Rather than hard coding various lengths, we can use the right constants.
Strings should be `char *` while buffers should be `u8 *`. Rather than
have a nonsensical and unused maxlength, just remove it. Finally, use
snprintf instead of sprintf, just out of good hygiene.

As well, remove the old comment about returning a binary UUID via the
binary sysctl syscall. That syscall was removed from the kernel in 5.5,
and actually, the "uuid_strategy" function and related infrastructure
for even serving it via the binary sysctl syscall was removed with
894d2491 ("sysctl drivers: Remove dead binary sysctl support") back
in 2.6.33.
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

The only time that we need to wake up /dev/random writers on
RNDCLEARPOOL/RNDZAPPOOL is when we're changing from a value that is
greater than or equal to POOL_MIN_BITS to zero, because if we're
changing from below POOL_MIN_BITS to zero, the writers are already
unblocked.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

When the interrupt handler does not have a valid cycle counter, it calls
get_reg() to read a register from the irq stack, in round-robin.
Currently it does this assuming that registers are 32-bit. This is
_probably_ the case, and probably all platforms without cycle counters
are in fact 32-bit platforms. But maybe not, and either way, it's not
quite correct. This commit fixes that to deal with `unsigned long`
rather than `u32`.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

For the irq randomness fast pool, rather than having to use expensive
atomics, which were visibly the most expensive thing in the entire irq
handler, simply take care of the extreme edge case of resetting count to
zero in the cpuhp online handler, just after workqueues have been
reenabled. This simplifies the code a bit and lets us use vanilla
variables rather than atomics, and performance should be improved.

As well, very early on when the CPU comes up, while interrupts are still
disabled, we clear out the per-cpu crng and its batches, so that it
always starts with fresh randomness.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Acked-by: NSebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

add_hwgenerator_randomness() is a function implemented and documented
inside of random.c. It is the way that hardware RNGs push data into it.
Therefore, it should be declared in random.h. Otherwise sparse complains
with:

random.c:1137:6: warning: symbol 'add_hwgenerator_randomness' was not declared. Should it be static?

The alternative would be to include hw_random.h into random.c, but that
wouldn't really be good for anything except slowing down compile time.

Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

This has no real functional change, as crng_pre_init_inject() (and
before that, crng_slow_init()) always checks for == 0, not >= 2. So
correct the outer unlocked change to reflect that. Before this used
crng_ready(), which was not correct.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

crng_fast_load() and crng_slow_load() have different semantics:

- crng_fast_load() xors and accounts with crng_init_cnt.
- crng_slow_load() hashes and doesn't account.

However add_hwgenerator_randomness() can afford to hash (it's called
from a kthread), and it should account. Additionally, ones that can
afford to hash don't need to take a trylock but can take a normal lock.
So, we combine these into one function, crng_pre_init_inject(), which
allows us to control these in a uniform way. This will make it simpler
later to simplify this all down when the time comes for that.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

Since rand_initialize() is run while interrupts are still off and
nothing else is running, we don't need to repeatedly take and release
the pool spinlock, especially in the RDSEED loop.
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

On PREEMPT_RT, it's problematic to take spinlocks from hard irq
handlers. We can fix this by deferring to a workqueue the dumping of
the fast pool into the input pool.

We accomplish this with some careful rules on fast_pool->count:

  - When it's incremented to >= 64, we schedule the work.
  - If the top bit is set, we never schedule the work, even if >= 64.
  - The worker is responsible for setting it back to 0 when it's done.

There are two small issues around using workqueues for this purpose that
we work around.

The first issue is that mix_interrupt_randomness() might be migrated to
another CPU during CPU hotplug. This issue is rectified by checking that
it hasn't been migrated (after disabling irqs). If it has been migrated,
then we set the count to zero, so that when the CPU comes online again,
it can requeue the work. As part of this, we switch to using an
atomic_t, so that the increment in the irq handler doesn't wipe out the
zeroing if the CPU comes back online while this worker is running.

