Martin KaFai Lau says:

====================
tcp: Merge timestamp info when coalescing skbs

This series is separated from the RFC series related to
tcp_sendmsg(MSG_EOR) and it is targeting for the net branch.
This patchset is focusing on fixing cases where TCP
timestamp could be lost after coalescing skbs.

A BPF prog is used to kprobe to sock_queue_err_skb()
and print out the value of serr->ee.ee_data.  The BPF
prog (run-able from bcc) is attached here:

BPF prog used for testing:
~~~~~

from __future__ import print_function
from bcc import BPF

bpf_text = """

int trace_err_skb(struct pt_regs *ctx)
{
	struct sk_buff *skb = (struct sk_buff *)ctx->si;
	struct sock *sk = (struct sock *)ctx->di;
	struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
	u32 ee_data = 0;

	if (!sk || !skb)
		return 0;

	serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
	bpf_probe_read(&ee_data, sizeof(ee_data), &serr->ee.ee_data);
	bpf_trace_printk("ee_data:%u\\n", ee_data);

	return 0;
};
"""

b = BPF(text=bpf_text)
b.attach_kprobe(event="sock_queue_err_skb", fn_name="trace_err_skb")
print("Attached to kprobe")
b.trace_print()
====================
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

After receiving sacks, tcp_shifted_skb() will collapse
skbs if possible.  tx_flags and tskey also have to be
merged.

This patch reuses the tcp_skb_collapse_tstamp() to handle
them.

BPF Output Before:
~~~~~
<no-output-due-to-missing-tstamp-event>

BPF Output After:
~~~~~
<...>-2024  [007] d.s.    88.644374: : ee_data:14599

Packetdrill Script:
~~~~~
+0 `sysctl -q -w net.ipv4.tcp_min_tso_segs=10`
+0 `sysctl -q -w net.ipv4.tcp_no_metrics_save=1`
+0 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3
+0 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0
+0 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0
+0 listen(3, 1) = 0

0.100 < S 0:0(0) win 32792 <mss 1460,sackOK,nop,nop,nop,wscale 7>
0.100 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 7>
0.200 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257
0.200 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4
+0 setsockopt(4, SOL_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, [1], 4) = 0

0.200 write(4, ..., 1460) = 1460
+0 setsockopt(4, SOL_SOCKET, 37, [2688], 4) = 0
0.200 write(4, ..., 13140) = 13140

0.200 > P. 1:1461(1460) ack 1
0.200 > . 1461:8761(7300) ack 1
0.200 > P. 8761:14601(5840) ack 1

0.300 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257 <sack 1461:14601,nop,nop>
0.300 > P. 1:1461(1460) ack 1
0.400 < . 1:1(0) ack 14601 win 257

0.400 close(4) = 0
0.400 > F. 14601:14601(0) ack 1
0.500 < F. 1:1(0) ack 14602 win 257
0.500 > . 14602:14602(0) ack 2
Signed-off-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Tested-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

If two skbs are merged/collapsed during retransmission, the current
logic does not merge the tx_flags and tskey.  The end result is
the SCM_TSTAMP_ACK timestamp could be missing for a packet.

The patch:
1. Merge the tx_flags
2. Overwrite the prev_skb's tskey with the next_skb's tskey

BPF Output Before:
~~~~~~
<no-output-due-to-missing-tstamp-event>

BPF Output After:
~~~~~~
packetdrill-2092  [001] d.s.   453.998486: : ee_data:1459

Packetdrill Script:
~~~~~~
+0 `sysctl -q -w net.ipv4.tcp_min_tso_segs=10`
+0 `sysctl -q -w net.ipv4.tcp_no_metrics_save=1`
+0 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3
+0 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0
+0 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0
+0 listen(3, 1) = 0

0.100 < S 0:0(0) win 32792 <mss 1460,sackOK,nop,nop,nop,wscale 7>
0.100 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 7>
0.200 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257
0.200 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4
+0 setsockopt(4, SOL_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, [1], 4) = 0

0.200 write(4, ..., 730) = 730
+0 setsockopt(4, SOL_SOCKET, 37, [2688], 4) = 0
0.200 write(4, ..., 730) = 730
+0 setsockopt(4, SOL_SOCKET, 37, [2176], 4) = 0
0.200 write(4, ..., 11680) = 11680
+0 setsockopt(4, SOL_SOCKET, 37, [2688], 4) = 0

0.200 > P. 1:731(730) ack 1
0.200 > P. 731:1461(730) ack 1
0.200 > . 1461:8761(7300) ack 1
0.200 > P. 8761:13141(4380) ack 1

0.300 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257 <sack 1461:2921,nop,nop>
0.300 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257 <sack 1461:4381,nop,nop>
0.300 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257 <sack 1461:5841,nop,nop>
0.300 > P. 1:1461(1460) ack 1
0.400 < . 1:1(0) ack 13141 win 257

0.400 close(4) = 0
0.400 > F. 13141:13141(0) ack 1
0.500 < F. 1:1(0) ack 13142 win 257
0.500 > . 13142:13142(0) ack 2
Signed-off-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Tested-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The cpsw_ndo_open() could try to access CPSW registers before
calling pm_runtime_get_sync(). This will trigger L3 error:

 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 21 at drivers/bus/omap_l3_noc.c:147 l3_interrupt_handler+0x220/0x34c()
 44000000.ocp:L3 Custom Error: MASTER M2 (64-bit) TARGET L4_FAST (Idle): Data Access in Supervisor mode during Functional access

and CPSW will stop functioning.

Hence, fix it by moving pm_runtime_get_sync() before the first access
to CPSW registers in cpsw_ndo_open().
Signed-off-by: NGrygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Assuming SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_ACK is on. When dup acks are received,
it could incorrectly think that a skb has already
been acked and queue a SCM_TSTAMP_ACK cmsg to the
sk->sk_error_queue.

In tcp_ack_tstamp(), it checks
'between(shinfo->tskey, prior_snd_una, tcp_sk(sk)->snd_una - 1)'.
If prior_snd_una == tcp_sk(sk)->snd_una like the following packetdrill
script, between() returns true but the tskey is actually not acked.
e.g. try between(3, 2, 1).

The fix is to replace between() with one before() and one !before().
By doing this, the -1 offset on the tcp_sk(sk)->snd_una can also be
removed.

A packetdrill script is used to reproduce the dup ack scenario.
Due to the lacking cmsg support in packetdrill (may be I
cannot find it),  a BPF prog is used to kprobe to
sock_queue_err_skb() and print out the value of
serr->ee.ee_data.

Both the packetdrill and the bcc BPF script is attached at the end of
this commit message.

BPF Output Before Fix:
~~~~~~
      <...>-2056  [001] d.s.   433.927987: : ee_data:1459  #incorrect
packetdrill-2056  [001] d.s.   433.929563: : ee_data:1459  #incorrect
packetdrill-2056  [001] d.s.   433.930765: : ee_data:1459  #incorrect
packetdrill-2056  [001] d.s.   434.028177: : ee_data:1459
packetdrill-2056  [001] d.s.   434.029686: : ee_data:14599

