lock_mount(path) and forget to unlock_mount
if clone_mnt or copy_mnt fails.

[   77.661566] ================================================
[   77.662939] [ BUG: lock held when returning to user space! ]
[   77.664104] 3.9.0-rc5+ #17 Not tainted
[   77.664982] ------------------------------------------------
[   77.666488] mount/514 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
[   77.668027] 2 locks held by mount/514:
[   77.668817]  #0:  (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811cca22>] lock_mount+0x32/0xe0
[   77.671755]  #1:  (&namespace_sem){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffff811cca3a>] lock_mount+0x4a/0xe0
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

just what it sounds like; do that only to procfs subtrees you've
created - doing that to something shared with another driver is
not only antisocial, but might cause interesting races with
proc_create() and its ilk.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... lest we get livelocks between path_is_under() and d_path() and friends.

The thing is, wrt fairness lglocks are more similar to rwsems than to rwlocks;
it is possible to have thread B spin on attempt to take lock shared while thread
A is already holding it shared, if B is on lower-numbered CPU than A and there's
a thread C spinning on attempt to take the same lock exclusive.

As the result, we need consistent ordering between vfsmount_lock (lglock) and
rename_lock (seq_lock), even though everything that takes both is going to take
vfsmount_lock only shared.
Spotted-by: NBrad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

vfs_writev() updates the offset argument - but the code then passes the
offset to vfs_fsync_range(). Since offset now points to the offset after
what was just written, this is probably not what was intended

Introduced by face1502 "nfsd: use
vfs_fsync_range(), not O_SYNC, for stable writes".
Signed-off-by: NKent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NZach Brown <zab@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

Dave Jones found another /proc issue with his Trinity tool: thanks to
the namespace model, we can have multiple /proc dentries that point to
the same inode, aliasing directories in /proc/<pid>/net/ for example.

This ends up being a total disaster, because it acts like hardlinked
directories, and causes locking problems.  We rely on the topological
sort of the inodes pointed to by dentries, and if we have aliased
directories, that odering becomes unreliable.

In short: don't do this.  Multiple dentries with the same (directory)
inode is just a bad idea, and the namespace code should never have
exposed things this way.  But we're kind of stuck with it.

This solves things by just always allocating a new inode during /proc
dentry lookup, instead of using "iget_locked()" to look up existing
inodes by superblock and number.  That actually simplies the code a bit,
at the cost of potentially doing more inode [de]allocations.

That said, the inode lookup wasn't free either (and did a lot of locking
of inodes), so it is probably not that noticeable.  We could easily keep
the old lookup model for non-directory entries, but rather than try to
be excessively clever this just implements the minimal and simplest
workaround for the problem.
Reported-and-tested-by: NDave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Analyzed-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

We've had several reports of people attempting to mount Windows 8 shares
and getting failures with a return code of -EINVAL. The default sec=
mode changed recently to sec=ntlmssp. With that, we expect and parse a
SPNEGO blob from the server in the NEGOTIATE reply.

The current decode_negTokenInit function first parses all of the
mechTypes and then tries to parse the rest of the negTokenInit reply.
The parser however currently expects a mechListMIC or nothing to follow the
mechTypes, but Windows 8 puts a mechToken field there instead to carry
some info for the new NegoEx stuff.

In practice, we don't do anything with the fields after the mechTypes
anyway so I don't see any real benefit in continuing to parse them.
This patch just has the kernel ignore the fields after the mechTypes.
We'll probably need to reinstate some of this if we ever want to support
NegoEx.
Reported-by: NJason Burgess <jason@jacknife2.dns2go.com>
Reported-by: NYan Li <elliot.li.tech@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

default_file_splice_from() ends up calling vfs_write() (via very convoluted
callchain).  It's an overkill, since we already have done rw_verify_area()
in the caller by the time we call vfs_write() we are under set_fs(KERNEL_DS),
so access_ok() is also pointless.  Add a new helper (__kernel_write()),
use it instead of kernel_write() in there.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

In order to be able to safely return the layout in nfs4_proc_setattr,
we need to block new uses of the layout, wait for all outstanding
users of the layout to complete, commit the layout and then return it.

