- 03 12月, 2014 13 次提交
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
Once we receive the DHKey check PDU it's time to first verify that the value is correct and then proceed with encrypting the link. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
With LE SC, once the user has responded to the numeric comparison it's time to send DHKey check values in both directions. The DHKey check value is generated using new smp_f5 and smp_f6 cryptographic functions. The smp_f5 function is responsible for generating the LTK and the MacKey values whereas the smp_f6 function takes the MacKey as input and generates the DHKey Check value. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
After the Pairing Confirm and Random PDUs have been exchanged in LE SC it's time to generate a numeric comparison value using a new smp_g2 cryptographic function (which also builds on AES-CMAC). This patch adds the smp_g2 implementation and updates the Pairing Random PDU handler to proceed with the value genration and user confirmation. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
When LE SC is being used we should always respond to it by sending our local random number. This patch adds a convenience function for it which also contains a check for the pre-requisite public key exchange completion Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
Once the public key exchange is complete the next step is for the non-initiating device to send a SMP Pairing Confirm PDU to the initiating device. This requires the use of a new smp_f4 confirm value generation function which in turn builds on the AES-CMAC cryptographic function. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
This patch adds a handler function for the LE SC SMP Public Key PDU. When we receive the key we proceed with generating the shared DHKey value from the remote public key and local private key. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
When the initial pairing request & response PDUs have been exchanged and both have had the LE SC bit set the next step is to generate a ECDH key pair and to send the public key to the remote side. This patch adds basic support for generating the key pair and sending the public key using the new Public Key SMP PDU. It is the initiating device that sends the public key first and the non-initiating device responds by sending its public key respectively (in a subsequent patch). Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
Most of the LE Secure Connections SMP crypto functions build on top of the AES-CMAC function. This patch adds access to AES-CMAC in the kernel crypto subsystem by allocating a crypto_hash handle for it in a similar way that we have one for AES-CBC. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
Depending on whether Secure Connections is enabled or not we may need to add the link key generation bit to the key distribution. This patch does the necessary modifications to the build_pairing_cmd() function. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
Now that hci_find_ltk_by_addr is the only LTK lookup function there's no need to keep the long name anymore. This patch shortens the function name to simply hci_find_ltk. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
This patch updates the functions which map the SMP authentication request to a security level and vice-versa to take into account the Secure Connections feature. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
This patch adds a new SMP flag for tracking whether Secure Connections is in use and sets the flag when both remote and local side have elected to use Secure Connections. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
If we haven't enabled SC support on our side we should use the same mask for the authentication requirement as we were using before SC support was added, otherwise we should use the extended mask for SC. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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- 15 11月, 2014 4 次提交
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
Now that the SMP related key lists are converted to RCU there is nothing in smp_cmd_sign_info() or smp_cmd_ident_addr_info() that would require taking the hdev lock (including the smp_distribute_keys call). This patch removes this unnecessary locking. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
This patch set converts the hdev->identity_resolving_keys list to use RCU to eliminate the need to use hci_dev_lock/unlock. An additional change that must be done is to remove use of CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC for the hdev-specific AES crypto context. The reason is that this context is used for matching RPAs and the loop that does the matching is under the RCU read lock, i.e. is an atomic section which cannot sleep. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
This patch set converts the hdev->long_term_keys list to use RCU to eliminate the need to use hci_dev_lock/unlock. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
So far smp_sufficient_security() has returned false if we're encrypted with an STK but do have an LTK available. However, for the sake of LE CoC servers we do want to let the incoming connection through even though we're only encrypted with the STK. This patch adds a key preference parameter to smp_sufficient_security() with two possible values (enum used instead of bool for readability). Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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- 13 11月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