BPF Output After Fix:
~~~~~~
      <...>-2049  [000] d.s.   113.517039: : ee_data:1459
      <...>-2049  [000] d.s.   113.517253: : ee_data:14599

BCC BPF Script:
~~~~~~
#!/usr/bin/env python

from __future__ import print_function
from bcc import BPF

bpf_text = """
#include <uapi/linux/ptrace.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <bcc/proto.h>
#include <linux/errqueue.h>

#ifdef memset
#undef memset
#endif

int trace_err_skb(struct pt_regs *ctx)
{
	struct sk_buff *skb = (struct sk_buff *)ctx->si;
	struct sock *sk = (struct sock *)ctx->di;
	struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
	u32 ee_data = 0;

	if (!sk || !skb)
		return 0;

	serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
	bpf_probe_read(&ee_data, sizeof(ee_data), &serr->ee.ee_data);
	bpf_trace_printk("ee_data:%u\\n", ee_data);

	return 0;
};
"""

b = BPF(text=bpf_text)
b.attach_kprobe(event="sock_queue_err_skb", fn_name="trace_err_skb")
print("Attached to kprobe")
b.trace_print()

Packetdrill Script:
~~~~~~
+0 `sysctl -q -w net.ipv4.tcp_min_tso_segs=10`
+0 `sysctl -q -w net.ipv4.tcp_no_metrics_save=1`
+0 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3
+0 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0
+0 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0
+0 listen(3, 1) = 0

0.100 < S 0:0(0) win 32792 <mss 1460,sackOK,nop,nop,nop,wscale 7>
0.100 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 7>
0.200 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257
0.200 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4
+0 setsockopt(4, SOL_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, [1], 4) = 0

+0 setsockopt(4, SOL_SOCKET, 37, [2688], 4) = 0
0.200 write(4, ..., 1460) = 1460
0.200 write(4, ..., 13140) = 13140

0.200 > P. 1:1461(1460) ack 1
0.200 > . 1461:8761(7300) ack 1
0.200 > P. 8761:14601(5840) ack 1

0.300 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257 <sack 1461:2921,nop,nop>
0.300 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257 <sack 1461:4381,nop,nop>
0.300 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257 <sack 1461:5841,nop,nop>
0.300 > P. 1:1461(1460) ack 1
0.400 < . 1:1(0) ack 14601 win 257

0.400 close(4) = 0
0.400 > F. 14601:14601(0) ack 1
0.500 < F. 1:1(0) ack 14602 win 257
0.500 > . 14602:14602(0) ack 2
Signed-off-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil.kdev@gmail.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Tested-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This is the IPv6 counterpart to commit 8282f274 ("inet: frag: Always
orphan skbs inside ip_defrag()").

Prior to commit 029f7f3b ("netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: avoid/free
clone operations"), ipv6 fragments sent to nf_ct_frag6_gather() would be
cloned (implicitly orphaning) prior to queueing for reassembly. As such,
when the IPv6 message is eventually reassembled, the skb->sk for all
fragments would be NULL. After that commit was introduced, rather than
cloning, the original skbs were queued directly without orphaning. The
end result is that all frags except for the first and last may have a
socket attached.

This commit explicitly orphans such skbs during nf_ct_frag6_gather() to
prevent BUG_ON(skb->sk) during a later call to ip6_fragment().

kernel BUG at net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:631!
[...]
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 [<ffffffff810be8f7>] ? __lock_acquire+0x927/0x20a0
 [<ffffffffa042c7c0>] ? do_output.isra.28+0x1b0/0x1b0 [openvswitch]
 [<ffffffff810bb8a2>] ? __lock_is_held+0x52/0x70
 [<ffffffffa042c587>] ovs_fragment+0x1f7/0x280 [openvswitch]
 [<ffffffff810bdab5>] ? mark_held_locks+0x75/0xa0
 [<ffffffff817be416>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x50
 [<ffffffff81697ea0>] ? dst_discard_out+0x20/0x20
 [<ffffffff81697e80>] ? dst_ifdown+0x80/0x80
 [<ffffffffa042c703>] do_output.isra.28+0xf3/0x1b0 [openvswitch]
 [<ffffffffa042d279>] do_execute_actions+0x709/0x12c0 [openvswitch]
 [<ffffffffa04340a4>] ? ovs_flow_stats_update+0x74/0x1e0 [openvswitch]
 [<ffffffffa04340d1>] ? ovs_flow_stats_update+0xa1/0x1e0 [openvswitch]
 [<ffffffff817be387>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
 [<ffffffffa042de75>] ovs_execute_actions+0x45/0x120 [openvswitch]
 [<ffffffffa0432d65>] ovs_dp_process_packet+0x85/0x150 [openvswitch]
 [<ffffffff817be387>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
 [<ffffffffa042def4>] ovs_execute_actions+0xc4/0x120 [openvswitch]
 [<ffffffffa0432d65>] ovs_dp_process_packet+0x85/0x150 [openvswitch]
 [<ffffffffa04337f2>] ? key_extract+0x442/0xc10 [openvswitch]
 [<ffffffffa043b26d>] ovs_vport_receive+0x5d/0xb0 [openvswitch]
 [<ffffffff810be8f7>] ? __lock_acquire+0x927/0x20a0
 [<ffffffff810be8f7>] ? __lock_acquire+0x927/0x20a0
 [<ffffffff810be8f7>] ? __lock_acquire+0x927/0x20a0
 [<ffffffff817be416>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x50
 [<ffffffffa043c11d>] internal_dev_xmit+0x6d/0x150 [openvswitch]
 [<ffffffffa043c0b5>] ? internal_dev_xmit+0x5/0x150 [openvswitch]
 [<ffffffff8168fb5f>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x2df/0x660
 [<ffffffff8168f5ea>] ? validate_xmit_skb.isra.105.part.106+0x1a/0x2b0
 [<ffffffff81690925>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x8f5/0x950
 [<ffffffff81690080>] ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x50/0x950
 [<ffffffff810bdab5>] ? mark_held_locks+0x75/0xa0
 [<ffffffff81690990>] dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x20
 [<ffffffff8169a418>] neigh_resolve_output+0x178/0x220