The second issue is that, though relatively minor in effect, we probably
want to make sure we get a consistent view of the pool onto the stack,
in case it's interrupted by an irq while reading. To do this, we don't
reenable irqs until after the copy. There are only 18 instructions
between the cli and sti, so this is a pretty tiny window.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Acked-by: NSebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NSultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

Now that we've re-documented the various sections, we can remove the
outdated text here and replace it with a high-level overview.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

This pulls all of the sysctl-focused functions into the sixth labeled
section.

No functional changes.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

This pulls all of the userspace read/write-focused functions into the
fifth labeled section.

No functional changes.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

This pulls all of the entropy collection-focused functions into the
fourth labeled section.

No functional changes.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

This pulls all of the entropy extraction-focused functions into the
third labeled section.

No functional changes.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

This pulls all of the crng-focused functions into the second labeled
section.

No functional changes.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

This pulls all of the readiness waiting-focused functions into the first
labeled section.

No functional changes.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

This is purely cosmetic. Future work involves figuring out which of
these headers we need and which we don't.
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

This really adds nothing at all useful.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

In preparation for separating responsibilities, break out the entropy
count management part of crng_reseed() into its own function.

No functional changes.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

In the irq handler, we fill out 16 bytes differently on 32-bit and
64-bit platforms, and for 32-bit vs 64-bit cycle counters, which doesn't
always correspond with the bitness of the platform. Whether or not you
like this strangeness, it is a matter of fact.  But it might not be a
fact you well realized until now, because the code that loaded the irq
info into 4 32-bit words was quite confusing.  Instead, this commit
makes everything explicit by having separate (compile-time) branches for
32-bit and 64-bit types.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

Convert the current license into the SPDX notation of "(GPL-2.0 OR
BSD-3-Clause)". This infers GPL-2.0 from the text "ALTERNATIVELY, this
product may be distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public
License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are required INSTEAD OF
the above restrictions" and it infers BSD-3-Clause from the verbatim
BSD 3 clause license in the file.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

These explicit tracepoints aren't really used and show sign of aging.
It's work to keep these up to date, and before I attempted to keep them
up to date, they weren't up to date, which indicates that they're not
really used. These days there are better ways of introspecting anyway.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

With tools like kbench9000 giving more finegrained responses, and this
basically never having been used ever since it was initially added,
let's just get rid of this. There *is* still work to be done on the
interrupt handler, but this really isn't the way it's being developed.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

Now that we have an explicit base_crng generation counter, we don't need
a separate one for batched entropy. Rather, we can just move the
generation forward every time we change crng_init state or update the
base_crng key.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock. Therefore, we need
to hold this lock when increasing crng_init to 2. As we shouldn't
hold this lock for too long, only hold it for those parts which
require protection.
Signed-off-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

This buffer may contain entropic data that shouldn't stick around longer
than needed, so zero out the temporary buffer at the end of write_pool().
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

In 79a84687 ("random: check for increase of entropy_count because of
signed conversion"), a number of checks were added around what values
were passed to account(), because account() was doing fancy fixed point
fractional arithmetic, and a user had some ability to pass large values
directly into it. One of things in that commit was limiting those values
to INT_MAX >> 6. The first >> 3 was for bytes to bits, and the next >> 3
was for bits to 1/8 fractional bits.

However, for several years now, urandom reads no longer touch entropy
accounting, and so this check serves no purpose. The current flow is:

urandom_read_nowarn()-->get_random_bytes_user()-->chacha20_block()

Of course, we don't want that size_t to be truncated when adding it into
the ssize_t. But we arrive at urandom_read_nowarn() in the first place
either via ordinary fops, which limits reads to MAX_RW_COUNT, or via
getrandom() which limits reads to INT_MAX.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

We've been using a flurry of int, unsigned int, size_t, and ssize_t.
Let's unify all of this into size_t where it makes sense, as it does in
most places, and leave ssize_t for return values with possible errors.

In addition, keeping with the convention of other functions in this
file, functions that are dealing with raw bytes now take void *
consistently instead of a mix of that and u8 *, because much of the time
we're actually passing some other structure that is then interpreted as
bytes by the function.