By default lockdep considers all L2CAP channels equal. This would mean that we get warnings if a channel is locked when another one's lock is tried to be acquired in the same thread. This kind of inter-channel locking dependencies exist in the form of parent-child channels as well as any channel wishing to elevate the security by requesting procedures on the SMP channel. To eliminate the chance for these lockdep warnings we introduce a nesting level for each channel and use that when acquiring the channel lock. For now there exists the earlier mentioned three identified categories: SMP, "normal" channels and parent channels (i.e. those in BT_LISTEN state). The nesting level is defined as atomic_t since we need access to it before the lock is actually acquired. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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- 12 11月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
The mgmt_user_passkey_request and related functions do not do anything else except read access to hdev->id. This member never changes after the hdev creation so there is no need to acquire a lock to read it. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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- 29 10月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Stephen Hemminger 提交于
Fix spelling errors in comments. Signed-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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- 28 10月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
This reverts commits c6992e9e and 4cd3362d. The reason for the revert is that we cannot have more than one module initialization function and the SMP one breaks the build with modular kernels. As the proper fix for this is right now looking non-trivial it's better to simply revert the problematic patches in order to keep the upstream tree compilable. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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- 26 10月, 2014 3 次提交
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
This patch adds self-tests for the c1 and s1 crypto functions used for SMP pairing. The data used is the sample data from the core specification. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
This patch adds a basic skeleton for SMP self-tests. The tests are put behind a new configuration option since running them will slow down the boot process. For now there are no actual tests defined but those will come in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
In order to make unit testing possible we need to make the SMP crypto functions only take the crypto context instead of the full SMP context (the latter would require having hci_dev, hci_conn, l2cap_chan, l2cap_conn, etc around). The drawback is that we no-longer get the involved hdev in the debug logs, but this is really the only way to make simple unit tests for the code. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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- 18 9月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
We can only determine the final security level when both pairing request and response have been exchanged. When initiating pairing the starting target security level is set to MEDIUM unless explicitly specified to be HIGH, so that we can still perform pairing even if the remote doesn't have MITM capabilities. However, once we've received the pairing response we should re-consult the remote and local IO capabilities and upgrade the target security level if necessary. Without this patch the resulting Long Term Key will occasionally be reported to be unauthenticated when it in reality is an authenticated one. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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- 11 9月, 2014 6 次提交
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
This is a trivial change to use a proper define for the NoInputNoOutput IO capability instead of hard-coded values. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
There are several places that need to determine the security level that an LTK can provide. This patch adds a convenience function for this to help make the code more readable. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
When the local IO capability is NoInputNoOutput any attempt to convert the remote authentication requirement to a target security level is futile. This patch makes sure that we set the target security level at most to MEDIUM if the local IO capability is NoInputNoOutput. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
All the cases where we mark SMP commands as dissalowed are their respective command handlers. We can therefore simplify the code by always clearing the bit immediately after testing it. This patch converts the corresponding test_bit() call to a test_and_clear_bit() call and also removes the now unused SMP_DISALLOW_CMD macro. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
The SMP specification states that we should ignore any unknown bits from the authentication requirement. We already have a define for masking out unknown bits but we haven't used it in all places so far. This patch adds usage of the AUTH_REQ_MASK to all places that need it and ensures that we don't pass unknown bits onward to other functions. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
We do nothing else with the auth variable in smp_cmd_pairing_rsp() besides passing it to tk_request() which in turn only cares about whether one of the sides had the MITM bit set. It is therefore unnecessary to assign a value to it until just before calling tk_request(), and this value can simply be the bit-wise or of the local and remote requirements. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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- 10 9月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
If the remote side is not distributing its IRK but is distributing the CSRK the next PDU after master identification is the Signing Information. This patch fixes a missing SMP_ALLOW_CMD() for this in the smp_cmd_master_ident() function. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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- 09 9月, 2014 8 次提交
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