 [<ffffffff81752759>] ? ip6_finish_output2+0x219/0x7b0
 [<ffffffff81752759>] ip6_finish_output2+0x219/0x7b0
 [<ffffffff817525a5>] ? ip6_finish_output2+0x65/0x7b0
 [<ffffffff816cde2b>] ? ip_idents_reserve+0x6b/0x80
 [<ffffffff8175488f>] ? ip6_fragment+0x93f/0xc50
 [<ffffffff81754af1>] ip6_fragment+0xba1/0xc50
 [<ffffffff81752540>] ? ip6_flush_pending_frames+0x40/0x40
 [<ffffffff81754c6b>] ip6_finish_output+0xcb/0x1d0
 [<ffffffff81754dcf>] ip6_output+0x5f/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff81754ba0>] ? ip6_fragment+0xc50/0xc50
 [<ffffffff81797fbd>] ip6_local_out+0x3d/0x80
 [<ffffffff817554df>] ip6_send_skb+0x2f/0xc0
 [<ffffffff817555bd>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x4d/0x50
 [<ffffffff817796cc>] icmpv6_push_pending_frames+0xac/0xe0
 [<ffffffff8177a4be>] icmpv6_echo_reply+0x42e/0x500
 [<ffffffff8177acbf>] icmpv6_rcv+0x4cf/0x580
 [<ffffffff81755ac7>] ip6_input_finish+0x1a7/0x690
 [<ffffffff81755925>] ? ip6_input_finish+0x5/0x690
 [<ffffffff817567a0>] ip6_input+0x30/0xa0
 [<ffffffff81755920>] ? ip6_rcv_finish+0x1a0/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff817557ce>] ip6_rcv_finish+0x4e/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff8175640f>] ipv6_rcv+0x45f/0x7c0
 [<ffffffff81755fe6>] ? ipv6_rcv+0x36/0x7c0
 [<ffffffff81755780>] ? ip6_make_skb+0x1c0/0x1c0
 [<ffffffff8168b649>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x229/0xb80
 [<ffffffff810bdab5>] ? mark_held_locks+0x75/0xa0
 [<ffffffff8168c07f>] ? process_backlog+0x6f/0x230
 [<ffffffff8168bfb6>] __netif_receive_skb+0x16/0x70
 [<ffffffff8168c088>] process_backlog+0x78/0x230
 [<ffffffff8168c0ed>] ? process_backlog+0xdd/0x230
 [<ffffffff8168db43>] net_rx_action+0x203/0x480
 [<ffffffff810bdab5>] ? mark_held_locks+0x75/0xa0
 [<ffffffff817c156e>] __do_softirq+0xde/0x49f
 [<ffffffff81752768>] ? ip6_finish_output2+0x228/0x7b0
 [<ffffffff817c070c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
 <EOI>
 [<ffffffff8106f88b>] do_softirq.part.18+0x3b/0x40
 [<ffffffff8106f946>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xb6/0xc0
 [<ffffffff81752791>] ip6_finish_output2+0x251/0x7b0
 [<ffffffff81754af1>] ? ip6_fragment+0xba1/0xc50
 [<ffffffff816cde2b>] ? ip_idents_reserve+0x6b/0x80
 [<ffffffff8175488f>] ? ip6_fragment+0x93f/0xc50
 [<ffffffff81754af1>] ip6_fragment+0xba1/0xc50
 [<ffffffff81752540>] ? ip6_flush_pending_frames+0x40/0x40
 [<ffffffff81754c6b>] ip6_finish_output+0xcb/0x1d0
 [<ffffffff81754dcf>] ip6_output+0x5f/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff81754ba0>] ? ip6_fragment+0xc50/0xc50
 [<ffffffff81797fbd>] ip6_local_out+0x3d/0x80
 [<ffffffff817554df>] ip6_send_skb+0x2f/0xc0
 [<ffffffff817555bd>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x4d/0x50
 [<ffffffff81778558>] rawv6_sendmsg+0xa28/0xe30
 [<ffffffff81719097>] ? inet_sendmsg+0xc7/0x1d0
 [<ffffffff817190d6>] inet_sendmsg+0x106/0x1d0
 [<ffffffff81718fd5>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x5/0x1d0
 [<ffffffff8166d078>] sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x50
 [<ffffffff8166d4d6>] SYSC_sendto+0xf6/0x170
 [<ffffffff8100201b>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1b/0x1d
 [<ffffffff8166e38e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10
 [<ffffffff817bebe5>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0xa8
Code: 06 48 83 3f 00 75 26 48 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 2b 87 d0 00 00 00 48 39 d0 72 14 8b 87 e4 00 00 00 83 f8 01 75 09 48 83 7f 18 00 74 9a <0f> 0b 41 8b 86 cc 00 00 00 49 8#
RIP  [<ffffffff8175468a>] ip6_fragment+0x73a/0xc50
 RSP <ffff880072803120>

Fixes: 029f7f3b ("netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: avoid/free clone
operations")
Reported-by: NDaniele Di Proietto <diproiettod@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: NJoe Stringer <joe@ovn.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This reverts commit cfe25560

This can result in a "Unable to handle kernel paging request"
during boot. This was due to using an uninitialised struct member,
data->slaves.
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Goodbody <andrew.goodbody@cambrionix.com>
Tested-by: NTony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

If skb_recv_datagram returns an skb, we should ignore the err
value returned. Otherwise, datagram receives will return EAGAIN
when they have to wait for a datagram.
Acked-by: NAdit Ranadive <aditr@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: NJorgen Hansen <jhansen@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

skb->sk could point to timewait or request socket which has no sk_classid.
Detected as "BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cls_cgroup_classify".
Signed-off-by: NKonstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch fixes couple error paths after allocation failures.
Atomic set of page reference counter is safe only if it is zero,
otherwise set can race with any speculative get_page_unless_zero.
Signed-off-by: NKonstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

High order pages are optional here since commit 51151a16 ("mlx4: allow
order-0 memory allocations in RX path"), so here is no reason for depleting
reserves. Generic __netdev_alloc_frag() implements the same logic.
Signed-off-by: NKonstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The new MACsec driver uses the AES crypto algorithm, but can be configured
even if CONFIG_CRYPTO is disabled, leading to a build error:

warning: (MAC80211 && MACSEC) selects CRYPTO_GCM which has unmet direct dependencies (CRYPTO)
