1. 23 3月, 2021 1 次提交
    • A
      Bluetooth: verify AMP hci_chan before amp_destroy · 5c4c8c95
      Archie Pusaka 提交于
      hci_chan can be created in 2 places: hci_loglink_complete_evt() if
      it is an AMP hci_chan, or l2cap_conn_add() otherwise. In theory,
      Only AMP hci_chan should be removed by a call to
      hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt(). However, the controller might mess
      up, call that function, and destroy an hci_chan which is not initiated
      by hci_loglink_complete_evt().
      
      This patch adds a verification that the destroyed hci_chan must have
      been init'd by hci_loglink_complete_evt().
      
      Example crash call trace:
      Call Trace:
       __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
       dump_stack+0xe3/0x144 lib/dump_stack.c:118
       print_address_description+0x67/0x22a mm/kasan/report.c:256
       kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
       kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:412 [inline]
       kasan_report+0x251/0x28f mm/kasan/report.c:396
       hci_send_acl+0x3b/0x56e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4072
       l2cap_send_cmd+0x5af/0x5c2 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:877
       l2cap_send_move_chan_cfm_icid+0x8e/0xb1 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4661
       l2cap_move_fail net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5146 [inline]
       l2cap_move_channel_rsp net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5185 [inline]
       l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5464 [inline]
       l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5799 [inline]
       l2cap_recv_frame+0x1d12/0x51aa net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7023
       l2cap_recv_acldata+0x2ea/0x693 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7596
       hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4606 [inline]
       hci_rx_work+0x2bd/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4796
       process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175
       worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321
       kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253
       ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415
      
      Allocated by task 38:
       set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
       kasan_kmalloc+0x8d/0x9a mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
       kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x102/0x129 mm/slub.c:2787
       kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:515 [inline]
       kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:709 [inline]
       hci_chan_create+0x86/0x26d net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1674
       l2cap_conn_add.part.0+0x1c/0x814 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7062
       l2cap_conn_add net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7059 [inline]
       l2cap_connect_cfm+0x134/0x852 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7381
       hci_connect_cfm+0x9d/0x122 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1404
       hci_remote_ext_features_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:4161 [inline]
       hci_event_packet+0x463f/0x72fa net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:5981
       hci_rx_work+0x197/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4791
       process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175
       worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321
       kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253
       ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415
      
      Freed by task 1732:
       set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
       __kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/kasan.c:521 [inline]
       __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x128 mm/kasan/kasan.c:493
       slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
       slab_free_freelist_hook+0xaa/0xf6 mm/slub.c:1436
       slab_free mm/slub.c:3009 [inline]
       kfree+0x182/0x21e mm/slub.c:3972
       hci_disconn_loglink_complete_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:4891 [inline]
       hci_event_packet+0x6a1c/0x72fa net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6050
       hci_rx_work+0x197/0x45e net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4791
       process_one_work+0x6f8/0xb50 kernel/workqueue.c:2175
       worker_thread+0x4fc/0x670 kernel/workqueue.c:2321
       kthread+0x2f0/0x304 kernel/kthread.c:253
       ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415
      
      The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881d7af9180
       which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
      The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
       128-byte region [ffff8881d7af9180, ffff8881d7af9200)
      The buggy address belongs to the page:
      page:ffffea00075ebe40 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881da403200 index:0x0
      flags: 0x8000000000000200(slab)
      raw: 8000000000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff8881da403200
      raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080150015 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
      page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
      
      Memory state around the buggy address:
       ffff8881d7af9080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
       ffff8881d7af9100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      >ffff8881d7af9180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                  ^
       ffff8881d7af9200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
       ffff8881d7af9280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      Signed-off-by: NArchie Pusaka <apusaka@chromium.org>
      Reported-by: syzbot+98228e7407314d2d4ba2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
      Reviewed-by: NAlain Michaud <alainm@chromium.org>
      Reviewed-by: NAbhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      5c4c8c95
  2. 17 3月, 2021 1 次提交
  3. 04 3月, 2021 1 次提交
  4. 07 12月, 2020 2 次提交
    • D
      Bluetooth: Query LE tx power on startup · 7c395ea5
      Daniel Winkler 提交于
      Queries tx power via HCI_LE_Read_Transmit_Power command when the hci
      device is initialized, and stores resulting min/max LE power in hdev
      struct. If command isn't available (< BT5 support), min/max values
      both default to HCI_TX_POWER_INVALID.
      
