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  1. 24 8月, 2017 1 次提交
  3. 17 8月, 2017 1 次提交
  5. 10 8月, 2017 1 次提交
  7. 09 8月, 2017 3 次提交
  9. 05 8月, 2017 1 次提交
    • D
      bpf: fix byte order test in test_verifier · 2c460621
      由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于 
      We really must check with #if __BYTE_ORDER == XYZ instead of
just presence of #ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN. I noticed that when
actually running this on big endian machine, the latter test
resolves to true for user space, same for #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN.

E.g., looking at endian.h from libc, both are also defined
there, so we really must test this against __BYTE_ORDER instead
for proper insns selection. For the kernel, such checks are
fine though e.g. see 13da9e20 ("Revert "endian: #define
__BYTE_ORDER"") and 415586c9 ("UAPI: fix endianness conditionals
in M32R's asm/stat.h") for some more context, but not for
user space. Lets also make sure to properly include endian.h.
After that, suite passes for me:

./test_verifier: ELF 64-bit MSB executable, [...]

Linux foo 4.13.0-rc3+ #4 SMP Fri Aug 4 06:59:30 EDT 2017 s390x s390x s390x GNU/Linux

Before fix: Summary: 505 PASSED, 11 FAILED
After  fix: Summary: 516 PASSED,  0 FAILED

Fixes: 18f3d6be ("selftests/bpf: Add test cases to test narrower ctx field loads")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NYonghong <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      2c460621
  11. 25 7月, 2017 1 次提交
  13. 21 7月, 2017 4 次提交
  15. 03 7月, 2017 1 次提交
  17. 30 6月, 2017 1 次提交
    • D
      bpf: prevent leaking pointer via xadd on unpriviledged · 6bdf6abc
      由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于 
      Leaking kernel addresses on unpriviledged is generally disallowed,
for example, verifier rejects the following:

  0: (b7) r0 = 0
  1: (18) r2 = 0xffff897e82304400
  3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +48) = r2
  R2 leaks addr into ctx

Doing pointer arithmetic on them is also forbidden, so that they
don't turn into unknown value and then get leaked out. However,
there's xadd as a special case, where we don't check the src reg
for being a pointer register, e.g. the following will pass:

  0: (b7) r0 = 0
  1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +48) = r0
  2: (18) r2 = 0xffff897e82304400 ; map
  4: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r1 +48) += r2
  5: (95) exit

We could store the pointer into skb->cb, loose the type context,
and then read it out from there again to leak it eventually out
of a map value. Or more easily in a different variant, too:

   0: (bf) r6 = r1
   1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
   2: (bf) r2 = r10
   3: (07) r2 += -8
   4: (18) r1 = 0x0
   6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
   7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+3
   R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R6=ctx R10=fp
   8: (b7) r3 = 0
   9: (7b) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = r3
  10: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r0 +0) += r6
  11: (b7) r0 = 0
  12: (95) exit

  from 7 to 11: R0=inv,min_value=0,max_value=0 R6=ctx R10=fp
  11: (b7) r0 = 0
  12: (95) exit

Prevent this by checking xadd src reg for pointer types. Also
add a couple of test cases related to this.

Fixes: 1be7f75d ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: 17a52670 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: NEdward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      6bdf6abc
  19. 15 6月, 2017 2 次提交
    • Y
      selftests/bpf: Add test cases to test narrower ctx field loads · 18f3d6be
      由 Yonghong Song 提交于 
      Add test cases in test_verifier and test_progs.
Negative tests are added in test_verifier as well.
The test in test_progs will compare the value of narrower ctx field
load result vs. the masked value of normal full-field load result,
and will fail if they are not the same.
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NYonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      18f3d6be
    • Y
      bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields · 31fd8581
      由 Yonghong Song 提交于 
      Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an
narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example,
        __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or
        __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol
        __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period
which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field.

This patch solves the issue by:
  . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the
    field size of narrower load from prog type
    specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier.
  . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates
    (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses
         supporting non-whole-field access
    (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access.
  . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is
    less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it
    to a full field load followed by proper masking.
  . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period
    are supporting narrowing loads.
  . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores
    are just normal stores.

Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and
these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound
__sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two
redundant "skb cb oob" tests.
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NYonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      31fd8581
  21. 14 6月, 2017 1 次提交
  23. 26 5月, 2017 1 次提交
  25. 01 5月, 2017 1 次提交
  27. 29 4月, 2017 1 次提交
  29. 22 4月, 2017 1 次提交
  31. 07 4月, 2017 1 次提交
  33. 02 4月, 2017 1 次提交
  35. 25 3月, 2017 1 次提交
  37. 23 3月, 2017 1 次提交
  39. 13 3月, 2017 1 次提交
  41. 11 2月, 2017 4 次提交
  43. 07 2月, 2017 2 次提交
  45. 25 1月, 2017 1 次提交
    • D
      bpf: enable verifier to better track const alu ops · 3fadc801
      由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于 
      William reported couple of issues in relation to direct packet
access. Typical scheme is to check for data + [off] <= data_end,
where [off] can be either immediate or coming from a tracked
register that contains an immediate, depending on the branch, we
can then access the data. However, in case of calculating [off]
for either the mentioned test itself or for access after the test
in a more "complex" way, then the verifier will stop tracking the
CONST_IMM marked register and will mark it as UNKNOWN_VALUE one.

Adding that UNKNOWN_VALUE typed register to a pkt() marked
register, the verifier then bails out in check_packet_ptr_add()
as it finds the registers imm value below 48. In the first below
example, that is due to evaluate_reg_imm_alu() not handling right
shifts and thus marking the register as UNKNOWN_VALUE via helper
__mark_reg_unknown_value() that resets imm to 0.

In the second case the same happens at the time when r4 is set
to r4 &= r5, where it transitions to UNKNOWN_VALUE from
evaluate_reg_imm_alu(). Later on r4 we shift right by 3 inside
evaluate_reg_alu(), where the register's imm turns into 3. That
is, for registers with type UNKNOWN_VALUE, imm of 0 means that
we don't know what value the register has, and for imm > 0 it
means that the value has [imm] upper zero bits. F.e. when shifting
an UNKNOWN_VALUE register by 3 to the right, no matter what value
it had, we know that the 3 upper most bits must be zero now.
This is to make sure that ALU operations with unknown registers
don't overflow. Meaning, once we know that we have more than 48
upper zero bits, or, in other words cannot go beyond 0xffff offset
with ALU ops, such an addition will track the target register
as a new pkt() register with a new id, but 0 offset and 0 range,
so for that a new data/data_end test will be required. Is the source
register a CONST_IMM one that is to be added to the pkt() register,
or the source instruction is an add instruction with immediate
value, then it will get added if it stays within max 0xffff bounds.
>From there, pkt() type, can be accessed should reg->off + imm be
within the access range of pkt().

  [...]
  from 28 to 30: R0=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1
    R1=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=22) R2=pkt_end
    R3=imm144,min_value=144,max_value=144
    R4=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0
    R5=inv48,min_value=2054,max_value=2054 R10=fp
  30: (bf) r5 = r3
  31: (07) r5 += 23
  32: (77) r5 >>= 3
  33: (bf) r6 = r1
  34: (0f) r6 += r5
  cannot add integer value with 0 upper zero bits to ptr_to_packet

  [...]
  from 52 to 80: R0=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1
    R1=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=34) R2=pkt_end R3=inv
    R4=imm272 R5=inv56,min_value=17,max_value=17
    R6=pkt(id=0,off=26,r=34) R10=fp
  80: (07) r4 += 71
  81: (18) r5 = 0xfffffff8
  83: (5f) r4 &= r5
  84: (77) r4 >>= 3
  85: (0f) r1 += r4
  cannot add integer value with 3 upper zero bits to ptr_to_packet

Thus to get above use-cases working, evaluate_reg_imm_alu() has
been extended for further ALU ops. This is fine, because we only
operate strictly within realm of CONST_IMM types, so here we don't
care about overflows as they will happen in the simulated but also
real execution and interaction with pkt() in check_packet_ptr_add()
will check actual imm value once added to pkt(), but it's irrelevant
before.

With regards to 06c1c049 ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable
memory") that works on UNKNOWN_VALUE registers, the verifier becomes
now a bit smarter as it can better resolve ALU ops, so we need to
adapt two test cases there, as min/max bound tracking only becomes
necessary when registers were spilled to stack. So while mask was
set before to track upper bound for UNKNOWN_VALUE case, it's now
resolved directly as CONST_IMM, and such contructs are only necessary
when f.e. registers are spilled.