warning: (BT && CEPH_LIB && INET && MAC802154 && MAC80211 && BLK_DEV_RBD && MACSEC && AIRO_CS && LIBIPW && HOSTAP && USB_WUSB && RTLLIB_CRYPTO_CCMP && FS_ENCRYPTION && EXT4_ENCRYPTION && CEPH_FS && BIG_KEYS && ENCRYPTED_KEYS) selects CRYPTO_AES which has unmet direct dependencies (CRYPTO)
crypto/built-in.o: In function `gcm_enc_copy_hash':
aes_generic.c:(.text+0x2b8): undefined reference to `crypto_xor'
aes_generic.c:(.text+0x2dc): undefined reference to `scatterwalk_map_and_copy'

This adds an explicit 'select CRYPTO' statement the way that other
drivers handle it.
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Fixes: c09440f7 ("macsec: introduce IEEE 802.1AE driver")
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

On 64bit kernels, device stats are 64bit wide, not 32bit.

Fixes: 1c1008c7 ("net: bcmgenet: add main driver file")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Vivien Didelot says:

====================
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: fix hardware cross-chip bridging

In order to accelerate cross-chip switching of frames with the hardware,
the DSA Tag ports, used to interconnect switch devices, must learn SA
and DA addresses, and share the same FDB with the user ports.

The two first patches restore address learning on DSA links. This fixes
hardware cross-chip bridging in a VLAN filtering enabled system, which
implements a bridge group as a 802.1Q VLAN and thus share an isolated
address database between DSA and user ports.

The third patch changes the distinct default databases used for each
port, to the same address database. This fixes the hardware cross-chip
bridging in a VLAN filtering disabled system, where a bridge group gets
implemented only as a port-based VLAN.
====================
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

For hardware cross-chip bridging to work, user ports *and* DSA ports
need to share a common address database, in order to switch a frame to
the correct interconnected device.

This is currently working for VLAN filtering aware systems, since Linux
will implement a bridge group as a 802.1Q VLAN, which has its own FDB,
including DSA and CPU links as members.

However when the system doesn't support VLAN filtering, Linux only
relies on the port-based VLAN to implement a bridge group.

To fix hardware cross-chip bridging for such systems, set the same
default address database 0 for user and DSA ports, instead of giving
them all a different default database.

Note that the bridging code prevents frames to egress between unbridged
ports, and flushes FDB entries of a port when changing its STP state.

Also note that the FID 0 is special and means "all" for ATU operations,
but it's OK since it is used as a default forwarding address database.

Fixes: 2db9ce1f ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: assign default FDB to ports")
Fixes: 466dfa07 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: assign dynamic FDB to bridges")
Signed-off-by: NVivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@savoirfairelinux.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In multi-chip systems, DSA Tag ports must learn SA addresses in order to
correctly switch frames between interconnected chips.

This fixes cross-chip hardware bridging in a VLAN filtering aware
system, because a bridge group gets implemented as an hardware 802.1Q
VLAN and thus DSA and user ports share the same FDB.

Fixes: 4c7ea3c0 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: disable SA learning for DSA and CPU ports")
Signed-off-by: NVivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@savoirfairelinux.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Locking a port generates an hardware interrupt when a new SA address is
received. This enables CPU directed learning, which is needed for 802.1X
MAC authentication.

To disable automatic learning on a port, the only configuration needed
is to set its Port Association Vector to all zero.

Clear PAV when SA learning should be disabled instead of locking a port.

Fixes: 4c7ea3c0 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: disable SA learning for DSA and CPU ports")
Signed-off-by: NVivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@savoirfairelinux.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Two different threads with different rds sockets may be in
rds_recv_rcvbuf_delta() via receive path. If their ports
both map to the same word in the congestion map, then
using non-atomic ops to update it could cause the map to
be incorrect. Lets use atomics to avoid such an issue.

Full credit to Wengang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com> for
finding the issue, analysing it and also pointing out
to offending code with spin lock based fix.
Reviewed-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leon@leon.nu>
Signed-off-by: NWengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NSantosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

dp->dp_ack_seq is used in big endian format. We need to do the
big endianness conversion when we assign a value in host format
to it.
Signed-off-by: NQing Huang <qing.huang@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NSantosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When __vlan_insert_tag() fails from skb_vlan_push() path due to the
skb_cow_head(), we need to undo the __skb_push() in the error path
as well that was done earlier to move skb->data pointer to mac header.

Moreover, I noticed that when in the non-error path the __skb_pull()
is done and the original offset to mac header was non-zero, we fixup