      This patch is manually verified by ensuring BT5 devices correctly query
      and receive controller tx power range.
      Reviewed-by: NSonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Winkler <danielwinkler@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
      7c395ea5
    • D
      Bluetooth: Break add adv into two mgmt commands · 12410572
      Daniel Winkler 提交于
      This patch adds support for the new advertising add interface, with the
      first command setting advertising parameters and the second to set
      advertising data. The set parameters command allows the caller to leave
      some fields "unset", with a params bitfield defining which params were
      purposefully set. Unset parameters will be given defaults when calling
      hci_add_adv_instance. The data passed to the param mgmt command is
      allowed to be flexible, so in the future if bluetoothd passes a larger
      structure with new params, the mgmt command will ignore the unknown
      members at the end.
      
      This change has been validated on both hatch (extended advertising) and
      kukui (no extended advertising) chromebooks running bluetoothd that
      support this new interface. I ran the following manual tests:
      - Set several (3) advertisements using modified test_advertisement.py
      - For each, validate correct data and parameters in btmon trace
      - Verified both for software rotation and extended adv
      
      Automatic test suite also run, testing many (25) scenarios of single and
      multi-advertising for data/parameter correctness.
      Reviewed-by: NSonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Winkler <danielwinkler@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
      12410572
  5. 11 11月, 2020 1 次提交
  6. 09 11月, 2020 2 次提交
  7. 20 9月, 2020 1 次提交
  8. 13 9月, 2020 1 次提交
    • A
      Bluetooth: Emit controller suspend and resume events · 2f20216c
      Abhishek Pandit-Subedi 提交于
      Emit controller suspend and resume events when we are ready for suspend
      and we've resumed from suspend.
      
      The controller suspend event will report whatever suspend state was
      successfully entered. The controller resume event will check the first
      HCI event that was received after we finished preparing for suspend and,
      if it was a connection event, store the address of the peer that caused
      the event. If it was not a connection event, we mark the wake reason as
      an unexpected event.
      
      Here is a sample btmon trace with these events:
      
      @ MGMT Event: Controller Suspended (0x002d) plen 1
              Suspend state: Page scanning and/or passive scanning (2)
      
      @ MGMT Event: Controller Resumed (0x002e) plen 8
              Wake reason: Remote wake due to peer device connection (2)
              LE Address: CD:F3:CD:13:C5:9A (OUI CD-F3-CD)
      Signed-off-by: NAbhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit@chromium.org>
      Reviewed-by: NMiao-chen Chou <mcchou@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      2f20216c
  9. 31 7月, 2020 1 次提交
    • A
      Bluetooth: fix kernel oops in store_pending_adv_report · a2ec905d
      Alain Michaud 提交于
      Fix kernel oops observed when an ext adv data is larger than 31 bytes.
      
      This can be reproduced by setting up an advertiser with advertisement
      larger than 31 bytes.  The issue is not sensitive to the advertisement
      content.  In particular, this was reproduced with an advertisement of
      229 bytes filled with 'A'.  See stack trace below.
      
      This is fixed by not catching ext_adv as legacy adv are only cached to
      be able to concatenate a scanable adv with its scan response before
      sending it up through mgmt.
      
      With ext_adv, this is no longer necessary.
      
        general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
        CPU: 6 PID: 205 Comm: kworker/u17:0 Not tainted 5.4.0-37-generic #41-Ubuntu
        Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 15 7590/0CF6RR, BIOS 1.7.0 05/11/2020
        Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work [bluetooth]
        RIP: 0010:hci_bdaddr_list_lookup+0x1e/0x40 [bluetooth]
        Code: ff ff e9 26 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 8b 07 48 89 e5 48 39 c7 75 0a eb 24 48 8b 00 48 39 f8 74 1c 44 8b 06 <44> 39 40 10 75 ef 44 0f b7 4e 04 66 44 39 48 14 75 e3 38 50 16 75
        RSP: 0018:ffffbc6a40493c70 EFLAGS: 00010286
        RAX: 4141414141414141 RBX: 000000000000001b RCX: 0000000000000000
        RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9903e76c100f RDI: ffff9904289d4b28
        RBP: ffffbc6a40493c70 R08: 0000000093570362 R09: 0000000000000000
        R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9904344eae38 R12: ffff9904289d4000
        R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffa3 R15: ffff9903e76c100f
        FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff990434580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
        CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
        CR2: 00007feed125a000 CR3: 00000001b860a003 CR4: 00000000003606e0
        Call Trace:
          process_adv_report+0x12e/0x560 [bluetooth]
          hci_le_meta_evt+0x7b2/0xba0 [bluetooth]
          hci_event_packet+0x1c29/0x2a90 [bluetooth]
          hci_rx_work+0x19b/0x360 [bluetooth]
          process_one_work+0x1eb/0x3b0
          worker_thread+0x4d/0x400
          kthread+0x104/0x140
      