We also take the opportunity to fix the outdated and incorrect comment
in get_random_bytes_arch().

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

Since we have a hash function that's really fast, and the goal of
crng_slow_load() is reportedly to "touch all of the crng's state", we
can just hash the old state together with the new state and call it a
day. This way we dont need to reason about another LFSR or worry about
various attacks there. This code is only ever used at early boot and
then never again.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

Rather than the clunky NUMA full ChaCha state system we had prior, this
commit is closer to the original "fast key erasure RNG" proposal from
<https://blog.cr.yp.to/20170723-random.html>, by simply treating ChaCha
keys on a per-cpu basis.

All entropy is extracted to a base crng key of 32 bytes. This base crng
has a birthdate and a generation counter. When we go to take bytes from
the crng, we first check if the birthdate is too old; if it is, we
reseed per usual. Then we start working on a per-cpu crng.

This per-cpu crng makes sure that it has the same generation counter as
the base crng. If it doesn't, it does fast key erasure with the base
crng key and uses the output as its new per-cpu key, and then updates
its local generation counter. Then, using this per-cpu state, we do
ordinary fast key erasure. Half of this first block is used to overwrite
the per-cpu crng key for the next call -- this is the fast key erasure
RNG idea -- and the other half, along with the ChaCha state, is returned
to the caller. If the caller desires more than this remaining half, it
can generate more ChaCha blocks, unlocked, using the now detached ChaCha
state that was just returned. Crypto-wise, this is more or less what we
were doing before, but this simply makes it more explicit and ensures
that we always have backtrack protection by not playing games with a
shared block counter.

The flow looks like this:

──extract()──► base_crng.key ◄──memcpy()───┐
                   │                       │
                   └──chacha()──────┬─► new_base_key
                                    └─► crngs[n].key ◄──memcpy()───┐
                                              │                    │
                                              └──chacha()───┬─► new_key
                                                            └─► random_bytes
                                                                      │
                                                                      └────►

There are a few hairy details around early init. Just as was done
before, prior to having gathered enough entropy, crng_fast_load() and
crng_slow_load() dump bytes directly into the base crng, and when we go
to take bytes from the crng, in that case, we're doing fast key erasure
with the base crng rather than the fast unlocked per-cpu crngs. This is
fine as that's only the state of affairs during very early boot; once
the crng initializes we never use these paths again.

In the process of all this, the APIs into the crng become a bit simpler:
we have get_random_bytes(buf, len) and get_random_bytes_user(buf, len),
which both do what you'd expect. All of the details of fast key erasure
and per-cpu selection happen only in a very short critical section of
crng_make_state(), which selects the right per-cpu key, does the fast
key erasure, and returns a local state to the caller's stack. So, we no
longer have a need for a separate backtrack function, as this happens
all at once here. The API then allows us to extend backtrack protection
to batched entropy without really having to do much at all.

The result is a bit simpler than before and has fewer foot guns. The
init time state machine also gets a lot simpler as we don't need to wait
for workqueues to come online and do deferred work. And the multi-core
performance should be increased significantly, by virtue of having hardly
any locking on the fast path.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

During crng_init == 0, we never credit entropy in add_interrupt_
randomness(), but instead dump it directly into the primary_crng. That's
fine, except for the fact that we then wind up throwing away that
entropy later when we switch to extracting from the input pool and
xoring into (and later in this series overwriting) the primary_crng key.
The two other early init sites -- add_hwgenerator_randomness()'s use
crng_fast_load() and add_device_ randomness()'s use of crng_slow_load()
-- always additionally give their inputs to the input pool. But not
add_interrupt_randomness().