from a wrong skb->data offset in the checksum complete processing.

So the skb_postpush_rcsum() really needs to be done before __skb_pull()
where skb->data still points to the mac header start and thus operates
under the same conditions as in __vlan_insert_tag().

Fixes: 93515d53 ("net: move vlan pop/push functions into common code")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: NJiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Adding a 2nd PHY to cpsw results in a NULL pointer dereference
as below. Fix by maintaining a reference to each PHY node in slave
struct instead of a single reference in the priv struct which was
overwritten by the 2nd PHY.

[   17.870933] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000180
[   17.879557] pgd = dc8bc000
[   17.882514] [00000180] *pgd=9c882831, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000
[   17.889213] Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
[   17.893838] Modules linked in:
[   17.897102] CPU: 0 PID: 1657 Comm: connmand Not tainted 4.5.0-ge463dfb-dirty #11
[   17.904947] Hardware name: Cambrionix whippet
[   17.909576] task: dc859240 ti: dc968000 task.ti: dc968000
[   17.915339] PC is at phy_attached_print+0x18/0x8c
[   17.920339] LR is at phy_attached_info+0x14/0x18
[   17.925247] pc : [<c042baec>]    lr : [<c042bb74>]    psr: 600f0113
[   17.925247] sp : dc969cf8  ip : dc969d28  fp : dc969d18
[   17.937425] r10: dda7a400  r9 : 00000000  r8 : 00000000
[   17.942971] r7 : 00000001  r6 : ddb00480  r5 : ddb8cb34  r4 : 00000000
[   17.949898] r3 : c0954cc0  r2 : c09562b0  r1 : 00000000  r0 : 00000000
[   17.956829] Flags: nZCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment none
[   17.964401] Control: 10c5387d  Table: 9c8bc019  DAC: 00000051
[   17.970500] Process connmand (pid: 1657, stack limit = 0xdc968210)
[   17.977059] Stack: (0xdc969cf8 to 0xdc96a000)
[   17.981692] 9ce0:                                                       dc969d28 dc969d08
[   17.990386] 9d00: c038f9bc c038f6b4 ddb00480 dc969d34 dc969d28 c042bb74 c042bae4 00000000
[   17.999080] 9d20: c09562b0 c0954cc0 dc969d5c dc969d38 c043ebfc c042bb6c 00000007 00000003
[   18.007773] 9d40: ddb00000 ddb8cb58 ddb00480 00000001 dc969dec dc969d60 c0441614 c043ea68
[   18.016465] 9d60: 00000000 00000003 00000000 fffffff4 dc969df4 0000000d 00000000 00000000
[   18.025159] 9d80: dc969db4 dc969d90 c005dc08 c05839e0 dc969df4 0000000d ddb00000 00001002
[   18.033851] 9da0: 00000000 00000000 dc969dcc dc969db8 c005ddf4 c005dbc8 00000000 00000118
[   18.042544] 9dc0: dc969dec dc969dd0 ddb00000 c06db27c ffff9003 00001002 00000000 00000000
[   18.051237] 9de0: dc969e0c dc969df0 c057c88c c04410dc dc969e0c ddb00000 ddb00000 00000001
[   18.059930] 9e00: dc969e34 dc969e10 c057cb44 c057c7d8 ddb00000 ddb00138 00001002 beaeda20
[   18.068622] 9e20: 00000000 00000000 dc969e5c dc969e38 c057cc28 c057cac0 00000000 dc969e80
[   18.077315] 9e40: dda7a40c beaeda20 00000000 00000000 dc969ecc dc969e60 c05e36d0 c057cc14
[   18.086007] 9e60: dc969e84 00000051 beaeda20 00000000 dda7a40c 00000014 ddb00000 00008914
[   18.094699] 9e80: 30687465 00000000 00000000 00000000 00009003 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   18.103391] 9ea0: 00001002 00008914 dd257ae0 beaeda20 c098a428 beaeda20 00000011 00000000
[   18.112084] 9ec0: dc969edc dc969ed0 c05e4e54 c05e3030 dc969efc dc969ee0 c055f5ac c05e4cc4
[   18.120777] 9ee0: beaeda20 dd257ae0 dc8ab4c0 00008914 dc969f7c dc969f00 c010b388 c055f45c
[   18.129471] 9f00: c071ca40 dd257ac0 c00165e8 dc968000 dc969f3c dc969f20 dc969f64 dc969f28
[   18.138164] 9f20: c0115708 c0683ec8 dd257ac0 dd257ac0 dc969f74 dc969f40 c055f350 c00fc66c
[   18.146857] 9f40: dd82e4d0 00000011 00000000 00080000 dd257ac0 00000000 dc8ab4c0 dc8ab4c0
[   18.155550] 9f60: 00008914 beaeda20 00000011 00000000 dc969fa4 dc969f80 c010bc34 c010b2fc
[   18.164242] 9f80: 00000000 00000011 00000002 00000036 c00165e8 dc968000 00000000 dc969fa8
[   18.172935] 9fa0: c00163e0 c010bbcc 00000000 00000011 00000011 00008914 beaeda20 00009003
[   18.181628] 9fc0: 00000000 00000011 00000002 00000036 00081018 00000001 00000000 beaedc10
[   18.190320] 9fe0: 00083188 beaeda1c 00043a5d b6d29c0c 600b0010 00000011 00000000 00000000
[   18.198989] Backtrace:
[   18.201621] [<c042bad8>] (phy_attached_print) from [<c042bb74>] (phy_attached_info+0x14/0x18)
[   18.210664]  r3:c0954cc0 r2:c09562b0 r1:00000000
[   18.215588]  r4:ddb00480
[   18.218322] [<c042bb60>] (phy_attached_info) from [<c043ebfc>] (cpsw_slave_open+0x1a0/0x280)
[   18.227293] [<c043ea5c>] (cpsw_slave_open) from [<c0441614>] (cpsw_ndo_open+0x544/0x674)
[   18.235874]  r7:00000001 r6:ddb00480 r5:ddb8cb58 r4:ddb00000
[   18.241944] [<c04410d0>] (cpsw_ndo_open) from [<c057c88c>] (__dev_open+0xc0/0x128)
[   18.249972]  r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:00001002 r6:ffff9003 r5:c06db27c r4:ddb00000
[   18.258255] [<c057c7cc>] (__dev_open) from [<c057cb44>] (__dev_change_flags+0x90/0x154)
[   18.266745]  r5:00000001 r4:ddb00000
[   18.270575] [<c057cab4>] (__dev_change_flags) from [<c057cc28>] (dev_change_flags+0x20/0x50)
[   18.279523]  r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:beaeda20 r6:00001002 r5:ddb00138 r4:ddb00000
[   18.287811] [<c057cc08>] (dev_change_flags) from [<c05e36d0>] (devinet_ioctl+0x6ac/0x76c)
[   18.296483]  r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:beaeda20 r6:dda7a40c r5:dc969e80 r4:00000000
[   18.304762] [<c05e3024>] (devinet_ioctl) from [<c05e4e54>] (inet_ioctl+0x19c/0x1c8)
[   18.312882]  r10:00000000 r9:00000011 r8:beaeda20 r7:c098a428 r6:beaeda20 r5:dd257ae0