For commit 6b173873 ("bpf: recognize 64bit immediate loads as
consts") that initially enabled dw load tracking only for nfp jit/
analyzer, I did couple of tests on large, complex programs and we
don't increase complexity badly (my tests were in ~3% range on avg).
I've added a couple of tests similar to affected code above, and
it works fine with verifier now.
Reported-by: NWilliam Tu <u9012063@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com>
Cc: William Tu <u9012063@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      3fadc801
  47. 12 1月, 2017 1 次提交
  49. 10 1月, 2017 3 次提交
    • G
      bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory · 06c1c049
      由 Gianluca Borello 提交于 
      Currently, helpers that read and write from/to the stack can do so using
a pair of arguments of type ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE.
ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE accepts a constant register of type CONST_IMM, so
that the verifier can safely check the memory access. However, requiring
the argument to be a constant can be limiting in some circumstances.

Since the current logic keeps track of the minimum and maximum value of
a register throughout the simulated execution, ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE can
be changed to also accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register in case its
boundaries have been set and the range doesn't cause invalid memory
accesses.

One common situation when this is useful:

int len;
char buf[BUFSIZE]; /* BUFSIZE is 128 */

if (some_condition)
	len = 42;
else
	len = 84;

some_helper(..., buf, len & (BUFSIZE - 1));

The compiler can often decide to assign the constant values 42 or 48
into a variable on the stack, instead of keeping it in a register. When
the variable is then read back from stack into the register in order to
be passed to the helper, the verifier will not be able to recognize the
register as constant (the verifier is not currently tracking all
constant writes into memory), and the program won't be valid.

However, by allowing the helper to accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register,
this program will work because the bitwise AND operation will set the
range of possible values for the UNKNOWN_VALUE register to [0, BUFSIZE),
so the verifier can guarantee the helper call will be safe (assuming the
argument is of type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, otherwise one more
check against 0 would be needed). Custom ranges can be set not only with
ALU operations, but also by explicitly comparing the UNKNOWN_VALUE
register with constants.

Another very common example happens when intercepting system call
arguments and accessing user-provided data of variable size using
bpf_probe_read(). One can load at runtime the user-provided length in an
UNKNOWN_VALUE register, and then read that exact amount of data up to a
compile-time determined limit in order to fit into the proper local
storage allocated on the stack, without having to guess a suboptimal
access size at compile time.

Also, in case the helpers accepting the UNKNOWN_VALUE register operate
in raw mode, disable the raw mode so that the program is required to
initialize all memory, since there is no guarantee the helper will fill
it completely, leaving possibilities for data leak (just relevant when
the memory used by the helper is the stack, not when using a pointer to
map element value or packet). In other words, ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK will
be treated as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK.
Signed-off-by: NGianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      06c1c049
    • G
      bpf: allow adjusted map element values to spill · f0318d01
      由 Gianluca Borello 提交于 
      commit 48461135 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
introduces the ability to do pointer math inside a map element value via
the PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ register type.

The current support doesn't handle the case where a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ
is spilled into the stack, limiting several use cases, especially when
generating bpf code from a compiler.

Handle this case by explicitly enabling the register type
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ to be spilled. Also, make sure that min_value and
max_value are reset just for BPF_LDX operations that don't result in a
restore of a spilled register from stack.
Signed-off-by: NGianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f0318d01
    • G
      bpf: allow helpers access to map element values · 5722569b
      由 Gianluca Borello 提交于 
      Enable helpers to directly access a map element value by passing a
register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (or PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) to helper
arguments ARG_PTR_TO_STACK or ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK.

This enables several use cases. For example, a typical tracing program
might want to capture pathnames passed to sys_open() with:

struct trace_data {
	char pathname[PATHLEN];
};

SEC("kprobe/sys_open")
void bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx)
{
	struct trace_data data;
	bpf_probe_read(data.pathname, sizeof(data.pathname), ctx->di);

	/* consume data.pathname, for example via
	 * bpf_trace_printk() or bpf_perf_event_output()
	 */
}

Such a program could easily hit the stack limit in case PATHLEN needs to
be large or more local variables need to exist, both of which are quite
common scenarios. Allowing direct helper access to map element values,
one could do:

struct bpf_map_def SEC("maps") scratch_map = {
	.type = BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY,
	.key_size = sizeof(u32),
	.value_size = sizeof(struct trace_data),
	.max_entries = 1,
};

SEC("kprobe/sys_open")
int bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx)
{
	int id = 0;
	struct trace_data *p = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&scratch_map, &id);
	if (!p)
		return;
	bpf_probe_read(p->pathname, sizeof(p->pathname), ctx->di);

	/* consume p->pathname, for example via
	 * bpf_trace_printk() or bpf_perf_event_output()
	 */
}

And wouldn't risk exhausting the stack.