This commit fixes that shortcoming by calling mix_pool_bytes() after
crng_fast_load() in add_interrupt_randomness(). That's partially
verboten on PREEMPT_RT, where it implies taking spinlock_t from an IRQ
handler. But this also only happens during early boot and then never
again after that. Plus it's a trylock so it has the same considerations
as calling crng_fast_load(), which we're already using.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Suggested-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

Continuing the reasoning of "random: ensure early RDSEED goes through
mixer on init", we don't want RDRAND interacting with anything without
going through the mixer function, as a backdoored CPU could presumably
cancel out data during an xor, which it'd have a harder time doing when
being forced through a cryptographic hash function. There's actually no
need at all to be calling RDRAND in write_pool(), because before we
extract from the pool, we always do so with 32 bytes of RDSEED hashed in
at that stage. Xoring at this stage is needless and introduces a minor
liability.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

Continuing the reasoning of "random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in
entropy extraction" from this series, at init time we also don't want to
be xoring RDSEED directly into the crng. Instead it's safer to put it
into our entropy collector and then re-extract it, so that it goes
through a hash function with preimage resistance. As a matter of hygiene,
we also order these now so that the RDSEED byte are hashed in first,
followed by the bytes that are likely more predictable (e.g. utsname()).

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

This is a preparatory commit for the following one. We simply inline the
various functions that rand_initialize() calls that have no other
callers. The compiler was doing this anyway before. Doing this will
allow us to reorganize this after. We can then move the trust_cpu and
parse_trust_cpu definitions a bit closer to where they're actually used,
which makes the code easier to read.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

As the comment said, this is indeed a "hack". Since it was introduced,
it's been a constant state machine nightmare, with lots of subtle early
boot issues and a wildly complex set of machinery to keep everything in
sync. Rather than continuing to play whack-a-mole with this approach,
this commit simply removes it entirely. This commit is preparation for
"random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys" in this
series, which introduces a simpler (and faster) mechanism to accomplish
the same thing.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

When /dev/random was directly connected with entropy extraction, without
any expansion stage, extract_buf() was called for every 10 bytes of data
read from /dev/random. For that reason, RDRAND was used rather than
RDSEED. At the same time, crng_reseed() was still only called every 5
minutes, so there RDSEED made sense.

Those olden days were also a time when the entropy collector did not use
a cryptographic hash function, which meant most bets were off in terms
of real preimage resistance. For that reason too it didn't matter
_that_ much whether RDSEED was mixed in before or after entropy
extraction; both choices were sort of bad.

But now we have a cryptographic hash function at work, and with that we
get real preimage resistance. We also now only call extract_entropy()
every 5 minutes, rather than every 10 bytes. This allows us to do two
important things.

First, we can switch to using RDSEED in extract_entropy(), as Dominik
suggested. Second, we can ensure that RDSEED input always goes into the
cryptographic hash function with other things before being used
directly. This eliminates a category of attacks in which the CPU knows
the current state of the crng and knows that we're going to xor RDSEED
into it, and so it computes a malicious RDSEED. By going through our
hash function, it would require the CPU to compute a preimage on the
fly, which isn't going to happen.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Suggested-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, so keep holding that lock
when incrementing crng_init from 0 to 1 in crng_fast_load(). The call to
pr_notice() can wait until the lock is released; this code path cannot
be reached twice, as crng_fast_load() aborts early if crng_init > 0.
Signed-off-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

Rather than use spinlocks to protect batched entropy, we can instead
disable interrupts locally, since we're dealing with per-cpu data, and
manage resets with a basic generation counter. At the same time, we
can't quite do this on PREEMPT_RT, where we still want spinlocks-as-
mutexes semantics. So we use a local_lock_t, which provides the right
behavior for each. Because this is a per-cpu lock, that generation
counter is still doing the necessary CPU-to-CPU communication.

This should improve performance a bit. It will also fix the linked splat
that Jonathan received with a PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING=y.
Reviewed-by: NSebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Suggested-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reported-by: NJonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Tested-by: NJonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YfMa0QgsjCVdRAvJ@latitude/Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

The primary_crng is always reseeded from the input_pool, while the NUMA
crngs are always reseeded from the primary_crng.  Remove the redundant
'use_input_pool' parameter from crng_reseed() and just directly check
whether the crng is the primary_crng.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

This is called from various hwgenerator drivers, so rather than having
one "safe" version for userspace and one "unsafe" version for the
kernel, just make everything safe; the checks are cheap and sensible to
have anyway.
Reported-by: NSultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>