      Fixes: c215e939 ("Bluetooth: Process extended ADV report event")
      Reported-by: NAndy Nguyen <theflow@google.com>
      Reported-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Reported-by: NBalakrishna Godavarthi <bgodavar@codeaurora.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAlain Michaud <alainm@chromium.org>
      Tested-by: NSonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
      Acked-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      a2ec905d
  10. 30 7月, 2020 3 次提交
  11. 14 7月, 2020 2 次提交
  12. 11 7月, 2020 2 次提交
  13. 07 7月, 2020 1 次提交
  14. 23 6月, 2020 1 次提交
    • L
      Bluetooth: Disconnect if E0 is used for Level 4 · 8746f135
      Luiz Augusto von Dentz 提交于
      E0 is not allowed with Level 4:
      
      BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C page 1319:
      
        '128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
         required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed,
         SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key
         not shortened'
      
      SC enabled:
      
      > HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13
              Status: Success (0x00)
              Handle: 256
              Page: 1/2
              Features: 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
                Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
                LE Supported (Host)
                Secure Connections (Host Support)
      > HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
              Status: Success (0x00)
              Handle: 256
              Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x02)
      
      SC disabled:
      
      > HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13
              Status: Success (0x00)
              Handle: 256
              Page: 1/2
              Features: 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
                Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
                LE Supported (Host)
      > HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
              Status: Success (0x00)
              Handle: 256
              Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01)
      [May 8 20:23] Bluetooth: hci0: Invalid security: expect AES but E0 was used
      < HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3
              Handle: 256
              Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05)
      Signed-off-by: NLuiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      8746f135
  15. 18 6月, 2020 2 次提交
  16. 20 5月, 2020 1 次提交
  17. 18 5月, 2020 1 次提交
    • H
      Bluetooth: Add SCO fallback for invalid LMP parameters error · 56b5453a
      Hsin-Yu Chao 提交于
      Bluetooth PTS test case HFP/AG/ACC/BI-12-I accepts SCO connection
      with invalid parameter at the first SCO request expecting AG to
      attempt another SCO request with the use of "safe settings" for
      given codec, base on section 5.7.1.2 of HFP 1.7 specification.
      
      This patch addresses it by adding "Invalid LMP Parameters" (0x1e)
      to the SCO fallback case. Verified with below log:
      
      < HCI Command: Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) plen 17
              Handle: 256
              Transmit bandwidth: 8000
              Receive bandwidth: 8000
              Max latency: 13
              Setting: 0x0003
                Input Coding: Linear
                Input Data Format: 1's complement
                Input Sample Size: 8-bit
                # of bits padding at MSB: 0
                Air Coding Format: Transparent Data
              Retransmission effort: Optimize for link quality (0x02)
              Packet type: 0x0380
                3-EV3 may not be used
                2-EV5 may not be used
                3-EV5 may not be used
      > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4
            Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) ncmd 1
              Status: Success (0x00)
      > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5
              Num handles: 1
              Handle: 256
              Count: 1
      > HCI Event: Max Slots Change (0x1b) plen 3
              Handle: 256
              Max slots: 1
      > HCI Event: Synchronous Connect Complete (0x2c) plen 17
              Status: Invalid LMP Parameters / Invalid LL Parameters (0x1e)
              Handle: 0
              Address: 00:1B:DC:F2:21:59 (OUI 00-1B-DC)
              Link type: eSCO (0x02)
              Transmission interval: 0x00
              Retransmission window: 0x02
              RX packet length: 0
              TX packet length: 0
              Air mode: Transparent (0x03)
      < HCI Command: Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) plen 17
              Handle: 256
              Transmit bandwidth: 8000
              Receive bandwidth: 8000
              Max latency: 8
              Setting: 0x0003
                Input Coding: Linear
                Input Data Format: 1's complement
                Input Sample Size: 8-bit
                # of bits padding at MSB: 0
                Air Coding Format: Transparent Data
              Retransmission effort: Optimize for link quality (0x02)
              Packet type: 0x03c8
                EV3 may be used
                2-EV3 may not be used
                3-EV3 may not be used
                2-EV5 may not be used
                3-EV5 may not be used
      > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4
            Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) ncmd 1
              Status: Success (0x00)
      > HCI Event: Max Slots Change (0x1b) plen 3
              Handle: 256
              Max slots: 5
      > HCI Event: Max Slots Change (0x1b) plen 3
              Handle: 256
              Max slots: 1
      > HCI Event: Synchronous Connect Complete (0x2c) plen 17
              Status: Success (0x00)
              Handle: 257
              Address: 00:1B:DC:F2:21:59 (OUI 00-1B-DC)
              Link type: eSCO (0x02)
              Transmission interval: 0x06
              Retransmission window: 0x04
              RX packet length: 30
              TX packet length: 30
              Air mode: Transparent (0x03)
      Signed-off-by: NHsin-Yu Chao <hychao@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      56b5453a
  18. 13 5月, 2020 1 次提交
    • S
      Bluetooth: Handle Inquiry Cancel error after Inquiry Complete · adf1d692
      Sonny Sasaka 提交于
      After sending Inquiry Cancel command to the controller, it is possible
      that Inquiry Complete event comes before Inquiry Cancel command complete
      event. In this case the Inquiry Cancel command will have status of
      Command Disallowed since there is no Inquiry session to be cancelled.
      This case should not be treated as error, otherwise we can reach an
      inconsistent state.
      