This patch adds a helper in order to do all this safely.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com>

Note that clearing NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMIT is tricky, since it requires
you to also clear the NFS_LSEG_LAYOUTCOMMIT bits from the layout
segments.
The only two sites that need to do this are the ones that call
pnfs_return_layout() without first doing a layout commit.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Acked-by: NBenny Halevy <bhalevy@tonian.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

We need to clear the NFS_LSEG_LAYOUTCOMMIT bits atomically with the
NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMIT bit, otherwise we may end up with situations
where the two are out of sync.
The first half of the problem is to ensure that pnfs_layoutcommit_inode
clears the NFS_LSEG_LAYOUTCOMMIT bit through pnfs_list_write_lseg.
We still need to keep the reference to those segments until the RPC call
is finished, so in order to make it clear _where_ those references come
from, we add a helper pnfs_list_write_lseg_done() that cleans up after
pnfs_list_write_lseg.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Acked-by: NBenny Halevy <bhalevy@tonian.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

when pnfs block using device mapper,if umounting later,it maybe
cause oops. we apply "1 + sizeof(bl_umount_request)" memory for
msg->data, the memory maybe overflow when we do "memcpy(&dataptr
[sizeof(bl_msg)], &bl_umount_request, sizeof(bl_umount_request))",
because the size of bl_msg is more than 1 byte.

Signed-off-by: fanchaoting<fanchaoting@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Functions like nfs_map_uid_to_name() and nfs_map_gid_to_group() are
expected to return a string without any terminating NUL character.
Regression introduced by commit 57e62324
(NFS: Store the legacy idmapper result in the keyring).
Reported-by: NDave Chiluk <dave.chiluk@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [>=3.4]

In data=journal mode, if we unmount the file system before a
transaction has a chance to complete, when the journal inode is being
evicted, we can end up calling into jbd2_log_wait_commit() for the
last transaction, after the journalling machinery has been shut down.

Arguably we should adjust ext4_should_journal_data() to return FALSE
for the journal inode, but the only place it matters is
ext4_evict_inode(), and so to save a bit of CPU time, and to make the
patch much more obviously correct by inspection(tm), we'll fix it by
explicitly not trying to waiting for a journal commit when we are
evicting the journal inode, since it's guaranteed to never succeed in
this case.

This can be easily replicated via: 

     mount -t ext4 -o data=journal /dev/vdb /vdb ; umount /vdb

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: at /usr/projects/linux/ext4/fs/jbd2/journal.c:542 __jbd2_log_start_commit+0xba/0xcd()
Hardware name: Bochs
JBD2: bad log_start_commit: 3005630206 3005630206 0 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 2909, comm: umount Not tainted 3.8.0-rc3 #1020
Call Trace:
 [<c015c0ef>] warn_slowpath_common+0x68/0x7d
 [<c02b7e7d>] ? __jbd2_log_start_commit+0xba/0xcd
 [<c015c177>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x2b/0x2f
 [<c02b7e7d>] __jbd2_log_start_commit+0xba/0xcd
 [<c02b8075>] jbd2_log_start_commit+0x24/0x34
 [<c0279ed5>] ext4_evict_inode+0x71/0x2e3
 [<c021f0ec>] evict+0x94/0x135
 [<c021f9aa>] iput+0x10a/0x110
 [<c02b7836>] jbd2_journal_destroy+0x190/0x1ce
 [<c0175284>] ? bit_waitqueue+0x50/0x50
 [<c028d23f>] ext4_put_super+0x52/0x294
 [<c020efe3>] generic_shutdown_super+0x48/0xb4
 [<c020f071>] kill_block_super+0x22/0x60
 [<c020f3e0>] deactivate_locked_super+0x22/0x49
 [<c020f5d6>] deactivate_super+0x30/0x33
 [<c0222795>] mntput_no_expire+0x107/0x10c
 [<c02233a7>] sys_umount+0x2cf/0x2e0
 [<c02233ca>] sys_oldumount+0x12/0x14
 [<c08096b8>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb
---[ end trace 6a954cc790501c1f ]---
jbd2_log_wait_commit: error: j_commit_request=-1289337090, tid=0
Signed-off-by: N"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Commit 84c17543 (ext4: move work from io_end to inode) triggered a
regression when running xfstest #270 when the file system is mounted
with dioread_nolock.