Whether through HCI with BR/EDR or SMP with LE when authentication fails we should also notify any pending Pair Device mgmt command. This patch updates the mgmt_auth_failed function to take the actual hci_conn object and makes sure that any pending pairing command is notified and cleaned up appropriately. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
This patch fixes the following type of static analyzer warning (and probably a real bug as well as the NULL check should be there for a reason): net/bluetooth/smp.c:1182 smp_conn_security() warn: variable dereferenced before check 'conn' (see line 1174) Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
SMP defines quite clearly when certain PDUs are to be expected/allowed and when not, but doesn't have any explicit request/response definition. So far the code has relied on each PDU handler to behave correctly if receiving PDUs at an unexpected moment, however this requires many different checks and is prone to errors. This patch introduces a generic way to keep track of allowed PDUs and thereby reduces the responsibility & load on individual command handlers. The tracking is implemented using a simple bit-mask where each opcode maps to its own bit. If the bit is set the corresponding PDU is allow and if the bit is not set the PDU is not allowed. As a simple example, when we send the Pairing Request we'd set the bit for Pairing Response, and when we receive the Pairing Response we'd clear the bit for Pairing Response. Since the disallowed PDU rejection is now done in a single central place we need to be a bit careful of which action makes most sense to all cases. Previously some, such as Security Request, have been simply ignored whereas others have caused an explicit disconnect. The only PDU rejection action that keeps good interoperability and can be used for all the applicable use cases is to drop the data. This may raise some concerns of us now being more lenient for misbehaving (and potentially malicious) devices, but the policy of simply dropping data has been a successful one for many years e.g. in L2CAP (where this is the *only* policy for such cases - we never request disconnection in l2cap_core.c because of bad data). Furthermore, we cannot prevent connected devices from creating the SMP context (through a Security or Pairing Request), and once the context exists looking up the corresponding bit for the received opcode and deciding to reject it is essentially an equally lightweight operation as the kind of rejection that l2cap_core.c already successfully does. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
When we're in the process of receiving keys in phase 3 of SMP we keep track of which keys are still expected in the smp->remote_key_dist variable. If we still have some key bits set we need to continue waiting for more PDUs and not needlessly call smp_distribute_keys(). This patch fixes two such cases in the smp_cmd_master_ident() and smp_cmd_ident_addr_info() handler functions. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
This patch adds a define for the allowed bits of the key distribution mask so we don't have to have magic 0x07 constants throughout the code. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
Before the move the l2cap_chan the SMP context (smp_chan) didn't have any kind of proper locking. The best there existed was the HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND flag which was used to enable mutual exclusion for potential multiple creators of the SMP context. Now that SMP has been converted to use the l2cap_chan infrastructure and since the SMP context is directly mapped to a corresponding l2cap_chan we get the SMP context locking essentially for free through the l2cap_chan lock. For all callbacks that l2cap_core.c makes for each channel implementation (smp.c in the case of SMP) the l2cap_chan lock is held through l2cap_chan_lock(chan). Since the calls from l2cap_core.c to smp.c are covered the only missing piece to have the locking implemented properly is to ensure that the lock is held for any other call path that may access the SMP context. This means user responses through mgmt.c, requests to elevate the security of a connection through hci_conn.c, as well as any deferred work through workqueues. This patch adds the necessary locking to all these other code paths that try to access the SMP context. Since mutual exclusion for the l2cap_chan access is now covered from all directions the patch also removes unnecessary HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND flag (once we've acquired the chan lock we can simply check whether chan->smp is set to know if there's an SMP context). Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
Now that the identity address update happens through its own deferred work there's no need to have smp_distribute_keys anymore behind a second deferred work. This patch removes this extra construction and makes the code do direct calls to smp_distribute_keys() again. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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由 Johan Hedberg 提交于
The identity address update of all channels for an l2cap_conn needs to take the lock for each channel, i.e. it's safest to do this by a separate workqueue callback. Previously this was partially solved by moving the entire SMP key distribution behind a workqueue. However, if we want SMP context locking to be correct and safe we should always use the l2cap_chan lock when accessing it, meaning even smp_distribute_keys needs to take that lock which would once again create a dead lock when updating the identity address. The simplest way to solve this is to have l2cap_conn manage the deferred work which is what this patch does. A subsequent patch will remove the now unnecessary SMP key distribution work struct. Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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