[   18.321235]  r4:00008914
[   18.323956] [<c05e4cb8>] (inet_ioctl) from [<c055f5ac>] (sock_ioctl+0x15c/0x2d8)
[   18.331829] [<c055f450>] (sock_ioctl) from [<c010b388>] (do_vfs_ioctl+0x98/0x8d0)
[   18.339765]  r7:00008914 r6:dc8ab4c0 r5:dd257ae0 r4:beaeda20
[   18.345822] [<c010b2f0>] (do_vfs_ioctl) from [<c010bc34>] (SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x84)
[   18.353573]  r10:00000000 r9:00000011 r8:beaeda20 r7:00008914 r6:dc8ab4c0 r5:dc8ab4c0
[   18.361924]  r4:00000000
[   18.364653] [<c010bbc0>] (SyS_ioctl) from [<c00163e0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x3c)
[   18.372682]  r9:dc968000 r8:c00165e8 r7:00000036 r6:00000002 r5:00000011 r4:00000000
[   18.380960] Code: e92dd810 e24cb010 e24dd010 e59b4004 (e5902180)
[   18.387580] ---[ end trace c80529466223f3f3 ]---
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Goodbody <andrew.goodbody@cambrionix.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Only core revisions older than 4 use BGMAC_CMDCFG_SR_REV0. This mainly
fixes support for BCM4708A0KF SoCs with Ethernet core rev 5 (it means
only some devices as most of BCM4708A0KF-s got core rev 4).
This was tested for regressions on BCM47094 which doesn't seem to care
which bit gets used.
Signed-off-by: NFelix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Signed-off-by: NRafał Miłecki <zajec5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Craig Gallek says:

====================
Fixes for SO_REUSEPORT and mixed v4/v6 sockets

Recent changes to the datastructures associated with SO_REUSEPORT broke
an existing behavior when equivalent SO_REUSEPORT sockets are created
using both AF_INET and AF_INET6.  This patch series restores the previous
behavior and includes a test to validate it.

This series should be a trivial merge to stable kernels (if deemed
necessary), but will have conflicts in net-next.  The following patches
recently replaced the use of hlist_nulls with hlists for UDP and TCP
socket lists:
ca065d0c ("udp: no longer use SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU")
3b24d854 ("tcp/dccp: do not touch listener sk_refcnt under synflood")

If this series is accepted, I will send an RFC for the net-next change
to assist with the merge.
====================
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Test to validate the behavior of SO_REUSEPORT sockets that are
created with both AF_INET and AF_INET6.  See the commit prior to this
for a description of this behavior.
Signed-off-by: NCraig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

With the SO_REUSEPORT socket option, it is possible to create sockets
in the AF_INET and AF_INET6 domains which are bound to the same IPv4 address.
This is only possible with SO_REUSEPORT and when not using IPV6_V6ONLY on
the AF_INET6 sockets.

Prior to the commits referenced below, an incoming IPv4 packet would
always be routed to a socket of type AF_INET when this mixed-mode was used.
After those changes, the same packet would be routed to the most recently
bound socket (if this happened to be an AF_INET6 socket, it would
have an IPv4 mapped IPv6 address).

The change in behavior occurred because the recent SO_REUSEPORT optimizations
short-circuit the socket scoring logic as soon as they find a match.  They
did not take into account the scoring logic that favors AF_INET sockets
over AF_INET6 sockets in the event of a tie.

To fix this problem, this patch changes the insertion order of AF_INET
and AF_INET6 addresses in the TCP and UDP socket lists when the sockets
have SO_REUSEPORT set.  AF_INET sockets will be inserted at the head of the
list and AF_INET6 sockets with SO_REUSEPORT set will always be inserted at
the tail of the list.  This will force AF_INET sockets to always be
considered first.

Fixes: e32ea7e7 ("soreuseport: fast reuseport UDP socket selection")
Fixes: 125e80b88687 ("soreuseport: fast reuseport TCP socket selection")
Reported-by: NMaciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NCraig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

We now have a positive report of another Huawei device needing
this quirk: The ME906s-158 (12d1:15c1).  This is an m.2 form
factor modem with no obvious relationship to the E3372 (12d1:157d)
we already have a quirk entry for.  This is reason enough to
believe the quirk might be necessary for any number of current
and future Huawei devices.

Applying the quirk to all Huawei devices, since it is crucial
to any device affected by the firmware bug, while the impact
on non-affected devices is negligible.

The quirk can if necessary be disabled per-device by writing
N to /sys/class/net/<iface>/cdc_ncm/ndp_to_end
Reported-by: NAndreas Fett <andreas.fett@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: NBjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This fixes Ethernet on D-Link DIR-885L with BCM47094 SoC. Felix reported
similar fix was needed for his BCM4709 device (Buffalo WXR-1900DHP?).
I tested this for regressions on BCM4706, BCM4708A0 and BCM47081A0.

Cc: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Signed-off-by: NRafał Miłecki <zajec5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Martin KaFai Lau says:

====================
ipv6: datagram: Update dst cache of a connected udp sk during pmtu update

v2:
~ Protect __sk_dst_get() operations with rcu_read_lock in
  release_cb() because another thread may do ip6_dst_store()
  for a udp sk without taking the sk lock (e.g. in sendmsg).
~ Do a ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr) check before