The problem is that after ext4_evict_inode() calls ext4_ioend_wait(),
this guarantees that last io_end structure has been freed, but it does
not guarantee that the workqueue structure, which was moved into the
inode by commit 84c17543, is actually finished.  Once
ext4_flush_completed_IO() calls ext4_free_io_end() on CPU #1, this
will allow ext4_ioend_wait() to return on CPU #2, at which point the
evict_inode() codepath can race against the workqueue code on CPU #1
accessing EXT4_I(inode)->i_unwritten_work to find the next item of
work to do.

Fix this by calling cancel_work_sync() in ext4_ioend_wait(), which
will be renamed ext4_ioend_shutdown(), since it is only used by
ext4_evict_inode().  Also, move the call to ext4_ioend_shutdown()
until after truncate_inode_pages() and filemap_write_and_wait() are
called, to make sure all dirty pages have been written back and
flushed from the page cache first.

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at   (null)
IP: [<c01dda6a>] cwq_activate_delayed_work+0x3b/0x7e
*pdpt = 0000000030bc3001 *pde = 0000000000000000 
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in:
Pid: 6, comm: kworker/u:0 Not tainted 3.8.0-rc3-00013-g84c17543-dirty #91 Bochs Bochs
EIP: 0060:[<c01dda6a>] EFLAGS: 00010046 CPU: 0
EIP is at cwq_activate_delayed_work+0x3b/0x7e
EAX: 00000000 EBX: 00000000 ECX: f505fe54 EDX: 00000000
ESI: ed5b697c EDI: 00000006 EBP: f64b7e8c ESP: f64b7e84
 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 00000000 CR3: 30bc2000 CR4: 000006f0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process kworker/u:0 (pid: 6, ti=f64b6000 task=f64b4160 task.ti=f64b6000)
Stack:
 f505fe00 00000006 f64b7e9c c01de3d7 f6435540 00000003 f64b7efc c01def1d
 f6435540 00000002 00000000 0000008a c16d0808 c040a10b c16d07d8 c16d08b0
 f505fe00 c16d0780 00000000 00000000 ee153df4 c1ce4a30 c17d0e30 00000000
Call Trace:
 [<c01de3d7>] cwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x71/0xfb
 [<c01def1d>] process_one_work+0x5d8/0x637
 [<c040a10b>] ? ext4_end_bio+0x300/0x300
 [<c01e3105>] worker_thread+0x249/0x3ef
 [<c01ea317>] kthread+0xd8/0xeb
 [<c01e2ebc>] ? manage_workers+0x4bb/0x4bb
 [<c023a370>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x27/0x37
 [<c0f1b4b7>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x1b/0x28
 [<c01ea23f>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x71/0x71
Code: 01 83 15 ac ff 6c c1 00 31 db 89 c6 8b 00 a8 04 74 12 89 c3 30 db 83 05 b0 ff 6c c1 01 83 15 b4 ff 6c c1 00 89 f0 e8 42 ff ff ff <8b> 13 89 f0 83 05 b8 ff 6c c1
 6c c1 00 31 c9 83
EIP: [<c01dda6a>] cwq_activate_delayed_work+0x3b/0x7e SS:ESP 0068:f64b7e84
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace a1923229da53d8a4 ]---
Signed-off-by: N"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

If we end up doing "goto out_nomem" in this function, we'll call
nfsd_reply_cache_shutdown. That will attempt to walk the LRU list and
free entries, but that list may not be initialized yet if the server is
starting up for the first time. It's also possible for the shrinker to
kick in before we've initialized the LRU list.

Rearrange the initialization so that the LRU list_head and cache size
are initialized before doing any of the allocations that might fail.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

It's not safe to call hlist_del() on a newly initialized hlist_node.
That leads to a NULL pointer dereference. Only do that if the entry
is hashed.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>