      Example of a btmon trace when this happened:
      
      < HCI Command: Inquiry Cancel (0x01|0x0002) plen 0
      > HCI Event: Inquiry Complete (0x01) plen 1
              Status: Success (0x00)
      > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4
            Inquiry Cancel (0x01|0x0002) ncmd 1
              Status: Command Disallowed (0x0c)
      Signed-off-by: NSonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      adf1d692
  19. 28 4月, 2020 1 次提交
  20. 10 4月, 2020 1 次提交
  21. 05 4月, 2020 3 次提交
  22. 03 4月, 2020 1 次提交
  23. 25 3月, 2020 1 次提交
  24. 24 3月, 2020 1 次提交
  25. 12 3月, 2020 2 次提交
    • J
      Bluetooth: clean up connection in hci_cs_disconnect · b8d29052
      Joseph Hwang 提交于
      In bluetooth core specification 4.2,
      Vol 2, Part E, 7.8.9 LE Set Advertise Enable Command, it says
      
          The Controller shall continue advertising until ...
          or until a connection is created or ...
          In these cases, advertising is then disabled.
      
      Hence, advertising would be disabled before a connection is
      established. In current kernel implementation, advertising would
      be re-enabled when all connections are terminated.
      
      The correct disconnection flow looks like
      
        < HCI Command: Disconnect
      
        > HCI Event: Command Status
            Status: Success
      
        > HCI Event: Disconnect Complete
            Status: Success
      
      Specifically, the last Disconnect Complete Event would trigger a
      callback function hci_event.c:hci_disconn_complete_evt() to
      cleanup the connection and re-enable advertising when proper.
      
      However, sometimes, there might occur an exception in the controller
      when disconnection is being executed. The disconnection flow might
      then look like
      
        < HCI Command: Disconnect
      
        > HCI Event: Command Status
            Status: Unknown Connection Identifier
      
        Note that "> HCI Event: Disconnect Complete" is missing when such an
      exception occurs. This would result in advertising staying disabled
      forever since the connection in question is not cleaned up correctly.
      
      To fix the controller exception issue, we need to do some connection
      cleanup when the disconnect command status indicates an error.
      Signed-off-by: NJoseph Hwang <josephsih@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NManish Mandlik <mmandlik@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      b8d29052
    • A
      Bluetooth: Handle BR/EDR devices during suspend · 4f40afc6
      Abhishek Pandit-Subedi 提交于
      To handle BR/EDR devices, we first disable page scan and disconnect all
      connected devices. Once that is complete, we add event filters (for
      devices that can wake the system) and re-enable page scan.
      Signed-off-by: NAbhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      4f40afc6
  26. 08 3月, 2020 1 次提交
  27. 04 3月, 2020 1 次提交
  28. 14 2月, 2020 1 次提交
    • H
      Bluetooth: secure bluetooth stack from bluedump attack · cee5f20f
      Howard Chung 提交于
      Attack scenario:
      1. A Chromebook (let's call this device A) is paired to a legitimate
         Bluetooth classic device (e.g. a speaker) (let's call this device
         B).
      2. A malicious device (let's call this device C) pretends to be the
         Bluetooth speaker by using the same BT address.
      3. If device A is not currently connected to device B, device A will
         be ready to accept connection from device B in the background
         (technically, doing Page Scan).
      4. Therefore, device C can initiate connection to device A
         (because device A is doing Page Scan) and device A will accept the
         connection because device A trusts device C's address which is the
         same as device B's address.
      5. Device C won't be able to communicate at any high level Bluetooth
         profile with device A because device A enforces that device C is
         encrypted with their common Link Key, which device C doesn't have.
         But device C can initiate pairing with device A with just-works
         model without requiring user interaction (there is only pairing
         notification). After pairing, device A now trusts device C with a
         new different link key, common between device A and C.
      6. From now on, device A trusts device C, so device C can at anytime
         connect to device A to do any kind of high-level hijacking, e.g.
         speaker hijack or mouse/keyboard hijack.
      
      Since we don't know whether the repairing is legitimate or not,
      leave the decision to user space if all the conditions below are met.
      - the pairing is initialized by peer
      - the authorization method is just-work
      - host already had the link key to the peer
      Signed-off-by: NHoward Chung <howardchung@google.com>
      Acked-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      cee5f20f
  29. 04 1月, 2020 2 次提交