  calling ip6_datagram_dst_update() in patch 3 and 4.  It is
  similar to how __ip6_datagram_connect handles it.
~ One fix in ip6_datagram_dst_update() in patch 2.  It needs
  to check (np->flow_label & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) before
  doing fl6_sock_lookup.  I was confused with the naming
  of IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK and IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK.
~ Check dst->obsolete just on the safe side, although I think it
  should at least have DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK by now.
~ Add Fixes tag to patch 3 and 4
~ Add some points from the previous discussion about holding
  sk lock to the commit message in patch 3.

v1:
There is a case in connected UDP socket such that
getsockopt(IPV6_MTU) will return a stale MTU value. The reproducible
sequence could be the following:
1. Create a connected UDP socket
2. Send some datagrams out
3. Receive a ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG
4. No new outgoing datagrams to trigger the sk_dst_check()
   logic to update the sk->sk_dst_cache.
5. getsockopt(IPV6_MTU) returns the mtu from the invalid
   sk->sk_dst_cache instead of the newly created RTF_CACHE clone.

Patch 1 and 2 are the prep work.
Patch 3 and 4 are the fixes.
====================
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch adds a release_cb for UDPv6.  It does a route lookup
and updates sk->sk_dst_cache if it is needed.  It picks up the
left-over job from ip6_sk_update_pmtu() if the sk was owned
by user during the pmtu update.

It takes a rcu_read_lock to protect the __sk_dst_get() operations
because another thread may do ip6_dst_store() without taking the
sk lock (e.g. sendmsg).

Fixes: 45e4fd26 ("ipv6: Only create RTF_CACHE routes after encountering pmtu exception")
Signed-off-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Reported-by: NWei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

There is a case in connected UDP socket such that
getsockopt(IPV6_MTU) will return a stale MTU value. The reproducible
sequence could be the following:
1. Create a connected UDP socket
2. Send some datagrams out
3. Receive a ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG
4. No new outgoing datagrams to trigger the sk_dst_check()
   logic to update the sk->sk_dst_cache.
5. getsockopt(IPV6_MTU) returns the mtu from the invalid
   sk->sk_dst_cache instead of the newly created RTF_CACHE clone.

This patch updates the sk->sk_dst_cache for a connected datagram sk
during pmtu-update code path.

Note that the sk->sk_v6_daddr is used to do the route lookup
instead of skb->data (i.e. iph).  It is because a UDP socket can become
connected after sending out some datagrams in un-connected state.  or
It can be connected multiple times to different destinations.  Hence,
iph may not be related to where sk is currently connected to.

It is done under '!sock_owned_by_user(sk)' condition because
the user may make another ip6_datagram_connect()  (i.e changing
the sk->sk_v6_daddr) while dst lookup is happening in the pmtu-update
code path.

For the sock_owned_by_user(sk) == true case, the next patch will
introduce a release_cb() which will update the sk->sk_dst_cache.

Test:

Server (Connected UDP Socket):
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Route Details:
[root@arch-fb-vm1 ~]# ip -6 r show | egrep '2fac'
2fac::/64 dev eth0  proto kernel  metric 256  pref medium
2fac:face::/64 via 2fac::face dev eth0  metric 1024  pref medium

A simple python code to create a connected UDP socket:

import socket
import errno

HOST = '2fac::1'
PORT = 8080

s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET6, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
s.bind((HOST, PORT))
s.connect(('2fac:face::face', 53))
print("connected")
while True:
    try:
	data = s.recv(1024)
    except socket.error as se:
	if se.errno == errno.EMSGSIZE:
		pmtu = s.getsockopt(41, 24)
		print("PMTU:%d" % pmtu)
		break
s.close()

Python program output after getting a ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG:
[root@arch-fb-vm1 ~]# python2 ~/devshare/kernel/tasks/fib6/udp-connect-53-8080.py
connected
PMTU:1300

Cache routes after recieving TOOBIG:
[root@arch-fb-vm1 ~]# ip -6 r show table cache
2fac:face::face via 2fac::face dev eth0  metric 0
    cache  expires 463sec mtu 1300 pref medium

Client (Send the ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG):
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
scapy is used to generate the TOOBIG message.  Here is the scapy script I have
used:

>>> p=Ether(src='da:75:4d:36:ac:32', dst='52:54:00:12:34:66', type=0x86dd)/IPv6(src='2fac::face', dst='2fac::1')/ICMPv6PacketTooBig(mtu=1300)/IPv6(src='2fac::
1',dst='2fac:face::face', nh='UDP')/UDP(sport=8080,dport=53)
>>> sendp(p, iface='qemubr0')

Fixes: 45e4fd26 ("ipv6: Only create RTF_CACHE routes after encountering pmtu exception")
Signed-off-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Reported-by: NWei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch moves the route lookup and update codes for connected
datagram sk to a newly created function ip6_datagram_dst_update()

It will be reused during the pmtu update in the later patch.
Signed-off-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Move flowi6 init codes for connected datagram sk to a newly created
function ip6_datagram_flow_key_init().

Notes:
1. fl6_flowlabel is used instead of fl6.flowlabel in __ip6_datagram_connect
2. ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6->daddr) is used instead of