Code changes are loosely modeled after commit 6841de8b ("bpf: allow
helpers access the packet directly"). Unlike with PTR_TO_PACKET, these
changes just work with ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK (not
ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ...): adding those would be
trivial, but since there is not currently a use case for that, it's
reasonable to limit the set of changes.

Also, add new tests to make sure accesses to map element values from
helpers never go out of boundary, even when adjusted.
Signed-off-by: NGianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5722569b
  51. 17 12月, 2016 2 次提交
    • D
      bpf, test_verifier: fix a test case error result on unprivileged · 0eb6984f
      由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于 
      Running ./test_verifier as unprivileged lets 1 out of 98 tests fail:

  [...]
  #71 unpriv: check that printk is disallowed FAIL
  Unexpected error message!
  0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
  1: (bf) r1 = r10
  2: (07) r1 += -8
  3: (b7) r2 = 8
  4: (bf) r3 = r1
  5: (85) call bpf_trace_printk#6
  unknown func bpf_trace_printk#6
  [...]

The test case is correct, just that the error outcome changed with
ebb676da ("bpf: Print function name in addition to function id").
Same as with e00c7b21 ("bpf: fix multiple issues in selftest suite
and samples") issue 2), so just fix up the function name.

Fixes: ebb676da ("bpf: Print function name in addition to function id")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      0eb6984f
    • D
      bpf: fix regression on verifier pruning wrt map lookups · a08dd0da
      由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于 
      Commit 57a09bf0 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
registers") introduced a regression where existing programs stopped
loading due to reaching the verifier's maximum complexity limit,
whereas prior to this commit they were loading just fine; the affected
program has roughly 2k instructions.

What was found is that state pruning couldn't be performed effectively
anymore due to mismatches of the verifier's register state, in particular
in the id tracking. It doesn't mean that 57a09bf0 is incorrect per
se, but rather that verifier needs to perform a lot more work for the
same program with regards to involved map lookups.

Since commit 57a09bf0 is only about tracking registers with type
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, the id is only needed to follow registers
until they are promoted through pattern matching with a NULL check to
either PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or UNKNOWN_VALUE type. After that point, the
id becomes irrelevant for the transitioned types.

For UNKNOWN_VALUE, id is already reset to 0 via mark_reg_unknown_value(),
but not so for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE where id is becoming stale. It's even
transferred further into other types that don't make use of it. Among
others, one example is where UNKNOWN_VALUE is set on function call
return with RET_INTEGER return type.

states_equal() will then fall through the memcmp() on register state;
note that the second memcmp() uses offsetofend(), so the id is part of
that since d2a4dd37 ("bpf: fix state equivalence"). But the bisect
pointed already to 57a09bf0, where we really reach beyond complexity
limit. What I found was that states_equal() often failed in this
case due to id mismatches in spilled regs with registers in type
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. Unlike non-spilled regs, spilled regs just perform
a memcmp() on their reg state and don't have any other optimizations
in place, therefore also id was relevant in this case for making a
pruning decision.

We can safely reset id to 0 as well when converting to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE.
For the affected program, it resulted in a ~17 fold reduction of
complexity and let the program load fine again. Selftest suite also
runs fine. The only other place where env->id_gen is used currently is
through direct packet access, but for these cases id is long living, thus
a different scenario.

Also, the current logic in mark_map_regs() is not fully correct when
marking NULL branch with UNKNOWN_VALUE. We need to cache the destination
reg's id in any case. Otherwise, once we marked that reg as UNKNOWN_VALUE,
it's id is reset and any subsequent registers that hold the original id
and are of type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL won't be marked UNKNOWN_VALUE
anymore, since mark_map_reg() reuses the uncached regs[regno].id that
was just overridden. Note, we don't need to cache it outside of
mark_map_regs(), since it's called once on this_branch and the other
time on other_branch, which are both two independent verifier states.
A test case for this is added here, too.

Fixes: 57a09bf0 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      a08dd0da
  53. 06 12月, 2016 1 次提交