   (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST) in ip6_datagram_flow_key_init()

This new function will be reused during pmtu update in the later patch.
Signed-off-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The current binding document only describes a single interrupt. Update the
document by adding the 2 other interrupts.

The driver currently only uses a single interrupt. The HW is however able
to using IRQ grouping to split TX and RX onto separate GIC irqs.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Crispin <blogic@openwrt.org>
Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NRob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Merge tag 'mac80211-for-davem-2016-04-14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jberg/mac80211

Johannes Berg says:

====================
This has just the single fix from Dmitry Ivanov, adding the missing
netlink notifier family check to avoid the socket close DoS problem.
====================
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

verifier must check for reserved size bits in instruction opcode and
reject BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_DW and BPF_LD | BPF_IND | BPF_DW instructions,
otherwise interpreter will WARN_RATELIMIT on them during execution.

Fixes: ddd872bc ("bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions")
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

A failure in validate_xmit_skb_list() triggered an unconditional call
to dev_requeue_skb with skb=NULL. This slowly grows the queue
discipline's qlen count until all traffic through the queue stops.

We take the optimistic approach and continue running the queue after a
failure since it is unknown if later packets also will fail in the
validate path.

Fixes: 55a93b3e ("qdisc: validate skb without holding lock")
Signed-off-by: NLars Persson <larper@axis.com>
Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Because we miss to wipe the remainder of i->addr[] in packet_mc_add(),
pdiag_put_mclist() leaks uninitialized heap bytes via the
PACKET_DIAG_MCLIST netlink attribute.

Fix this by explicitly memset(0)ing the remaining bytes in i->addr[].

Fixes: eea68e2f ("packet: Report socket mclist info via diag module")
Signed-off-by: NMathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Jeff Kirsher says:

====================
Intel Wired LAN Driver Updates 2016-04-13

This series contains updates to i40e, i40evf and fm10k.

Alex fixes a bug introduced earlier based on his interpretation of the
XL710 datasheet.  The actual limit for fragments with TSO and a skbuff
that has payload data in the header portion of the buffer is actually
only 7 fragments and the skb-data portion counts as 2 buffers, one for
the TSO header, and the one for a segment payload buffer.

Jacob fixes a bug where in a previous refactor of the code broke
multi-bit updates for VFs.  The problem occurs because a multi-bit
request has a non-zero length, and the PF would simply drop any
request with the upper 16 bits set.
====================
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

For local routes that require a particular output interface we do not want
to cache the result.  Caching the result causes incorrect behaviour when
there are multiple source addresses on the interface.  The end result
being that if the intended recipient is waiting on that interface for the
packet he won't receive it because it will be delivered on the loopback
interface and the IP_PKTINFO ipi_ifindex will be set to the loopback
interface as well.

This can be tested by running a program such as "dhcp_release" which
attempts to inject a packet on a particular interface so that it is
received by another program on the same board.  The receiving process
should see an IP_PKTINFO ipi_ifndex value of the source interface
(e.g., eth1) instead of the loopback interface (e.g., lo).  The packet
will still appear on the loopback interface in tcpdump but the important
aspect is that the CMSG info is correct.

Sample dhcp_release command line:

   dhcp_release eth1 192.168.204.222 02:11:33:22:44:66
Signed-off-by: NAllain Legacy <allain.legacy@windriver.com>
Signed off-by: Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@windriver.com>
Reviewed-by: NJulian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The VF uses a multi-bit update request to clear unused VLANs whenever it
resets. However, an accident in a previous refector broke multi-bit
updates for VFs, due to misreading a comment in fm10k_vf.c and
attempting to reduce code duplication. The problem occurs because
a multi-bit request has a non-zero length, and the PF would simply drop
any request with the upper 16 bits set.

We can't simply remove the check of the upper 16 bits and the call to
fm10k_iov_select vid, because this would remove the checks for default
VID and for ensuring no other VLANs can be enabled except pf_vid when it
has been set. To resolve that issue, this revision uses the
iov_select_vid when we have a single-bit update, and denies any
multi-bit update when the VLAN was administratively set by the PF. This
should be ok since the PF properly updates VLAN_TABLE when it assigns
the PF vid. This ensures that requests to add or remove the PF vid work
as expected, but a rogue VF could not use the multi-bit update as
a loophole to attempt receiving traffic on other VLANs.
Reported-by: NNgai-Mint Kwan <ngai-mint.kwan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Tested-by: NKrishneil Singh <Krishneil.k.singh@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>